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What We Owe to Each Other by T. M. Scanlon
How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong.
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First published January 1, 1999
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About the author
T.M. Scanlon
11 books58 followersThomas Michael Scanlon, usually cited as T. M. Scanlon, is an American philosopher. At the time of his retirement in 2016, he was the Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity in Harvard University's Department of Philosophy, where he had taught since 1984.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 70 reviews
August 1, 2018
I won't lie, I read this because of The Good Place.
As others have mentioned this was a somewhat dense read. I felt at times like there were just a few key points that were stretched far more than they needed to be.
As others have mentioned this was a somewhat dense read. I felt at times like there were just a few key points that were stretched far more than they needed to be.
December 3, 2019
Eleanor - Find Chidi.
A helpful note to self shoved inside... Magical slave robot lady? Busty Alexa? Oh, Janet!
A helpful note to self shoved inside... Magical slave robot lady? Busty Alexa? Oh, Janet!
July 29, 2019
I picked this up because it was referenced in The Good Place, so I feel bad leaving a review considering I am clearly not the target audience for this dense piece of philosophical writing. The book is exceptionally plodding and full of qualification-upon-qualification. What does Scanlon believe we owe to each other? I have no idea.
Want to read
July 15, 2018S1:E6. Chidi uses this book to explain contractualism to Eleanor.
C: Anyone can veto any rule that they think is unfair.
E: My first rule would be that no one could veto my rules.
C: Well, that's called tyranny and it's generally frowned upon.
C: Anyone can veto any rule that they think is unfair.
E: My first rule would be that no one could veto my rules.
C: Well, that's called tyranny and it's generally frowned upon.
April 18, 2016
So, worked through this book somewhat slowly due to intervening life circumstances. Some short commentary on the writing before getting into the substance. Scanlon's writing style is pretty much prototypical in analytic philosophy, very dry and organized in a straightforward and systematic way. I wouldn't call the writing "good" in anything beyond the academic scope, but it's serviceable and more accessible than some of the other philosophical literature on the market.
In the course of the book, Scanlon outlines his own account of normative reasons, particularly moral reasons, and what he takes to be the general underpinnings for systematically justifying moral norms, e.g. norms against causing harm, punishing people for crimes, etc. A lot of the work on this feels familiar, and has the same kind of socially oriented vibe one might expect from John Rawls. In that vein, I think Scanlon does pretty well, and the account that he offers is fairly compelling.
The course of his argument isn't really unified; it's probably not best to think of the book as an argument for Contractualism in that sort of singular way, but that's honestly fine for the course of the book. Really, the general tie in for Scanlon has to do with the very general assessment of moral judgments as about reasons. (He says as much on page three of the introduction.) Much of the book, then, is really an account of how reasons behave in the moral domain. For many in philosophy, especially in metaethics, I don't think this is satisfying as an account of obligations, as the title and dustjacket seem to imply. It does, however, act as a pretty general approach to understanding and thinking about moral reasons.
Are moral reasons responsive to social norms? Or conditioned by those norms? What gives us reason to help or protect others? What gives us reason to punish others? What gives us reasons to parent or teach in certain ways, rather than other historical alternatives? These are all questions into which I think Scanlon offers some useful insight. I don't think it answers much on the titular issue, but it still succeeds in providing a general background to an increasingly important discussion in metaethics, namely what sorts of things reasons are and how they behave.
In the course of the book, Scanlon outlines his own account of normative reasons, particularly moral reasons, and what he takes to be the general underpinnings for systematically justifying moral norms, e.g. norms against causing harm, punishing people for crimes, etc. A lot of the work on this feels familiar, and has the same kind of socially oriented vibe one might expect from John Rawls. In that vein, I think Scanlon does pretty well, and the account that he offers is fairly compelling.
The course of his argument isn't really unified; it's probably not best to think of the book as an argument for Contractualism in that sort of singular way, but that's honestly fine for the course of the book. Really, the general tie in for Scanlon has to do with the very general assessment of moral judgments as about reasons. (He says as much on page three of the introduction.) Much of the book, then, is really an account of how reasons behave in the moral domain. For many in philosophy, especially in metaethics, I don't think this is satisfying as an account of obligations, as the title and dustjacket seem to imply. It does, however, act as a pretty general approach to understanding and thinking about moral reasons.
Are moral reasons responsive to social norms? Or conditioned by those norms? What gives us reason to help or protect others? What gives us reason to punish others? What gives us reasons to parent or teach in certain ways, rather than other historical alternatives? These are all questions into which I think Scanlon offers some useful insight. I don't think it answers much on the titular issue, but it still succeeds in providing a general background to an increasingly important discussion in metaethics, namely what sorts of things reasons are and how they behave.
September 10, 2022
T.M Scanlon’s _What We Owe to Each Other_ is not a good book. The author has good ideas, but he’s such an awful writer that he fails to communicate them well.
The book begins by arguing that reason, rather than desire, is fundamental to moral decision making. This is a refreshing counter to the prevailing direction in moral thought, best described by Kahneman and Haidt as more of an intuitive than rational process. However, Scanlon undercuts his argument by describing the rational moral matrix as a thing of such complexity that it seems, in essence, intuitive.
The author continues by challenging the idea that value can be defined in terms of how worthy a given thought or deed is of promotion. Rather, he argues for a more complex concept of value, teeing up the book’s “third act.”
The “third act” brings us to the meat of Scanlon’s argument: that motivations for moral thoughts and behaviors, in all their diversity across times and cultures, share one central component: “What we owe to each other.” He calls this contractual thinking, and it boils down to this: “What we owe to each other” is to behave in such a way that those affected by our behavior can reasonably agree that we’re behaving in a morally just fashion.
This is interesting stuff, but Scanlon hampers his book by writing like a college sophomore desperate to fill a twenty-page paper before turning it in the following morning (NB: I’ve been that sophomore!). He prizes the passive voice. He never uses a two-syllable word when a five-syllable word will do. His sentences go on an on and on and on.
It’s a shame, really. Scanlon makes excellent points and contributes to the moral conversation. He just needs a ghostwriter to help him communicate more effectively.
The book begins by arguing that reason, rather than desire, is fundamental to moral decision making. This is a refreshing counter to the prevailing direction in moral thought, best described by Kahneman and Haidt as more of an intuitive than rational process. However, Scanlon undercuts his argument by describing the rational moral matrix as a thing of such complexity that it seems, in essence, intuitive.
The author continues by challenging the idea that value can be defined in terms of how worthy a given thought or deed is of promotion. Rather, he argues for a more complex concept of value, teeing up the book’s “third act.”
The “third act” brings us to the meat of Scanlon’s argument: that motivations for moral thoughts and behaviors, in all their diversity across times and cultures, share one central component: “What we owe to each other.” He calls this contractual thinking, and it boils down to this: “What we owe to each other” is to behave in such a way that those affected by our behavior can reasonably agree that we’re behaving in a morally just fashion.
This is interesting stuff, but Scanlon hampers his book by writing like a college sophomore desperate to fill a twenty-page paper before turning it in the following morning (NB: I’ve been that sophomore!). He prizes the passive voice. He never uses a two-syllable word when a five-syllable word will do. His sentences go on an on and on and on.
It’s a shame, really. Scanlon makes excellent points and contributes to the moral conversation. He just needs a ghostwriter to help him communicate more effectively.
May 19, 2018
In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon offers a genuinely novel ethical theory that overcomes many of the limitations of Kantian and utilitarian theories. Scanlon's contractualism owes more to Rawls and Kant than Hobbes. The contractualist principle states that an act is wrong if it disallowed by a principle that no one can reasonably reject. As a fundamental basis for morality, Scanlon maintains that this principle stands alone and cannot be founded upon any other particular basis. Instead, on Scanlon's view, the contractualist principle is an expression of a commitment to the value of humanity, which is nothing else than a willingness to treat people according to principles that they could not reasonably reject, insofar as they share this same commitment.
Scanlon takes reasons for action to be objective and accordingly applications of the contractualist principle involve a determination of whether a proposed principle could be reasonably rejected when one takes account of the reasons for action that are relevant to persons that could be affected by actions according to the principle. The elaboration of this principle is complemented by a critique of both utilitarian claims concerning the priority of promoting value and of the notion of wellbeing as concept that can play a fundamental role in ethical theory.
What is compelling about Scanlon's approach, is the idea that at the most basic level, ethics is about practical reasoning in manner that is impartial but which does not rely some foundational substantive principles. Of course, contractualism is a commitment to the substantive value of humanity and this means that Scanlon's approach is not a form of constitutivism. Scanlon says clearly that it is 'heteronomous' but if this is a problem (and there are many reasons to think that it is not) it is not the most fundamental issues that Scanlon faces.
Contractualism faces two major and related problems. First, there is reason to think that attempts to apply the contractualist principle to specific problems will face intractable disputes. Rival conceptions of the good make it likely that in many cases there may be no way to come to reasonable consensus about what principles can be reasonably rejected. Scanlon could turn to MacIntyre's theory of tradition to address this issue but this will mean that the contractualist principle needs additional values to be adequately applied. Second, and related to this, there is a need for an account of moral education, an account that describes the process by which people come to appreciate the reasons that are relevant to adjudicating moral disputes. For this, Scanlon should turn to perspectives in virtue ethics. Again, this suggests that contractualism must be supplemented if it is to provide a complete moral theory.
Scanlon takes reasons for action to be objective and accordingly applications of the contractualist principle involve a determination of whether a proposed principle could be reasonably rejected when one takes account of the reasons for action that are relevant to persons that could be affected by actions according to the principle. The elaboration of this principle is complemented by a critique of both utilitarian claims concerning the priority of promoting value and of the notion of wellbeing as concept that can play a fundamental role in ethical theory.
What is compelling about Scanlon's approach, is the idea that at the most basic level, ethics is about practical reasoning in manner that is impartial but which does not rely some foundational substantive principles. Of course, contractualism is a commitment to the substantive value of humanity and this means that Scanlon's approach is not a form of constitutivism. Scanlon says clearly that it is 'heteronomous' but if this is a problem (and there are many reasons to think that it is not) it is not the most fundamental issues that Scanlon faces.
Contractualism faces two major and related problems. First, there is reason to think that attempts to apply the contractualist principle to specific problems will face intractable disputes. Rival conceptions of the good make it likely that in many cases there may be no way to come to reasonable consensus about what principles can be reasonably rejected. Scanlon could turn to MacIntyre's theory of tradition to address this issue but this will mean that the contractualist principle needs additional values to be adequately applied. Second, and related to this, there is a need for an account of moral education, an account that describes the process by which people come to appreciate the reasons that are relevant to adjudicating moral disputes. For this, Scanlon should turn to perspectives in virtue ethics. Again, this suggests that contractualism must be supplemented if it is to provide a complete moral theory.
January 30, 2019
I came into this book excited about the premise and how Scanlon views morality as relative to those around us. But wow is this book obtuse. Scanlon had so many opportunities to play out the impacts of contractualism on today's issues -- how does it impact politics? How can it change the criminal injustice system? What does it say about race relations in the U.S., for example? -- but is never brave enough to see it through. The book is too lost in its own self-importance at times, which is a disappointment because it *is* an important work and idea, and I hope Scanlon and others give it its *proper* due in the coming years.
January 30, 2020
‘What We Owe to Each Other’ was easily one of the most profound books I read in 2019 (and maybe in my entire life?) After being referenced multiple times in one of my favorite shows in recent memory, ‘The Good Place’, I picked it up on a lark. What I didn’t expect was to have the impact that it had. ‘What We Owe to Each Other’ asks readers to examine their relationships with others and the actions that affect the world around them. But be warned, it’s a dense read! The writing style is more akin to someone’s doctoral thesis rather than a New York Times Bestseller. But if you can make your way through the text, what lies within is something special.
August 1, 2014
Dense. Nice little dip into what he understands as Contractualism. Seems like a modified version of utilitarianism, but it suites todays world well. Difficult read, philosophical, big words, etc.
Want to read
May 26, 2023[Before-reading]
I can see from reviews that some people (including me!) are reading this book because of the series The Good Place! Good job, Michael Schur!
I can see from reviews that some people (including me!) are reading this book because of the series The Good Place! Good job, Michael Schur!
Read
October 23, 2025Took me a hot minute to read this bc it felt like something I’d read for class in college and I was taking notes throughout. Anyways read this bc it inspired the good place and I’ve been wanting to start my philosophy journey. Think I’ll move to a different school of thought as I continue shaping my interests
September 21, 2022
A humble and sensitive argument — contra moral relativists, utilitarians, and even more “friendly” philosophers like John Rawls — that a limited but universal core to morality exists and has value for moral reasoning. Scanlon leaves room for a plurality of values (and weights on values) while grounding this central conception of right and wrong in “what we owe to each other,” reasons for acting that others cannot reasonably reject. One of the most helpful implications of contractualism as Scanlon develops it here is that accurate moral reasoning requires curiosity about the needs, experiences, and reasoning of others who are unlike us.
The argument is a bit ungainly and the writing tedious ��� not surprising for a work of analytic philosophy. But I found it convincing and worth reading.
The argument is a bit ungainly and the writing tedious ��� not surprising for a work of analytic philosophy. But I found it convincing and worth reading.
January 7, 2021
Although I found this book a useful and relatively straightforward read, I also found that Scanlon had a tendency to what, because I’m not an academic, I’m going to call ‘waffle’. As far as I can tell, his basic premise is that morality – and therefore duty, and ethical behaviour – is contingent upon situation, context, and individual factors of the persons involved. Therefore, any attempt to come up with general or over-arching moral ‘rules’ for right and wrong behaviour are going to fail when applied to outliers. He could have expressed that more clearly, I feel, if he came up with better or more engaging examples. He’s too fond of using what I expect is an academic requirement of using letters like M or L to denote theories or examples of moral behaviour. This makes for, at times, dull and confusing reading.
I think the summation that there’s no such thing as a universal in morality is fair and correct. On the other hand, I don’t have to defend my (possibly?) thesis to a whole community of academics, some of whom are relativists and some of whom are contractualists and some of whom are utilitarians (the bad guys, I gather). Which makes my life easier, but doesn’t do much for the ease of readability of this book.
“If judgements of right and wrong can be said to be true or false, this must be because there is some realm of facts that they are meant to describe, and to which they can correspond, or fail to correspond.”
I guess the point being, this only works if you ascribe to a positivist worldview.
“This effect can be seen in defenses of subjectivism about reasons which appeal to the oddness of applying the term ‘irrational’ to a person who has desires that we regard as mistaken. […] the question is not whether the desire is irrational in this narrower sense but whether it is open to rational criticism as, for example, mistaken or misguided. Someone who wishes to defend the latter claim need not (and should not) go on to make the former, stronger claim as well.”
What I take from this whole chapter is that people use the world ‘irrational’ too loosely when it pertains to moral decisions. Rule of thumb here is that when people say irrational they usually mean ‘I, myself, do not like this, ergo you are irrational’.
“It is, for example, a matter of controversy how one’s future interests should be taken into account in present decisions - whether these interests should be ‘discounted’ because of their remoteness in time and at what rate.”
Ha!
“So, while it would be a mistake to conclude from the case of Owen Wilgrave that all reasons for action are a matter of what will ‘satisfy’, in a suitably broad sense, some elements in one’s subjective motivational set, this case does indicate another way in which the reasons we have can depend on subjective conditions (a type of dependence that is peculiar to choosing a career and other similar choices).”
As I said, everything’s contingent.
“[…] vivid awareness of the consequences of his taking bribes […] might make a conscientious civil servant conclude that he had good reason to overcome his scruples and become corrupt. But this does not show that he in fact had good reason to do so.”
Doesn’t it…? Hair splitting, much?
“One’s life might be much better than another from an individual’s point of view – happier, more successful, and so on – even though the two lives were the same as measured by Rawl’s or Sen’s criteria.”
The key to the fact that you can feel unhappy despite having plenty of money or education and so on.
“I conclude that any plausible theory of well-being would have to recognize at least the following fixed points. First, certain experiential states […] contribute to well-being, but well-being is not determined solely by the quality of experience. Second, well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree of success in achieving his or her main ends in life, provided that these are worth pursuing. […] well-being is therefore in large part a matter of how well this is done – of how well the ends are selected and how successfully they are pursued. Third, many goods that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on the person’s aims but. Go beyond the good of success in achieving those aims. These include such things as friendship […] and the achievement of various forms of excellence, such as in art or science.”
I enjoyed this passage, and I think it’s a good demonstration of how long and complicated it gets when you try to define anything in moral terms – like ‘well-being’.
“Enjoyments, success in one’s main aims, and substantive goods such as friendship all contribute to well-being, but the idea of well-being plays little role in explaining why they are good.”
Well, at least it’s not a tautology, I guess?
“This account might supply a reason for doing the right thing, but it would not be the kind of reason that we suppose a moral person first and foremost to be moved by [Prichard’s dilemma].”
I like this.
“Acceptable principles could not require us, in deciding what to do, to consider how every actual individual would feel about it.”
This also seems fair.
“But here a judgement is required, and I do not think that any plausible theory could eliminate the need for judgements of this kind.”
Basically his mission statement!
“[…] the reasons people have for wanting outcomes to be dependent on their choices often have to do with the significance that this dependence itself has for them, not merely with its efficacy in promoting outcomes that are desirable on other grounds.”
People be people, basically.
“He is responsible (that is to say, open to criticism) for these actions, but he cannot simply be left to bear the consequences, since he has not had adequate opportunity to avoid being subject to them.”
“[…] what separates us from such people is […] our luck in being the kind of people who respond in these ways. In this respect our attitude towards those who suffer or are blamed should not be ‘You asked for this’ but rather ‘There but for the grace of God go I’.”
And this is the core of what he’s saying, I reckon. That you can be ‘held responsible’ for a decision while at the same time the person holding you responsible acknowledges that many things outside your control contributed to the making of the decision. It’s a two-way street, and it’s a very big ask, and I again wish this book was written in a slightly less dry and stuffy tone so that this important message could be sold better.
I think the summation that there’s no such thing as a universal in morality is fair and correct. On the other hand, I don’t have to defend my (possibly?) thesis to a whole community of academics, some of whom are relativists and some of whom are contractualists and some of whom are utilitarians (the bad guys, I gather). Which makes my life easier, but doesn’t do much for the ease of readability of this book.
“If judgements of right and wrong can be said to be true or false, this must be because there is some realm of facts that they are meant to describe, and to which they can correspond, or fail to correspond.”
I guess the point being, this only works if you ascribe to a positivist worldview.
“This effect can be seen in defenses of subjectivism about reasons which appeal to the oddness of applying the term ‘irrational’ to a person who has desires that we regard as mistaken. […] the question is not whether the desire is irrational in this narrower sense but whether it is open to rational criticism as, for example, mistaken or misguided. Someone who wishes to defend the latter claim need not (and should not) go on to make the former, stronger claim as well.”
What I take from this whole chapter is that people use the world ‘irrational’ too loosely when it pertains to moral decisions. Rule of thumb here is that when people say irrational they usually mean ‘I, myself, do not like this, ergo you are irrational’.
“It is, for example, a matter of controversy how one’s future interests should be taken into account in present decisions - whether these interests should be ‘discounted’ because of their remoteness in time and at what rate.”
Ha!
“So, while it would be a mistake to conclude from the case of Owen Wilgrave that all reasons for action are a matter of what will ‘satisfy’, in a suitably broad sense, some elements in one’s subjective motivational set, this case does indicate another way in which the reasons we have can depend on subjective conditions (a type of dependence that is peculiar to choosing a career and other similar choices).”
As I said, everything’s contingent.
“[…] vivid awareness of the consequences of his taking bribes […] might make a conscientious civil servant conclude that he had good reason to overcome his scruples and become corrupt. But this does not show that he in fact had good reason to do so.”
Doesn’t it…? Hair splitting, much?
“One’s life might be much better than another from an individual’s point of view – happier, more successful, and so on – even though the two lives were the same as measured by Rawl’s or Sen’s criteria.”
The key to the fact that you can feel unhappy despite having plenty of money or education and so on.
“I conclude that any plausible theory of well-being would have to recognize at least the following fixed points. First, certain experiential states […] contribute to well-being, but well-being is not determined solely by the quality of experience. Second, well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree of success in achieving his or her main ends in life, provided that these are worth pursuing. […] well-being is therefore in large part a matter of how well this is done – of how well the ends are selected and how successfully they are pursued. Third, many goods that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on the person’s aims but. Go beyond the good of success in achieving those aims. These include such things as friendship […] and the achievement of various forms of excellence, such as in art or science.”
I enjoyed this passage, and I think it’s a good demonstration of how long and complicated it gets when you try to define anything in moral terms – like ‘well-being’.
“Enjoyments, success in one’s main aims, and substantive goods such as friendship all contribute to well-being, but the idea of well-being plays little role in explaining why they are good.”
Well, at least it’s not a tautology, I guess?
“This account might supply a reason for doing the right thing, but it would not be the kind of reason that we suppose a moral person first and foremost to be moved by [Prichard’s dilemma].”
I like this.
“Acceptable principles could not require us, in deciding what to do, to consider how every actual individual would feel about it.”
This also seems fair.
“But here a judgement is required, and I do not think that any plausible theory could eliminate the need for judgements of this kind.”
Basically his mission statement!
“[…] the reasons people have for wanting outcomes to be dependent on their choices often have to do with the significance that this dependence itself has for them, not merely with its efficacy in promoting outcomes that are desirable on other grounds.”
People be people, basically.
“He is responsible (that is to say, open to criticism) for these actions, but he cannot simply be left to bear the consequences, since he has not had adequate opportunity to avoid being subject to them.”
“[…] what separates us from such people is […] our luck in being the kind of people who respond in these ways. In this respect our attitude towards those who suffer or are blamed should not be ‘You asked for this’ but rather ‘There but for the grace of God go I’.”
And this is the core of what he’s saying, I reckon. That you can be ‘held responsible’ for a decision while at the same time the person holding you responsible acknowledges that many things outside your control contributed to the making of the decision. It’s a two-way street, and it’s a very big ask, and I again wish this book was written in a slightly less dry and stuffy tone so that this important message could be sold better.
May 5, 2020
Good gravy that was a challenging read. I read the first third of the book about 4 times, the second third about twice. By the final third I had some confidence in my ability, some familiarity with the author's style and with the structure of the book, so read that part only once.
I am not a student of moral philosophy. I'm not a neophyte either. I've done some reading. But I'm a long way from being the kind of person who can easily trade in that vernacular and I struggle with the abstractions. So, I'm not sure what I expected the book to be when I decided to read it. I think I imagined a kind of pop-psyche kind of book written for the layperson. This was not that. This is the kind of thing you would teach in a higher level ethics class, it seems to me. It assumed some familiarity with foundational works of moral philosophy, more recent propositions, and even some knowledge of other scholars and their works. I had some, as I said, but that did not help much. This was hard work.
Were Scanlon's arguments for contractualism convincing? They were to me. Am I a contractualist now? Not exactly. But I can imagine running decisions about how to act, about what I owe to others, through the contractualist algorithm. And I particularly liked the last few pages of the book in which Scanlon appeals to us to dig deeper into why we make the judgments about morality than we do.
I am not a student of moral philosophy. I'm not a neophyte either. I've done some reading. But I'm a long way from being the kind of person who can easily trade in that vernacular and I struggle with the abstractions. So, I'm not sure what I expected the book to be when I decided to read it. I think I imagined a kind of pop-psyche kind of book written for the layperson. This was not that. This is the kind of thing you would teach in a higher level ethics class, it seems to me. It assumed some familiarity with foundational works of moral philosophy, more recent propositions, and even some knowledge of other scholars and their works. I had some, as I said, but that did not help much. This was hard work.
Were Scanlon's arguments for contractualism convincing? They were to me. Am I a contractualist now? Not exactly. But I can imagine running decisions about how to act, about what I owe to others, through the contractualist algorithm. And I particularly liked the last few pages of the book in which Scanlon appeals to us to dig deeper into why we make the judgments about morality than we do.
November 14, 2020
I'm in the uncool-kids club of "read this after hearing it mentioned in that one sitcom", but I ended up really enjoying it.
As others have said, this book is *dense*, and incredibly academic and dry, and I asked myself if I really wanted to read a few hundred pages on a theory that I've seen summed up in a single sentence ("an act is immoral if it is prohibited by any rule that everyone involved in the act agrees on").
The answer turns out to be yes: despite the general "college philosophy tome" nature of this, I found myself stopping to stare at the ceiling of my bedroom while saying "......oh." to myself more than once. Definitely not for everyone, and I slowed down quite a bit towards the end, but I'm very glad I read it.
As others have said, this book is *dense*, and incredibly academic and dry, and I asked myself if I really wanted to read a few hundred pages on a theory that I've seen summed up in a single sentence ("an act is immoral if it is prohibited by any rule that everyone involved in the act agrees on").
The answer turns out to be yes: despite the general "college philosophy tome" nature of this, I found myself stopping to stare at the ceiling of my bedroom while saying "......oh." to myself more than once. Definitely not for everyone, and I slowed down quite a bit towards the end, but I'm very glad I read it.
December 28, 2020
I'll never be a professional philosopher but I've read a number of "real" philosophy books over the past two years or so. This was the worst of them. Which is a bit surprising because this one is pretty famous, so I suppose I need to explain myself now.
Scanlon's book on moral philosophy -- determining what is right and wrong -- is famous in large part because it was featured in the TV show The Good Place. But decades before that it had already made waves because Scanlon was a well-known philosopher and in this his laid out the case for his theory of "contractualism". (Short version: "an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement".)
The first reason for my struggles with this book is that the first ~100 pages are very much an "inside baseball" kind of thing. Scanlon goes to great lengths to convince us that he only needs "reasons" and not "desires" to build the foundation for his moral philosophy. And he just kinda assumes you know the background argument of what that has to do with anything. A lot of professional philosophy books have this issue -- and I don't entirely blame them. (Who wants to rehash all the basics that will just bore your colleagues on the off-chance that some outsider reads your book?) But Scanlon's motivations for the argument were particularly opaque to me. Even after reading it all I still honestly couldn't really tell you why it is important to his theory of contractualism to separate out desires like that.
It doesn't help that something about Scanlon's writing is just extremely boring to read to an extent that I haven't found with most other philosophy books I've read.
The second reason for my struggles is that Scanlon is ultimately trying to offer a descriptive theory of morality. That is, he isn't trying to explain to us how we should act -- he's trying explain why we act the way we do.
I guess that's just not a project I'm super interested in, especially when it isn't a multi-disciplinary descriptive theory. When you combine my lack of interest in the project with Scanlon's less than gripping writing, I suppose it isn't a surprise that I didn't particularly care for this.
Finally: Once a book has introduced its central theory there's always the point where you want the author to them go on and show the surprising implication or less obvious consequences of that theory. This was another area where I felt Scanlon didn't really deliver. Later chapters on "Responsibility" and "Promises" were insufficiently "surprising" to keep me engaged.
Scanlon's book on moral philosophy -- determining what is right and wrong -- is famous in large part because it was featured in the TV show The Good Place. But decades before that it had already made waves because Scanlon was a well-known philosopher and in this his laid out the case for his theory of "contractualism". (Short version: "an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement".)
The first reason for my struggles with this book is that the first ~100 pages are very much an "inside baseball" kind of thing. Scanlon goes to great lengths to convince us that he only needs "reasons" and not "desires" to build the foundation for his moral philosophy. And he just kinda assumes you know the background argument of what that has to do with anything. A lot of professional philosophy books have this issue -- and I don't entirely blame them. (Who wants to rehash all the basics that will just bore your colleagues on the off-chance that some outsider reads your book?) But Scanlon's motivations for the argument were particularly opaque to me. Even after reading it all I still honestly couldn't really tell you why it is important to his theory of contractualism to separate out desires like that.
It doesn't help that something about Scanlon's writing is just extremely boring to read to an extent that I haven't found with most other philosophy books I've read.
The second reason for my struggles is that Scanlon is ultimately trying to offer a descriptive theory of morality. That is, he isn't trying to explain to us how we should act -- he's trying explain why we act the way we do.
I myself accept contractualism largely because the account it offers of moral motivation is phenomenologically more accurate than any other I know of. It captures very accurately my sense of the reasons that ground and shape my thinking about central questions of right and wrong.
I guess that's just not a project I'm super interested in, especially when it isn't a multi-disciplinary descriptive theory. When you combine my lack of interest in the project with Scanlon's less than gripping writing, I suppose it isn't a surprise that I didn't particularly care for this.
Finally: Once a book has introduced its central theory there's always the point where you want the author to them go on and show the surprising implication or less obvious consequences of that theory. This was another area where I felt Scanlon didn't really deliver. Later chapters on "Responsibility" and "Promises" were insufficiently "surprising" to keep me engaged.
March 22, 2021
I'd had this on a wishlist for a while after watching the Good Place, I've not read philosophy in a while and previously read Plato and Decartes which didn't really prepare me for Scanlon. As the character Chidi mentions in the show, it's quite far down his curriculum. Without a grounding in Kant and Contractionalism this is difficult to follow, not defining ideas such as Prichards Dilema or teleological in layman's terms. I'd suggest if Akantic is not yet in your vocabulary you should probably do some background reading.
As far a I understood Scanlon argues that Reasons not desires should form the basis of his Contractualist Morality, the key test being Principles that no Reasonable person would disagree with. This allows for principles to vary with respect to situation and culture without failing into a moral relativist philosophy.
The work is dense and the author doesn't often feel the need to repeat key points or terminology, especially of other authors, as it isn't aimed for the generalist.
I didn't like that Contractualism doesn't cover all of morality and that there are parts of morality that fall outside of the theory. There are also a couple of points where he disregards some lines of enquiry because it is too difficult to find universal principles or other areas.
Some principles are discussed, such as lying and various kinds of deception however it its light on other proposed principles.
As far a I understood Scanlon argues that Reasons not desires should form the basis of his Contractualist Morality, the key test being Principles that no Reasonable person would disagree with. This allows for principles to vary with respect to situation and culture without failing into a moral relativist philosophy.
The work is dense and the author doesn't often feel the need to repeat key points or terminology, especially of other authors, as it isn't aimed for the generalist.
I didn't like that Contractualism doesn't cover all of morality and that there are parts of morality that fall outside of the theory. There are also a couple of points where he disregards some lines of enquiry because it is too difficult to find universal principles or other areas.
Some principles are discussed, such as lying and various kinds of deception however it its light on other proposed principles.
May 6, 2024
Like a lot of people, I learned about this book from the good place. I think it laid out the theory of contractualism well, if a bit dense. That being said, I don’t know that the book is meant for more casual philosophers like me. I’d be interested to learn more in a more academic setting, also just to learn more critiques of it.
Quotes I like (I stopped highlighting after the beginning because they stopped making sense without the whole context):
This is because, in contrast to everyday empirical judgments, scientific claims, and religious beliefs that involve claims about the origin and control of the universe, the point of judgments of right and wrong is not to make claims about what the spatiotemporal world is like. The point of such judgments is, rather, a practical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do.
A rational creature is, first of all, a reasoning creature—one that has the capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved by reasons, and hence to have judgment-sensitive attitudes.
Key themes for if I ever want to go back (spoiler for contractualism):
Why should we give considerations of right and wrong, whatever they are, this kind of priority over our other concerns and over other values?
It holds that thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject.
Quotes I like (I stopped highlighting after the beginning because they stopped making sense without the whole context):
This is because, in contrast to everyday empirical judgments, scientific claims, and religious beliefs that involve claims about the origin and control of the universe, the point of judgments of right and wrong is not to make claims about what the spatiotemporal world is like. The point of such judgments is, rather, a practical one: they make claims about what we have reason to do.
A rational creature is, first of all, a reasoning creature—one that has the capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved by reasons, and hence to have judgment-sensitive attitudes.
Key themes for if I ever want to go back (spoiler for contractualism):
Why should we give considerations of right and wrong, whatever they are, this kind of priority over our other concerns and over other values?
It holds that thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject.
December 20, 2022
I think The Good Place ruined the book for me or it was the wrong time to read this, it was below expectations. However this is philosophy about "what we owe each other" and Scanlon goes into such a depth that it raises some questions about feelings, principles, values and other components that are related to what we believe is doing the right thing.
A solid 3.5 for the first read but will definitely be better on the next
A solid 3.5 for the first read but will definitely be better on the next
May 24, 2023
Like many readers of this book, I was led here by the show The Good Place—though my path was indirect. A friend of mine spent months trying to convince me to watch it, arguing that it was “made for me.” But I very rarely watch TV and I never felt compelled to make an exception for the show, however brilliant it may have been.
About a year after my friend moved away, however, I received this book in the mail. Apparently, this relatively obscure philosophy text was referred to multiple times in the show, as the protagonist slowly learned what it means to be a good person. And my friend decided, if she could not get me to watch the show, it would be far easier to get me to read a book. Considering that I am here now, this was a correct surmise.
I really don’t know why the show’s writers chose this, among all of the available philosophy texts, to be featured in the show (an in-joke?). For I really can hardly imagine a work of philosophy less likely to improve a person’s everyday behavior than this one. This is not a criticism of Scanlon, you see, as the book was not written to be exhortatory or uplifting. Rather, this is a work of academic philosophy about the abstract nature of morality. I only point this out to save fans of the show from disappointment.
Scanlon here sets out to give a contractualist account of morality. Well, not quite. He quickly admits that his focus does not include all of what is conventionally thought of as ethics. For some people, saying grace before a meal is morally right, whereas for others preserving a particularly beautiful tree from destruction is something they consider a duty. Indeed, what people consider to be a moral requirement constitutes a large, messy, and varied category. Scanlon here restricts himself to a narrower domain, what he calls “what we owe to each other.” This, in short, has to do with the morality of interpersonal behavior—how we treat one another.
Scanlon begins in a somewhat unusual way, with a delve into the psychology of motivation. He argues that humans, as rational creatures, are better described as being motivated by “reasons” than by “desires.” A desire, in his view, is a kind of short-term motivational urge; and while we do experience such urges, we most often do things because of some larger goal or in accordance with some value. A parent may punish a child, for example, because they think discipline is a necessary part of child-rearing, even if they feel no actual anger—or, indeed, even if they are tired and would rather let it slide.
The fact that humans are motivated by “reasons” and not just “desires” is what makes us, in Scanlon’s views, particularly subject to the laws of morality. This is because we humans, as rational creatures, have a strong motive to care that the reasons for our actions be justifiable to our fellows. Social life would be impossible otherwise. Indeed, for Scanlon, this is the very heart of morality: that we act in a way that no one affected by our action could reasonably reject the principles which guided us.
You might notice that this formula has much in common with Kant’s categorical imperative. Where it differs is in its social (or contractualist) orientation. Morality is not a consequence of a priori rational rules or a special metaphysical category, but rather a consequence of the nature of rationality itself—something we are almost certain to care about, given that we live in communities and act in accordance with broad principles. This account of morality does, however, differ sharply from those along utilitarian lines, and Scanlon argues at length against such views.
I have been trying to present Scanlon’s views fairly, but I have to admit that I did not find this book compelling. For one, his distinction between reasons and desires—an important foundation of his theory—strikes me as particularly fragile. At various points in the book he formulates principles (such as about honesty) which could serve for ethical action. But it is obvious that these principles are so abstract that virtually no ordinary person would think along such lines. Indeed, Scanlon himself admits that most people have rather vague intuitions about their reasons for action, though for him it suffices that the reasons could be formulated.
Worse, while arguing for the primacy of reasons over desires in human motivation, Scanlon does not cite any but “phenomenological” evidence—which is to say, his own experience. To be fair, I have no idea what the state of psychological research into motivation was in 1998, when the book was published. But within a decade, researchers like Jonathan Haidt would make a very strong case that the reasons we profess for acting or thinking in a certain way are not reliable indications of our true motivation.
For example, people often have strong moral feelings (of outrage or disgust, say) without being able to say exactly why they object to something. It seems that our emotional reaction comes first and then our frontal lobe tries to justify the feeling, rather than the opposite. To quote Benjamin Franklin: “So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do.”
If Haidt’s model is true, and humans are not primarily motivated by “reasons,” then many of Scanlon’s arguments about morality and why we ought to care about it are considerably weakened. Yet even if we leave this issue to the side, I also found Scanlon’s test of moral validity to be unhelpful. His formula is: Act in such a way that nobody affected by the action could reasonably reject the principles which guided your actions.
To my mind, Scanlon ought to have spent much more time specifying exactly what he meant by “reasonable.” He does not provide any sort of test or easily applicable standards which would show whether a given principle can be reasonably rejected or not, apparently believing that our intuitions about what is reasonable or not would mostly coincide. Perhaps that is true much of the time, but in my experience there is a great deal of disagreement over what is reasonable (and, indeed, what is moral). By the end, I could not help thinking that Scanlon’s formulation was so vague as to be close to useless.
This is related to another fault. Though Scanlon spends a great deal of time explaining the specifics and advantages of his ethical system, he does not show how his way of thinking applies to any tricky areas of morality. He entirely avoids any controversial case—such as abortion, animal rights, the death penalty—and seems content to show that his system forbids murder and most forms of dishonesty. Bertrand Russell once remarked that, in ethics, the philosopher often proceeds by taking the conventional conclusions of morality for granted, and then finding some extra way of justifying them—and this strikes me as precisely the sort of exercise Scanlon is engaged in.
As for the writing style, I notice that many readers found it off-putting. But by the standards of academic philosophy, I would actually say that this book is extremely accessible. That is, of course, not high praise, but at the very least Scanlon avoids formal logic and the impenetrable argot of continental philosophers. Yet it must be admitted that by normal standards the writing is quite dry and lifeless.
But I really do not want to heap so many criticisms upon this book. Scanlon here presents a thoughtful new take on ethics with a minimum of jargon and without being strident or doctrinaire. If I did not find it a rewarding read, it is probably because I am not part of the book’s intended audience (other academic philosophers). Now, after having spent weeks on the book and a lot of time on this review, I wonder if I wouldn’t have been better off just watching the show…
About a year after my friend moved away, however, I received this book in the mail. Apparently, this relatively obscure philosophy text was referred to multiple times in the show, as the protagonist slowly learned what it means to be a good person. And my friend decided, if she could not get me to watch the show, it would be far easier to get me to read a book. Considering that I am here now, this was a correct surmise.
I really don’t know why the show’s writers chose this, among all of the available philosophy texts, to be featured in the show (an in-joke?). For I really can hardly imagine a work of philosophy less likely to improve a person’s everyday behavior than this one. This is not a criticism of Scanlon, you see, as the book was not written to be exhortatory or uplifting. Rather, this is a work of academic philosophy about the abstract nature of morality. I only point this out to save fans of the show from disappointment.
Scanlon here sets out to give a contractualist account of morality. Well, not quite. He quickly admits that his focus does not include all of what is conventionally thought of as ethics. For some people, saying grace before a meal is morally right, whereas for others preserving a particularly beautiful tree from destruction is something they consider a duty. Indeed, what people consider to be a moral requirement constitutes a large, messy, and varied category. Scanlon here restricts himself to a narrower domain, what he calls “what we owe to each other.” This, in short, has to do with the morality of interpersonal behavior—how we treat one another.
Scanlon begins in a somewhat unusual way, with a delve into the psychology of motivation. He argues that humans, as rational creatures, are better described as being motivated by “reasons” than by “desires.” A desire, in his view, is a kind of short-term motivational urge; and while we do experience such urges, we most often do things because of some larger goal or in accordance with some value. A parent may punish a child, for example, because they think discipline is a necessary part of child-rearing, even if they feel no actual anger—or, indeed, even if they are tired and would rather let it slide.
The fact that humans are motivated by “reasons” and not just “desires” is what makes us, in Scanlon’s views, particularly subject to the laws of morality. This is because we humans, as rational creatures, have a strong motive to care that the reasons for our actions be justifiable to our fellows. Social life would be impossible otherwise. Indeed, for Scanlon, this is the very heart of morality: that we act in a way that no one affected by our action could reasonably reject the principles which guided us.
You might notice that this formula has much in common with Kant’s categorical imperative. Where it differs is in its social (or contractualist) orientation. Morality is not a consequence of a priori rational rules or a special metaphysical category, but rather a consequence of the nature of rationality itself—something we are almost certain to care about, given that we live in communities and act in accordance with broad principles. This account of morality does, however, differ sharply from those along utilitarian lines, and Scanlon argues at length against such views.
I have been trying to present Scanlon’s views fairly, but I have to admit that I did not find this book compelling. For one, his distinction between reasons and desires—an important foundation of his theory—strikes me as particularly fragile. At various points in the book he formulates principles (such as about honesty) which could serve for ethical action. But it is obvious that these principles are so abstract that virtually no ordinary person would think along such lines. Indeed, Scanlon himself admits that most people have rather vague intuitions about their reasons for action, though for him it suffices that the reasons could be formulated.
Worse, while arguing for the primacy of reasons over desires in human motivation, Scanlon does not cite any but “phenomenological” evidence—which is to say, his own experience. To be fair, I have no idea what the state of psychological research into motivation was in 1998, when the book was published. But within a decade, researchers like Jonathan Haidt would make a very strong case that the reasons we profess for acting or thinking in a certain way are not reliable indications of our true motivation.
For example, people often have strong moral feelings (of outrage or disgust, say) without being able to say exactly why they object to something. It seems that our emotional reaction comes first and then our frontal lobe tries to justify the feeling, rather than the opposite. To quote Benjamin Franklin: “So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do.”
If Haidt’s model is true, and humans are not primarily motivated by “reasons,” then many of Scanlon’s arguments about morality and why we ought to care about it are considerably weakened. Yet even if we leave this issue to the side, I also found Scanlon’s test of moral validity to be unhelpful. His formula is: Act in such a way that nobody affected by the action could reasonably reject the principles which guided your actions.
To my mind, Scanlon ought to have spent much more time specifying exactly what he meant by “reasonable.” He does not provide any sort of test or easily applicable standards which would show whether a given principle can be reasonably rejected or not, apparently believing that our intuitions about what is reasonable or not would mostly coincide. Perhaps that is true much of the time, but in my experience there is a great deal of disagreement over what is reasonable (and, indeed, what is moral). By the end, I could not help thinking that Scanlon’s formulation was so vague as to be close to useless.
This is related to another fault. Though Scanlon spends a great deal of time explaining the specifics and advantages of his ethical system, he does not show how his way of thinking applies to any tricky areas of morality. He entirely avoids any controversial case—such as abortion, animal rights, the death penalty—and seems content to show that his system forbids murder and most forms of dishonesty. Bertrand Russell once remarked that, in ethics, the philosopher often proceeds by taking the conventional conclusions of morality for granted, and then finding some extra way of justifying them—and this strikes me as precisely the sort of exercise Scanlon is engaged in.
As for the writing style, I notice that many readers found it off-putting. But by the standards of academic philosophy, I would actually say that this book is extremely accessible. That is, of course, not high praise, but at the very least Scanlon avoids formal logic and the impenetrable argot of continental philosophers. Yet it must be admitted that by normal standards the writing is quite dry and lifeless.
But I really do not want to heap so many criticisms upon this book. Scanlon here presents a thoughtful new take on ethics with a minimum of jargon and without being strident or doctrinaire. If I did not find it a rewarding read, it is probably because I am not part of the book’s intended audience (other academic philosophers). Now, after having spent weeks on the book and a lot of time on this review, I wonder if I wouldn’t have been better off just watching the show…
April 15, 2022
While it is up to us to judge whether appropriate reasons for [judgement-sensitive attitudes] are or are not present, it is not generally within our power to make it the case that these reasons are or are not there; this depends on facts outside us.
While I found "Part I: Reasons and Values" much more interesting than the heart of the contractualist theory of right and wrong in Part II, What We Owe to Each Other is undeniably an important piece of moral philosophy. Scanlon is deliberate and clear in his prose, though occasionally overwrought.
For example, the definition of his theory is defined in the negative: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement." If you followed that on the first read, then you'll have no problem with the rest of the book. If you're like me and have trouble following double and triple negations, then be prepared to re-read sections. That being said, the book is crucial for anyone interested in contemporary ethical theory.
While I found "Part I: Reasons and Values" much more interesting than the heart of the contractualist theory of right and wrong in Part II, What We Owe to Each Other is undeniably an important piece of moral philosophy. Scanlon is deliberate and clear in his prose, though occasionally overwrought.
For example, the definition of his theory is defined in the negative: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement." If you followed that on the first read, then you'll have no problem with the rest of the book. If you're like me and have trouble following double and triple negations, then be prepared to re-read sections. That being said, the book is crucial for anyone interested in contemporary ethical theory.
Read
October 16, 2022No rating - this was not read for enjoyment.
I found a lot of this very difficult to read, especially as someone who has no proper education in philosophy or formal logic. Nonetheless, it's transformed the way I think about my own morality, and it feels like a hell of an accomplishment to finish it now, after 10 months.
I don't think I'd recommend this as a starting point to any other laypeople - go read How to Be Perfect as a start - but I'm very glad I did. It's taught me a huge amount.
I found a lot of this very difficult to read, especially as someone who has no proper education in philosophy or formal logic. Nonetheless, it's transformed the way I think about my own morality, and it feels like a hell of an accomplishment to finish it now, after 10 months.
I don't think I'd recommend this as a starting point to any other laypeople - go read How to Be Perfect as a start - but I'm very glad I did. It's taught me a huge amount.
Read
December 11, 2022Not rating this because I am not qualified. I was attracted by the simple title and led to pick it up because this book appeared several times in my life, like some kind of message. But this is an expert-level philosophy text, and I’m not experienced with the argument format or the broader context of sources, which made it incredibly hard to read as a lay person. The gist is that one subset of moral behavior should be governed by the concept of “This person could not reasonably reject the way they are being treated;” the argument in support of this sentence was 360 pages long!
March 4, 2015
It was a good book probably aimed more at the academic market but I found the writing style useful for my own book writing namely concept, refer to others, analyse, conclude.
September 16, 2022
beyin gerekitiriyo
June 22, 2024
I made a slideshow that walks you through this book: what-we-owe-to-each-other-notes.pdf. Making it helped me get a better grasp on a lot of stuff that I missed or misunderstood during my initial read-through of the book, so maybe it’ll be useful to someone else too.
Ultimately, I don’t buy Scanlon’s theory, but I found a lot of what he had to say pretty thought-provoking. My confidence in my preferred theory (utilitarianism) has been slightly reduced.
Favorite parts:
- Morality as the quest for justifiability: Simply as an empirical/phenomenological description of what we’re actually doing when we think about morality, the idea that we’re trying to ensure our actions could be justified to others rings true to me.
- Clever approach to aggregation: To navigate between the Scylla of you-have-to-torture-one-person-if-it-would-save-a-zillion-people-from-a-mild-annoyance and the Charybdis of you-have-no-reason-to-save-a-million-lives-over-one-life, Scanlon tries to show that when each member of two groups is facing an equally serious threat, any individual member of the larger group can complain that you are undervaluing their life if you do not use group size as a tie-breaking consideration. I think this misidentifies the fundamental reason why saving more people is better, but it is an interesting argument.
- Compatibilist account of “the Value of Choice”: Scanlon has some insightful thoughts on how and why our choices should have moral significance even if the universe is deterministic or probabilistic.
Notwithstanding Scanlon’s arguments against treating well-being as a “master value”, I still think our reasons to care about promoting happiness and preventing suffering are fundamental in a way that no other moral reasons seem to be. If I ask why is pleasure good and you answer it just obviously is, this answer may not be fully satisfying, but it seems less unsatisfying to me than it would as an answer to any other why is X good? question. So I’m still drawn to hedonistic utilitarianism.
Concurrently with (re)reading this book, I was listening to a book speculating about AGI. So I started thinking about whether something like Scanlon’s theory could be helpful in designing safe/ethical AI. The classic AI doom scenarios tend to revolve around the AI maximizing something and going too far; naive attempts to program strict deontological rules could also have unintended consequences. I don’t think the most responsible human thinkers are really maximizers or rigid rule-followers; rather, when confronted with a choice, they do something more like what Scanlon prescribes: cast a wide net for all the possible objections that could be raised against each option, and try to judge how reasonable and serious those objections are. If my fate were in the (metaphorical) hands of a machine, I’d probably feel safest if I knew the machine was following a similar process—and if, like a wise human, it became more cautious (and more inclined to seek advice from others) in proportion to how unclear the right way to adjudicate the competing objections is in a given case.
(crosspost)
Ultimately, I don’t buy Scanlon’s theory, but I found a lot of what he had to say pretty thought-provoking. My confidence in my preferred theory (utilitarianism) has been slightly reduced.
Favorite parts:
- Morality as the quest for justifiability: Simply as an empirical/phenomenological description of what we’re actually doing when we think about morality, the idea that we’re trying to ensure our actions could be justified to others rings true to me.
- Clever approach to aggregation: To navigate between the Scylla of you-have-to-torture-one-person-if-it-would-save-a-zillion-people-from-a-mild-annoyance and the Charybdis of you-have-no-reason-to-save-a-million-lives-over-one-life, Scanlon tries to show that when each member of two groups is facing an equally serious threat, any individual member of the larger group can complain that you are undervaluing their life if you do not use group size as a tie-breaking consideration. I think this misidentifies the fundamental reason why saving more people is better, but it is an interesting argument.
- Compatibilist account of “the Value of Choice”: Scanlon has some insightful thoughts on how and why our choices should have moral significance even if the universe is deterministic or probabilistic.
Notwithstanding Scanlon’s arguments against treating well-being as a “master value”, I still think our reasons to care about promoting happiness and preventing suffering are fundamental in a way that no other moral reasons seem to be. If I ask why is pleasure good and you answer it just obviously is, this answer may not be fully satisfying, but it seems less unsatisfying to me than it would as an answer to any other why is X good? question. So I’m still drawn to hedonistic utilitarianism.
Concurrently with (re)reading this book, I was listening to a book speculating about AGI. So I started thinking about whether something like Scanlon’s theory could be helpful in designing safe/ethical AI. The classic AI doom scenarios tend to revolve around the AI maximizing something and going too far; naive attempts to program strict deontological rules could also have unintended consequences. I don’t think the most responsible human thinkers are really maximizers or rigid rule-followers; rather, when confronted with a choice, they do something more like what Scanlon prescribes: cast a wide net for all the possible objections that could be raised against each option, and try to judge how reasonable and serious those objections are. If my fate were in the (metaphorical) hands of a machine, I’d probably feel safest if I knew the machine was following a similar process—and if, like a wise human, it became more cautious (and more inclined to seek advice from others) in proportion to how unclear the right way to adjudicate the competing objections is in a given case.
(crosspost)
November 28, 2024
Oh my, this text was dry! In fact, there were several moments where I leaned toward just quitting overall; however, there were some compelling pearls I knew I’d take away if I just pressed through. Below are a few of the following:
“We cannot respond to all the reasons that every human creature has for wanting his or her life to go well; so we must select among these reasons; and we should do this in a way that recognizes the capacity of human beings, as rational creatures, to assess reasons and to govern their lives according to this assessment. In my view the best response to these two considerations is this: respecting the value of human (rational) life requires us to treat rational creatures only in ways that would be allowed by principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they, too, were seeking principles of mutual governance which other rational creatures could not reasonably reject. This responds to the problem of selecting among reasons in a way that recognizes our distinctive capacities as reason-assessing, self-governing creatures.”
“Whether or not I regard others' judgments as possibly superior to mine, I have reason to be concerned with them if they may represent an emerging consensus that will affect me.”
“…we can see the need for limits on certain patterns of action (patterns of justification) by seeing the ways in which we are at risk if people are left free to decide to act in these ways; and by understanding the rationale for these moral constraints we can see why it is that certain reasons for action, and certain ways of giving some reasons priority over others, are morally inadmissible.”
“Moral relativism, as I will understand it, is the thesis that there is no single ultimate standard for the moral appraisal of actions, a standard uniquely appropriate for all agents and all moral judges; rather, there are many such standards. According to relativism, moral appraisals of actions, insofar as they are to make sense and be defensible, must be understood not as judgments about what is right or wrong absolutely, but about what is right or wrong relative to the particular standards that are made relevant by the context of the action in question, or by the context of the judgment itself.' It is important that the standards in question here are ultimate standards. Any plausible moral view would allow for the fact that actions that are right in one place can be wrong in another place, where people have different expectations, or where different conditions obtain.”
3 (more like 3.5) stars. A difficult read, and one that kept me from engaging as deeply as I desired. Still, the considerations above were well worth the time it took to read this work. For that, I’m grateful.
“We cannot respond to all the reasons that every human creature has for wanting his or her life to go well; so we must select among these reasons; and we should do this in a way that recognizes the capacity of human beings, as rational creatures, to assess reasons and to govern their lives according to this assessment. In my view the best response to these two considerations is this: respecting the value of human (rational) life requires us to treat rational creatures only in ways that would be allowed by principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they, too, were seeking principles of mutual governance which other rational creatures could not reasonably reject. This responds to the problem of selecting among reasons in a way that recognizes our distinctive capacities as reason-assessing, self-governing creatures.”
“Whether or not I regard others' judgments as possibly superior to mine, I have reason to be concerned with them if they may represent an emerging consensus that will affect me.”
“…we can see the need for limits on certain patterns of action (patterns of justification) by seeing the ways in which we are at risk if people are left free to decide to act in these ways; and by understanding the rationale for these moral constraints we can see why it is that certain reasons for action, and certain ways of giving some reasons priority over others, are morally inadmissible.”
“Moral relativism, as I will understand it, is the thesis that there is no single ultimate standard for the moral appraisal of actions, a standard uniquely appropriate for all agents and all moral judges; rather, there are many such standards. According to relativism, moral appraisals of actions, insofar as they are to make sense and be defensible, must be understood not as judgments about what is right or wrong absolutely, but about what is right or wrong relative to the particular standards that are made relevant by the context of the action in question, or by the context of the judgment itself.' It is important that the standards in question here are ultimate standards. Any plausible moral view would allow for the fact that actions that are right in one place can be wrong in another place, where people have different expectations, or where different conditions obtain.”
3 (more like 3.5) stars. A difficult read, and one that kept me from engaging as deeply as I desired. Still, the considerations above were well worth the time it took to read this work. For that, I’m grateful.
October 11, 2022
I love reading philosophy. Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Mill and Epictetus are among my very favorite authors. This book, on the other hand, was anything but pleasant. Scanlon's prose is tedious, repetitive and fractured. There is no logical structure. There are few concrete examples, and the arguments are difficult to follow. Scanlon at no point gives a comprehensive definition of what he means by "what we owe to each other". This is as close as he gets (and gives you a sample of his poorly expressed language):
"When I ask myself what reason the fact that an action would be wrong provides me with not to do it, my answer is that such an action would be one that I could not justify to others on grounds I could expect them to accept. This leads me to describe the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong by saying that they are judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject."
He seems to assume that we will understand that with an intuitive leap, and proceeds to contrast it with other theories of morality, without explaining exactly what he is arguing, or what he is arguing against. I finished this book merely so that I could set it aside, having given all that I could to comprehend it. It reads as if it was written in a foreign language and poorly translated, yet it was originally written in my native english. Save yourself some frustration. Just read the title of the book, and imagine to yourself what is implied by it. You won't get any further than that by reading the book.
"When I ask myself what reason the fact that an action would be wrong provides me with not to do it, my answer is that such an action would be one that I could not justify to others on grounds I could expect them to accept. This leads me to describe the subject matter of judgments of right and wrong by saying that they are judgments about what would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject."
He seems to assume that we will understand that with an intuitive leap, and proceeds to contrast it with other theories of morality, without explaining exactly what he is arguing, or what he is arguing against. I finished this book merely so that I could set it aside, having given all that I could to comprehend it. It reads as if it was written in a foreign language and poorly translated, yet it was originally written in my native english. Save yourself some frustration. Just read the title of the book, and imagine to yourself what is implied by it. You won't get any further than that by reading the book.
December 15, 2023
Hello everyone.
I noticed that many found Scanlon's book very difficult to read to the point of sapping away all potential enjoyment. Some claimed that they couldn't follow the argument, that it was fragmentary, repetitive etc...
I know the feeling. I have encountered it with countless philosophical texts. Knowing the struggle, I decided to create a YouTube channel in which I explain dense philosophy books without leaving aside a single detail. I'm currently doing a series on What We Owe To Each Other.
I upload a video every week covering a chapter. You can watch the video for the introduction here, and hopefully, it will make the reading easier and more enjoyable for you. That's the goal of the channel.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=mbTuZw9...
I noticed that many found Scanlon's book very difficult to read to the point of sapping away all potential enjoyment. Some claimed that they couldn't follow the argument, that it was fragmentary, repetitive etc...
I know the feeling. I have encountered it with countless philosophical texts. Knowing the struggle, I decided to create a YouTube channel in which I explain dense philosophy books without leaving aside a single detail. I'm currently doing a series on What We Owe To Each Other.
I upload a video every week covering a chapter. You can watch the video for the introduction here, and hopefully, it will make the reading easier and more enjoyable for you. That's the goal of the channel.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=mbTuZw9...
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