Charmides

by Plato, Benjamin Jowett (Translator)

A literal translation, allowing the simplicity and vigor of the Greek diction to shine through.

Genres: Philosophy, Classics, Nonfiction, Ancient, Ancient History, History, Classical Studies

64 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 391

About the author

Plato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."

Reviews

[Manny · Rating 2 out of 5]

I'm just going to have to spell this out: the author is a pedophile. There's no reasonable doubt about it.

Charmides, an early volume in the very popular Socrates series, is a particularly clear case. There's a kind of vague plot, but basically it's not much more a step-by-step manual in the art of seducing young boys with smooth talk about epistemology, the relationship between philosophy and science, and the nature of virtue. The fact that Socrates is a role model to many overimpressionable men only makes it worse.

No doubt Goodreads will delete my review. But someone had to say it.

[Greg · Rating 4 out of 5]

I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a man has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined.

Synopsis:

Socrates, who elsewhere is described as quite ugly, is hanging out in a wrestling gym when this totally hot younger guy walks in. "Dude, he's hot," Socrates says. "Yeah, but wait till you see him naked, he's got a killer bod," Chaerephon says. "Hey Critias, call your hot cousin over here so I can chat him up," Socrates says. "Yeah? You want to talk to my hot cousin, why don't I tell him your a doctor, that will get him over here?" Critias replies, and Socrates agrees to play doctor. They talk, Socrates woos him with some talk about temperance. Critias gets all worked up when Socrates shoots down one of his pet theories that he had told his hot cousin. The two older men argue for a bit and then Charmides tells Socrates that he'd still like to play Doctor with him. Socrates says some stuff, Charmides tells him that resistance will be futile, Socrates says, "I wouldn't think of resisting." And the dialogue ends there, presumably with some man on man action taking place soon afterwards.

Philosophy stuff:

Like most other people who have probably ever existed, Socrates falls for (assumes?) the basic idea that really beautiful people also have really beautiful souls. Ok, this isn't necessarily true, it does take some the tiniest bit of prodding after he has started to drool over the hotness of the guy to ask, but is a good person, too? Yeah, yeah, he's as good of a person as he is hot. Phew. This is a vaguely Hermetic idea, you know what is above is below. The 'higher' soul influences the 'lower' body. Socrates goes a step farther while he's playing at being a doctor to expound on the theory that to cure the eyes you need to cure the head, and to sure the head you need to cure the body, and to cure the body you need to cure the soul. Trickle down curing all around. He only plays around with this idea a bit in this dialogue though, there are others where this idea is more focused. The curious thing in this (which is considered one of the 'early' dialogues) is that the person who has taught him the charm that he says will help cure Charmides of his headaches is Thracian, and given to him by a stranger (a Thracian Stranger?). The Stranger is an interesting person in the Socratic dialogues, and the appearance of the people fitting this description have a tendency to be foils to Socrates. A quick internet search puts two pre-Socratic philosophers as being from Thrace; Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus. There is no reason to think of the stranger necessarily as being either of these two philosophers (neither of whom are described as being a physician as far as I can tell), but Plato did have some major problems with the thought of Democritus. And the way the dialogue veers towards epistemology once Critias jumps in to intellectually spar with Socrates suggests that Plato might be using this dialogue as an attempt to refute the "scientific" (I'm quoting this because it wouldn't be known in this way for years and years) theory of knowledge of Democritus.

If this is true than the Stranger fails in his attempt to foil Socrates as this dialogue fails to produce any results but only shows some inherent inconsistencies with the idea that something like wisdom can be the science of science. This is really pure speculation and I'm talking out of my ass. But I am quite fascinated with the role of the Stranger in some of Plato's works and my attention was caught by the almost offhand mention of a stranger in the early part of this dialogue.

Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom , and no one else.

The starting point for this dialogue is, what is temperance? The question fairly quickly produces a couple of responses that are easily dismissed by Socrates and then the dialogue moves to the weighty parts with the suggestion that temperance is wisdom. And with a couple of innocent questions Socrates gets Critias to basically define wisdom as the science of science. The knowledge of knowledge. Socrates hates this definition and spends most of the dialogue tearing down the idea that even if a science of science does exist that it would have any value. He concludes that it would be profitless, since it would only know itself, knowledge without any utility to extrapolate this sort of knowledge to any field beyond it's own self-awareness.

He sort of sums this up when he says, "But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear Critias,--this is a point which we have not yet been able to determine.

What is the point of knowledge for knowledge's sake? For me when I read this I saw Socrates as pointing a finger at the idea of pure epistemology and reducing it to another type of sophistry. This is a bit troubling to me and points to a possible change of opinion in Plato from this early dialogue to his more later ones. I won't go into the idea in much depth (not like I'm doing anything much justice here), but how does this fit into Plato's general theory of knowledge. You know, Forms and all. How does this work with his idea of the Philosopher King? Or basically how does the potshots Socrates takes at epistemology and wisdom in this early dialogue not threaten the foundations that The Republic-era Plato would advocate?

One answer, I think, is that the more mature Plato can be read as being post-Socrates (although all the dialogues are technically post-Socrates since he had already sipped on the hemlock by the time they were written). The Socrates in The Republic being even more of a literary device and a stock character in Plato's rhetoric than he was in the earlier works. Would this make the Socrates in this dialogue more likely to a 'truer' representation of Socrates than the later incarnations that are ready to crown philosophers as kings?

As much of a conclusion as can be hoped for from this dialogue comes when Socrates says to Critias, "Monster! I said; you have been carrying me around in a circle, and all this time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge include all the sciences, but one science only, that of good and evil."

In a sense, what Socrates is saying is that all this talk of knowledge, or wisdom as being the highest good is nonsense. It's letting those that spend their time idly dwelling on such questions feel good about themselves, like they have achieved some great height, but that is misleading. Socrates goes through a list of occupations and pretty much says, so Critias you think that a shoemaker can't do good, since you say that good comes from this science of science and they only know about making shoes? What about the physician? Huh, you don't think they can be good men because they debase themselves by not kneeling at the altar of the science of science?

The answer turns out to be simple to Socrates, it's about knowing what is good and what is evil and doing what is good. All the talk of higher things, the lofty thoughts of philosophers is fine and dandy but without having knowledge of what is good then all the other knowledge is in vain. In one sense the answer is simpler than anything suggested earlier in the dialogue. The concept of, but would you say that is good? A common rhetorical device used by Socrates points towards the answer throughout and all kinds of things are asked if they are 'good', is wrestling with quickness good? Is a physician healing someone good? Is reading quicker rather than slower good? Etc.

This begs the question, what is Good? It's a term used so often in the dialogue but with the sort of assured knowledge that one just will happen to know what it means. It is this kind of term that Socrates loves to question and twist about to get to the heart of a problem. Here it is just accepted. This is of course brought up in other dialogues, and is a very common term in Plato, which in a sense one can think of most of the dialogues as revolving around it in one way or another.

The answer is simple and can almost be expressed as a tautology. Instead of asking what is temperance, one can ask what makes a person good, and the answer he suggests is knowledge (the science) of good and evil. Reflecting this answer back through the dialogue though I think that the answer isn't simple. It's a Herculean task if you look at how many questions revolved around the basic idea of but would you say that (x) is good if done this way? How many times would you need to confront this question, and really think about it if you had to go through and answer without just a quick reaction to what is good and what isn't. It suggests a different meaning to the self-centered interpretation of the Delphic Oracle "Know Thyself" to be not an invitation to navel-gazing but to be aware of oneself in the world and keep a constant vigilance to that awareness in order to try to discern what is good.

One Last Thought, on a different topic:

This is even more rambling nonsense than the last section. Feel free to skip this, it is just me trying to work out some ideas that I've been having about why a particular work of literature works or doesn't work for someone, and where (if any) blame should be placed. I'm currently toying around with the idea that every failure of reading and enjoying a book is the readers failure, with exceptions for what are obviously just bad bad bad works, but how does one define what is a bad bad bad book. These are questions I'm not going to deal with here, but just some general thoughts I had from this quote in the dialogue:

Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of this definition of temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do not understand them?

This passage caught my eye. It is at the turning point in the dialogue. Charmides has just quoted an answer to one of Socrates questions that his cousin Critias had told him at an earlier time. And Socrates has guessed that the view Charmides is expressing is Critias, and now Socrates is baiting Critias into the dialectic.

What I can't figure out in this passage is where the intended emphasis should be placed. Is it an accusation of sophistry? Sort of like arguments against, "difficult" books usually can be reduced to saying, there are easier ways for the author to say what they said. They can be more concise, they can make themselves clearer, but instead they hide what they mean to say in obscurant language and prose and are fooling people into believing that there is more being said than their really is. Or is it saying the opposite side of that argument, and saying, just because you don't get what the person is saying doesn't mean that the message isn't there. That you can't blame every failing you have with a text on the author.

Or maybe he means neither. Maybe the target of his comment is at the 'reader' and the 'author' (or the speaker and the listener to be more precise in this instance). The assumption being that either side be failing to know what the words they are using mean. That there could just be rampant sophistry going on. There could be ignorance on the reader/listeners side. But, in this case, it is the statement made by Critias, with the words that end up not meaning exactly what Critias would have wanted them to mean on closer examination that ends up yielding the answer to Socrates. And when he calls Critias a monster it can be thought that Socrates is saying that the original answer was wrong, but so close to being correct that they could have all saved a lot of time if only Critias hadn't been mistaken about what he thought his own words meant. This passes the failure of the original answer interestingly not to Critias for saying the wrong thing but for not sufficiently understanding he meant by the words. The listener/reader would also be to blame for the misunderstanding because they have it in their own power to have worked out the meaning to the words and used the cipher as a means to arriving at the better answer.

As I said above, this is just a rambling of some thoughts I've been having about some other topics. I'll try to make more sense of them at some point in the near future.

[Manny · Rating 2 out of 5]

[A singles bar in Athens. CHARMIDES, CRITAS, SOCRATES and OSCAR WILDE]

SOCRATES: ... Now consider again the nature of temperance.

CHARMIDES: Of what?

SOCRATES: It's an ancient Greek term that doesn't translate well into English. [Aside] Zeus, he's hot!

CHARMIDES: Oh... right.

SOCRATES: Well, if you possessed temperance, would you post better reviews on Goodreads?

CHARMIDES: You mean, if it had been invented yet?

SOCRATES: Naturally.

CHARMIDES: I guess not.

SOCRATES: Would you get more votes?

CHARMIDES: You're right, I wouldn't. Oh Socrates, how good you are at explaining the invisible world!

WILDE: Remember that the true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.

CHARMIDES: My, what excellent advice!

WILDE: The only thing to do with good advice is pass it on. It is never any use to oneself.

CHARMIDES: By Minerva! You are as insightful as the sage here!

SOCRATES: [Sotto voce to WILDE] I saw him first.

WILDE: [Sotto voce to SOCRATES] Maybe we can work something out. How'd you feel about a spit-roast?

SOCRATES: We were talking philosophy. You leave your filthy gutter language out of it.

WILDE: We are all in the gutter. But some of us are looking at the stars.

CHARMIDES: I am lost in admiration. Well said sir!

SOCRATES: Okay, okay. Deal.

CRITAS: Hey, what's going on here?

WILDE: We're inviting your cousin to a barbecue.

SOCRATES: He's bringing the buns.

[Roy Lotz · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of the early inconclusive Socratic dialogues. Socrates, just come back from fighting in the Peloponnesian War, meets two of Plato’s relatives, Critias and Charmides. The latter of these is portrayed as a handsome youth, graceful of form and pure of mind. (Ironically enough, after the disastrous defeat of Athens in the war, both Critias and Charmides went on to become members of the Thirty Tyrants.) Socrates takes the opportunity to question Charmides about a Greek term that is rather unsatisfactorily translated into English as “temperance.”

The conversation takes many twists and turns, following the normal Socratic procedure: a definition is proposed (in this case, living quietly), an exception to the definition is found, a new one is proposed, and the process continues. As often happens in these early dialogues, the conversants seem to only get further from the point the longer they speak, getting hopelessly lost in the weeds of dialectic. Here we also see a quality that commonly irks readers of Plato, the tendency of Socrates’ interlocutors to give their unwavering assent to whatever rhetorical question, thought experiment, or logical distinction that Socrates poses, even when obviously fallacious. We also see Plato’s early tendency to get wrapped up in merely verbal confusions that hardly make sense when translated.

In any case, the dialogue takes an interesting turn when Critias proposes that temperance is a kind of meta-knowledge, the knowledge of knowledge. But how could we know for sure whether we knew something or not? And besides, how would that knowledge be useful? Merely knowing that we knew the art of medicine, for example, would be inconsequential compared to the knowledge of medicine itself. But how could temperance be inconsequential knowledge, if it is an important and noble attribute? The dialogue proceeds thus, seeming to intentionally confuse the issue through its series of involutions. But Plato will return to these questions with a vengeance.

[Paul Haspel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Charmides, in real life, was a prominent Athenian who made some very bad choices and came to an unhappy end. In the chaos that followed Athens’ defeat by Sparta in the Peloponnesian Wars, he aligned himself with an oligarchy that came to be known as the Thirty Tyrants. The Tyrants established a brutal pro-Spartan dictatorship that ruled Athens for eight months in the year 403 B.C., drove a great many Athenians into exile, and killed off 5 percent of the remaining Athenian population while they held power. Charmides served the Tyrants to the bitter end, and was killed fighting pro-democracy forces in the Battle of Munichia.

Knowledge of those circumstances would have imparted a decided sense of pathos to the original readers of Plato’s dialogue Charmides; for in that dialogue, Charmides is still a young man. Good-looking and intelligent - the proverbial cynosure of all eyes - Charmides seems to have a bright future ahead of him. Like other Platonic dialogues, Charmides takes on additional significance when one knows the historical context against which the dialogue was written.

The nominal subject of this Socratic dialogue is temperance. Yet temperance, in this work, has a different meaning from the one that the Romans later bequeathed to the rest of the West – a meaning that tends to focus on exerting a proportional degree of control over one’s temporal appetites. Indeed, the meaning is sufficiently different that translator Jowett mentions that the original Greek term could also be translated as “moderation” or even “wisdom.”

As one often sees in Socratic dialogues, Socrates politely and persistently asks questions of his interlocutor, in order to establish that said interlocutor’s easy working definitions of a key concept are incomplete and need refinement. As the dialogue begins, in the Palaestra (wrestling school) of one Taureas, Charmides is seeking treatment for a headache, and asks Socrates for help. In response, Socrates quotes the philosopher-demigod Zamolxis “that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul”.

Continuing with his invocation of the ideas of Zamolxis, Socrates tries to persuade Charmides that they should pursue the health of the soul before worrying about something as “trivial” as a headache:

For all good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, as if from the head into the eyes. And therefore, if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body….“For this,” [Zamolxis] said, is the great error of our day in the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.”

I have a number of friends who experience frequent and severe headaches; and if one of them reported a headache to me, I would try to help them with their headache first, and would defer until a later time any discussion of the ideas of Zamolxis. But I understand that all this is a convention of the Platonic dialogue – setting the scene with a bit of characterization, before getting to the heart of the matter: in this case, the definition of temperance.

Charmides, in response to Socrates’ gentle prompting, dutifully tries to provide a number of successive definitions of temperance, only to find that Socrates can point out a problem with each definition. First, Charmides suggests that “temperance [is] doing things orderly and quietly – such things, for example, as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that nature. In a word…I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance is quietness.” But, Socrates points out, there are many occasions in life – boxing, wrestling, playing a musical instrument – when it is better to be quick, and to make a bit of noise, rather than being slow and quiet.

Charmides tries again, stating that “My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.” But Socrates evokes Homer’s statement (from the Odyssey) that “Modesty is not good for a needy man,” and thereby induces Charmides to admit that modesty is not always an absolute good.

As often happens in Plato’s dialogues, another co-respondent breaks in when the first seems to be flailing. And in the Charmides, the second co-respondent is Critias. Like Charmides, Critias would join with the Thirty Tyrants; unlike Charmides, who held a relatively minor position within the Tyrants’ regime, Critias was a leading Tyrant, notorious for his bloodthirsty approach to his work. Situational irony abounds, as Socrates quietly discusses temperance, moderation, and wisdom with two future tyrants.

Critias clearly thinks that he has the upper hand in the dialogue when he states that “temperance I define in plain words as the doing of good actions”, and adds that “self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription ‘Know thyself!’ at Delphi.”

But Socrates, as is his wont, slowly and carefully leads his co-respondent into a logical contradiction – a rhetorical trap from which there is no escape. He asks Critias, “[I]s not the discovery of things, as they truly are, a good common to all mankind?” Critias agrees, and adds that “wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself”. Socrates responds, “Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and will be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and to see what others know and think that they know and do really know; and what they do not know, and fancy that they know, when they do not.”

But then Socrates suggests that, as there can be no sense of sense itself, and no desire of desire itself, so the idea of a “science of science itself” is a logical contradiction – a case of begging the question – and suggests further that “wisdom, or being wise, appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we do or do not know”. Critias is compelled to agree.

Like many of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, the Charmides concludes with an admission that any concept – in this case, temperance – is more complex and difficult to define than was originally assumed, and that further philosophical inquiry will be necessary. The dialogue concludes with Critias making Charmides promise to be a faithful follower of Socrates – though the promise is expressed in a strange and rather menacing way, considering that both Critias and Charmides would one day become co-conspirators in the formation of a bloody and violent tyranny:

You, sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?

We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.

And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?

Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore you had better consider well.

But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood for violence, are irresistible.

Do not you resist me, then, he said.

I will not resist you, I replied.

On that ambiguous note – one that points ahead from the time in which the dialogue is set, toward a singularly unhappy future for the Athenians – the Charmides ends.

[Sheyda Heydari Shovir · Rating 2 out of 5]

متن واقعی این کتاب رو نخونده‌‌م و ترجمه‌ش بانگلیسی رو خونده‌م از بنجامین جوئت، لذا در مورد نثرش حرفی نمیزنم. کارمیدس اونطور که حدس زده‌ند و پذیرفته‌ند از دیالوگهای اولیه افلاطونه. قهرمان داستان دوباره سقراطه. سقراط از جنگ برمیگرده و میپرسه امردها کجان؟ کریتیاس هم میگه امردها زیادند ولی وایستا تا فامیل ما رو ببینی. بله در واقع کریتیاس فامیل کم‌سنش رو بسقراط تعارف میزنه و یکی از متون مهم فلسفی در چنین بستری اتفاق میفته. بهرروی باین ترتیب کارمیدس زیبای ساده‌روی وارد داستان میشه و سقراط میگه حالا باید دید تو که انقدر زیبایی درونت هم همین شکلیه یا نه.
Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised?
و اینجاست که عیش سقراط شروع میشه و سوال رو پلی میکنه. وسط دیالوگ کارمیدس میره بگه بزرگترش بیاد و قسمت بزرگی از دیالوگ بین سقراط و کریتیاس اتفاق میفته. موضوعات فضیلته مثل همیشه، و اعتدال و دانایی. دیالوگ بی‌نتیجه‌ست و بیک جواب درست نهایی قطعی نمیرسند اما در دیالوگ حرفهای قابل تامل و بعضا خیلی غامضی خصوصا در مورد دانایی مطرح میشه که فی المثل من رو گیج کرد. نهایتا کارمیدس بقصد تلمذ میاد بافروتنی بسمت سقراط و یک گفتگوی بزعم من خیلی شهوانی کوچک میکنند و دیالوگ تموم میشه.
دیالوگ خیلی ساده‌ست و تمهیدات خاصی باون صورت نداره اما جالب و سرگرم‌کننده و تامل برانگیزه. این تشبیه توش بود و خیلی ازش خوشم اومد:
Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty."

[Duffy Pratt · Rating 3 out of 5]

On one level, this is just a primer by Socrates on how to pick up a hot guy. It's also a typical working of the Socratic method. People start out thinking they know something, but by the end, everyone sees they are better off now realizing that they know nothing at all. In one way, this dialogue is especially interesting, because there is no English translation for the virtue that Charmides is trying to define. Thus, when he is giving a definition of it, he's defining something that we really need a definition for. And by the end, when they all give up, we don't have any idea what virtue they were talking about to begin with. There's some mention of temperence, and also of wisdom, and also of the Delphic admonishment to "know thyself," but here its much easier for me to admit that I don't know what they are talking about because I don't, in fact, know what they were talking about. But it's nice to know that in return for causing so much confusion, Socrates probably got laid.

[David Sarkies · Rating 3 out of 5]

What Exactly is Self-Control?
20 December 2019

So, it looks like Socrates is now having a discussion about self-control, or to be more precise, the definition of the word sophrosune. One interesting note is that this word seems to come from sophos, which is Greek for wisdom, so it seems as if there is an element of wisdom in self control. I guess it comes down to that old saying: knowledge is knowing that a tomato is a fruit, wisdom is not putting it into a fruit salad. In that sense, I would then go on to suggest that maybe self-control is resisting the temptation to actually see was a tomato flavoured fruit salad actually looks like.

Yet sometimes I wander about these who arguments that Socrates has with regards to definitions of words. It’s not as if we seem to go into a huge debate about what a single word actually means. Well, not quite, though we certainly end up writing billions of pages of text based on what a collection of words actually mean. Take Shakespeare for instance – he gets a bunch of words and puts them into a specific order, and it results in debates as to the meaning of these collections of words right down to the present day.

Though in my mind, the whole concept of self control does seem to make a lot of sense, and that we don’t really need to go down the path of attempting to either understand, or debate, the meaning. Rather, self control seems to me to be the ability not to do something, and the fact that something might be easy, makes it even harder to not do it. For instance, if something gives you a rush when you do it, then it is harder not to do it, than otherwise. Yet there are things that seem much easier not to do, though of course we might end up in a state of mind that results in much lower inhibitions. Though, to be honest with you, sometimes it is amazing the lengths that some people go to just to get a rush.

Yet one could also argue that self control could actually be maintaining control of one’s emotions – though that comes under the definition of emotional intelligence. Like, you know, not becoming obsessed with one particular person to the exception of all others – whether it be in the form of a lover, or just a person whom you really want to be friends with. However, in these circumstances, it might even come down to unrequited love, in that you just waste your time chasing after somebody who simply isn’t going to return it (or may even be caught up in the delusion that this particular person is much better than what they really are).

So, it does seem that it could fall into two categories – emotional intelligence, and resisting the temptation to do something stupid, or to continue to do something that is going to be harmful to one’s health. Though, of course, addiction is a pretty nasty beast, and thus one could argue whether self-control is not succumbing to it, or whether we are now discussing the concept of willpower, that is to continue to stay a particular course despite the fact that it is really painful to do so.

Yeah, I guess Socrates was right in the end – there is a lot more to self-control than meets the eye, and like a lot of these other dialogues, it is more designed to start us think, and debate, as opposed to blinding following what the text says.

[Amir · Rating 4 out of 5]

یکی از شگفت انگیز ترین محاورات افلاطون. موضوع محاوره درباره چیستی خویشتن داریه. پژوهش با شکست مواجه میشه اما در مسیر پژوهش اتفاقات عجیبی می افته. سقراط از تعریف ساده‌ی "خویشتن داری، سادگی و متانت است" به "خویشتن داری، شناساییِ شناسایی است" می رسه...شناساییِ شناسایی دقیقا چه معنایی میده؟ اینجا انگار برای افلاطون افق جدیدی گشوده شده اما هنوز شهامت لازم برای مواجه با این مسئله رو پیدا نکرده...

پی‌نوشت: در محاورات افلاطون، یکی پس از دیگری، جنب و جوش روح و اندیشه یونانی رو می‌بینی...می بینی که چطور زبان در حال بالیدنه و تا محمل اندیشه بشه و در نهایت در دستان بزرگترین فیلسوف تمام دوران ها قرار بگیره: معلم اول؛ ارسطو

[Mir · Rating 4 out of 5]

The teacher of the philosophy course for which I read this nicknamed one of the guys in the class "Charmides." I hope that kid got an A.

[L · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this dialgoue Plato explores the nature of sophrosyne - known as something relating to temperance, character and balance. The interlocutors in this dialogue are Critias and Charmides, the prior being cousin to the latter and the latter being the son of the infamous Glaucon. There is a heavily-placed dramatic irony regarding the involvement of these particular interlocutors as they were two of the thirty tyrants who ruled Athens, of course lacking sophrosyne in their approach. A noticable feature of the dialogue is the way in which Critias defines sophrosyne to something similar to the attribute of a tyrant, in that they know how to efficiently control those with abilities. Particularly the way in which the dialogue ends, which initially seems jovial represents the forceful nature of the interlocutors.

Besides the historical features of the dialogue, there are some interesting philosophical questions raised. What is sophrosyne in relation to other virtues and forms of knowledge? Can an idea encapsulate both itself, an extension of itself alongside the negation of the extension? This is an enjoyable dialogue, primarily for historical content, though there is enough here philosophically for someone desiring to think about the nature of sophrosyne.

[Simo Ibourki · Rating 4 out of 5]

After reading a small homosexual introduction (Socrates feeling a "wild-beast appetite" for Charmides), I got lost in arguments and refutations of a what makes a person temprant, good or virtuous. Socrates as always keeps up with "I know nothing" attitude, all he does was listenning for the definitions and then jumping to argumentations and inferences (The socratic method 101). A good read if you want to know about anciant greek philosophy and culture.

[Joao Baptista · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cármides é um diálogo platónico do chamado período de juventude, em que Sócrates investiga um determinado conceito, normalmente associado a uma virtude. Neste caso, trata-se de uma virtude que não só é lexicalmente de difícil tradução para português, como o seu conteúdo não se deixa captar de forma evidente: a σωφροσύνη, isto é, “sofrósina”, que tanto pode significar prudência, como moderação, auto-controlo e/ou auto-conhecimento. Tradicionalmente, o indivíduo sophron é aquele que tem o entendimento suficiente para conhecer os seus limites, saber ocupar o seu lugar, moderar-se e não ceder à hybris.
Cármides é tido pelo mais belo moço de então e Sócrates propõe-se desnudar-lhe a alma, para perceber se à beleza física corresponde a beleza da alma, condições necessárias para ser considerado perfeito.
Como sucede nos diálogos deste tipo, a pergunta fundamental que Sócrates coloca é “o que é”. Várias tentativas definicionais se vão sucedendo, primeiro avançadas pelo jovem Cármides, depois pelo seu tutor, Crítias. Todas vão sendo sucessivamente refutadas por Sócrates, até que o diálogo termina em aporia.
A tentativa mais extensamente discutida define a sofrósina como a ciência das ciências, isto é, uma espécie de meta-ciência, que teria por objecto a própria ciência em si e que permitiria, a quem a possuísse, saber o que sabe e o que não sabe. A uma tal qualidade estariam associadas implicações políticas, pois que só aquele que se sabe governar poderá saber governar a polis, naquela que é, porventura, uma prefiguração da ideia dos reis-filósofos que Platão desenvolverá posteriormente na República.
Porém, Sócrates argumenta que, assim concebida, sofrósina não se revestiria de qualquer utilidade, por estar dependente dos conhecimentos das concretas ciências de que é ciência.
Trata-se de uma leitura bastante interessante, que exemplifica de forma clara o método socrático de questionamento (maiêutica) e que, em certa medida, antecipa algumas das temáticas mais tipicamente platónicas que as obras subsequentes desenvolverão.
Esta edição, vertida directamente do grego, tem uma interessante e informativa introdução e extensas notas de contexto, interpretativas e bibliográficas.

[Josh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Socrates investigates the nature of self control with Charmides and Critias

[Sookie · Rating 2 out of 5]

I am not sure which part of this dialogue was one man hitting on other with blatant homosexual innuendos and which part was part of philosophical discussion.

Or if one was metaphor for the other (you will know which is which), I missed it.

[Matthew Bloomquist · Rating 3 out of 5]

In Charmides, Socrates seeks to understand the nature of temperance, one of the four virtues characterizing Plato's healthy mind (Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice). It seems to me that a key aspect of Socratic dialogue is the keeping of the question at hand from being explicitly resolved. Rather than explicitly answering, Socrates chooses to demonstrate the answer through his questioning. No one can answer what temperance is, yet Socrates demonstrates it in his search for beauty. Rather than giving into the physical beauty of Charmides (super gay and pedophilic. Freaking Greeks), Socrates searches for the deeper beauty of the soul, demonstrating temperance. Three stars cause of the gay stuff and some parts were confusing (which I think is intentional).

[Fernando Ferreira · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pequeno grande diálogo que, em meio à tentativa frustrada de alcançar uma definição satisfatória da sophrosyne, nos arrasta pelo caminho que vai de Eros - de seu impacto desnorteador - até a compreensão da necessidade inescapável da contemplação serena do Agathón.

"Mais um vez, Cármides, retruquei, olha com atenção para dentro de ti mesmo, considera o que faz em ti a presença da temperança e o que deverá ela ser produzir semelhante efeito, e, depois de bem refletires, dize-me com decisão e lealdade o que te parece que seja a temperança?".

[James Dempsey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bought recently a spread of Platonic dialogues. Really enjoying them thus far, given that i have read a preliminary summary of each. I finished Charmides today. A philosophical dialogue, taking the form of a first person narrative, Socrates and a young charmides discuss the nature of temperance, dispelling throughout their discussion some of the myths which surround this concept of mind, this temperament. Very good, I give it 4 beans.

[John Damon Davis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ancient Greeks be gay.
Also, the knowledge of knowledge without an external object is largely useless.

[Roman Zadorozhnii · Rating 5 out of 5]

Спроба розібратися, що таке Софросюне (грец. σωφροσύνη — «розсудливість, поміркованість, здоровий глузд»)

[Josh Anderson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The judgement of people on this is a tad pedestrian. So what, Socrates was an old man who supposedly remained chaste, and had an inclination for young men. I say again, so what? Charmides age is never mentioned, I don't think, and is just called a 'youth' and was probably around 17 years of age, which the media agrees, is a very fine age when it comes to the human form. I'm sorry, but it kind of makes me sick the way we judge this even more because it is homosexual. Look at Sparta and the way they raised their young. Greek culture was obviously very different from Judeo-Christian culture, but I'd rather make Socrates blush than a Catholic priest. At least Socrates tries to calm himself and return to his regular disposition. I don't believe sex is in any way an accident when discussing sophrosyne, or temperance. Sure, this is probably NAMBLA prime material, but this dialoge needs to be seen for what it is, not through the eyes of the Nancy Grace-world we live in.

[c · Rating 3 out of 5]

An entirely strange dialogue in which Socrates and Critias both fail totally to find a satisfying, even to themselves, conclusion or definition. I couldn't stop thinking what a ridiculous figure Socrates must have struck to Charmides and his mates, although this sentiment is leavened in the end with some lighthearted, laughably creepy banter.

Some good things come about as byproduct. The science of man's self I think is a good enough conclusion, although with "science" taken as a metaphor, not a literal science, as it's taken in this dialogue. "Know thyself"—I think the missing concept in this dialogue was preference or interest, as it seems tying a continuous exploration and self-challenging to something that truly interests oneself is an unbeatable combo, although what do I know, the dialogue starts out with an untranslatable concept, sophrosyne, after all.

[Maan Kawas · Rating 4 out of 5]

A beautiful dialogue by the great Ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, which basically deals with definition temperance (in Greek: Sophrosyne)! I particularly loved the idea of self-knowledge, knowing what one knows and what one does not know. Furthermore, I loved the discussion on the relation between medicine and science. The dialogue did not reach a precise definition of temperance, but it raised various important question, which makes it an interesting and enjoyable philosophical work.

[Maxfield · Rating 3 out of 5]

Plato's Socrates is a pain in the ass as usual. The ending lets you wonder whether he's about to take fair Charmides to his bed-chamber.

[Illiterate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting dialogue on temperance/self-knowledge. The characterization is particularly fine.

[Realini Ionescu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Charmides by Plato

About Wisdom



Like most of the other dialogues, this one is also beautiful.

To read about wisdom, virtue, good, valor and he most important human qualities is in itself a joy.

Diderot has said that

“A superior mind profits from a page of Plato more than from a thousand pages of critique…

Plato talks about the general harmony of the universe in such a way, that the Almighty Himself would borrow his language and ideas…”

In other words, instead of reading this note of mine here, you are a thousand times better off by reading Plato.

“Wisdom gives health not only to the head, but also to the whole body”

Plato was prescient in many ways, and without knowing about the latest discoveries that today are obtained with scanners, tomography and RMOI, Plato could anticipate that the state of the mind affects the whole body.

Trying to find out about what wisdom really is, in the dialogue the interlocutors move between various hypotheses so much that one of the participants gets dizzy.

They wrongly suggest that the speed with which things get done or a conclusion is reached might determine wisdom/

Then it is guessed that shame might have something to do with being wise.

What is evident throughout the dialogues of Plato is the importance of being Good, Virtuous, even if definitions can be hard to come by, sometimes they are misleading and impossible to agree on.

We have to think of the conclusion of Socrates on the pronouncement of the Oracle of the Temple of Delphi, who said that Socrates is the wisest man.

Thinking about it, Socrates looked around him and found lots of people who thought about themselves in the most positive terms: that they know about horses, politics and more. But when it comes down to real knowledge, they did not know anything about the subjects they claimed to be so familiar with.

Therefore it became clear that, since he never claimed that he knows what he doesn’t know, like the rest of the citizens of Athens, it must be concluded that Socrates is the wisest.

Speaking of the Temple of Delphi, at the entrance it was said: “Know thyself”

In the dialogue, this possibility is contemplated- that wisdom means to know yourself.

The argument that wisdom equals “minding ones business” is easily refuted.

Knowing good and evil sounds more like it, in my opinion...but in the end, Socrates is so modest as to say that he doesn’t know, he seeks for the truth. He even declared that “he knows that he knows nothing”

His humility should be a lesson in modesty and relentless search for the truth, virtue and goodness.



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[Truls Ljungström · Rating 5 out of 5]

Denna text har två nivåer: dels beskriver den dygden måttlighet (detta är den första halvan av texten), dels beskriver den svårigheten att tillämpa en definition på systemet som skapar definitioner.

Den första nivån, samtalet om måttlighet som fenomen, landar i att måttlighet är att göra det man är satt att göra, utan överdrift men också utan underdrift. Ett slags ickehierarkisk version av skomakare bliv vid din läst. Denna del av samtalet är elegant, och ganska insiktsfullt. För att komma vidare spelar Sokrates bort korten, genom att spela in medvetande som diskussionspunkt, och argumentera för att en konst bara kan vara en konst, om den görs medvetet. Det innebär i princip att grundsamtalet är avslutat, eftersom man går till metanivån.

Den andra nivån, om medvetande och definitioner, landar i att filosofi som fenomen blir omöjligt, om man tillämpar filosofins nivå av begreppsstringens på fenomenet i sig själv.

Jag gillar idén.

[nemėgstu filosofijos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Visų pirma, negaliu nepaminėti, jog knygų pirkėjo prekinio fetišizmo geną baisiai pradžiugino DVIKALBIS leidimas. Leidėjai sąžiningai paliko s. graikų bei lietuviškąjį tekstą greta vienas kito, tokiu būdu skaitytojas, išmanantis originalo kalbą, gali palyginti įvairias sąvokas, pažiūrėti, kiek vertėjas nukrypo nuo kelio (ko beveik ir neatsitiko). Dialoge "Charmidas" tyrinėta santūrumo sąvoka yra labai svarbi, tačiau kiek netikėta, nes šiais laikais niekam neįdomu kalbėti apie santūrumą, o iš filosofijos istorijos perspektyvos -- šis dialogas yra vienas iš tylesnių, jį perrėkia garsesni Platono veikalai. Tačiau, nuvertinimo šalyje dažnai esti daug lobių, taip yra ir su šia knyga. Tikiuosi, jog leidykla Phi knygos (buvusi Jonas ir Jokūbas) tęs Platono tylesnių tekstų leidybą.

[Armenuhy]

Plato's dialogues cover the luck of modern life of going deeper in the meaning of definitions: thinking, describing, reflecting.
In 'Charmides' the topic of thinking is 'temperance'.
Ընթերցելուս ժամանակը համընկավ Մեծ Պահքի հետ։ Հետաքրքիր է, թե ինչպես է Պլատոնի տեքստը կարողանում ներառել ընթերցողին զրույցի մեջ։
Ընթերցեք, եթե ուզում եք զգալ տեքստն ու մտնել դրա մեջ։

[Miloš Dikić · Rating 3 out of 5]

Platon ovde, za razliku od svojih kompleksnijih i apstraktnijih dijaloga, govori o pojmu razboritosti na jedan praktičan način. Ovde vrlina (razboritost) nije sama sebi cilj, već je sredstvo za nešto konkretno, koje na kraju dovodi do spoznaje dobra i zla.

Ipak, više uživam kada ode u potpunu apstrakciju, kao u Gozbi, i o vrlini (ljubavi, lepoti) govori kao o nečemu večnom, izvan ovoga sveta. Vrlina izdignuta do ideje, nečeg savršenog, a da je sve ostalo samo ovozemaljska, nesavršena projekcija.