The Many Faces of Realism (Paul Carus Lectures) by Putnam, Hilary(December 19, 1988) Paperback

by Hilary Putnam

An introduction to realism which concentrates on the alternatives to metaphysical realism and cultural relativism. The author places her thoughts in a historical context, appraises Kantian circumstances and defends moral objectivity.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Metaphysics

Paperback

First published February 1, 1987

About the author

Hilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who was a central figure in analytic philosophy from the 1960s until his death, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his own position. Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.

Reviews

[Todd · Rating 4 out of 5]

Let's say this. I am so glad I did not give up on Hilary Putnam after my first few forays into his oeuvre. Perhaps those earlier forays were on me for choosing more doctrinal works, or perhaps Putnam was building up to something through various adventures and misadventures. He is refreshingly forthright at admitting his prior misses and taking another shot at his philosophical aims. In any case, this work hits its intended target. In his main argument, Putnam takes all of the field clearings that analytic philosophy had completed over the 20th century, posits a thoroughgoing realism that there is a world out there independent of our categories, but argues that invariably our experiences and interpretations of the world are distilled through our conceptions and categories. You may have different conceptions and categories than I do, and the aboriginal tribes may have had different ones than either of us; in any case, there is a picture and conceptual system guiding the experience and interpretation. In the second half of the work, Putnam extends this framing into an ethical and moral argument on behalf of liberal and democratic pictures and stances toward life and society. There is a thoroughgoing pluralism to the picture that emerges, along with an openness and an unboundedness that the picture portends for those experiencing it. This is a benefit of this stance, not a defect. It allows for choice and the pursuit of happiness, as your choices and way of pursuing happiness may be different than mine, and both of ours may be different than the kids these days when they grow up. We do not have to confine ourselves to a singular virtue and end dictated on high by any autocrat or ruling class. There are limits, as my choices and pursuits of happiness have limits when they impinge on yours, and yours have limits when they impinge on others, such as the neighborhood kids or the old folks in the retirement home. Why these values rather than others? That, in fact, is determined by other standards and values. One philosophical tradition going back to Socrates, running through Kant and Putnam, and picked up by a strain of American self-determination, says that it is better to choose one's course oneself rather than it coming down from one's parents, or from society, or from some ruler or ruling class. Individually and socially, the pragmatist standard adds that the broadly democratic values and ways of life produce more desired results than the alternatives; this is a continual project of interpretation, life and experience, further interpretation and re-interpretation, and yet more life and experience. One shortcoming, fully embraced and owned by Putnam, is the rationalist underpinnings of this stance and picture. What if, though, a group of people divorced themselves from this project and threw their lot with a cynical game of will to power, even if their pursuit of power trampled others' pursuit of their needs, wants, and happiness? What if a group of people attempted to solve the problem of a "private language" with an attenuated link to phenomena and the world by forming it together as a community and stressing adherence to the rules of the private language and the power of the group over truth conditions? Answers and responses to these hypothetical groups could help shore up the argument. It would have been interesting if Putnam had run with this argument further in subsequent works, or if subsequent authors pick up the baton and extend the argument to a fuller and more fleshed-out picture.

[Pavlogreen]

Breve y asequible a un público amplio, Las mil caras del realismo permite conocer de cerca y con claridad el realismo de sentido común y pluralista de Hilary Putnam. También nos aproxima a sus opiniones sobre filosofía moral, en especial su crítica a la dicotomía hecho-valor. Gracias a esta variedad de temas podemos ver cómo cuestiones tan aparentemente alejadas como la deconstrucción de la división tradicional entre las proyecciones de la mente y las cualidades en sí de las cosas o la relatividad conceptual (que una misma realidad se puede expresar de maneras muy distintas según el discurso que se esté utilizando) no solo son lujos filosóficos aislados, sino una base sólida para desarrollar una filosofía significativa ético-políticamente hablando y con anclaje en la vida humana, que es a fin de cuentas lo que de verdad está en juego.

[Andrew]

One of the most masterful of analytical philosophers, in terms of insight, in terms of lucidity, and in terms of his ability to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable ideas... almost like a modern incarnation of William James. Here, he takes on "realism," and what that means in an era in which we know that a granite boulder is mostly empty intra-atomic space. Really, pragmatist philosophy is the most elegant way of saying "fuck it!" And Putnam says it better than almost anyone else.

[Aman · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this series of four lectures, Putnam rejects that there is an Epistemology or Ontology; the capital letter signifying a unique, singular, Ultimate result in a study, and his rejection of this capital letter reflecting his pluralism.

To this end, he argues for conceptual relativity. He supports an ethics of equality and of thinking for oneself about how to live (Kant: für sich selbst denken!), while arguing that such things do not rest on conclusive (epistemological) foundations. But do not let this make you think that, for Putnam, anything goes! It certainly does not. Simply, there is a point at which one has to say, "This is where my spade is turned!" But fear not, for there remains a plethora of interesting epistemological questions and ontological images of the human situation in the world.

Littered throughout are examples and allusions, wonderfully woven, from Polish logicians to the solubility of ice cubes, from Newton and Kant to an ethics of Judean provenance, from Brave New World to Mohammed and Charlemagne.

What is left for me to ponder is the way that this broadly coheres with the pragmatist project.

[Tyler · Rating 4 out of 5]

I wish there were halves on Goodreads, because 4 is not good enough, but this is not a 5 star worthy book.

Hilary Putnam is a phenomenal writer (or speaker) because he makes everything so simple to understand. I can't shed much more light on what exactly he wrote that is not already on the back. I will say that he attacked scientism quite a bit. Showing that induction is not the only way to know the truth, and that it won't' even help explain our common sense beliefs. His contribution on finding a common ground between relativism and objectivity in truth seemed like it was something that people already know, but maybe I am wrong. He just says that truth itself is objective, but because people look at things differently, they can come up with two different answers that are both true, but shown from a different perspective. It sounds a lot like relativism itself, but read the book to understand it better, I don't do justice to it. After all, I am not Hilary Putnam.

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid details on his vision.

[Luther Wilson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Currently my favorite philosopher. Enjoy the explorations of meaning and of how the world is related to our concepts.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Readable exposition of the position that concepts always interpose themselves between us and reality.

[Raymond Lam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This collection of essays is Putnum's Paul Carus lectures in 1985 in which he presented his early pragmatic realism (or internal realism), and then from which he derives a Kantian moral image of the world that is based on the given moral narrative in the context.

The way Putnum sets up his pragmatic realism in the first two lectures is to consider the dichotomy from Husserl of examining the world from the laws of modern science at microscopic particles level vs the world consisting of middle-sized objects, such as tables and trees, by examining their secondary properties. Considering the secondary properties of objects involve their disposition properties projected onto the observer which are not necessarily the objects' intrinsic properties as well as the intentionality of the observers towards the objects. Secondary properties can lead to antirealism motivated by conceptual relativity. Putnum suggests an internal realism that accepts a realism of the world based on contextual relativity. Facts about the world are based on a conceptual scheme but are nonetheless true. Conceptual scheme relativity can be considered as viewing the world at different scales. One can view the world at the microscopic particle level or at the middle-sized object level by their secondary properties such as size, colour, shape, and weight.

In the third lecture, he explores the moral framework that can result from his internal realism. Putnum thinks Kant sees observers contribute concepts to the phenomenal world. The moral image of the world is based on the. epistemological positions we find ourselves in a given context of ethics, history, and culture. The foundation of our moral image is not just given to us.

These lectures don't just present Putnum's own views but how he discovered them by considering the views available and puzzles or paradoxes to be solved

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER FOLLOWS UP HIS “REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY”

Hilary Whitehall Putnam (born 1926-2016) was an American analytic philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who taught at Harvard for many years. He wrote many other books, such as 'Realism with a Human Face,' 'Pragmatism: An Open Question,' 'Reason, Truth and History,' etc.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1987 book, “When I wrote ‘Reason, Truth and History,’ I described my purpose as breaking the stranglehold which a number of dichotomies have on our thinking, chief among them the dichotomy between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ views of truth and reason… The invitation to give the Paul Carus Lectures at the December 1985 meeting of the American Philosophical Association… provided me with the opportunity to further specify the alternative that I see to metaphysical realist views of reality and truth, on the one hand, and to cultural relativist ones, on the other. In the earlier book I described current views of truth as ‘alienated’ views, views which cause one to lose one or another part of one’s self and the world; in these lectures I have tried to elaborate on this remark…”

He says, “I asked… whether there is still anything … really new to say, about reality and truth. If ‘new’ means ‘absolutely unprecedented,’ I suspect the answer is ‘no.’ But if we allow that William James might have had something ‘new’ to say… if we allow that Husserl and Wittgenstein and Austin may have shared something of the same program, even if they too, in their different ways, failed to state it properly; then there is still something new, something unfinished and important to say about reality and truth. And that is what I believe.” (Pg. 17)

He observes, “Metaphysical realists to this day continue to argue about whether points … are individuals or properties, particulars or mere limits, etc. My view is that God himself, if he consented to answer the question, ‘Do points really exist or are they mere limits?’ would say, ‘I don’t know’; not because His omniscience is limited, but because there is a limit to how far questions make sense." (Pg. 19)

He explains, "My own view… differs from all these. These authors all assume we can make the distinction between what is ‘simply true’ and what has only ‘assertibility conditions,’ or the cut between what is already true or false and what is an ‘extension of previous use’ … or between what is a ‘projection’ and what is an independent and unitary property of things in themselves. I think that, epistemically at least, the attempt to draw this distinction, to make this cut, has been a total failure. The time has come to try the methodological hypothesis that no such cut can be made.” (Pg. 26-27)

He admits, “The idea that we owe respect to the untalented, and to those whose achievement is not significant---[Nietzsche] didn’t care about ‘social contribution’---is one that Nietzsche attacked vehemently, and it is because I regard it as fundamentally right that I do not fully share the current admiration for Nietzsche.” (Pg. 45)

He notes, “Robert Nozick reports being asked whether one could give an argument to show that Hitler is a bad man that would convince Hitler himself. The only answer to this demand---the demand that what is fact must be provable to every ‘intelligent’ person---is to point out that probably no statement except the Principle of Contradiction---has this property.” (Pg. 68)

He asserts, “In ‘Reason, Truth, and History’ I assumed that this appeal to ‘the scientific method’ is empty. My own view, to be frank, is that there is no such thing as THE scientific method. Case studies of particular theories in physics, biology, etc., have convinced me that no one paradigm can fit all of the various inquiries that go under the name of ‘science.’ But let me not presuppose any of this today.” (Pg. 72)

He continues, “When [Rudolf] Carnap and I worked together on inductive logic in 1953-1954, the problem that he regarded as the MOST intractable in the whole area of inductive logic was the problem of ‘giving proper weight to analogy.’ No criterion is known for distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ analogies, and a well-known argument of Nelson Goodman’s shows that a purely FORMAL criterion is ruled out.” (Pg. 73)

He suggests, “Our notions---the notion of a value, the notion of a moral image, the notion of a standard, the notion of a need---are so intertwined that none of them can provide a ‘foundation’ for ethics, just as we have come to see that there is no possibility of a ‘foundation’ for ethics. That, I think, is exactly right. We must come to see that there is no possibility of a ‘foundation’ for ethics, just as we have come to see that there is no possibility of a ‘foundation’ for scientific knowledge, or for any other kind of knowledge.” (Pg. 79)

He concludes, “rejecting the project of Epistemology with a capital ‘E’---the project of a Universal Method for telling who has ‘reason on his side’ no matter WHAT the dispute---will not put an end to all the interesting questions about knowledge in science and in ethics; instead it will direct our attention to other phenomena we have been trying to ignore … Above all, I hope it may redirect philosophical energy to one of its very traditional tasks---the one task philosophy should never abandon---the task of providing meaningful, important, and discussable images of the human situation in the world.” (Pg. 86)

This book will be of great interest to anyone studying contemporary analytic philosophy.

[Rex Libris · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read this in grad school and re-read it now. Now, as was then, the most I got out of it was a defense of what you could call naive realism.

[Evan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Science is real! And so are our minds! So just don't worry about it!

[Zoonanism · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is something not quite right with Putnam's arguments in these lectures