The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics

by Gilbert Harman

Contains an overall account of morality in its philosophical format particularly with regard to problems of observation, evidence, and truth.

Genres: Philosophy

192 pages, Paperback

First published January 6, 1977

Reviews

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gilbert Harman got my attention as a modern day philosopher who proposed an actual contract/convention theory of morality: morality consists of rules which we ourselves have actually agreed to which is laid out in chapter 9. This is better described as actual convention to distinguish from social contract theories of justice in which rational individuals in a hypothetical state of nature/anarchy/ignorance consent to alienate a bundle of rights to a sovereign. Actual conventions are an outcome of a real bargaining process of unequal self-interested individuals who must 1) themselves actually commit to the principle they espouse and 2) expect others with similar reasons to adopt said principles. Outside these reasons which we and others agree or would have reason to consent to moral judgements are essentially expressive, we can judge outsiders but unless they share reasons to behave as we do cannot be expected to behave morally.

This explains a lot of moral puzzles according to Harman such as why the duty to not harm is greater than the duty to help, as this rule is more universal and in the interest of the more powerful and wealthy who have more to lose by assisting others but also more to protect. Also why we usually have lesser duties to animals and assign less responsibility to children as they are in degrees not part of the moral discussion or lack reasons or abilities to adopt our rules. We may be wrong about the facts of these exceptions and hierarchies, but this depends on the extent or possibility of a consensus of knowledge. Harman is a sort of moral relativist with these conclusions but not a total subjectivist as the extent of this consensus depends on acceptance of naturalism or higher metaphysical/theistic principles as this is meant to be an explanatory metaethical account of ethics not what most people think they mean when they make moral statements.

The book begins with the problem that moral questions are not provable or reliant on observation the way scientific questions are. Observation is relevant for our knowledge not just of scientific hypotheses but also mathematical demonstration. Rather than begin with a metaphysical or theistic account Harman starts with nihilism, that there are no moral truths or at least no knowledge of moral truths is possible. Nihilism may be counterintuitive and unpopular but that does not make it false. Emotivism is presented as moderate nihilism which accounts for why moral statements are meaningful but does not make a statement about what morality is, just what people express by their approval or disapproval. Emotivism risks being trivial without additional assumptions from nihilism or naturalism which it is compatible with, but it is part of morality to personally favor the rules one is for. The naturalist version of emotivism is compatible with ideal observer theory, in which an idealized abstract individual would have the same moral dispositions. Ideal observer answers the trivial objections like how people could be mistaken or change their moral views and have a common morality. But both are subject to the open question argument as are all forms of naturalism if purely definitional. Without moral reasoning ethics becomes part of aesthetics, what we find pleasing beautiful etc. Emotivism’s good point is we should actually be for what we say is moral. Ideal observer’s good point is we should be impartial and aim to universalize our views.

Harman then discusses non-naturalist morality chiefly that of Kant and existentialism. Existentialism is a variant of nihilism; sincerity, good faith, commitment and self-consistency the only standards but has no basis in reality or inherent obligation for others. The problem with Kantian morality is that rationality is not usually enough to give one a reason to judge something good or bad or to motivate oneself to act even if we desire other people to. However Kant’s insight is that moral rules involve reasoning even if not deductive. RM Hare takes morality to be universalizable commands without the need to justify their content. The problem with Hare is other people are not obligated to adopt a moral principle if they don’t have a reason to but we should aim to have others adopt our morality.

Harman then discusses the tools of his own which is good reasons analysis. There are at least four senses of the word ought: moral, evaluative, expectative, and rational. Moral ought is the subject of the book while the other three are more obvious. Moral reasoning is inductive but makes use of deduction in individual cases and is either internal or external. Actual convention is externalist but relative. Moral analysis is divided into prima facie and ‘all things considered’ oughts, all principles have exceptions but there is a hierarchy.

The conclusion of the book is a sort of utilitarianism that recognizes we are usually self interested but can take an interest in others even if non-rational and interested which can be improved by praise of altruistic behavior and condemnation of vicious acts rather than guilting people for not doing more good. Actual convention is a useful way of understanding morality and explaining seeming inconsistencies when people apply principles to those not in good faith or lacking a motive. The two most important principles are a good faith commitment to moral rules one espouses and logical consistency of applying them to others similarly inclined, found in existentialist and Kantian morality respectively but here derived from a discussion of emotivism and ideal observer theory. This may be a more fruitful means of resolving ethical and political disagreement than resorting to a god’s eye perspective of perfect rationality. The difference with political philosophy however is that these norms would be unstable without a formal process of bargaining and coercion. In these ways the law is a fallible implementation of the impartial judge.

All this is similar to David Hume’s moral philosophy and application of utility to justice, but whereas Hume was a naturalist Hobbes was closer to a conventional view of morality as when Harman supposes a state of nature to be amoral which to some extent exists de facto among and between humans, the earth, and animals prior to convention. Hobbes states that the state of nature need not be universal nor long lived and may have genuinely believed human nature to be antisocial and pretend to equality from which his conclusions would follow. Hobbes’ concept of natural law as agreement of rationals also suggests an actual convention theory although using the language of natural law since the use of reason is instrumental toward non-rational ends. Hobbes went as far to apply contractarian reasoning to parental and servile relationships, consent being valid under duress and implied in preservation. Contract and more specifically covenant however means mutual transference of right and so a special kind of convention. Locke and Kant departed from this by using theistic language (Locke) or making the state of nature hypothetical (Kant). Rousseau would differ from Hobbes by a sentimentalist account of natural morality like Hume and rationality developing from the evolution of civil society.

[Imlac · Rating 5 out of 5]

Challenging and original account of what ethics is about. It is not an introduction, save in the sense that it presupposes no prior aquaintance with the main ethical theories. However, it certainly presupposes some philosophical training and aptitude.