[from Dec 2013] Hackett Classics edition, tr. G.M.A. Grube, revised Cooper.
Philosophy is a subject I don't really get on with. Many of its topics I find fascinating when reading about them in the context of the sciences, psychology, sociology, contemporary religion/atheism debate etc, or as informal conversation. But reading long books of the serious abstract stuff with all the interesting, real-life bits missing? I've never quite seen the point, and I'd almost rather learn crochet or golf or some other equally dull and useless hobby.
My record with Classical texts isn't much better. Catullus is a great favourite, Sappho also good, I finished the Oedipus plays, but not Herodotus (though I did keep reading bits of him to take breaks from this, and it was much more interesting than I remembered). That's pretty much it. All my adult life I've farmed out any Greek and Roman questions not answerable online to friends who studied Classics, as it seemed futile to try and catch up.
Why this then? It was set for a short-lived book group on Goodreads nearly two years ago [early 2012], and it's only 150 pages. The book group fizzled out almost before I could leave it - which is a record - and we'd never got round to reading this.
Whilst reading I found myself considering what texts like this are for these days. Very odd really, given that I find classics (of the small-c variety) intrinsically interesting as historical documents never mind anything else, and I have little patience with people who criticise them because they don't contain 100% contemporary values, as if that were their purpose. It's an attitude I associate mostly with the U.S. culture wars and have only rarely heard from intelligent people from Britain and Europe.
There's a common root here: the American Great Books programs, which are astoundingly conservative compared with British literature syllabuses I've been aware of from my lifetime, and which say or imply that one can be educated for almost anything, not simply about pre-twentieth century thought, by reading some very old books indeed. (It's claimed much more grandly, and as if the books themselves will do it, in a way I can never remember hearing about any British course. They even use old texts centrally in science classes, not merely history of science.) The culture wars in part began as a rebellion against those programs. The book-group this came from followed a list inspired by Great Books. The web has given these lists greater prominence than they had outside America 10+ years ago and it's easier to bump into them if looking for lists of important books.
Perhaps I was more susceptible to the claims of those Great Books lists as a historian, because they contain a lot of the substance of pre-twentieth century education. (I'd never been happy that I couldn't muster enthusiasm for the material the Renaissance humanists I studied, themselves studied so assiduously - or with the idea that if I'd been around 150+ years ago that I may as well have been a bit thick because much of what made up learning then just doesn't interest me.)
As I read more of these dialogues, I thankfully concluded that it's plain daft to expect this to be some magical guide to everything, rather than a translated primary source giving some idea of what a few Ancient Greeks, and those influenced by them, thought, just as the narrative of Dickens gives some idea of how some Victorians thought. It is an interesting text because it shows that many of the same questions have been obsessing intellectuals in the Western tradition (and probably others too) for two and a half thousand years - though it was rather a plough-through. Made me wonder if we're still a bit trapped in that legacy and if these things have been universally important to humans everywhere.
(The Great Books programs, I decided, are a charming fringe eccentricity that shouldn't have been treated as generally representative ... I'd have to read more on the history of the culture wars to check how fair that implication about the opponents is.)
I have just looked back at my reivews and notes for the actual dialogues and seen how long they are, so this will be a veritable essay, handed in probably to no-one who has time to read it.
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My responses to the dialogues are inevitably flippant, but I'd be very interested in discussion from friends who know the material, or know much about Plato and Socrates, if they can be bothered to plough through this post.
Euthyphro
I think Socrates rather rude for haranguing Euthyphro at such length and at a time like this, and that Euthyphro would have been quite within his rights to tell him to fuck off - but that is quite beside the point. I imagine this accusation of rudeness being argued with as pedantically as Socrates does here, and the idea is completely exhausting.
If I had to describe most of my political principles I'd have to start in terms of psychology (especially attachment theory and person-centred) with a bit of Nordic style socialism and quite a lot of Mill-type liberalism (which these days sounds so extreme it's easier to describe as libertarianism). These all leave a lot of space for human factors, and for a system not being based on absolute cold Vulcan logic, which I feel Socrates and those who argue like him are ultimately trying to establish.
Euthyphro describes his prosecution of his father for the manslaughter of a servant, who had himself killed a slave, as a pious action. (I tend to approve of Euthyphro here because he seems to consider that the law should apply equally to different social classes, however, I do not like potentially continuing any chain of killing or maiming people.) Socrates questions the definition of a pious action by establishing that different gods approve of different things. They both sound so arrogantly certain that they're right that I just want to leave them to get on with things as individuals and am not enjoying listening to the argument... I don't like arguments and that's kind of a problem.
I also struggle with the Socratic idea of knowing nothing. Everyone, even people with vast knowledge, knows only a tiny fraction of the stuff in the world, and “knowledge” is subject to change based on new events and new evidence. But people do know something. Your detailed knowledge of medieval canon law may be no bloody use if you're asked to operate a combine harvester for the first time, but it meant something at an academic conference. These are two completely separate domains of knowledge which are to one extent or another agreed on by people who use them daily. Within those systems, within certain spheres of existence, they are “knowledge” even if certain philosophers who haven't spent enough time doing practical, non-ivory tower work want to chunter about whether or not life and perception are real: human activity goes on from day to day using this knowledge.
I disagree with something cited here as a fundamental principle, that wrongdoers should be punished. I don't believe in retribution or punishment, though some people should be kept away from most of society to stop them doing further harm; also rehabilitation may be possible. If you've seen any British stories going slack-jawed at the Norwegian prison system... it would all work something like that. Also, more widely in society, conditioning inevitably occurs and some actions termed “punishment” act as forms of conditioning.
Whilst I've tried to use this reading to go into some fundamental principles that apply today, the main things I've actually learnt from this were the extent to which Greek morality and justice were thought to come from the gods, and that I could understand why some might find Socrates annoying .
Apology
(not an apology - an apologia, a defence)
A historical record of Socrates' speech in his own defence, not something of a manufactured set-piece like Euthyphro.
The first example of the stealth boast I have not wanted to defend
Sounds like the sort of petty point-scoring in debates at student parties
The idea that Classical texts are relevant to everything or that you can learn everything from them – not I hasten to add that the two friends mentioned above have ever pushed this on me. It seems to have come more from reading about American Great Books reading programs. (Which are way more conservative than what we have here.)
Gadfly: Why do I not like him when I usually like similar characters? Is it because of his coldness?
That he actually says he's god's gift?
I don't find things very interesting when put in this abstract way.
It bothers me that if I had lived before the twentieth century (though as I would not have survived infancy the point is moot) I would have effectively been a bit thick, because most learning constituted stuff like this and I find it pretty dull. Housework, manual work, physical activity, and possibly even embroidery – though that's a very close-run thing - are all preferable to reading abstract waffle that states the obvious. Though perhaps it wouldn't have all seemed so goddamn obvious.
Crito
People couldn't help doing wrong – I pretty much agree
This is a long argument about something I don't really have a problem with though plenty of modern people apparently do, just as they do with Oscar Wilde not escaping to the Continent.
Meno
Parallel to the nature-nurture debate which is to a significant extent answered in principle, though not in absolute detail by the understanding of gene-environment interaction and epigenetics
Surely this sort of thing is more useful for teaching forms of debate than for its content. Or perhaps if presented to, say, 12 year olds in the manner of “thinking skills” lessons it would be useful.
It is clear then that those who do not know things to be bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they [e] believe to be good but that are in fact bad.
Virtù and virtue are quite different things.
I am reading this quite differently from the way I read most other older books, which I automatically treat as a historical document. I keep trying to understand its direct modern applications. Although I think that is the problem with the way too many people on this site approach books older than they are. I had considered this an extremely short-sighted approach, but if I relate it to an American tradition that's actually more conservative than the British, (which to us looks like an extreme eccentricity) in which the Culture Wars were a revolt against, I have a better understanding of their context, though I still think it wrong-headed.
Not, oh, look, it's an early example of the hypothesis approach, more, what can I learn from this now? That's so not the point.
Certain qualities when taken to extremes are judged by authority to be bad.
Nature. Nurture and the possibility of teaching – questions still debated in psychology although there is now more research and evidence.
Text lacks examples
Badly written – Crito especially [the cheek! but I did say I didn't get on with these types of texts, and maybe there *are* less-dry ways to translate them?]
Can goodness be taught? Implicit and explicit memory. Is virtue knowledge?
live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge [67] or we can do so after death.
Disdain for the body
that the gods are our guardians and that men are one of their possessions.
I have good hope that some future awaits men after death, as we have been told for years, a much better future for the good than for the wicked.
But if people can't help their actions that is unfair
Souls must go somewhere they can come back from
knowledge as recollection
what triggers memory?
The Equal – a singular concept
soul exists before they are born
Whether souls die or live on after the person
No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced [c] philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lover of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious
mind/body dualism
Ceebs!
Forms: Beautiful Good etc abstract nouns existing as absolute template entities
Could be investigated by cross cultural comparison, neuroscience etc
But even within groups there are variations. For instance: white British middle class vegetarians I have known disagree on whether, in a hypothetical scenario where they were starving in the wild with no proximity to civilisation, they would eat animals. 1) some would kill and eat an animal in this scenario 2) some would only kill and eat non-mammals 3) some would only eat animals which had died anyway, and it may differ what types 4) some would rather starve than eat any animals.
friend, in the first place it is said that the earth, looked at from above, looks like those spherical balls made up of twelve pieces of leather; it is multicolored, and of these colors those used by our painters give us an indication;
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Originally posted in this review field:
I have about 2000 draft words on this from the time of reading, nowhere near finished, and not sure if I ever shall finish the review. Aside from the minutiae of philosophy, the upshot was that I really didn't get much out of it; these are so clearly old versions of current debates (lacking some of the information / technology / progressive opinion), and the main object of interest was to be reminded that people had such similar thoughts nearly 2500 years ago. Also a bit of a slog for such a short book, which may or may not be the translation. I'm really not a Classicist.
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August 2020: decided to post my old draft and notes from December 2013, as it fits here. However silly and callow it may be, there's no point rewriting a review this old without re-reading the book. It's all as it was then, except for "[early 2012]" and the bit in square brackets re. Crito .