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Minimizing Marriage: Morality, Marriage, and the Law
Even in secular and civil contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. Yet what moral significance does it have? This book examines its morally salient features -- promise, commitment, care, and contract -- with surprising results. In Part One, "De-Moralizing Marriage," essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. The book contends with the most influential philosophical accounts of the moral value of marriage to argue that marriage has no inherent moral significance. Further, the special value accorded marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination - discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, polyamorous groups, or urban tribes. The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the possibilities and bounds of interpersonal moral obligations and the nature of commitment.
The central argument of Part Two, "Democratizing Marriage," is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognition of groups, polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. Under the constraints of public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines; but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic love dyads. Restrictions on marriage should thus be minimized. But public reason can provide a strong rationale for minimal marriage: care, and social supports for care, are a matter of fundamental justice. Part Two also responds to challenges posed by property division on divorce, polygyny, and supporting parenting, and builds on critiques of marriage drawn from feminism, queer theory, and race theory. It argues, using the example of minimal marriage, for the compatibility of liberalism and feminism.
The central argument of Part Two, "Democratizing Marriage," is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognition of groups, polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. Under the constraints of public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines; but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic love dyads. Restrictions on marriage should thus be minimized. But public reason can provide a strong rationale for minimal marriage: care, and social supports for care, are a matter of fundamental justice. Part Two also responds to challenges posed by property division on divorce, polygyny, and supporting parenting, and builds on critiques of marriage drawn from feminism, queer theory, and race theory. It argues, using the example of minimal marriage, for the compatibility of liberalism and feminism.
254 pages, Paperback
First published February 17, 2012
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February 3, 2013
Marriage these days is confined to two people and the usual arrangement is between a man and a woman. Lately, there has been growing acceptance of same-sex relationships and thereby same-sex marriage. But anything more than this is going “too far.” Brake makes a bold claim: marriage should not be restricted to the gender or number of people involved, otherwise the state is practicing discriminatory practices. She has two main reasons: (1) a liberal neutral state will not sponsor any value claim in relationships, including marriage, and (2) by doing so, the state will not sponsor amatonormativity (Brake’s coinage) which means that the “traditional” couple (monogamous, sexual dyad, male and female) should not be the state-sponsored norm of any relationship because it discriminates all other types of relationships. The major thesis behind Brake’s book is that there is no special connection between marriage and morality. Thus, a marriage could consist of the “traditional” model (one man + one woman), a same-sex model, a polyamorous or polygamous relationship, diverse care networks, urban tribes, and even a network of friends. But why? Two reasons: (1) for economic independence and (2) gender equality. I’ll go through a chapter by chapter breakdown.
Part One is Brake’s thesis that marriage needs to be de-moralized. Because marriage has been given a higher moral status, this value has made marriage a higher priority in terms of what is a valuable relationship. Anything that doesn’t fit into this model is de-valued. Thus, people who don’t aim for this typical “traditional” marriage don’t have the “proper” relationship to aim for. In short, critics would say that marriage is moral because it makes a promise, follows a special commitment, it is the only type of relationship where sexual relations are permissible, and that marriage involves a special type of relationship that no other relationship can have. Brake argues against all of this carefully.
Chapter One is Brake’s argument that wedding vows cannot be promises. Things may change in the future. So how can we be sure that our love will continue? Moreover, if wedding vows are promises, and a divorce is breaking a promise, and breaking a promise is immoral, then this entails that divorces are immoral. How does one get around this problem? Brake looks at some replies around it, but finds them unsatisfactory. Her conclusion is that wedding vows are not promises at all. This is because we cannot control our feelings, thus we cannot promise to love someone. Rather, a wedding vow is a promise of action and behavior: to act lovingly. By promising to do something rather than to feel something, the wedding vow de-couples love from the wedding in a necessary sense. Thus, a wedding vow is more akin to commitments rather than promises. So what’s a commitment?
Chapter Two analyzes commitments and finds the differences between promises and commitments. In short, a promise is an utterance to do something whereas a commitment is a psychological disposition that one takes on as a matter of integrity. For example, I may promise my friends to take them shopping this weekend, but I’m committed to cut back on my expenses by not eating out so much. It is here that I have some troubles with Brake’s notion of commitment.
There’s something problematic that I see. Typically, commitments are something that has high value and priority in one’s life. But the above criteria above doesn’t mention that. What if the commitment is to something trivial? Is it still a commitment? For example, the popular show The Big Bang Theory has a character who follows a certain routine and if the routine isn’t followed, then he feels off. The character I’m thinking is Sheldon Cooper. One example is that he must use the bathroom at 8AM every morning and if not, then he doesn’t “feel right.” Is Sheldon Cooper making a commitment go to the bathroom at a certain time? It seems strange, but Brake’s analysis doesn’t account for that. Indeed, I’m not sure I can see a significant difference between commitment and routine here.
Another problem is how promises and commitments interrelate, if at all? Can one make a commitment to make a commitment? Can one make a commitment to make a promise? Can one promise to make a promise? Can one promise to make a commitment? I suspect that in some instances, a “yes” could be answered. Thus, these need to be deciphered in order to clarify a distinction between commitments and promises.
Despite the small critique I have of her, Brake’s point is that “a commitment does not in itself entail interpersonal obligation” (p. 50). A spouse isn’t obligated to continue to care for the other if there is something about the relationship that is no longer worth caring about. For example, if the relationship turns sour or becomes abusive, the commitment to stay in the relationship is no longer valuable. Thus, commitments are conditional, and they are conditional on what objects and values it brings to the table. In this sense then, love doesn’t require commitments! One can be committed to a person through a series of choices and through a duration of time, but there is no necessary connection between commitments and love. A breakup can happen but one person can still love the other person regardless. And I can be committed to another person even though I may not love him or her romantically. The point behind chapter two is to show that marriage and commitments are not intimately tied as we thought they were. A commitment is morally neutral: it’s only as good as the value of that object. To stay in a marriage because of some obligation isn’t really commitment; to stay in a marriage (or any type of relationship) because one chooses to shows true commitment.
Chapter Three argues the idea that sexual relations are only moral within the bounds of sex. Part of this argument is that marriage somehow morally transforms the couple so that sex is now permissible or virtuous within marriage. Brake argues against the Kantian argument that sex outside of marriage is objectifying the other, John Finnis’ new natural law argument that sex outside of marriage is unnatural, and Roger Scruton’s conservative argument that marriage makes the individuals involved more chaste thereby having a more flourishing life. I won’t go into the details of these arguments, but I think Brake does a very good job showing the flaws of these arguments.
Chapter Four argues against the idea that marriage is somehow a higher form of relationship. Along with this, marriage brings in a sense of care that no other relationship can. Here, Brake brings up a new term: “amatonormativity.” In the same way as relationships have been heteronormative, the current model of relationships is still amatonormative. Brake argues that care ethics only makes sense within the context of justice and contracts. Her focus is on amatonormativity and why it’s unjust. As an analogy, relationships have been heteronormative meaning that if the relationship doesn’t follow the heterosexual norm (one man + one woman), then the relationship isn’t deemed “normal” and thus since it doesn’t fit the norm, the relationship isn’t seen as legitimate. Slowly, heteronormativity is breaking down by the public slowly gaining acceptance of same-sex relations and same-sex marriage. However, amatonormativity is still prevalent. Amatonormativity “consists in the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, in that it is a universal shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types” (p. 88-89). By making this the norm, other type of relationships such as friendship, urban tribes, quirkyalones, polyamorists and asexuals have been devalued as a “normal” and “proper” relationship. Amatonormativity overlooks other type of caring relationships; “marriage promotes one form of caring relationship at the expense of many others. Our culture focuses on dyadic amorous relationships at the cost of recognizing friendships, care networks, urban tribes, and other intimate associations” (p. 88). Those who violate amatonormative lifestyles face discrimination either through societal or legal pressures. Thus, the setup is that amatonormativity already privileges those who are married or seeking marriage. We still see this in our culture: if one is single, we often feel bad for that person or there must be something wrong with that person. Being coupled up is seen as “progress” in one’s lifestyle and that being in a relationship is better than being single. However, the couple isn’t a legitimate relationship unless they are married because marriage is the high value of what a relationship is all about. This sort of thinking is discriminatory and wrong because many type of relationships can be just as caring, supportive, and intimate. There is nothing special about being “coupled up” or being part of a “traditional” marriage. Moreover, in the same way as there is sexism, racism, and classism, “singlism” is still in society where individuals are judged inferior because of their (lack of) relationship status.
Thus ends Part One. Part Two is Brake’s positive account of what marriage can do. She argues for “minimal marriage” in which the state will offer marriage but in a minimal way, meaning that it won’t promote a certain type of marriage. Her term is similar to Robert Nozick’s libertarian minimal state. Nozick had to balance against two sides: those who argue for having more than a minimal state, and those who argue against the state entirely. Brake is doing the same thing. In Part One, she looked at the arguments for the state getting involved in marriage and that they should promote a certain type of marriage. She showed why those arguments are flawed. In Part Two, she goes to the other side and must argue against critics who say that the state shouldn’t get involved in marriage at all. The critics argue that since marriage has had a bad history and since it’s a private affair, the state should get out of the marriage business. Brake argues that the state should still get involved in the marriage business, but only minimally. Overall, I find Part One to be stronger than Part Two, as I’ll show.
Chapter Five looks at the critics of marriage as a whole because marriage has been an unjust institution. These mainly come from the feminist critique that marriage has been patriarchal, heteronormative, and restrictive of love. Brake’s conclusion is that marriage is contingently, and not essentially, unjust. The solution is not to abolish marriage completely, but to reform it so that it is just. This is an interesting prospect: suppose x started from violent beginnings. Can x be justified through reform, or will x always be unjustified because of the initial violence? Brake argues that x (in this case, marriage) can be justified through reform. The problem is the abuses within marriage don’t show that marriage actually caused it. Allowing people from other type of relationships to get married may give society the acceptance that other forms of relationships are legitimate too. The state needs to still be involved because if marriage was completely privatized, then certain powerful groups and institutions would take control of marriage and thereby still engage in amatonormativity. ”Abolition [of marriage] would allow private-sector providers to deny entry, with no countervailing public message of equality whereas reform would send an unequivocal message of equality. Ensuring equal access to a broadly recognized institution of marriage requires state involvement” (p. 123). If the state sponsors one type of marriage, it constrains other type of relationships. Ok, so getting the state involved would send a message that other forms of relationships are legitimate but why? Brake’s answer is, ”State noninterference would simply shift the construction of love wholly to cultural, social, corporate, and religious pressures. Love would be shaped by the machinations of the market and the mass media” (p. 122-123). But even if the state did get involved, love is still constructed to cultural, social, corporate, and religious pressures. Laws may enforce certain behaviors, but it won’t change the hearts and minds of people as a whole. Perhaps in later generations when the laws are in effect, then the next generation will see different types of relationships as common and no big deal. Thus, there is the assumption that laws would eventually change people’s minds. Obviously, this is still a contentious matter. Laws can eventually institutionalize an action or behavior to make it seem like it’s the norm, but so can grassroots movements too. Which is more effective? Here, Brake’s answer seems to be laws but I don’t see an argument as to why. On another reason this may not be effective, here is a libertarian account of why Brake’s argument may not work.
Chapter Six offers what political liberalism does and what it calls for. Brake takes on Rawlsian liberalism. In many instances, critics of same-sex marriage claim that this could harm children. Brake’s counter-reply is that there needs to be a distinction between marriage and child-rearing. If these two are collapsed, then the assumption is that marriage is necessarily procreative, which isn’t the case. Moreover, there isn’t any empirical evidence to support the critics claims. To this end, should the state even get involved in marriage at all?
Chapter Seven is the core of Brake’s book in which she argues for minimal marriage in a liberal state. This means that the individuals involved in a minimal marriage can select from the rights and responsibilities and exchanges that are within marriage and exchange them to whomever s/he wants, rather than taking on an existing predefined bundle of rights and responsibilities. Moreover, these rights may be asymmetrical as well. So far, minimal marriage means that the state cannot restrict the gender, number, or reciprocal rights of the individuals involved. Because there are certain benefits and rights that one obtains when married, these would be lost if marriage was abolished completely. Thus, another reason why the state still needs to be involved.
What does Brake mean by rights being asymmetrical? Suppose that A and B are in a loving relationship, and A and C are friends. A may want to bequeath B the right to visit A during hospital visits when A is sick, but A may want to bequeath C funeral arrangements. Likewise, suppose D (A’s relative) is very close to A. Perhaps because B and C are quite healthy but D is getting old, A would want to give health benefits to D because of the close relationship they have. In this way, there are many rights and responsibilities one could divvy out depending on the relationship.
This seems like it would be complex and difficult, yet this isn’t my critique. Complexity is not the problem here. The problem is how extensive this could get. I’m currently a grad student. Graduate students, as some of you may know, rely on loans and a small stipend to get by. We can’t afford insurance or other benefits. What if the grad students in the department got married to each other? We all care for each other, and certain responsibilities and rights could be divvied out so that all of us are taken care of. Could this work out under Brake’s model? It’s hard to say, but on p. 164, Brake’s suggestion is that this could theoretically work. However, the point behind minimal marriage is that it takes care of adult (not parental) relationships and it is free of amatonormativity.
Overall, Brake’s project is bold and daring. One question I have is why call it “marriage?” Her argument, it seems, is that by minimizing marriage, all other types of relationships will also be acceptable to get married. In other words, the only acceptable marriage was the “traditional,” amatonormative kind. Only certain people could fit in this tent. But if we make the tent bigger to include all types of relationships, the state won’t be practicing any form of amatonormative discrimination. However, if the tent gets so big, what’s the point of having a tent in the first place? What advantages are there to “marriage?” There still seems to be a hidden amatonormative feature in her claim: keep the term “marriage.” But why? She even admits that this could be called “personal relationship law” instead (p. 185). Her answer is that marriage designates some legitimacy. Saying that same-sex unions as “civil unions” instead of “marriage” undermines same-sex unions as legitimate or on the same level as a marriage. But this is still amatonormative. If marriage is what makes it legitimate, then people like Claudia Card still make a strong point. Brake’s notion of minimal marriage is still amatonormative in that the legitimacy of marriage is what counts. By holding onto the term marriage, Brake is holding onto the idea that being married is legitimate in holding some distributive goods in relationships.
The last chapter is Brake’s reply to certain challenges to her claim of minimal marriage. I think Brake offers good replies to her challenges. Despite my criticisms, I think people who are interested in politics, especially the politics of relationships, would find this book very fruitful. Brake’s view of marriage is thought-provoking and will give more ammo to those who fight for marriage equality. Moreover, her claims are a serious matter for those who are part of the debate about the good behind marriage and the state’s involvement in it.
Part One is Brake’s thesis that marriage needs to be de-moralized. Because marriage has been given a higher moral status, this value has made marriage a higher priority in terms of what is a valuable relationship. Anything that doesn’t fit into this model is de-valued. Thus, people who don’t aim for this typical “traditional” marriage don’t have the “proper” relationship to aim for. In short, critics would say that marriage is moral because it makes a promise, follows a special commitment, it is the only type of relationship where sexual relations are permissible, and that marriage involves a special type of relationship that no other relationship can have. Brake argues against all of this carefully.
Chapter One is Brake’s argument that wedding vows cannot be promises. Things may change in the future. So how can we be sure that our love will continue? Moreover, if wedding vows are promises, and a divorce is breaking a promise, and breaking a promise is immoral, then this entails that divorces are immoral. How does one get around this problem? Brake looks at some replies around it, but finds them unsatisfactory. Her conclusion is that wedding vows are not promises at all. This is because we cannot control our feelings, thus we cannot promise to love someone. Rather, a wedding vow is a promise of action and behavior: to act lovingly. By promising to do something rather than to feel something, the wedding vow de-couples love from the wedding in a necessary sense. Thus, a wedding vow is more akin to commitments rather than promises. So what’s a commitment?
Chapter Two analyzes commitments and finds the differences between promises and commitments. In short, a promise is an utterance to do something whereas a commitment is a psychological disposition that one takes on as a matter of integrity. For example, I may promise my friends to take them shopping this weekend, but I’m committed to cut back on my expenses by not eating out so much. It is here that I have some troubles with Brake’s notion of commitment.
There’s something problematic that I see. Typically, commitments are something that has high value and priority in one’s life. But the above criteria above doesn’t mention that. What if the commitment is to something trivial? Is it still a commitment? For example, the popular show The Big Bang Theory has a character who follows a certain routine and if the routine isn’t followed, then he feels off. The character I’m thinking is Sheldon Cooper. One example is that he must use the bathroom at 8AM every morning and if not, then he doesn’t “feel right.” Is Sheldon Cooper making a commitment go to the bathroom at a certain time? It seems strange, but Brake’s analysis doesn’t account for that. Indeed, I’m not sure I can see a significant difference between commitment and routine here.
Another problem is how promises and commitments interrelate, if at all? Can one make a commitment to make a commitment? Can one make a commitment to make a promise? Can one promise to make a promise? Can one promise to make a commitment? I suspect that in some instances, a “yes” could be answered. Thus, these need to be deciphered in order to clarify a distinction between commitments and promises.
Despite the small critique I have of her, Brake’s point is that “a commitment does not in itself entail interpersonal obligation” (p. 50). A spouse isn’t obligated to continue to care for the other if there is something about the relationship that is no longer worth caring about. For example, if the relationship turns sour or becomes abusive, the commitment to stay in the relationship is no longer valuable. Thus, commitments are conditional, and they are conditional on what objects and values it brings to the table. In this sense then, love doesn’t require commitments! One can be committed to a person through a series of choices and through a duration of time, but there is no necessary connection between commitments and love. A breakup can happen but one person can still love the other person regardless. And I can be committed to another person even though I may not love him or her romantically. The point behind chapter two is to show that marriage and commitments are not intimately tied as we thought they were. A commitment is morally neutral: it’s only as good as the value of that object. To stay in a marriage because of some obligation isn’t really commitment; to stay in a marriage (or any type of relationship) because one chooses to shows true commitment.
Chapter Three argues the idea that sexual relations are only moral within the bounds of sex. Part of this argument is that marriage somehow morally transforms the couple so that sex is now permissible or virtuous within marriage. Brake argues against the Kantian argument that sex outside of marriage is objectifying the other, John Finnis’ new natural law argument that sex outside of marriage is unnatural, and Roger Scruton’s conservative argument that marriage makes the individuals involved more chaste thereby having a more flourishing life. I won’t go into the details of these arguments, but I think Brake does a very good job showing the flaws of these arguments.
Chapter Four argues against the idea that marriage is somehow a higher form of relationship. Along with this, marriage brings in a sense of care that no other relationship can. Here, Brake brings up a new term: “amatonormativity.” In the same way as relationships have been heteronormative, the current model of relationships is still amatonormative. Brake argues that care ethics only makes sense within the context of justice and contracts. Her focus is on amatonormativity and why it’s unjust. As an analogy, relationships have been heteronormative meaning that if the relationship doesn’t follow the heterosexual norm (one man + one woman), then the relationship isn’t deemed “normal” and thus since it doesn’t fit the norm, the relationship isn’t seen as legitimate. Slowly, heteronormativity is breaking down by the public slowly gaining acceptance of same-sex relations and same-sex marriage. However, amatonormativity is still prevalent. Amatonormativity “consists in the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, in that it is a universal shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types” (p. 88-89). By making this the norm, other type of relationships such as friendship, urban tribes, quirkyalones, polyamorists and asexuals have been devalued as a “normal” and “proper” relationship. Amatonormativity overlooks other type of caring relationships; “marriage promotes one form of caring relationship at the expense of many others. Our culture focuses on dyadic amorous relationships at the cost of recognizing friendships, care networks, urban tribes, and other intimate associations” (p. 88). Those who violate amatonormative lifestyles face discrimination either through societal or legal pressures. Thus, the setup is that amatonormativity already privileges those who are married or seeking marriage. We still see this in our culture: if one is single, we often feel bad for that person or there must be something wrong with that person. Being coupled up is seen as “progress” in one’s lifestyle and that being in a relationship is better than being single. However, the couple isn’t a legitimate relationship unless they are married because marriage is the high value of what a relationship is all about. This sort of thinking is discriminatory and wrong because many type of relationships can be just as caring, supportive, and intimate. There is nothing special about being “coupled up” or being part of a “traditional” marriage. Moreover, in the same way as there is sexism, racism, and classism, “singlism” is still in society where individuals are judged inferior because of their (lack of) relationship status.
Thus ends Part One. Part Two is Brake’s positive account of what marriage can do. She argues for “minimal marriage” in which the state will offer marriage but in a minimal way, meaning that it won’t promote a certain type of marriage. Her term is similar to Robert Nozick’s libertarian minimal state. Nozick had to balance against two sides: those who argue for having more than a minimal state, and those who argue against the state entirely. Brake is doing the same thing. In Part One, she looked at the arguments for the state getting involved in marriage and that they should promote a certain type of marriage. She showed why those arguments are flawed. In Part Two, she goes to the other side and must argue against critics who say that the state shouldn’t get involved in marriage at all. The critics argue that since marriage has had a bad history and since it’s a private affair, the state should get out of the marriage business. Brake argues that the state should still get involved in the marriage business, but only minimally. Overall, I find Part One to be stronger than Part Two, as I’ll show.
Chapter Five looks at the critics of marriage as a whole because marriage has been an unjust institution. These mainly come from the feminist critique that marriage has been patriarchal, heteronormative, and restrictive of love. Brake’s conclusion is that marriage is contingently, and not essentially, unjust. The solution is not to abolish marriage completely, but to reform it so that it is just. This is an interesting prospect: suppose x started from violent beginnings. Can x be justified through reform, or will x always be unjustified because of the initial violence? Brake argues that x (in this case, marriage) can be justified through reform. The problem is the abuses within marriage don’t show that marriage actually caused it. Allowing people from other type of relationships to get married may give society the acceptance that other forms of relationships are legitimate too. The state needs to still be involved because if marriage was completely privatized, then certain powerful groups and institutions would take control of marriage and thereby still engage in amatonormativity. ”Abolition [of marriage] would allow private-sector providers to deny entry, with no countervailing public message of equality whereas reform would send an unequivocal message of equality. Ensuring equal access to a broadly recognized institution of marriage requires state involvement” (p. 123). If the state sponsors one type of marriage, it constrains other type of relationships. Ok, so getting the state involved would send a message that other forms of relationships are legitimate but why? Brake’s answer is, ”State noninterference would simply shift the construction of love wholly to cultural, social, corporate, and religious pressures. Love would be shaped by the machinations of the market and the mass media” (p. 122-123). But even if the state did get involved, love is still constructed to cultural, social, corporate, and religious pressures. Laws may enforce certain behaviors, but it won’t change the hearts and minds of people as a whole. Perhaps in later generations when the laws are in effect, then the next generation will see different types of relationships as common and no big deal. Thus, there is the assumption that laws would eventually change people’s minds. Obviously, this is still a contentious matter. Laws can eventually institutionalize an action or behavior to make it seem like it’s the norm, but so can grassroots movements too. Which is more effective? Here, Brake’s answer seems to be laws but I don’t see an argument as to why. On another reason this may not be effective, here is a libertarian account of why Brake’s argument may not work.
Chapter Six offers what political liberalism does and what it calls for. Brake takes on Rawlsian liberalism. In many instances, critics of same-sex marriage claim that this could harm children. Brake’s counter-reply is that there needs to be a distinction between marriage and child-rearing. If these two are collapsed, then the assumption is that marriage is necessarily procreative, which isn’t the case. Moreover, there isn’t any empirical evidence to support the critics claims. To this end, should the state even get involved in marriage at all?
Chapter Seven is the core of Brake’s book in which she argues for minimal marriage in a liberal state. This means that the individuals involved in a minimal marriage can select from the rights and responsibilities and exchanges that are within marriage and exchange them to whomever s/he wants, rather than taking on an existing predefined bundle of rights and responsibilities. Moreover, these rights may be asymmetrical as well. So far, minimal marriage means that the state cannot restrict the gender, number, or reciprocal rights of the individuals involved. Because there are certain benefits and rights that one obtains when married, these would be lost if marriage was abolished completely. Thus, another reason why the state still needs to be involved.
What does Brake mean by rights being asymmetrical? Suppose that A and B are in a loving relationship, and A and C are friends. A may want to bequeath B the right to visit A during hospital visits when A is sick, but A may want to bequeath C funeral arrangements. Likewise, suppose D (A’s relative) is very close to A. Perhaps because B and C are quite healthy but D is getting old, A would want to give health benefits to D because of the close relationship they have. In this way, there are many rights and responsibilities one could divvy out depending on the relationship.
This seems like it would be complex and difficult, yet this isn’t my critique. Complexity is not the problem here. The problem is how extensive this could get. I’m currently a grad student. Graduate students, as some of you may know, rely on loans and a small stipend to get by. We can’t afford insurance or other benefits. What if the grad students in the department got married to each other? We all care for each other, and certain responsibilities and rights could be divvied out so that all of us are taken care of. Could this work out under Brake’s model? It’s hard to say, but on p. 164, Brake’s suggestion is that this could theoretically work. However, the point behind minimal marriage is that it takes care of adult (not parental) relationships and it is free of amatonormativity.
Overall, Brake’s project is bold and daring. One question I have is why call it “marriage?” Her argument, it seems, is that by minimizing marriage, all other types of relationships will also be acceptable to get married. In other words, the only acceptable marriage was the “traditional,” amatonormative kind. Only certain people could fit in this tent. But if we make the tent bigger to include all types of relationships, the state won’t be practicing any form of amatonormative discrimination. However, if the tent gets so big, what’s the point of having a tent in the first place? What advantages are there to “marriage?” There still seems to be a hidden amatonormative feature in her claim: keep the term “marriage.” But why? She even admits that this could be called “personal relationship law” instead (p. 185). Her answer is that marriage designates some legitimacy. Saying that same-sex unions as “civil unions” instead of “marriage” undermines same-sex unions as legitimate or on the same level as a marriage. But this is still amatonormative. If marriage is what makes it legitimate, then people like Claudia Card still make a strong point. Brake’s notion of minimal marriage is still amatonormative in that the legitimacy of marriage is what counts. By holding onto the term marriage, Brake is holding onto the idea that being married is legitimate in holding some distributive goods in relationships.
The last chapter is Brake’s reply to certain challenges to her claim of minimal marriage. I think Brake offers good replies to her challenges. Despite my criticisms, I think people who are interested in politics, especially the politics of relationships, would find this book very fruitful. Brake’s view of marriage is thought-provoking and will give more ammo to those who fight for marriage equality. Moreover, her claims are a serious matter for those who are part of the debate about the good behind marriage and the state’s involvement in it.
August 4, 2019
Stylistically polished, this might give a careless reader the impression of being a bold, new look at marriage. However, there's little here that is novel (even in 2012, when it was published), and the stuff that's original is incredibly weakly argued for. In section I, I use quotations to summarize Brake's position, and in II and III criticize the book.
Warning: lengthly review.
I. The Proposal
Here's the proposal in brief. Instead of the current marriage set-up where the state provides a massive range of priveliges to a single spouse of the different-sex, Brake argues for "minimal marriage" (drawing from Nozick's notion of a minimal state):
II. The Defence
To a standard urban liberal, brought up within a Western context, this is a conclusion that has a lot of intuitive appeal. The idea that marriage is thought about too narrowly has been a regular critique from queer theorists and feminists for decades, and Brake even cites people like Michael Warner and Martha Nussbaum who've made this point. Brake also cites Tamara Metz's book from two years earlier, where Metz had argued for removing marriage from the state's purview and replacing it with “intimate caregiving union [ICGU] status.” Brake then should be understood as not providing new ideas, as much as tweaking existing ones. What sets her apart is how she argues for what she wants - Brake wants to use theoretical apparatus from liberal political philosophy and standard methods of analytic moral philosophy, but this screws everything up.
Her argument for minimal marriage has two branches, which I loosely summarize here.
The first involves pointing to how marriage, as it was in 2012 anyway, was and remains a site of much injustice, particularly tied to gender oppression. This includes coverture (where women lost their legal identity), the absence of recognition of marital rape, social expectations about how women should give up careers, etc.
[Of course, the whole time, Brake compares real-life heterosexual marriages with idealised minimal marriage, so it's far from clear that this change would actually be good]
The second concerns the range of living options that are discriminated against by this current system, including same-sex families, polyamorous ones, othermothers, cohabiting friends, etc. Since Rawlsian political liberalism holds that the state cannot make decisions based on any comprehensive moral doctrine, but only on the the basis of "public reason", marriage will have to include these other set-ups. In particular, the state can only intervene on matters of fundamental justice. Brake identifies care-giving as a "primary good", and argues that since minimal marriage allows for its provision, even the liberal state can get onboard minimal marriage since all (or at least most) comphrehensive doctines will agree about its importance.
[Rawls' entire set-up is a little convenient: it pretends to respect moral plurality, while sneaking in goods that supposedly cut across differences in the guise of "primary goods." But on basis should we assume that these goods really are valued across communities? Rawls, and Brake following him, certainly did not carry out surveys about this.
In addition, although care giving does seem like a plausible candidate for something widely desired, it's not even clear what "care" means. Can we get an answer that's non-trivial but still universally shared as an ideal? At one point we're told care involves both the material and the emotional, but this is far too vague. On the other hand, when arguing that pets cannot be care-givers, Brake claims that:
But this makes it seem as though Brake has a very particular notion of care in mind, and it's far from clear if this ideal of "reciprocal knowledge and communication" is actually shared among every community. Vulnerbaility, after all, is far from universally cherished. Of course, Brake might want care-giving to count as a near universally desired need, but we aren't shown this is actually the case.]
III. The Offences
While the information about minimal marriage is provided in around 30 pages, most of the book is about "engaging" with other views. And here is the weakest parts of Brake's book. A thematic overview:
1. Under minimal marriage, marriage is now contractual and egalitarian. This means "because the state would not assume dependency, property arrangements would be contractualized, allowing parties to decide property division, alimony, and inheritance, and to set conditional terms and specify penalties for default" (163). Brake argues for this by criticizing current marriage arrangements are being detrimental for women, but of course has to also consider how women will do under her proposal. In her last chapter, she admits that one concern is that women's relatively lower social and financial status compared to men would mean the contractual minimal marriage cannot be entered on an equal footing. Men as sole breadwinners, for example, could get women to accept a no-alimony provision.
Brake weakly responds with "these concerns may justify a transitional stage retaining alimony" (194). She then makes the argument that alimony is unfair because "the amount of money received and the percentage who receive it are particularly low for poor women" (194). This is fair, but she then proposes two pages later to support default "support obligations" on all dependency relationships, even unregistered relationships. Leaving aside the massive bloated bureacrcy this will need, this would mean that poor women dependent on poor men will continue to recieve less money. Why raise this as an objection against existing marriage if your arrangement will be susceptible to it too?!
2. A big part of Brake's framework is separating care from volunary relationships, and this includes the care of children. A standard argument from traditionalists is that traditional marriage is good for children, in part because of stability. Brake in engaging with these alternate views deploys...creative reasoning forms. For example,
Of course, Brake isn't looking at any social science. Sure, *some* traditional marriages have domestic violence and so would not teach stability. But how many? What proportion? Would there be less domestic violence in a regime of minimal marriage? Without these considerations, what Brake provides is nonsensical.
This reliance on vague, hand-wavey arguments instead of anything like studies and statistics occurs over and over again. Consider also:
Of course, it *may* disappear, but does it actually?
Of course we *can* contrast these things, but which dystopias are more plausible?
I suppose they *might* but how are we ever to *know*?
3. The first fouth of the book is this bizzare conceptual analysis of promise vs. commitment, which seems to ingore the diversity of contexts and strengths in which "commitment" is used. Some people really do use "commitment" to mean something as strong as a promise and as involving binding themself to someone else, and so "commitment" might not be a "forgiving notion" or merely "self-binding". So much for that analysis.
She also makes the (interesting?) argument that you can't promise to love because you can't control your feelings in a straight-forward manner. Which makes me think Brake simply lacks a sophisticated enough analysis of what promises can involve and their social functions, but I ignore this.
4. Brake also seems entirely incapable of appreciating any argument that comes from people outside her liberal feminist bubble. In dealing with Michael Sandel's point about how descriptions matter, and how a description of marriage as contractual and about rights primarily might take away from other values, Brake makes a blunt and unsubtle point (following Okin):
As for Bloom's critique:
These are clearly not the same senses of "value" in action.
With regard to Scruton,
This is gibberish.
If you want to insist that liberal norms always govern, it's important to be explicit about it. To pretend to engage with conservatives "on their own terms" while simplistically dismissing them seems unscholarly at best.
IV. Conclusion
I have to admit, it's a bold move to take already controversial ideas, tweak them into an even more unpopular one (does anyone want to "marry" their friends?), refuse to seriously engage with any criticism, fail to use any data from social science, and to barely provide an argument for your position. You have to respect the hustle.
Still, "amatonormativity" is a cool-sounding term and a cool idea. Two stars for simply that.
Warning: lengthly review.
I. The Proposal
Here's the proposal in brief. Instead of the current marriage set-up where the state provides a massive range of priveliges to a single spouse of the different-sex, Brake argues for "minimal marriage" (drawing from Nozick's notion of a minimal state):
[The villain: Amatonormativity]
The belief that marriage and companionate romantic love have special value leads to overlooking the value of other caring relationships. I call this disproportionate focus on marital and amorous love relationships as special sites of value, and the assumption that romantic love is a universal goal, “amatonormativity”: This consists in the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, in that it is a universally shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types. The assumption that valuable relationships must be marital or amorous devalues friendships and other caring relationships, as recent manifestos by urban tribalists, quirkyalones, polyamorists, and asexuals have insisted. Amatonormativity prompts the sacrifice of other relationships to romantic love and marriage and relegates friendship and solitudinousness to cultural invisibility...Violations of amatonormativity would include dining alone by choice, putting friendship above romance, bringing a friend to a formal event or attending alone, cohabiting with friends, or not searching for romance. (88-89)
[On Minimal Marriage]
Minimal marriage institutes the most extensive set of restrictions on marriage compatible with political liberalism...I argue that a liberal state can set no principled restrictions on the sex or number of spouses and the nature and purpose of their relationships, except that they be caring relationships. Moreover, the state cannot require exchanges of marital rights (shorthand for various entitlements, powers, obligations) to be reciprocal and complete, as opposed to asymmetrical and divided. (158)
Unlike current marriage, minimal marriage does not require that individuals exchange marital rights reciprocally and in complete bundles: It allows their disaggregation to support the numerous relationships, or adult care networks, that people may have. Minimal marriage would allow a person to exchange all her marital rights reciprocally with one other person or distribute them through her adult care network. It thus supports the variety of relationships excluded by amatonormative marriage law: friendships, urban tribes, overlapping networks, and polyamory. (161)
[On why the state should be involved]
First, three kinds of minimal marriage rights cannot currently be attained through private contract nor rights to privacy and association. These are, first, entitlements to special eligibility for immigration or legal residency (which has concrete implications for, e.g., in-state tuition and taxation); second, entitlements against employers for care taking or bereavement leave and designation as a spouse for spousal relocation and hiring policies; third, hospital and prison visitation rights. (181)
Enforcement of visitation rights and determination of immigration or residency eligibility can only be done by the state. Moreover, because it is enduring, centralized, and not subject to market pressures, the state is in the best position to register marriages to prove eligibility for third-party benefits. Employers, insurers, and others may still use marriage as a means to establish entitlements, and, while status designations could be sold by private companies or religious organizations, the state is in a position to record and authenticate such designations. (183)
II. The Defence
To a standard urban liberal, brought up within a Western context, this is a conclusion that has a lot of intuitive appeal. The idea that marriage is thought about too narrowly has been a regular critique from queer theorists and feminists for decades, and Brake even cites people like Michael Warner and Martha Nussbaum who've made this point. Brake also cites Tamara Metz's book from two years earlier, where Metz had argued for removing marriage from the state's purview and replacing it with “intimate caregiving union [ICGU] status.” Brake then should be understood as not providing new ideas, as much as tweaking existing ones. What sets her apart is how she argues for what she wants - Brake wants to use theoretical apparatus from liberal political philosophy and standard methods of analytic moral philosophy, but this screws everything up.
Her argument for minimal marriage has two branches, which I loosely summarize here.
The first involves pointing to how marriage, as it was in 2012 anyway, was and remains a site of much injustice, particularly tied to gender oppression. This includes coverture (where women lost their legal identity), the absence of recognition of marital rape, social expectations about how women should give up careers, etc.
[Of course, the whole time, Brake compares real-life heterosexual marriages with idealised minimal marriage, so it's far from clear that this change would actually be good]
The second concerns the range of living options that are discriminated against by this current system, including same-sex families, polyamorous ones, othermothers, cohabiting friends, etc. Since Rawlsian political liberalism holds that the state cannot make decisions based on any comprehensive moral doctrine, but only on the the basis of "public reason", marriage will have to include these other set-ups. In particular, the state can only intervene on matters of fundamental justice. Brake identifies care-giving as a "primary good", and argues that since minimal marriage allows for its provision, even the liberal state can get onboard minimal marriage since all (or at least most) comphrehensive doctines will agree about its importance.
[Rawls' entire set-up is a little convenient: it pretends to respect moral plurality, while sneaking in goods that supposedly cut across differences in the guise of "primary goods." But on basis should we assume that these goods really are valued across communities? Rawls, and Brake following him, certainly did not carry out surveys about this.
In addition, although care giving does seem like a plausible candidate for something widely desired, it's not even clear what "care" means. Can we get an answer that's non-trivial but still universally shared as an ideal? At one point we're told care involves both the material and the emotional, but this is far too vague. On the other hand, when arguing that pets cannot be care-givers, Brake claims that:
While these relationships may be a source of benefits for the human, they differ relevantly from adult caring relationships, the interpersonal cognitive dimensions of which are likely significant to their confirmation of self-worth. Adult caring relationships involve detailed reciprocal knowledge and communication typically greater than that had with pets. The reciprocal knowledge and communication that is possible between humans likely accounts for some of the psychological benefits of caring relationships. Being known and cared about as a particular other is important in confirming the sense of selfworth and the derivative sense of the worth of one’s plans; one’s sense of one’s own value is normally enhanced when one can communicate one’s complex projects or characteristics to another person who understands and cares about them. (180)
But this makes it seem as though Brake has a very particular notion of care in mind, and it's far from clear if this ideal of "reciprocal knowledge and communication" is actually shared among every community. Vulnerbaility, after all, is far from universally cherished. Of course, Brake might want care-giving to count as a near universally desired need, but we aren't shown this is actually the case.]
III. The Offences
While the information about minimal marriage is provided in around 30 pages, most of the book is about "engaging" with other views. And here is the weakest parts of Brake's book. A thematic overview:
1. Under minimal marriage, marriage is now contractual and egalitarian. This means "because the state would not assume dependency, property arrangements would be contractualized, allowing parties to decide property division, alimony, and inheritance, and to set conditional terms and specify penalties for default" (163). Brake argues for this by criticizing current marriage arrangements are being detrimental for women, but of course has to also consider how women will do under her proposal. In her last chapter, she admits that one concern is that women's relatively lower social and financial status compared to men would mean the contractual minimal marriage cannot be entered on an equal footing. Men as sole breadwinners, for example, could get women to accept a no-alimony provision.
Brake weakly responds with "these concerns may justify a transitional stage retaining alimony" (194). She then makes the argument that alimony is unfair because "the amount of money received and the percentage who receive it are particularly low for poor women" (194). This is fair, but she then proposes two pages later to support default "support obligations" on all dependency relationships, even unregistered relationships. Leaving aside the massive bloated bureacrcy this will need, this would mean that poor women dependent on poor men will continue to recieve less money. Why raise this as an objection against existing marriage if your arrangement will be susceptible to it too?!
2. A big part of Brake's framework is separating care from volunary relationships, and this includes the care of children. A standard argument from traditionalists is that traditional marriage is good for children, in part because of stability. Brake in engaging with these alternate views deploys...creative reasoning forms. For example,
While stability is a neutral rationale, this defense faces a number of problems in showing that “traditional” marriage promotes it. First, domestic violence and exploitation within “traditional” marriage teach children injustice and are thus by definition destabilizing.(172)
Of course, Brake isn't looking at any social science. Sure, *some* traditional marriages have domestic violence and so would not teach stability. But how many? What proportion? Would there be less domestic violence in a regime of minimal marriage? Without these considerations, what Brake provides is nonsensical.
This reliance on vague, hand-wavey arguments instead of anything like studies and statistics occurs over and over again. Consider also:
Although polygyny may, as Brooks claims, be correlated with greater harms than monogamy is, the gap may disappear if we focus on monogamy in small patriarchal religious communities such as those within which polygyny tends to be located in the United States. (198)
Of course, it *may* disappear, but does it actually?
Care ethicists and communitarians criticize liberal individualism as undermining caring relations in society, but insularity of care may do the same. Communitarians and care ethicists fear society becoming a marketplace of atomistic, mutually uncaring individuals; but this can be contrasted with other dystopias, of small, jealously defended communal outposts, or a marketplace of atomistic, mutually uncaring dyadic units.
Of course we *can* contrast these things, but which dystopias are more plausible?
Nor is it clear that erotic love and flourishing need such privacy... Desperate housewives stranded without community in suburban single-family dwellings might flourish more with less privacy.(77)
I suppose they *might* but how are we ever to *know*?
3. The first fouth of the book is this bizzare conceptual analysis of promise vs. commitment, which seems to ingore the diversity of contexts and strengths in which "commitment" is used. Some people really do use "commitment" to mean something as strong as a promise and as involving binding themself to someone else, and so "commitment" might not be a "forgiving notion" or merely "self-binding". So much for that analysis.
She also makes the (interesting?) argument that you can't promise to love because you can't control your feelings in a straight-forward manner. Which makes me think Brake simply lacks a sophisticated enough analysis of what promises can involve and their social functions, but I ignore this.
4. Brake also seems entirely incapable of appreciating any argument that comes from people outside her liberal feminist bubble. In dealing with Michael Sandel's point about how descriptions matter, and how a description of marriage as contractual and about rights primarily might take away from other values, Brake makes a blunt and unsubtle point (following Okin):
Sandel’s family example suggests a scenario in which women’s asserting rights to fairness and equal treatment within marriage corrodes trust and affection. But the absence of rights is even more problematic. In response to Sandel, John Tomasi imagines a family in which a servile, deferential wife takes her husband’s goals as her own and has no sense of her own interests. Lack of a self-conception as an autonomous and rights-bearing individual is a greater evil than an excessive focus on such a self-conception. Analogously, in the larger polity, community without liberty is not better than liberty without community. (104)
As for Bloom's critique:
Conservatives like Bloom assume that the option to exit degrades or lessens the worth of marriage, making it contingent rather than an unconditional priority. But only the free choice to remain in a relationship demonstrates that partners do value it enough to choose it. (64)
These are clearly not the same senses of "value" in action.
With regard to Scruton,
But even if society’s gaze is harmful, marriage alone does not avert it. Scruton’s metaphors of watching mislead: What kind of space is the private? Property rights and rights against trespassing and voyeurism, a heated room of one’s own, are the preconditions for privacy—and they don’t come with marriage! The most important kind of privacy depends on material conditions, not marriage. Scruton ignores the material conditions for intimacy to argue that marriage is a psychological condition for intimacy, creating “legitimate exclusion.” (77)
This is gibberish.
If you want to insist that liberal norms always govern, it's important to be explicit about it. To pretend to engage with conservatives "on their own terms" while simplistically dismissing them seems unscholarly at best.
IV. Conclusion
I have to admit, it's a bold move to take already controversial ideas, tweak them into an even more unpopular one (does anyone want to "marry" their friends?), refuse to seriously engage with any criticism, fail to use any data from social science, and to barely provide an argument for your position. You have to respect the hustle.
Still, "amatonormativity" is a cool-sounding term and a cool idea. Two stars for simply that.
July 27, 2022
clearly i don’t pay attention because i didn’t know this was a philosophy book 🤡 if i had, i would’ve just read the bits about amatonormativity (this is the book the author coined the term in, so i wanted to read it) 💀
i agree with the ideas presented (criticizing the importance, privilege, morality, and restrictions placed on marriage), i just wish they had been presented in a different way. i swear, philosophy has me saying “who cares!!!!” every two seconds because everything has to be so damn serious and deep and longwinded and i just can’t with philosophy 😩😴 (i also wish disability had been thoughtfully considered the way other marginalizations were).
content/trigger warnings; divorce mentioned, domestic abuse mentioned, rape mentioned, queerphobia mentioned, racism mentioned, slavery mentioned, sexism mentioned, child abuse mentioned, pedophilia mentioned,
i’m putting some quotes about amatonormativity here for reference:
“the belief that marriage and companionate romantic love have special value leads to overlooking the value of other caring relationships. i call this disproportionate focus on marital and amorous love relationships as special sites of value, and the assumption that romantic love is a universal goal, ‘amatonormativity’: this consists in the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, in that it is a universally shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types. the assumption that valuable relationships must be marital or amorous devalues friendships and other caring relationships, as recent manifestos by urban tribalists, quirkyalones, polyamorists, and asexuals have insisted. amatonormativity prompts the sacrifice of other relationships to romantic love and marriage and relegates friendship and solitudinousness to cultural invisibility.”
“the coinage ‘amatonormativity’ is modeled on the term ‘heteronormativity,’ which refers to the assumption of heterosexuality and gender difference as prescriptive norms.”
“violations of amatonormativity would include dining alone by choice, putting friendship above romance, bringing a friend to a formal event or attending alone, cohabiting with friends, or not searching for romance.”
“adults whose lives do not fit the amatonormative norm face discrimination, which benefits members of central, exclusive, sexual love relationships. amatonormative discrimination is widely practiced.”
“amatonormativity wrongly privileges the central, dyadic, exclusive, enduring amorous relationship associated with, but not limited to, marriage. by ‘central,’ i mean the relationship is prioritized by the partners over other relationships and projects.”
“friendships and adult care networks are not accorded the social importance of marriages or marriage-like relationships, nor are they eligible for the legal benefits of marriage. however, for many people, friendships play a similar role in their lives, and have the same importance to them, as marriages or amorous relationships do for others.”
“the relationships penalized by amatonormativity may or may not involve sex and romantic love. polyamorous relationships fail to meet the norm, just as groups of friends do.”
“while my main focus is on discrimination against friends and nonamorous care networks, it is important to note that polyamory, which overlaps with care networks, also faces amatonormative discrimination.”
“the significant friendships that amatonormativity wrongly devalues serve many functions of traditional families—material support, emotional security, and frequent companionship.”
“by attributing a special value to exclusive amorous relationships, amatonormativity implies that alternatives such as celibacy, singledom, care networks, and friendships lack a central human good.”
“amatonormativity intersects with other forms of oppression, especially gay and lesbian oppression and women’s oppression, to impose steep costs. amatonormativity is itself systematic in a way characteristic of oppression: legal penalties and discrimination interlock with social pressures and discrimination, stereotyping in the media, workplace discrimination, consumer pricing, and children’s education.”
“rejecting amatonormativity does not mean prohibiting or discouraging sexual and romantic relationships; it means ceasing to encourage them at the expense of relationship diversity and the marginalization of other caring relationships.”
i agree with the ideas presented (criticizing the importance, privilege, morality, and restrictions placed on marriage), i just wish they had been presented in a different way. i swear, philosophy has me saying “who cares!!!!” every two seconds because everything has to be so damn serious and deep and longwinded and i just can’t with philosophy 😩😴 (i also wish disability had been thoughtfully considered the way other marginalizations were).
content/trigger warnings; divorce mentioned, domestic abuse mentioned, rape mentioned, queerphobia mentioned, racism mentioned, slavery mentioned, sexism mentioned, child abuse mentioned, pedophilia mentioned,
i’m putting some quotes about amatonormativity here for reference:
“the belief that marriage and companionate romantic love have special value leads to overlooking the value of other caring relationships. i call this disproportionate focus on marital and amorous love relationships as special sites of value, and the assumption that romantic love is a universal goal, ‘amatonormativity’: this consists in the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, in that it is a universally shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types. the assumption that valuable relationships must be marital or amorous devalues friendships and other caring relationships, as recent manifestos by urban tribalists, quirkyalones, polyamorists, and asexuals have insisted. amatonormativity prompts the sacrifice of other relationships to romantic love and marriage and relegates friendship and solitudinousness to cultural invisibility.”
“the coinage ‘amatonormativity’ is modeled on the term ‘heteronormativity,’ which refers to the assumption of heterosexuality and gender difference as prescriptive norms.”
“violations of amatonormativity would include dining alone by choice, putting friendship above romance, bringing a friend to a formal event or attending alone, cohabiting with friends, or not searching for romance.”
“adults whose lives do not fit the amatonormative norm face discrimination, which benefits members of central, exclusive, sexual love relationships. amatonormative discrimination is widely practiced.”
“amatonormativity wrongly privileges the central, dyadic, exclusive, enduring amorous relationship associated with, but not limited to, marriage. by ‘central,’ i mean the relationship is prioritized by the partners over other relationships and projects.”
“friendships and adult care networks are not accorded the social importance of marriages or marriage-like relationships, nor are they eligible for the legal benefits of marriage. however, for many people, friendships play a similar role in their lives, and have the same importance to them, as marriages or amorous relationships do for others.”
“the relationships penalized by amatonormativity may or may not involve sex and romantic love. polyamorous relationships fail to meet the norm, just as groups of friends do.”
“while my main focus is on discrimination against friends and nonamorous care networks, it is important to note that polyamory, which overlaps with care networks, also faces amatonormative discrimination.”
“the significant friendships that amatonormativity wrongly devalues serve many functions of traditional families—material support, emotional security, and frequent companionship.”
“by attributing a special value to exclusive amorous relationships, amatonormativity implies that alternatives such as celibacy, singledom, care networks, and friendships lack a central human good.”
“amatonormativity intersects with other forms of oppression, especially gay and lesbian oppression and women’s oppression, to impose steep costs. amatonormativity is itself systematic in a way characteristic of oppression: legal penalties and discrimination interlock with social pressures and discrimination, stereotyping in the media, workplace discrimination, consumer pricing, and children’s education.”
“rejecting amatonormativity does not mean prohibiting or discouraging sexual and romantic relationships; it means ceasing to encourage them at the expense of relationship diversity and the marginalization of other caring relationships.”
September 15, 2016
The next frontier of marriage reform
A persuasive look at why marriage should be extended beyond exclusive, central, different-sex and same-sex dyadic amorous relationships to include all caring relationships. The language can get a little technical at times, especially in the later chapters, and Brake sometimes repeats herself, but overall a perfectly readable book for the layperson. Brake's argument for why it's morally acceptable to break wedding vows is interesting, even though I didn't entirely buy it.
A persuasive look at why marriage should be extended beyond exclusive, central, different-sex and same-sex dyadic amorous relationships to include all caring relationships. The language can get a little technical at times, especially in the later chapters, and Brake sometimes repeats herself, but overall a perfectly readable book for the layperson. Brake's argument for why it's morally acceptable to break wedding vows is interesting, even though I didn't entirely buy it.
April 18, 2013
This is the book I have been wanting to write for years. I'm glad Elizabeth Brake wrote it first, because it's perfect. It's philosophy, so I mostly recommend it for people who are reasonably comfortable with a bit of philosophical language, but even if you're not... read it anyway. Skim the parts you don't understand. Marriage needs some serious reform. If Brake's proposal became reality, I might even consider getting married myself (and that's saying something).
July 17, 2020
Somewhat dense ethics and legal philosophy, but clearly argued. Puts "caring relationships" at the center of a just society rather than particular heternormative, amatonormative, religiously prescribed forms of relationship. Both radical and eminently sensible.
September 27, 2022
painfully liberal. tolerance, neutrality, equality, statism, moralism, legalistic, reformism. internal criticism of each moral theoretic justification is a brave task but ultimately I think pretty misguided. recommendations are not great. also some of the arguments are weak on their own grounds, even when I agree with the conclusions. that being said, amatonormativity is a lovely conceptual innovation.
October 15, 2023
Interesting thoughts, especially about amatonormativity, coined by the author herself in philosophical feminist studies. To me, the writing is sometimes hard, quite heavy to read, and can be confusing ; I had to re-read some sentences several times (fyi, having English as a second langage). Some pages could have been summarized easily in one paragraph, there is a lot of redundancy in some parts of the book.
April 8, 2024
Imo Brake could have got a bit more radical with her proposals here, but this is still definitely an essential and very accessible read, and I think a great introduction for people who've not thought about the topics of marriage reform/abolition/amatonormativity before. I have a great deal of respect for people who can make philosophy readable and accessible without feeling dumbed down, and I think Brake is an absolute master of that!
June 11, 2021
more commodification of emotional labor; the destruction of old ideals and replacing them with capitalism, from the left!
May 26, 2021
Pensum.
Skjønner greia med at ekteskap er urettferdig, og at det ikke finnes noe ideal løsning i uideal verden.
Likevel litt vel lang. Ellers gode betraktninger om amotonormativitet:DD
Skjønner greia med at ekteskap er urettferdig, og at det ikke finnes noe ideal løsning i uideal verden.
Likevel litt vel lang. Ellers gode betraktninger om amotonormativitet:DD
August 5, 2016
I approached this book very much on board with the views that marriage law as it stands (generally speaking) is flawed and inequitable and that merely opening marriage to same-sex couples would not sufficiently address these problems. Though not her main thrust, Brake makes a fairly convincing argument that abolishing marriage altogether is also not the answer -- among other reasons, because in the absence of a just model from the state, it would be left to churches and private employers to define "legitimate" relationships.
Part One, which questions understandings and assumptions about what marriage entails, lays out the need for reform. Some points: marriage does not have a single definition and contemporary views vary significantly; marriage is not inherently moral and can in fact enable or propagate immorality and injustice; marriage differs from other contracts in that parties rarely fully comprehend all they are agreeing to and there are legal consequences established by the state that the participants cannot opt out of. Brake's examination is certainly thorough, though quite abstract: this is much more a philosophical argument than a legal/political one.
Part Two details Brake's argument for what marriage should be, a proposition she calls "minimal marriage." (Again, it's a philosophical framework, not concrete laws.) Key features are: the separation of parenting issues from the recognition of consensual adult relationships; removal of the sex-difference criteria and limits on number of parties (with some caveats); by extension, the ability to choose multiple "spouses" and assign different rights and benefits; a more deliberate, opting-in marriage process; delineation of marriage benefits that cannot be established through private contract. Brake is careful to anticipate the practical concerns of a transitional period, lest critics be inclined to dismiss this as merely an intellectual argument for the ideal society. There is justification on several grounds and I found her defenses to a liberal feminist audience, if not altogether convincing, thoughtful and serious.
Relevant, well-argued, and surprisingly accessible.
Part One, which questions understandings and assumptions about what marriage entails, lays out the need for reform. Some points: marriage does not have a single definition and contemporary views vary significantly; marriage is not inherently moral and can in fact enable or propagate immorality and injustice; marriage differs from other contracts in that parties rarely fully comprehend all they are agreeing to and there are legal consequences established by the state that the participants cannot opt out of. Brake's examination is certainly thorough, though quite abstract: this is much more a philosophical argument than a legal/political one.
Part Two details Brake's argument for what marriage should be, a proposition she calls "minimal marriage." (Again, it's a philosophical framework, not concrete laws.) Key features are: the separation of parenting issues from the recognition of consensual adult relationships; removal of the sex-difference criteria and limits on number of parties (with some caveats); by extension, the ability to choose multiple "spouses" and assign different rights and benefits; a more deliberate, opting-in marriage process; delineation of marriage benefits that cannot be established through private contract. Brake is careful to anticipate the practical concerns of a transitional period, lest critics be inclined to dismiss this as merely an intellectual argument for the ideal society. There is justification on several grounds and I found her defenses to a liberal feminist audience, if not altogether convincing, thoughtful and serious.
Relevant, well-argued, and surprisingly accessible.
November 22, 2021
Sometimes dense and slightly difficult for a layman to understand, but full of interesting and well-argued ideas. A must read for anyone interested in marriage reform.
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