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Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq
Throughout history, cities have been at the center of warfare, from sieges to street-fighting, from peace-keeping to coups de mains. Sun Tzu admonished his readers of The Art of War that the lowest realization of warfare was to attack a fortified city - a maxim that the Russian army should have heeded before it launched its operation to seize the Chechnyan city of Grozny. Indeed, although strategists have advised against it across the millennia, armies and generals have been forced nonetheless to attack and defend cities, and victory has required that they do it well. In Concrete Hell Louis DiMarco has provided a masterful study of the brutal realities of urban warfare, of what it means to seize and hold a city literally block by block. Such a study could not be more timely. We live in an increasingly urbanizing world, a military unprepared for urban operations is unprepared for tomorrow. Fighting in cities requires new skills, new weaponry and new tactics. But there is no better way to prepare than to look at the successes and failure of some of the most famous operations in modern military history including Stalingrad, Hue City and Fallujah.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published November 20, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
September 17, 2021
As I slowly make my way down my reading list now that I’m in country and basically restricted to all the books on my bookshelf, I finally came to Louis DiMarco’s Concrete Hell, which had been recommended reading from a previous course I took in 2019 by Major Jayson Geroux, the urban warfare expert at the time who gave one of the most lively lectures I’ve ever been a part of. Speaking to how defining that lecture was, I literally bought the book on Amazon that evening following the end of classes for the day.
As Major Geroux underlined in his lecture, with the planet’s ongoing urbanization and movement of populations towards city centres, urban warfare is heading towards becoming the norm, which is what it ironically was many generations ago in the days of city sieges and medieval warfare. Accordingly, Concrete Hell is one of the definitive studies now available on urban warfare, outlining key battles from Stalingrad to early-Iraq, providing striking details on what it truly means to seize a city block by block (or fail to do so).
Within Concrete Hell, DiMarco strives to underline not only the tactical considerations that led to success or failure on the battlefield, but also strategic & political atmospheres surrounding each battle, providing context as to how that particular conflict may have ultimately affected the campaign as a whole. Take for example the French intervention in Algiers, where overall success on the ground in eliminating the insurgency was conclusively achieved, but the tactics including torture ultimately led to a political loss on the international stage with the French withdrawal from the nation. It is examples such as these that DiMarco seeks to fully capture, as to understand the full implications of urban warfare, not just the details of the fighting on the ground.
One particularly important recurring detail that I noted throughout the text was the importance of the operational level of warfare, essentially the connection between strategic goals and the tactical gains. This is a point I’ve noted in other readings as well, most recently in the Modern Warfare Institute’s pieces on operational art, speaking to the rising importance of overall battlefield management with the return of great power competition. The example of the Russian failure to isolate the city of Grozny comes to mind, and it demonstrates the fact that you can’t simply attrit an adversary into submission anymore, as the political atmosphere and immediate international reaction, particularly in the age of social media, no longer allows for strategic goals to be achieved using ineffective or overly harsh tactical means.
Overall, Concrete Hell was an enjoyable read, both for personal pleasure and professional gain. As opposed to some manuscripts I’ve forced my way through that have been dry in material, DiMarco makes the effort to keep the stories captivating, providing snippets of action on the ground, and tidbits of information one would not otherwise find easily regarding these historical conflicts. I would recommend Concrete Hell to any of my peers in the profession of arms, as well as to any military history junkies, either for personal reading or urban warfare study. Either way, if you read this before ATOC, you’ll probably have a much better time doing the urban warfare estimate than I did. Happy Reading!
As Major Geroux underlined in his lecture, with the planet’s ongoing urbanization and movement of populations towards city centres, urban warfare is heading towards becoming the norm, which is what it ironically was many generations ago in the days of city sieges and medieval warfare. Accordingly, Concrete Hell is one of the definitive studies now available on urban warfare, outlining key battles from Stalingrad to early-Iraq, providing striking details on what it truly means to seize a city block by block (or fail to do so).
Within Concrete Hell, DiMarco strives to underline not only the tactical considerations that led to success or failure on the battlefield, but also strategic & political atmospheres surrounding each battle, providing context as to how that particular conflict may have ultimately affected the campaign as a whole. Take for example the French intervention in Algiers, where overall success on the ground in eliminating the insurgency was conclusively achieved, but the tactics including torture ultimately led to a political loss on the international stage with the French withdrawal from the nation. It is examples such as these that DiMarco seeks to fully capture, as to understand the full implications of urban warfare, not just the details of the fighting on the ground.
One particularly important recurring detail that I noted throughout the text was the importance of the operational level of warfare, essentially the connection between strategic goals and the tactical gains. This is a point I’ve noted in other readings as well, most recently in the Modern Warfare Institute’s pieces on operational art, speaking to the rising importance of overall battlefield management with the return of great power competition. The example of the Russian failure to isolate the city of Grozny comes to mind, and it demonstrates the fact that you can’t simply attrit an adversary into submission anymore, as the political atmosphere and immediate international reaction, particularly in the age of social media, no longer allows for strategic goals to be achieved using ineffective or overly harsh tactical means.
Overall, Concrete Hell was an enjoyable read, both for personal pleasure and professional gain. As opposed to some manuscripts I’ve forced my way through that have been dry in material, DiMarco makes the effort to keep the stories captivating, providing snippets of action on the ground, and tidbits of information one would not otherwise find easily regarding these historical conflicts. I would recommend Concrete Hell to any of my peers in the profession of arms, as well as to any military history junkies, either for personal reading or urban warfare study. Either way, if you read this before ATOC, you’ll probably have a much better time doing the urban warfare estimate than I did. Happy Reading!
April 28, 2022
Clear, concise and efficient writing. The book is divided into easy to read chapters on each battles plus a good intro on the basics concepts of urban warfare and their evolution from ancient history to present day. The book describe the conventional battles of Stalingrad, Aachen, Incheon-Seoul, Hue, Grozny and Jenin and the counter-insurgency ones of Algiers, Londonderry-Belfast and Ramadi. The chapters were I found fairly well balanced between the different aspects of the urban warfare: the importance of the city in the broader conflict, topography, description of opposing forces, leadership and finally the operational and tactical action. The author also often give a few paragraphs of details on some weapons or vehicules that were used in the particlular battles. The chapter on the 1995 battle of Grozny is a particularly interesting read in 2022.
June 15, 2020
Concrete Hell is an excellent primer on military urban operations with solid analysis on operations in Stalingrad, Aachen, Seoul, Hue, Algiers, Northern Ireland, Grozny, the Gaza Strip, and Ramadi. DiMarco's operational level focused analysis highlights strengths and weaknesses by all beligerants involved and illustrates lessons learned in both tactics and higher level maneuver. He builds a strong base of knowledge regarding urban conflict by studying multiple operations with various state and non-state actors across a large timeline. DiMarco does not solely focus on American experiences with urban combat. Though he does not attempt to summarize his work into one set of best practices across his research, DiMarco continually mentions that successful combatants in urban combat isolate the urban area of operations quickly, task organize assets (tanks, helicopters bulldozers) to the lowest tactical levels possible, leverage the civil-political aspects of the conflict, and maintain operational focus. DiMarco's insightful discussion is an easy read and provides enough information for readers to attack more dense works on urban combat. If you are looking to study military operations in urban terrain, I would recommend starting with Concrete Hell.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 9, 2021
Concise and carefully selected short case-studies, that illustrated the mulit-dimensional challenges associated with urban warfare. Highly recommende as an introductory / overviews text prior to more deep study and learning
May 30, 2024
Concise well written summary of WW2/post WW2 urban battles. The accounts of the strategic maneuvering before the battle is often inscrutable, and the operational summary doesn't go into extreme detail. Still, it definitely added to my understanding of historical events and I imagine its a good starting off point for learning about urban warfare.
(1) Battle of Stalingrad.
Main lesson is that urban battles are often decided by strategic decisions outside of the operational zone. In this case, by Germanies initial failure to surround Stalingrad, and then the Russian counteroffensive which cut off the German supply lines and encircled the German troops.
(ultimately, this is because Hitler modified the original offensive plan from checking Stalingrad to taking Stalingrad. Axis generals were on tilt and took risks with the supply lines, which were guarded by low morale Romanian etc troops).
At an operational level German artillery was able to smash Russian positions. And as a result Russians tried to keep their lines as close to the German lines as possible. The Russians devolved decisionmaking away from political commisioners and to the army. Which introduced snipers and special attack squads.
(2) Battle of Aachan
Again, the lesson is that urban warfare can be determined by strategic decisions outside of the battle. In this case, the Americans did a series of maneuvers outside Aachan to surround the German garrison there, which ultimately surrendered with a minimum of fighting.
Ironically, both sides achieved their objective, the Germans held Aachan long enough to protect their flank in the Battle of the Bulge and the Americans ultimately took it.
(3) The Inchon Landings
Shows the value of maneuver/stealth to avoid intense urban warfare. In the Inchon landings American forces landed behind North Korean lines to take Seoul before the North Koreans had a chance to dig in.
Like Stalingrad, urban warfare bled into the political. Retaking Seoul quickly was important for propaganda purposes. And South Korean troops were integrated into the battle to boost South Korean morale.
The American force also had a unique integration of all three branches, which allowed them to take Seoul with a relatively small infantry force
(4) The Battle of Hue
Again, the Battle of Hue demonstrated the value of maneuver and the relationship between urban warfare and strategic propaganda.
Hue was the third largest city in Vietnam. As part of the Test offensive PRVN snuck into Hue and seized most of the city, demonstrating their ability to strike anywhere in Vietnam and creating a huge propaganda victory. However, they failed to overrun two military installations in the city, and were beat back in about three weeks.
Operationally UN and ARVN forced employed combined arms and small squad forces to retake the city. A major innovation towards the end of the battle was the use of helicopters, which proved decisive in a number of engagements.
(5) Battle of Algiers
The archtype of a "People's Revolutionary War" and a good object lesson that effective tactics can lead to disastrous strategic consequences.
The FLN located its operations in the old city of Algiers (the Casbah), where it was arranged in a 3-man cell structure. They relied on bombings and murders to polarize the Muslim/European populations and draw international attention to their cause.
The French response relied on mapping the human battlefield. They
(i) Prioritized a HUMINT network of loyalists, paid informers and torture techniques. Most innovately they disguised French soldiers as Arabs to gain intelligence. They attached special rapid response units to the HUMINT to act quickly and decisively
(ii) Organized the Casbah by creating an address system and creating a census. They then split the Casbah into quadrants which were isolated into checkpoints. They assigned a regiment to each quadrant which became an expert on the people and the layout
Ultimately, French tactics effectively defeated the FLN. However, the use of torture both alienated the Muslim population and led to international isolation which ultimately led to Algeria's independence
(6) Operation Banner (British response to the Troubles)
Good demonstration of how counterinsurgency strategy changed as tactics that were previously acceptable became illegitimate.
The troubles were a long (38 year) multiphase, simmering, low intensity multiphase conflict. Where the British army's role switched from peacekeeping, to counterinsurgency, to policing, and back to a more targeted counterinsurgency. The resolution owed itself to
The general dynamic was that the IRA and militants would create a disturbance (either a bombing, murder, or hijack of a civil rights march to create a riot). The initial disturbance would reduce the popularity of the IRA. But the heavyhanded British response would ultimately increase their popularity for a net gain for the IRA.
The dynamic shifted because
(i) The increased effectiveness of loyalist paramilitary forces meant that the Catholics got the worse of tit-for-tat violence, exhausting the Catholic side
(ii) Improved intelligence allowed for a more targeted British response. British intelligence included innovations in SIGINT (cameras, aerial surveillance) and HUMINT (plainclothes spies, chatting up patrols)
(iii) Denial of space in Catholic neighborhoods. They introduced checkpoints in major road arteries, combined with mobile checkpoints in smaller roadways.
Patrols would chat up the population. Patrols would randomize routes and go in patrols of three to discourage attacks on the patrols.
Spotters would sneak into abandoned buildings to setup observation posts
(6) First Battle of Grozny
Another propaganda battle, and the first archtype of an information warfare battle.
The Russians invaded with 24,000 men, 80 tanks, 180 artillery pieces and 90 helicopters. The Chekens had about 3000 to 5000 defenders which were split into squads of 6-7 mobile fighers equipped with RPGs and small mortars.
The initial Russian advance had no defined battle line and was either pushed back via ambushes or when they took positions in the city were swarmed, isolated and destroyed.
In the second phase the Russians moved more systematically into the city with artillary and air support. Chekens started blending into the population and using sewers/tunnels to arrive behind Russian lines. Russians would bait the Chekens into ambushes.
Ultimately after 6 weeks Russia took the city with an estimated 35k civilian causalities (mostly Russian ethnics).
While Russia imposed a media blackout the Chekens invited the media in. Ultimately, the independent media contradicted the Russian state media reducing Russian legitimacy at home. And abroad portrayed the Chekens as sympathetic freedom fighters.
(7) Operation Defensive Shield
Another battle with both a military and information warfare angle to it. Defensive Shield was the initial response to the Second Intifidah and had two phases: in the first phase they'd use massive force to occupy and isolate urban areas where terrorist attacks were launched from. In the second phase systematic raids would destroy bomb-making capabilities and arrest known terrorists.
Some innovative aspects of the battles
(i) Information warfare. The Palestanian side created a false narrative of a massacre in Jenin which created realtime pressure on the Israelis and reduced Israeli legitimacy even after it was debunked.
(ii) Israel used bulldozers instead of air/artillery support to target Palestinian positions in a way that minimized causalities
(iii) The use of special forces to enter the hostile urban environment to gain intelligence
(5) Battle of Ramadi
The archtype of succesful urban warfare. The battle took over a year to win and had significant American causulties, but didn't destroy the city. Involved a combination of "clear, hold, build" and turning local tribal leaders against Al Qaeda in Iraq both to pacify the area and to build up an indigenous police force.
(1) Battle of Stalingrad.
Main lesson is that urban battles are often decided by strategic decisions outside of the operational zone. In this case, by Germanies initial failure to surround Stalingrad, and then the Russian counteroffensive which cut off the German supply lines and encircled the German troops.
(ultimately, this is because Hitler modified the original offensive plan from checking Stalingrad to taking Stalingrad. Axis generals were on tilt and took risks with the supply lines, which were guarded by low morale Romanian etc troops).
At an operational level German artillery was able to smash Russian positions. And as a result Russians tried to keep their lines as close to the German lines as possible. The Russians devolved decisionmaking away from political commisioners and to the army. Which introduced snipers and special attack squads.
(2) Battle of Aachan
Again, the lesson is that urban warfare can be determined by strategic decisions outside of the battle. In this case, the Americans did a series of maneuvers outside Aachan to surround the German garrison there, which ultimately surrendered with a minimum of fighting.
Ironically, both sides achieved their objective, the Germans held Aachan long enough to protect their flank in the Battle of the Bulge and the Americans ultimately took it.
(3) The Inchon Landings
Shows the value of maneuver/stealth to avoid intense urban warfare. In the Inchon landings American forces landed behind North Korean lines to take Seoul before the North Koreans had a chance to dig in.
Like Stalingrad, urban warfare bled into the political. Retaking Seoul quickly was important for propaganda purposes. And South Korean troops were integrated into the battle to boost South Korean morale.
The American force also had a unique integration of all three branches, which allowed them to take Seoul with a relatively small infantry force
(4) The Battle of Hue
Again, the Battle of Hue demonstrated the value of maneuver and the relationship between urban warfare and strategic propaganda.
Hue was the third largest city in Vietnam. As part of the Test offensive PRVN snuck into Hue and seized most of the city, demonstrating their ability to strike anywhere in Vietnam and creating a huge propaganda victory. However, they failed to overrun two military installations in the city, and were beat back in about three weeks.
Operationally UN and ARVN forced employed combined arms and small squad forces to retake the city. A major innovation towards the end of the battle was the use of helicopters, which proved decisive in a number of engagements.
(5) Battle of Algiers
The archtype of a "People's Revolutionary War" and a good object lesson that effective tactics can lead to disastrous strategic consequences.
The FLN located its operations in the old city of Algiers (the Casbah), where it was arranged in a 3-man cell structure. They relied on bombings and murders to polarize the Muslim/European populations and draw international attention to their cause.
The French response relied on mapping the human battlefield. They
(i) Prioritized a HUMINT network of loyalists, paid informers and torture techniques. Most innovately they disguised French soldiers as Arabs to gain intelligence. They attached special rapid response units to the HUMINT to act quickly and decisively
(ii) Organized the Casbah by creating an address system and creating a census. They then split the Casbah into quadrants which were isolated into checkpoints. They assigned a regiment to each quadrant which became an expert on the people and the layout
Ultimately, French tactics effectively defeated the FLN. However, the use of torture both alienated the Muslim population and led to international isolation which ultimately led to Algeria's independence
(6) Operation Banner (British response to the Troubles)
Good demonstration of how counterinsurgency strategy changed as tactics that were previously acceptable became illegitimate.
The troubles were a long (38 year) multiphase, simmering, low intensity multiphase conflict. Where the British army's role switched from peacekeeping, to counterinsurgency, to policing, and back to a more targeted counterinsurgency. The resolution owed itself to
The general dynamic was that the IRA and militants would create a disturbance (either a bombing, murder, or hijack of a civil rights march to create a riot). The initial disturbance would reduce the popularity of the IRA. But the heavyhanded British response would ultimately increase their popularity for a net gain for the IRA.
The dynamic shifted because
(i) The increased effectiveness of loyalist paramilitary forces meant that the Catholics got the worse of tit-for-tat violence, exhausting the Catholic side
(ii) Improved intelligence allowed for a more targeted British response. British intelligence included innovations in SIGINT (cameras, aerial surveillance) and HUMINT (plainclothes spies, chatting up patrols)
(iii) Denial of space in Catholic neighborhoods. They introduced checkpoints in major road arteries, combined with mobile checkpoints in smaller roadways.
Patrols would chat up the population. Patrols would randomize routes and go in patrols of three to discourage attacks on the patrols.
Spotters would sneak into abandoned buildings to setup observation posts
(6) First Battle of Grozny
Another propaganda battle, and the first archtype of an information warfare battle.
The Russians invaded with 24,000 men, 80 tanks, 180 artillery pieces and 90 helicopters. The Chekens had about 3000 to 5000 defenders which were split into squads of 6-7 mobile fighers equipped with RPGs and small mortars.
The initial Russian advance had no defined battle line and was either pushed back via ambushes or when they took positions in the city were swarmed, isolated and destroyed.
In the second phase the Russians moved more systematically into the city with artillary and air support. Chekens started blending into the population and using sewers/tunnels to arrive behind Russian lines. Russians would bait the Chekens into ambushes.
Ultimately after 6 weeks Russia took the city with an estimated 35k civilian causalities (mostly Russian ethnics).
While Russia imposed a media blackout the Chekens invited the media in. Ultimately, the independent media contradicted the Russian state media reducing Russian legitimacy at home. And abroad portrayed the Chekens as sympathetic freedom fighters.
(7) Operation Defensive Shield
Another battle with both a military and information warfare angle to it. Defensive Shield was the initial response to the Second Intifidah and had two phases: in the first phase they'd use massive force to occupy and isolate urban areas where terrorist attacks were launched from. In the second phase systematic raids would destroy bomb-making capabilities and arrest known terrorists.
Some innovative aspects of the battles
(i) Information warfare. The Palestanian side created a false narrative of a massacre in Jenin which created realtime pressure on the Israelis and reduced Israeli legitimacy even after it was debunked.
(ii) Israel used bulldozers instead of air/artillery support to target Palestinian positions in a way that minimized causalities
(iii) The use of special forces to enter the hostile urban environment to gain intelligence
(5) Battle of Ramadi
The archtype of succesful urban warfare. The battle took over a year to win and had significant American causulties, but didn't destroy the city. Involved a combination of "clear, hold, build" and turning local tribal leaders against Al Qaeda in Iraq both to pacify the area and to build up an indigenous police force.
November 18, 2021
The cliche that "Those who forget history are condemned to repeat it" is more true than ever in the case of urban warfare . The book examines famous 20th centuru urban battles starting with Stalingrad and moving on to 21st century Iraq and Israel. While the chapters are extremely well written and it might seem that every time there is something new in each chapter , the basics have been well established in the hell hole of Stalingard - with minor and major variations , similar incidents have repeated themselves over the century . It is this common thread that is fascinating and something most conventional armies forgot. In the case of the Russians, the Chechens brutally drove home the point in the poor Russian attacks against Grozny .
The truth remains - anyone interested in urban warfare has to remember the past and naturally read this book as it presents capsules of some major examples of urban warfare.
The truth remains - anyone interested in urban warfare has to remember the past and naturally read this book as it presents capsules of some major examples of urban warfare.
July 28, 2018
DiMarco uses Stalingrad, Aachen, Hue City, Northern Ireland and Ramadi. Each chapter focuses on the specific battle for one city. With one map, and little commentary the reader is left with just the actions of the two sides.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way thru my Professional Reading titles, and this was recently returned.
Why I finished it: This was a basic introduction, but I was intrigued by the shift from shift battles and total destruction, to longer drawn out battles with less destruction and civilian causalities. (Not all battles followed this dictum, but history an international attention are pushing urban warfare in this direction.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way thru my Professional Reading titles, and this was recently returned.
Why I finished it: This was a basic introduction, but I was intrigued by the shift from shift battles and total destruction, to longer drawn out battles with less destruction and civilian causalities. (Not all battles followed this dictum, but history an international attention are pushing urban warfare in this direction.
June 9, 2022
Another interesting history of modern warfare in an urban environment. With the fighting in the Ukraine my interest in military history has increased, The book provides a number of chapters on previous battles carried out in urban areas which in teh future will probably be the norm and not the exception.
February 8, 2023
Good read. The author underlines with solid examples the contours of urban warfare. Each chapter is concise but captivating. The conclusion was a bit underwhelming. Great introduction to urban warfare.
June 25, 2018
Perfect book to read in a tank
January 24, 2013
The book it self doesnt really cover much, just really plain.
Not much depth in the tactics the men used, no quotes from the boots on the ground.
No suggestions on how each side could do it differently (with exception to the Stalingrad chapter).
Not much depth in the tactics the men used, no quotes from the boots on the ground.
No suggestions on how each side could do it differently (with exception to the Stalingrad chapter).
July 9, 2014
This book could really do with a good editor. Scratch that, a good ghost writer. And lose the wishy-washy government-speak. But still an interesting look at urban warfare from a military man who's spent a good deal of time working in the field.
May 26, 2020
Didn't learned much about Urban warfare tactics, but diverse historical situations were interesting to learn. I'd say, this book opens more questions, whose answers should be found in another books.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews