Anyone tempted to be critical of the Obama administration for not reaching heights of greatness thus far needs to bear in mind: before you can attempt those heights, you have to play the hand you've been dealt. Not only on the economy, where four years after 2008 we are still extracting ourselves from a profoundly deep and wide recession, massive unemployment, and a cratered housing market, but also in foreign policy. The Bush administration's two wars left America despised around the world, and financially crippled by their costs. What Mitt Romney fondly termed Obama's "apology tour" was in actuality a necessary step not only in convincing the rest of the world that the U.S. wanted to repair its global relationships rather than damage them further, but also in regaining American prestige and power, a subtler, more deftly exercised power, that of the scalpel rather than the hammer.
Thus far, aside from the killing of bin Laden, the story of Obama's foreign policy is a lot less flashy than his predecessor's. One of the first conundrums Obama faced was how to react to the Green Revolution in Iran in 2009, when pro-democracy demonstrators filled the streets and used social networks like Twitter to protest Iran's dictatorship. The response was restrained; the U.S. did not interfere. Candidate Romney was critical of Obama during the 2012 campaign for not publicly supporting the Revolution, but it's far from clear a Romney administration would have acted differently, because Obama's non-interference was due to the desire to maintain any possible leverage over Iran's nuclear program. The Obamians felt that public support for pro-democracy protestors would doom any chance of negotiation or persuading Iran to halt developing a nuclear weapon. In addition, eight years of pro-democracy, anti-dictator rhetoric by the Bush administration had made the Obamians very wary, given that it was usually followed by invasion and war. It would be two years before Obamians, in the 2011 Arab Spring, felt comfortable urging dictators to step down and protesters to step up, and even then, they didn't urge it uniformly. Bahrain's protesters were crushed by its government, and the U.S. did not intervene because it needed Bahrain to remain the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet.
What has worked fairly well on Iran (and North Korea) is economic sanctions by the international community and banks. I always pictured sanctions as something that gets quickly "slapped" on a rogue nation. But as James Mann explains well, they are complicated, time-consuming, and involve a lot of financial intelligence-gathering and behind the scenes diplomacy and persuasion.
One of the administration's failures has been getting North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons. North Korea had learned the lesson of Libya well: Muammar Gaddafi, to the joy of the Bush administration in 2003, had given up his nuclear weapons in exchange for reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S. and removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism (Libya also took responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing). This meant that if the U.S. and others took military action against Libya, they didn't have to worry it would become a nuclear conflict. With North Korea, this would not apply. The U.S.'s hands will be tied in any military escalation or conflict with North Korea, because it does have nuclear weapons. This is generally why rogue nations try so hard to acquire them.
Another area that failed to see progress was Arab-Israeli peace. This was another case where the administration was hampered by the hand it had been dealt: with conservative Benjamin Netanyahu in power in Israel, there was no room for negotiation, and no incentive for the U.S. to push for talks.
If you're a liberal, or perhaps just a fan of the Constitution, you might also see as failures Obama's decision not to close Guantanamo (a campaign promise), and his policies to continue rendition of terrorist suspects and to escalate the use of unmanned drones, especially in targeted killings. The proposed Guantanamo closure received pushback from the public and Congress, and Obama gave up on it. It's not clear to me why the President wasn't willing to expend some political capital on this; maybe it's as simple as conserving political capital for the healthcare fight. Nor does Mann adequately explain Obama's fairly shocking reversals on rendition, habeas corpus, and targeted killing.
The picture we get of Obama is of a different kind of foreign policy president: not just the first "post-post Vietnam" president, whose team vigorously disconnects itself from any talk of Vietnam and its implications, but also a Democratic president unintimidated by foreign policy and unwilling to be chained to historical perceptions that his Party is weak in that area. As with every area of policy, Obama wants to hear any and all informed opinions, and then makes a decision himself based on all the evidence in front of him. Far from being risk-averse, he sometimes chooses the riskiest possible policies, as with the assault on bin Laden: a commando raid rather than an air strike, and not notifying Pakistan of the raid (which certainly would have tipped off bin Laden), even though this damaged our relations with Pakistan, a nation we very much need on our side. At every point in the planning for the raid, Obama took the riskiest path, differing with Vice President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Bob Gates, and others.
Mann's narrative stops in very early 2012. He leaves us with the foreign policy "pivot" toward Asia, in which we cultivate our Asian allies in order to both strengthen our position vis-a-vis regional Goliath China, as well as become a partner with China in various ways. (China is our frenemy.) Mann also notes in conclusion that we have a lot less to spend on foreign policy now than we did, oh, twelve years ago. The war in Iraq cost nearly one trillion dollars, and we're still spending about $10 billion per month in Afghanistan. We simply don't have the luxury of doing everything around the world that we might like to do.
Mann writes clearly and coherently and I would recommend this book to anyone looking for a balanced, somewhat lengthy description of Obama's first-term foreign policy. Two quibbles: Sarah Palin did not actually say "I can see Russia from my house," as Mann states she did, on page 98. It was Tina Fey who said that. And Mann fails to identify the man at the center of the famous bin Laden raid photograph, Marshall B. Webb, Assistant Commanding General of Joint Special Operations Command.