Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun

by John Prados

Acclaimed WWII historian and military intelligence expert John Prados offers a provocative reassessment of the Allies’ battle for the Solomon Islands—a turbulent, dramatic campaign that, he argues, was the true turning point of the Pacific conflict. 

Historians traditionally refer to the Battle of Midway as the point when Allied forces gained the advantage over the Japanese. In Islands of Destiny, Prados points out that the Japanese forces quickly regained strength after Midway and continued their assault undaunted. Taking this surprising fact as the start of his inquiry, he began to investigate how and when the Pacific tide turned in the Allies’ favor. His search led him to the decisive battles and strategic maneuvers in the fight for the Solomon Islands.

Beginning with the invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942, the Solomons became a hotly contested battleground for over a year, culminating in the isolation of Rabaul by the Allies. As military forces fought over the strategically important islands, a secret war of intelligence was also being waged. For a total picture of the conflict, Prados integrates blow-by-blow action on the ground with the code breaking, aerial reconnaissance, secret spy posts, and submarine scouting that were vital to the Allied effort.

The Solomons arena saw some of the most intense combat of WWII—from major naval actions, including a key confrontation between battleships, to air battles that took place almost daily. With expert knowledge and crystal clear prose, John Prados illustrates why these events were not only thrilling, but pivotal in the Allies’ path to victory.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, War, Military Fiction, American History, Nonfiction

388 pages, Hardcover

First published October 2, 2012

About the author

Dr. John Prados is an American historian & researcher whose primary areas of specialisation are the history of World War II, the Vietnam War, the Cold War and politico-military affairs generally. He earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University in Political Science (International Relations). Dr. Prados is a senior fellow and project director with the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).

Reviews

[Brian]

Did not finish. (I do not rate books I don’t complete.)

I’m in a slump. Picked up two books in a row on WW II that were not good and had to put them aside. Have not had that experience back-to-back before. This is a dull book.

ISLANDS OF DESTINY is supposedly about the Solomons Campaign in the Pacific during the war. If it is, I couldn’t tell. It is poorly written. It is a report, not a narrative, and that is why I could not get into it. It also emphasizes odd matters, like spring vs. winter uniforms, but then describes the Battle of the Coral Sea in two short paragraphs! Seriously?
The author also seems to want to take digs at others who have wrote on the subject. Feels petty.

On to the next. Life is too short. There have to be better books on this subject out there.

[Betsy · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a detailed accounting of the war in the Solomons and to a lesser extent, New Guinea. If you are familiar with the fight for Guadalcanal then most of the material will not be new, but there is more emphasis on the Japanese efforts than in some books. It's an interesting book with sidelights on the bringing down of Yamamoto in 1943, as well as the adventures of PT-109, but it tends to move slowly at times. Perhaps there is too much detail.

The final chapter is a wrap-up of the things the Americans did right, and the Japanese did wrong. Trying to fight on a shoestring (by choice) was a major mistake for the Japanese when there was no need to. They also failed to have a base far enough forward (such as Munda), which would have made it easier for the Tokyo Express. Tactics and strategy also tended to be lacking. Just as at Midway, the Japanese thought they could win one or two big battles, and they would be in control again. Instead, they underestimated what the Americans could do, especially once the Cactus Air Force was in place, along with the bravery of the ships which defended the Solomons. And of course, the advantage that the intelligence gave the Americans was without question.

The lives lost trying to take and trying to hold Starvation Island is one of the most memorable campaigns of WWII.

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 2 out of 5]

For those unfamiliar with the Solomon's Campaign, this book usefully juxtaposes the major events of the campaign, with an emphasis on sea and air activities, with intelligence work, which the author has written about extensively. His thesis that the Solomons was the decisive campaign of the war vice the Battle of Midway has been stated better elsewhere. He does go to great pains to point out several times during the campaign where the Japanese gained the upper-hand, but fails to accurately put this in the context of increasing overall Allied supremacy. Wilmott's argument against the decisiveness of any single battle in the Pacific Campaign -- that Midway only accelerated not caused the Japanese demise -- is argued better. But the author offers considerable insight into the context of the significant Allied intelligence effort -- including code-breaking, radio-interception, Coast-watching, photo-analysis and reconnaissance -- with respect to Allied decision making. He additionally spends considerable effort on Japanese Commanders -- and cites numerous Japanese sources. Errors weaken the work as does generally poor diction. He repeatedly misidentifies J. Lawton Collins -- one of the key US Army Division Commanders of the period -- as the Commanding General of the "Americal" Division -- when he gained considerable fame as CG of the 25th "Tropic Lightning" Division (thus "Lightning Joe" Collins of ETO fame). In short, if you have read Richard Frank's "Guadalcanal" or Wilmott's account of the campaign, I would only recommend reading this if you are interested in the intelligence aspects of the campaign in particular.

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

I will start by saying that, though I heartily agree with Prados' thesis that the Pacific War turning point was in the Solomons Campaign, I was initially unimpressed with the book. It seemed in bad need of an editor. Prados can have a stilted, choppy writing style that is difficult to read. He also used incorrect terminology (it's F6F and F4F, not F-6F or F-4F) and flat out derogatory terms (an author using "Jap" when they are quoting a contemporary source is completely acceptable, using it while writing in their own voice is completely unacceptable.) He also referred to Guadalcanal as "Cactus" throughout the book, even when discussing Japanese (not Jap) planning in reference to it. It was confusing and bizarre considering that was the U.S. codename for Guadalcanal. Last he also made some pretty obvious historical errors (he refers to Gen. Lawton Collins as the commander of the Americal Division multiple times throughout a multi-paragraph stretch. Collins was the commander of the 25th Division not the Americal, something Prados should have known.) I was surprised at the number of faults I found considering Prados' impressive reputation as a historian. In defense of the book I will say it covers some interesting and new, for me, ground by integrating intelligence into the campaign. However, what really saved the book for me was the final chapter. There Prados does an excellent job of explaining how the Japanese (not Jap) conflict between decisive battle strategy and attrition battle operations really hurt them. That alone made the book worthwhile. I would suggest picking it up in the library and just reading that last chapter. If you want good books on the Guadalcanal and Solomons campaign I recommend Richard Frank's Guadalcanal and the relevant volumes from Samuel Eliot Morison's History.

[J.S.]

DNF at page 138

John Prados contends that the battle of Midway was NOT the turning point of the Pacific War. He points out that the "military balance still favored the Japanese", and during the campaign in the Solomons they "remained capable of giving as good as they got."

"In the Solomons the Imperial Navy inflicted eleven major warship (cruiser and above) losses and endured the sinking of nine of its own big ships. But from the end of this campaign until their surrender, the Japanese managed to sink just two major enemy warships while losing dozens of their own." (all quotes are from the Introduction)

I won't dispute his conclusion - it sounds reasonable enough to me - but I just don't find the book very interesting. He states that it is a "classic military history" and his focus is on the "big picture" rather than the individual element. This leaves it much less readable than James Hornfischer's excellent history of Guadalcanal or Ian Toll's Pacific War Series. (That was a disappointment to me, since my own grandfather fought at Guadalcanal with the Marine's "Old Breed" division.) A couple of things that were nice were the inclusion of a little more information about the coast-watchers and code-breakers, as well as a lot more information from the Japanese perspective. Unfortunately, the Japanese perspective was too often mixed with the American side of the war and I often found it confusing who he was talking about and spent too much time re-reading. (Plus, he often uses the term "tin can" to refer to Japanese destroyers. I may be wrong, but I thought the term "tin can" was specific to the lighter and cheaper destroyer escorts the US began producing in quantity by the middle of the war.) Overall, it's probably a good book if you enjoy the "classic military history," but absent the human element I just couldn't stay interested enough.

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

Okay but rather pedestrian history of the Solomons campaign. It starts off rather disappointingly with the childish issue of whether Midway or the Solomons was the "turning point" of the war, as if such an amorphous concept has any analytical substance. (Not surprisingly, the author plumps for the latter.) As it turns out, this issue has little to do with the bulk of the book, which is a not particularly distinguished narrative of the campaign.

While the narrative does give some attention to US planning, it mainly focuses on the Japanese. The problem with this is that the author has no knowledge of Japanese and is reduced to gaining access to Japanese thought through such dubious routes as the thoroughly implausible post-war memoir of Tameichi Hara (*Japanese Destroyer Captain*; Hara has the astonishing skill of recalling conversations during the war in which he routinely upbraids his superiors for making stupid decisions, Hara always knowing the exact outcome that would eventually transpire; must be nice to be so prescient!).

Not surprisingly given that the author has written a number of books on intelligence, including one about the US use of code breaking against the Japanese (*Combined Fleet Decoded*), there's a fair amount of discussion of the influence of intelligence on the course of events. At times the emphasis on this seemed excessive considering the short shrift given to other topics.

Apart from the content, the book is written in a "breezy", colloquial fashion that would be suitable for the sports pages. The author routinely uses expressions like "confab" and "duke it out". I found this style contrived and annoying.

I didn't learn much I didn't already know from this book, and I didn't find the path along stuff I already know to be particularly enjoyable.

[Steve Scott · Rating 1 out of 5]

This a poorly written book. The author fails to maintain a coherent chronology, and style is choppy and confusing. He continually jumps back and forth in his time line. Prados throws some interesting details provided by Japanese sources, and I agree that with his proposition concerning the impact of the campaign, but this doesn't redeem his work. Where was his editor?

To give you an example of his choppiness, see the following:

“Back in 1943, when PT boat leader Lieutenant Brantingham saw the flaming carcass of Kennedy’s boat and heard the shell fire of that engagement, he rejoiced that at least someone had gotten a hit. But the shoe was on the other foot. Fate tied together many threads that night. John F. Kennedy’s war service later helped his political career. Arleigh Burke, whose destroyer unit had been too far away, smashed another Tokyo Express in November at the Battle of Cape St. George, one in which Captain Yamashiro led the transport unit. Yamashiro was subsequently banished to shoreside billets. And Commander Hanami’s hometown, Fukushima, would be devastated by a nuclear plant meltdown. Japan, whose war ended in the awesome destruction wrought by nuclear weapons, had swiftly adopted nuclear power, and in 2011 the Fukushima plant complex succumbed to the climactic disaster of a tsunami.”

This paragraph is one of THREE references Prados makes to the Fukushima disaster. If he discovered a Japanese commander was from Fukushima, he plugged it in for what would become needless and distracting digressions. The fact that three Japanese commanders were from Fukushima isn't relevant to the narrative, or interesting as irony.

I've read a number of accounts of the Solomon Islands Campaign over the years, this was by far one of the worst. I'd recommend it as a reference, but it isn't a joy to read if you love good writing.

[Sonny · Rating 2 out of 5]

After the better part of a month trying to get through this book, I finally had to throw in the towel. I think this was written for serious students of naval tactics because it is very, very detailed in every movement of every ship that fought in, it seemed, the entire Pacific theater not just one region.

The map symbol keys were the same for U.S. and Japanese ships which pretty much rendered the maps useless as far as gleaning any information from them as to ships movements.

Sorry I had to give this book such a low rating because I really did want to like it and I tried for 200 pages but it just didn't happen.

[Robin Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very detailed account of a very significant military campaign.

[Bill Rogers · Rating 4 out of 5]

The basic premise of this book is flawed. It makes much of the idea that the turning point of World War II in the Pacific was not the Battle of Midway, but rather the Solomons Campaign that followed; the invasion of Guadalcanal and the battles after.

In fact, the distinction is artificial. If you've read any history of Japan in World War II and before, you know that the Japanese Government of those years was about the worst that History has ever known. Not in the sense of mistreating their own people or of atrocities, although they did their share of those too, but in the sense of pure unadulterated dysfunction. A nation that was ruled not by one military hierarchy but by two, the Army and the Navy, and where failure to cooperate went so far as to plot to have high officers in the other service assassinated has got to be a level of incompetence unparalleled in recent centuries. They were bound to go flailing around attacking everyone in sight until they had accumulated enough enemies to destroy them, no matter what. They were doomed before they even started.

However, that aside, the book is a great one. While there are plenty of stories of the Battle of Guadalcanal, I never before encountered one which gave the wider command background, the Japanese side of the story, and the story of the rest of the Solomons campaign. This book does all of those.

It also taught me a few details that surprised me, since I thought I knew all about these campaigns. For example, have you ever heard of the aircraft carrier USS Robin? Short for USS Robin Hood? Neither had I.

[DAVID JAYCOX · Rating 1 out of 5]

If you are looking for a very boring text book on the Solomon Island campaign you have come to the right place.

I may keep this text around when ever I get insomnia it will help to put me to sleep. Nothing but numbers and anacronyms. Very few descriptions of action. The author's attempt to rewrite history to make the Solomon's the turning point battle of the Pacific failed miserably, mainly due to the unbelievably dry manor he uses to make his points. For all I know he may be correct. You'll never be able to tell from this book.

Don't waist your time on this one.

[Roger · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent work. An extremely well written history of the Solomon Island campaigns. Loaded with facts from both combatants, humorous anecdotes, and human interest stories. A must read if you like WWII histories.

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was immediately intrigued by this title, because the Solomons really were islands of destiny in the sense that nobody had imagined them to be of any importance before the war.

Prados does an excellent job in describing the tug of war between the US and Japan over these remote islands, where many battles were fought in cramped and unfavourable conditions and where the men were surviving on a shoestring.

Traditional historiography has it that Midway was the turning point of the Pacific War, and the loss of four Japanese carriers was probably the single greatest blow suffered by Japan.

Yet Prados makes a good case in support of the revisionists who argue that it was the long attritional warfare of the Solomons that led to Japan's defeat. He also does a good job in describing why Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands were so important for both sides, and why they would sacrifice so much to hold these rocks that hardly anybody had heard of before.

The Solomons were the islands of destiny because Japan met her nemesis there, and the US first arrested and then reversed the offensive momentum of Japan in these remote tropical islands.

The description of the naval battles, especially the night actions, are some of the most riveting I've read, and I greatly appreciate that Prados combines the naval, air, and land action, interweaving them into a complex whole to show how they impacted upon each other and how this was very much an amphibious campaign involving both sea and land power.

[Jack · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cape Esperance. Savo Island. Tassafaronga. The Santa Cruz islands. The Slot. The Tokyo Express. This remarkable phase of the Pacific campaign marked the end of Japanese offensive power. Midway stopped the Japanese onslaught, but the Solomon’s campaign from 1942 to 1943 marked the beginning of the Southern and Central Pacific drives that ultimately led to Tokyo’s surrender. This book was very enlightening since the intel aspect was heavily discussed. We started by breaking the JN25 Imperial code which allowed our ambush of Nagumo’s forces at Midway to the shoot down of Yamamoto’s bomber. Also discussed were the intrepid network of coastwatchers, whose daring spying resulted in (my opinion) saving thousands of allied lives. Air power. Sea power. Intel. It’s al here. For the future, will we Americans fight on malarial islands again? Will we be fighting surface battles at night against enemy combatants? Will our attack submarines intercept a moder day Tokyo Express? And will we island hope somewhere else to another enemy shore? Will we be ready?

[Marc Liebman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Most, if not all historians, make the case that the Battle of Midway was the turning point of the war against Japan. Prados makes an excellent case that while it allowed the U.S. to attempt to seize the initiative, it was the long, costly campaign to take and hold Guadalcanal that was the real turning point. His reasoning is that while the Japanese Navy lost four carriers during the Battle of Midway, it still retained the ability go on the attack, but after the island hopping to take the northern islands in the Solomons chain, it no longer had the assets to go on the attack, it could only react.

As an amateur military historian always looking for new perspectives, Prados fills the bill. This book is a must read for those interested in the Pacific Theater of WWII.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Full-Scope History of the Solomons Campaign

John Prados work is an exemplar for how to do military history. He integrates grand stra-egy and ground tactics, weapons development, leadership, and most of all, intelligence. His treatment of the intelligence side of the campaign for both sides is illuminating. As well, he forthrightly assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese and Allied leadership, strategies, forces, tactics, and weapons. This makes for a complex but rich and comprehensive narrative, drawn from Japanese and Allied sources.

[Lisa Ebert · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well balanced recounting of the Solomon Islands campaign

The author does an excellent job of not just recounting the Solomons campaign, but also explaining the background and related information. He includes both Allied and Japanese perspectives. I think his final summation is one of the most clear and yet thought-provoking that I have read.

[David Watts · Rating 4 out of 5]

As a novice in knowledge of the Solomons campaign, I thought this was a great read. Followed Operation Cartwheel through it’s entirety and highlighted the role of Allied intelligence throughout. Also interesting to hear of the conflict in Japanese strategy between Decisive battle strategy and attrition battle operations.

[R Locke · Rating 4 out of 5]

Early in the Solomons

A well written history of WW2 in the Solomons from pre-war to 1944. Written from the perspective of an intelligence specialist (duh). The last chapter devolves into what if analysis that doesn't contribute to the narrative.

[Richard George · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent reading on the key early campaign of the Pacific War against the Japanese. Great coverage of the battles, plans, strategies and all aspects of war fighting in the Pacific from Guadalcanal to the siege of Rabaul.

[Mark R. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great detail well written

Book really shows how lucky the US was in 1942. Midway made the IJN leaders tentative and they failed to exploit break thrus which could have altered the wars timeline

[Harlan Hanson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good Detailed Book

Presented detailed information about Solid and Japanese commands. Obviously well researched on both sides. Presented author's evaluation of both commands. Thanks.

[Bob McNamara · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid overall account of the Solomons Campaign with an emphasis on intelligence effects and breakthroughs. A bit tedious.

[Craig · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good book

I learned a lot and I thought I was knowledgeable before this book. It has wetted my appetite for further reading. I recommend highly.

[Arthur Diaz de Leon · Rating 5 out of 5]

great read

One of the best books about world war 2, great details and wealth of information about what really happened. Would recommend it to anyone

[Bill Engle · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very well written book. I loved the details of the battles.

[John Cole · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you read WW2 History put this on your list, you wont regret it!

[Ed Baldwin · Rating 5 out of 5]

his is a strong book. Written by an accomplished and experienced historian after exhaustive research of source material not available to previous authors on World War II in the Pacific, Islands of Destiny is an entertaining read; if you like history. If you're looking for a summer beach book, this isn't it. I bought it for research for a historical novel I might write one day, and I wanted someone else to read the volumes of memoirs and histories published in English since WW II, then wade through the recently translated diaries and journals of the Imperial Japanese Navy and their sailors and airmen, screen through the inflated after action reports each side produced after battles to count how many planes and ships were actually lost, lay out in reasonably concise terms the perspective of the various combatants, and tie it all together with maps, technical analysis of ships, planes, radar, secret codes and Japanese and American doctrine. Here it is. Other reviewers have criticized author Prados as providing excessive detail and not enough personal drama; get a romance novel, I say! This is the best chance we arm chair admirals will have to understand how it all went down.

The Solomons form the eastern edge of the Coral Sea, which borders Australia. At the beginning of WW II the Japanese took Rabaul, in the Bismarck Archipelago, which is just to the north of the Coral Sea. When they landed on Guadalcanal and began building an airfield, they threatened to encircle Australia and cut her supply route to the US. In July, 1942 American Marines landed on Guadalcanal. Thus begins this story of two mighty nations locked in mortal combat at the end of their supply chains. It went on for a year.

Now for some quibbling. John Prados is positively toxic on the subject of General George Kenney and the Army Air Corps' contribution to the Solomons Campaign. True, the Solomons was a Navy show, and the Navy did the bulk of the fighting and dying there, but the Army Air Corps held the eastern flank while protecting Australia from imminent invasion through New Guinea, and they did it on a shoestring compared with the firepower the Navy could muster. There are a lot of Japanese names in this book and I couldn't keep them straight. The addition of their source material is critical to this document, but it made for some tough cross checking. Perhaps a graphic with the Japanese hierarchy could have been added.

Contrary to some reviewers, author Prados gives us many personal vignettes and human profiles drawn from diaries and published memoirs to personalize this tale. I don't fault him a bit for being too dry. Insights I gained from this story include how our cracking of the Japanese code affected virtually every battle. It wasn't just the strategic movements but the actual routes and timing of ship movements, and the fact that we maintained that secret until 1978! Both American and Japanese dive bomber pilots experienced 80% attrition during major battles; put yourself in that cockpit as the engine warms up.

This book, in its paper form for the maps, pictures, and reference materials, belongs in the library of all descendants, American and Japanese, of the brave men who fought The Solomons Campaign. They changed the world.

[Nishant Pappireddi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book notes that Japan still had naval superiority in the Pacific even after Midway and explains how the Allies really turned the tide in the Solomons campaign, ending with the neutralization of Rabaul.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

I remember when the author, John Prados, was connected with the publication of board war-games in the 70's and 80's. That is what drew me to "Islands of Destiny." I found the book to be a first rate read. I like books that take a new look at old History (not revisionist history which is twisting historical facts to fit a political agenda) and Prados did that in this book. His premise is that while Midway stopped the Japanese advance for a time that it was Guadalcanal and the Solomons Campaign which was the actual turning point in the Pacific. The "new history" part is that he concentrates a lot of time on Japanese and American intelligence during the period, a lot which has never been published before. He proves his point as during the period Japan went for an advancing threat to an enemy on the run. The Solomons Campaign took all the wind out of the Japanese sails and was the first campaign won by the United States in the Pacific. Guadalcanal was a very near thing for the Americans; they nearly lost the fight for Guadalcanal several times but due to determination and some really good intelligence persevered. I am looking forward to reading Prados book "The Crucible of Normandy."