The era of economic liberalization, spanning 1978 to 2008, is often regarded as a period in which government was simply dismantled. In fact, government was reconstructed to meet the needs of a globalized economy. Central banking, fiscal control, tax collection, regulation, port and airport management, infrastructure development-in all of these areas, radical reforms were made to the architecture of government. A common philosophy shaped all of these the logic of discipline. It was premised on deep skepticism about the ability of democratic processes to make sensible policy choices. It sought to impose constraints on elected officials and citizens, often by shifting power to technocrat-guardians who were shielded from political influence. It placed great faith in the power of legal changes--new laws, treaties, and contracts--to produce significant alterations in the performance of governmental systems. Even before the global economic crisis of 2007-2009, the logic of discipline was under assault. Faced with many failed reform projects, advocates of discipline realized that they had underestimated the complexity of governmental change. Opponents of discipline emphasized the damage to democratic values that followed from the empowerment of new groups of technocrat-guardians. The financial crisis did further damage to the logic of discipline, as governments modified their attitudes about central bank independence and fiscal control, and global financial and trade flows declined. It was the market that now appeared to behave myopically and erratically--and which now insisted that governments should abandon precepts about the role of government that it had once insisted were inviolable. A sweeping account of neoliberal governmental restructuring across the world, The Logic of Discipline offers a powerful analysis of how this undemocratic model is unraveling in the face of a monumental--and ongoing--failure of the market.
Roberts describes how the much-celebrated "third wave democratization" has been accompanied by a broad process of disempowering of the elected officials through either the committed outsourcing of former governmental functions to the private sector (for example, delegating infrastructure building or management to the private sector), or the creation of politically "autonomous" and "independent" bureaucracies (e.g. central banks, tax collectors, and finance ministries). These institutional innovations have been motivated by a desire to ensure that even democratic governments remained "disciplined" about spending, taxation, regulation, and inflation, the better to allow them to participate in the globalized marketplace. Roberts is also right to point out that the promised benefits of the logic of discipline have not always materialized; proponents of the LoD suffer from a "naive institutionalism" that holds that profoundly political questions about who wins and loses out of particular government arrangements can be effectively goten around by a tweaking of laws and regulations. All of this is profound and important.
But, I was a little disappointed that Roberts didn't situate the political context for this move a little more broadly. I think he's wrong to call these things a "contradiction" with the democratization movement. On the contrary, democratization was only acceptable to capital insofar as the ambit for action of these now-democratic governments was sharply curtailed. These two movements were, in other words, more complementary than contradictory, from the POV of capital. Let the elections happen - it's a good way to legitimate authority - but don't let the governments have the power to do anything that will interfere with profits or that may upset the "balance" of the system. On this note, it's really a shame that the book pays virtually no attention to the opinion of and impact on organized labor with regard to this process. One other significant, if rarely articulated motivation for the logic of discipline, after all, was to find a way to curb the power of organized labor - which is yet another mechanism for exerting "popular" control over the economy. In other words, the historical conjecture that produced "the logic of discipline" is only intelligible except when situated as part of the broader effort since the late 1970s to reassert the power of capital over labor. Roberts doesn't ignore this, but he should have made a bigger deal of it.