This book, first published in 1966, was referred to me by my friend Dave Pritchard, a South African and Englishman, as an objective view of American foreign policies as seen from abroad. This of course is quite a stretch if you consider that it was written by a "traitorous" Democratic senator at a time when a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress were fervently pursuing the Vietnam War.
The book was written, I believe, out of Fullbright's basic belief that the Vietnam War was severely damaging to the US (not that he really cared about the Vietnamese) both as a foreign debacle and as a domestic poison. There are clear lessons that we can draw to the current Afghani War, but I would urge the reader not to be too blind to the differences in the conflicts. After all, in Vietnam, we had one major enemy who was well organized and focused on a central nationalistic ideal. Additionally, Fulbright borders on being an isolationist, something that is probably not supportable now during full globalization, or even during the 1960's.
Fulbright had several key points for me, and I'll sketch them briefly:
* Just because you are one of the biggest and the most powerful nations, you don't have a responsibility to run everyone else's business to their benefit.
* You seldom can understand what another nation needs or wants, since your own subtext distorts your ability to see the other nation's perspective, or predict that nation's actions.
* Historically, all empires get embroiled in foreign adventures to the point of destroying their domestic economic base, which provides your international power.
* We hang on to stupid positions and stay embroiled in losing conflicts because we are afraid of being embarrassed in front of other nations. By the time we are in this position, we are normally already embarrassed but too self centered to see it.
* For all our vaunted demonizing of the Red Chinese because of their strident words and bellicose statements, we appeared much more demonic through our strident military actions. They provided guns and money. We provided guns, money, and a huge occupying force.
* Dissent is healthy. A nation can have a consensus if the vast majority recognize the same basic goals and principles, but should still have a healthy dialogue or dissent on how to get there.
* Congress has failed to discharge is foreign affairs responsibilities (it is a rubber stamp). It has ceded power to the Executive Branch (and in my opinion, will seldom if ever get that power back).
* America had a conservative, nonviolent (sic), democratic revolution. No one else has much chance of pulling this one off again.
* We fundamentally mistook nationalism as a driving force for many other nations because it carried a label of communism, and this blinded us. We therefore acted often against our own best interests.
* Foreign aid should be based on our principles and our honest charity, rather than based on a ruthless effort to manipulate other countries internal policies (something we have seldom done in 200 years of foreign aid).
The tone of the book is reasonable, as if it were written by Sir Thomas More, and more than a bit pendantic. I believe that Fulbright, the center of a storm of controversy, believed his views reasonable and wanted to portray himself as a reasonable man. With this understandable context, the man is not an intriguing writer. The organization, scholarly footnoting, logic, and conclusions are all you would want, it just all tastes like Campbell's Tomato Soup.
If you want historical context, this book is okay - check it out of the library rather than buy it. On the other hand, buy all of Zbigniew Brzezinski's books, even if you never remember how to spell his name.