This book examines whether mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.
I had to visit my library at least four times to download this book (as an e-book) properly. One or two (or nearly all) chapters were always missing or the format wasn’t right. I am mentioning this to show you how good this book is. It was worth the effort to come again and again, to wait long minutes before the ancient library computers and deciphering the possibilities of download.
Przeworski and his team have put together a highly interesting and still relevant articles on accountability in (parliamentary) democracies. Each one of their articles was coherent and addressed a different point of view. What I liked the most about this book was the fact that none of the authors tried to pretend that accountability and democracy are easy definable topics. The world is complex and messy and it is ok to admit it even though you are a scientist looking for clear, straight forward conclusions.