Władysław Albert Anders was a general in the Polish Army and later in life a politician and prominent member of the Polish government-in-exile in London.
When Poland regained its independence in November 1918 Anders joined the newly-formed Polish Army. During the Polish–Soviet War of 1919 - 1921 he commanded the 15th Poznań Uhlans Regiment. After the war Anders continued his military education in France at the Ecole Superieur de Guerre and upon graduation he returned to Poland, where he served on the general staff of the Polish Army under General Tadeusz Jordan-Rozwadowski (Chief of the General Staff from 1920 to 1921).
Anders opposed Józef Piłsudski's coup d'état in Poland in 1926, but unlike Jordan-Rozwadowski, he avoided persecution by the Sanation regime that assumed power after the coup. Piłsudski made him the commander of a cavalry brigade in 1931 and he was promoted to the rank of general three years later.
It may well be some sort of record,nine brothers serving in all three branches of the armed forces of Pakistan.Two would become generals,one an admiral and two would be killed,one in a tank battle and one in an aircraft collision.
The author,Brigadier Z.A.Khan was the eldest and joined the Pakistan army in the early 1950s.He was a contemporary of my father,so my interest in this book was natural.
That was the army's formative phase. Later,when the Special Services Group (SSG commandos) was formed,the author joined it.
During the 1965 war,he was on a course in the US,and by the time he rushed back,the seventeen day war was over.So,he goes into a lengthy armchair analysis of what was done wrong during the war.
It is interesting that in official versions,that war is presented as a great success story.But reading the accounts of soldiers from that era who later analysed it,such a rosy picture does not emerge.
Still,a much larger Indian invading force was contained by a much smaller and poorly equipped Pakistan army.That to me,counts as success.In purely military terms,the 1965 war was a stalemate.
In 1971,the author was sent to East Pakistan.The most significant task his commandos were given was to capture Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman.I read the book years ago,so the details are sketchy but it was an account well worth reading.
Mujib was taken into custody without bloodshed and sent to West Pakistan.He remained there and was sent back after the war.Ironically,while the Pakistan army did not kill him,Mujib and nearly his whole family were massacred in cold blood by members of the Bangladeshi army,just a few years later !
This book is also a raw,brutal and unvarnished account of the horrors of the situation in 1971 The reader gets a sense of the blood being spilled and the stark horror.
The 1971 war was the trauma of my childhood,I can never forget it.My father,who was there,never talked about it.So,I'm always interested in the accounts of soldiers who wrote about it.
The author is pretty matter of fact in his description.He was called back to West Pakistan before the war was over,otherwise the story would have been even more interesting.
It was not an easy read for me,but one well worth reading.
Well sourced research (when estimating relative strength of troop and equipment levels at the start of Barbarossa the author footnotes no less than a dozen accounts to arrive at what may seem most accurate).
The author, Anders, makes the claim that the German main objective should have been to capture Moscow, not Leningrad or the Caucasus/Ukraine. He mentions his own interviews with Russian generals while he himself was in Russia, relating how important the defense of Moscow was and how the house of cards would have collapsed had Stalin abandoned Moscow.
The author brings up a useful and often overlooked point. To understand German military strategy (Hitler and top generals) you must understand their own takeaways from their WW1 experiences. Those lessons learned and studied led to the making of their strategies.
Many know that both Hitler and Stalin hampered their military capabilities with "do not retreat even one inch" sort of commands. Leading to encircling and surrender of important military forces. For Hitler this was the case at Stalingrad, but some blame is given to the German Air force which was overly boastful about how much materials it could deliver to the German 6th army, giving Hitler all the excuse he wanted to tell them to stay put.
This book espoused a convincing argument often overlooked in most analysis. That Hitler squandered what would have become potentially millions of more soldiers for his cause, by mistreating Russian prisoners and citizens, rather than incorporating the anti Soviets amongst them into paramilitary or military forces.
Lastly, Allied aid to the Soviet Union was greater than I had previously imagined- 375,000 trucks, 15,000 aircraft, etc., just from the United States alone. In essence all of these supplies bought time for the Russians to stall and bleed the Germans out, while the other Allies prepared for opening up new fronts in Europe.
For grand narrative, look elsewhere. For thorough professional analysis look here. Lt. Gen. Anders, himself an important figure in the war gives a soldier's analysis of Hitler's invasion of Russia. The book is well written and easy to read with enough information for both the amateur enthusiast as well as the professional historian. One of the topics covered in great detail is something typically skipped in most histories of WW2, the condition of people in the Soviet republics. In many cases, the German armies were actually hailed as liberators by people under Soviet rule! However Nazi bigotry failed to capitalize on this widespread sentiment and lost all local goodwill. The blame for the defeat is laid squarely upon the incompetence of Hitler who repeatedly failed to concentrate force to achieve key targets instead frittering away his initial advantage on multiple fronts trying to achieve too much too fast with too little. Time and again, the author shows the technical superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red armies shows how close they had come to victory. The Soviet Union may have fallen but for Allied aid and Nazi incompetence.
A good book for someone who was a general in world war two. Tells about Hitler blunders, from strategy to the mass killing of salvic people. Has chapters on the aid the west give to USSR:from the vital logistic support of the lend lease to the air front against Luftwaffe. In the lend lease the soviets had locomotives, radios, food, tools, supply, equipements, wires trucks, jeeps and canned food that the soviet system had difficulty to produce. A good overall book on the war on the east that show that the war was global and its not only one side that did the effort. A must have for people interested on the eastern front.