How We Reason by Philip Johnson-Laird

by Philip N. Johnson-Laird

Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet, it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes - so much of our mental life goes on outside our awareness. In recent years huge strides have been made into developing a scientific understanding of reasoning. This new book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of thescience of reasoning.We can all reason from our childhood onwards - but how? 'How we reason' outlines a bold approach to understanding reasoning. According to this approach, we don't rely on the laws of logic or probability - we reason by thinking about what's possible, we reason by seeing what is common to the possibilities. As the book shows, this approach can answer many of the questions about how we reason, and what causes mistakes in our reasoning that can lead to disasters such as Chernobyl. It shows why ourirrational fears may become psychological illnesses, why terrorists develop 'crazy' ideologies, and how we can act in order to improve our reasoning. The book ends by looking at the role of reasoning in three extraordinary case the Wright brothers' use of analogies in inventing theirflyer, the cryptanalysts' deductions in breaking the German's Enigma code in World War II, and Dr. John Snow's inductive reasoning in discovering how cholera spread from one person to another.Accessible, stimulating, and controversial, How we Reason presents a bold new approach to understanding one of the most intriguing facets of being human.

Genres: Psychology, Nonfiction, Philosophy, Neuroscience, Science

Hardcover

First published January 1, 2006

About the author

Philip N. Johnson-Laird is a professor at Princeton University's Department of Psychology and author of several notable books on human cognition and the psychology of reasoning.

Reviews

[TjeerdFokkens · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is very nice in that it contains many examples about reasoning both in the lab and in practice. The writing is good and lively and keeps the reader interested in the argument. A major -- and quite fundamental -- drawback, however, is that the theory of mental models is not well-defined; a problem which is common in the literature. This makes it difficult to see what the theory actually predicts. Instead, the book applies the vaguely formulated idea of mental models all too easily to a wide range of experiments, in hindsight. This is such a shame, as the theory, unless well-defined, could have the potential to explain the phenomena much more rigorously.
The conclusion is, in my opinion, that the theory of mental models needs to be formalised and then actively attempted to be falsified, after which a new book on the subject could be written.