Rethinking Military History is a bold new 'thought book' that reconsiders military history at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The chapters provide a valuable and concise survey of the main themes in the study of military history from 1500 to the present day as Jeremy Black reveals the main trends in the practice and approach to military history and proposes a new manifesto for the subject to move forward.
This must-read study demonstrates the limitations of current approaches, including common generalizations, omissions, and over-simplications. Engaging theoretical discussions, with reference to specific conflicts, suggest how these limitations can be remedied and adapted, whilst incorporating contributions from other disciplines. Rethinking Military History is essential reading for all those with an interest in military history, and all who wish to take part in moving the discipline forward.
Jeremy Black is an English historian, who was formerly a professor of history at the University of Exeter. He is a senior fellow at the Center for the Study of America and the West at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, US. Black is the author of over 180 books, principally but not exclusively on 18th-century British politics and international relations, and has been described by one commentator as "the most prolific historical scholar of our age". He has published on military and political history, including Warfare in the Western World, 1882–1975 (2001) and The World in the Twentieth Century (2002).
The main themes of Black's Rethinking Military History, which readers of his other work are likely to have run across elsewhere, are that the writing of military history, especially as consumed by the broader public,
1. has focused overwhelmingly on Western Europe and the United States, to the neglect of the military history of other regions. 2. has been biased toward technological explanations for capability, and other developments. 3. has focused on "leading powers and dominant military systems, leading to a paradigm/diffusion model of military capability and change." 4. has separated the understanding of war on land and on sea. 5. has focused on interstate wars rather than war within states (with few exceptions, like the Civil War). 6. has failed to pay enough attention to "political 'tasking' in the setting of force structures, doctrines and goals, and in the judging of military success."
For the most part, I find it impossible to argue with his view of the state of military historiography, and on the whole I think he did a good job of offering a corrective in the book (except perhaps for point number four, which got comparatively little attention).
I particularly enjoyed the discussion of the writing of "pop" military history in the book's second chapter. Quite accurately, I thought, he analyzed the focus not just on Western history and interstate conflicts, but the tendency of writers to treat the same handful of wars over in the same ways - namely memoir, biography and operational history – over and over and over again while ignoring other subject matter and approaches. (Because he devotes so much time to the British market, the details are a bit less reflective of the American market, rather less interested in the Napoleonic era, and with quite a different take on World War I, but the principle is pretty much the same.)
In this fascinating book, Jeremy Black sets out to challenge much of the current mainstream approach to military history. He highlights the overwhelming emphasis in published works on narrow studies focused on combat between Western conventional armies, with a concentration on technology as the decisive factor.
Black notes that this serves military history as a discipline, and its readers, poorly for three main reasons. First, battles are won by far more than technology, such that concentration on this factor above all others hinders our understanding of the true nature of victory. Second, combat represents only a small fraction of the experience of armies, so we may overlook most of influence. Third, treating the development of warfare as essentially a Western experience, with the non-West appearing only as inferior enemies to be defeated, not only exaggerates the Western contribution to military development, it also distorts the role of Western powers in the history of the non-West, where conflicts between non-Western states were often of far greater relevance. Finally, to focus on the West is to forgo much that is rich and fascinating in military history.
Black then moves on to an examination of the study of military affairs over the past five hundred years, exploring both how the subject was studied at the time and also how each period has been treated by subsequent military historians.
Overall, the book is a thought-provoking and chellenging work, which displays an extraordinary breadth of knowledge and understanding of the field of military history and the factors affecting both how it is written and how it is sold and read. Even if your interest is on the conduct of war by Western armies, this readable and thoroughly referenced volume will cause you to reflect and consider the subject with a more rounded judgement.
Provides some useful insights into Sun Tzu through a survey of military history. Black identifies several problems with Western readings of The Art of War. He contests that the limited knowledge of Taoist principles in the West inhibits accurately understanding the tenets of Sun Tzu. The author provides suggests on how these limitations can be overcome.
A useful and thought-provoking book. Valuable for those with an interest in some of the key issues and debates that have both defined and limited the field of Military History (as of 2004, the date of publication)