Motomura considers the legal history of immigration as it falls into three primary forms of logic: immigration as contract (in which the act of migration carries within it implied contracts of behavior, treatment, and mutuality), immigration as affiliation (in which the ability to become a citizen is predicated on one's having social and affinal ties and connections within one's new country), and immigration as transition, in which each immigrant is presumed to be on the road to citizenship from the moment of arrival. Much of his argument, made through exploration of specific court cases in the history of immigration law, focuses on how we have overly emphasized the first two forms of immigration and have subsequently sorted immigrants into the statuses of citizen and non-citizen, a form that in turn does not treat all members of society equally (aka if we put so much emphasis on legal citizenship, then we inherently make those without it as fundamentally less equipped for just treatment). If we were to focus on immigration as transition instead, then everyone coming to the US would start on somewhat equal footing, making the path to citizenship more incorporative while also preserving a greater degree of choice and autonomy.
While Motomura's argument seems in many ways like a pipe dream--and puts an enormous onus on those who do not pursue routes to full legal citizenship--I was increasingly more persuaded than expected because of the evidence he provides from past court cases. Many of the legal decisions made around immigration implicitly or explicitly invoke ideas of participation and belonging that in turn emphasize a right kind of immigrant (over a wrong kind)--is there a way to resist this dichotomy by making the entire immigration-to-citizenship narrative more standard and coherent?