A History of the Middle East

by Peter Mansfield, Nicolas Pelham (Primary Contributor)

For more than four thousand years, the Middle East has provided a setting for titanic struggles between great civilizations and religions. In the twentieth century it became the focus of rivalry between the European powers as the last major Islamic empire of the Ottoman Turks crumbled and collapsed. The discovery of the world's greatest oil reserves gave the region global economic importance as well as a unique strategic value. In this masterly work of synthesis, Peter Mansfield draws on his experience as a journalist and historian to form a picture of the political and social history of the meeting point of Occident and Orient over the last two centuries, from Bonaparte's marauding invasion of Egypt to the start of the Gulf War. In two penetrating final chapters, Peter Mansfield discusses Saddam Hussein and the prospects for the future. Incisive and illuminating, A History of the Middle East is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand what is perhaps the most crucial and volatile nerve center of the modern world.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Middle East, Politics, Islam, World History, Audiobook

608 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1991

About the author

Peter Mansfield was a British political journalist. He was educated at Winchester and Cambridge. He resigned from the British Foreign Service over the Suez affair in 1956. He worked in Beirut, editing the Middle East Forum and wrote regularly for the Financial Times, The Economist, The Guardian, the Indian Express and other newspapers. From 1961 to 1967 he was the Middle East correspondent of the Sunday Times.

Reviews

[Jason Koivu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Holy crap is the Middle East confusing! I thought I had a good grasp on it. After reading this I realize I most certainly did not.

So, I'm glad I read this well structured history lesson in book form, because it helped straighten out some of the intricate political web that has turned that area of the world into the contentious powder keg it's become. The history of the various religions, governments, sovereign leaders and all their disparate aims are difficult to juggle in one's mind. This book helps.

The only reason A History of the Middle East doesn't get a full 5 stars is that it is a little textbooky at times and the material got a bit laborious now and then, so my overall enjoyment didn't last from beginning to end, but that's mostly a personal issue. I'm not hugely into politics like I once was, so the subject is hard-pressed to keep my attention.

[Trevor · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is hard to recommend this book as a good introduction to this topic, as my knowledge of the history of the Middle East is so limited that really, as long as he mentioned Iraq, Persia, Egypt and some stuff about Islam he could have probably told me anything and I’d have been none the wiser. As it was I started off a little concerned when he talked about how great Christianity is and then went on to talk of the myth of Herod killing all the boy children as if it was literally true. I very nearly stopped reading altogether, but through gritted teeth...

Oh, not reading, I listened to this as an audio book and that made it much harder than it needed to be. I’m not sure I would recommend this as an audio book unless you have a better picture of the Middle East than I do. The problem is not just that I’m completely unfamiliar with the material, so one character more or less merged into the next, but also this is the sort of book that I would have needed to read with a good map in front of me. Actually, a good series of maps and maybe even a ‘family tree’ of all the characters.

I think I would have liked to have come away from this with a better understanding of the differences between the Turks, Persians, Kurds and Arabs. To be honest, this isn’t really covered as well as I would have liked or expected. Also, the difference between the Sunni and the Shiites is hardly explained at all. The key ideas in this book seem to be skipped over. This might be because, as he says of the differences in Islam, there basically is no difference except historical and political. This is nothing like the differences between Catholics and Protestants, but more like those between Anglicans and Wesleyans.

The good bits of this book were very good, but I felt there was too much detail that I didn’t think mattered and not enough to give the sort of helicopter view I was hoping for of either Islam or the Middle East.

This history ends at about the place where most of us more or less know how the story works out – that is, just before the start of the first Gulf War. The Soviet Union is still a going proposition (although only just) and Desert Storm is yet to rage.

His treatment of the background to this war is concise and interesting. He also has many interesting things to say about the Iran / Iraq war and the complications that Israel has added to the region. There is lots of information about Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, the First and Second World Wars and their consequences for the Middle East, but I still did not feel that I came away from this book really knowing nearly enough about any of these things. And like I said, I didn’t feel the Kurds rated nearly enough of a mention. I’m very curious about the differences between the Arabs and the Kurds and the Turks and just why they all hate each other quite so intensely, and yet all pray to the one God. I know religion is hardly the great unifier of people – but I would have thought that if everyone had what is almost exactly the same religion that it might have done something to unify these peoples. This is not evident from their history, nor is the reasons why this might not be the case explained in a way I would have liked.

You do come away from this book with a feeling for how the Arabs must feel. They did much to kick start the Renaissance in the West and the idea that we picked up the ball and ran with it must be a bit annoying. The standard line with all of this stuff is that Islam is much to blame. Well, yeah, as any religion is for sustaining ignorance, but there are clearly other issues involved here. It is generally felt in the Middle East that all that is required for Arabs to take their proper place at the pinnacle of world civilisations (as they have been for most of the history of civilisation) is for them to dedicate themselves more fully to their adherence to Islam. I was left with the impression that this view is so deeply held in the Middle East that for it to be forsaken would be akin to abandoning what it means to be an Arab. It also seems clear that Mansfield believes Islam is utterly core to what it means to be an Arab and that therefore these views are unlikely to change any time soon.

My favourite quote about the Middle East is from Chomsky who is often asked to come up with a title for his lectures many years in advance and when this is the case he says he invariably calls them, “The current crisis in the Middle East”. Savage, sad, but unfortunately also true – the problems in the Middle East do seem both eternal and beyond solution – and this book gives some of the background as to why this is the case. All the same, I think this history could have done with a better story teller.

I would have liked to have come away from this book with more answers, but perhaps that is the wrong way to look at it. Perhaps the mark of a good introductory history to somewhere as complex as the Middle East is the number of questions one is left with. If that is the case, this is a particularly fine introduction.

[Callum's Column · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Middle East is one the most consequential geographic regions in history. Ancient empires--Assyrian, Persian, Greek, Roman--came and went. The Abrahamic religions were birthed. Islam and later the Ottomans rose to dominance. With age, the Ottomans grew "sick," and were usurped by European empires, namely the British and French. These empires also fell, but not before partitioning the land across ethnic and sectarian lines and sponsoring a Jewish state. Oil made the region rich, which underpinned hegemonic desires. American-led imperialism returned and has remained to fight Islamic jihad.

Peter Mansfield initially published this book in 1991. Five new editions have since been written by Nicolas Pelham, with the latest being printed in 2019. Both are journalists, yet Mansfield's prose lacked the superfluousness that others of his profession often exhibit when writing a book. Pelham, however, tended to include too much information and was not able to write with analytical clarity of his counterpart. Whereas Mansfield wrote thematically, Pelham's additions read much like a hodgepodge of newspaper articles tacked together. Nonetheless, the book provides a reasonable overview of the key events that shape contemporary geopolitics.

The last sentence states: "Slowly, perhaps, the region was recovering the inclusivity that had been its hallmark for millennia before the rise of the modern Middle East." This was a vacuous conclusion. The Israel-Hamas war presently rages. Speculation that Israel may attack Hezbollah mounts, and the Houthis continue to attack commercial shipping. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are proxies of Iran, who has been waging a shadow war against the West for decades. Alongside various simmering regional conflicts, this shadow war almost stepped into the light with recent tit-for-tat attacks. The Middle East is a meniscus that may spill over.

[Virginia Cornelia · Rating 5 out of 5]

O istorie politica a Orientului Mijlociu

Dupa o scurta introducere de la antic la modern, cartea incepe cu ultimele doua sute de ani ale Imperiului Otoman.
Mansfield trece in revista realizarile unor sultani si incepe sa detalieze cu adevarat cand Imperiul este pe moarte.
Ramas in urma Europei si saracit de razboaie, el tot isi doreste sa ramana in viata si usor usor incep reformele. Cea mai notabila fiind Tanzimatul.
Lipsa banilor il face sa ia imprumuturi tot mai mari de la Franta si Marea Britanie , imprumuturi care vor determina falimentul Imperiului Otoman. Chiar si asa, cele doua puteri colonialiste nu il deconectează inca de la aparat, deoarece niciuna nu isi doreste ca Imperiul Tarist si isi faca simțită prezenta in zona controlata de otomani.

Descrisa de europeni drept Orientul Mijlociu, zona era condusa de Imperiul Otoman sub forma vilaietelor, regiuni cu un grad ridicat de autonomie , in viata carora turcii nu s-au amestecat foarte mult, dar care plateau tributuri semnificative. Totodata , pana la apariția Turciei , Imperiul Otoman a detinut si conducerea/califatul musulmanilor. Renuntand la titlu, Turcia a creat una din premisele luptei pentru conducerea religioasa a musulmanilor.

Slăbirea puterii Imperiului Otoman si dorinta Marii Britanii de a-si întări accesul catre Perla Coroanei, a dus la ocuparea Egiptului Otoman de catre englezi la jumatatea anilor 1800, zona din care au refuzat sa plece aproximativ 100 de ani. Mult disputatul Canal Suez , prin care astazi de desfasoara aproximativ 12% din comertul mondial si prin care trece zilnic aproximativ 8% din necesarul mondial de gaz lichefiat, a fost construit de francezi ( in detrimentul Angliei) pe banii pe care Egiptul nu ii avea si pentru care a trebuie sa se indatoreze masiv , dar si sa cedeze pe zeci de ani dreptul de exploatarea catre Marea Britanie si Franta. Mansfield continua cu cele doua personalitati semnificative ale Egiptului -Muhammad Ali si Nasser si rolurile pe care acestia le au avut in obtinerea independentei si modernizarii Egiptului ,nationizarii Canalului Suez si rolul de conducător/ mediator al Egiptului printre arabi.

O data cu decesul " bolnavului Europei" , cele 2 puteri colonialiste castigatoare ale WWI s-au asezat la masa si au trasat cu cerneala limite, liinii si granite. 100 de ani mai tarziu , granitele inca se scriu cu sange si vieti ale sunnitilor, shiitilor, maronitilor, palestinienilor si evreilor.

Granitele de la 1900 din Orientul Mijlociu au dus la aparitia unor noi natiuni si noi conflicte. Siria, Iordania, Liban, Palestina si Israel. Persia a devenit Iran si Mesopotamia Irak.

Impartirea regiunii a avut la baza 3 deziderate :
-securizarea intereselor Marii Britanii in India

-accesul la petrol. Initial exploatat de Marea Britanie in Iran si ulterior , pacalind Franta si in Mosul ( Irak). Este foarte intersant redata politica de spoliere , dar si aparitia intarziata a noii superputeri -USA si a relatiilor acesteia cu Arabia Saudita. Sarace lipite, statele Golfului au vazut si ele lumina zilei cand s-a descoperit petrol in deserturile lor.

-crearea unui camin al evreilor. Theodor Herzl, Rothschiel, declaratia Balfour, mandatul britanic al Palestinei si nesarsitul conflict israeliano-palestinian si mai putin sangeros, israeliano-arab. Ajutorul financiar si militar acordat de USA Israelului pentru a-si crea un satelit/aliat in mijlocul Orientului Mijlociu.

Am citit destul de incet cartea, data fiind lipsa mea de cunostinte asupra acestei zone si uitandu-ma in stanga si dreapta , cred ca ar fi fost util sa incep cu "O istorie a Imperiului Otoman" si " Imperiul. Cum a creat Marea Britanie lumea moderna". In orice caz, mi-a placut extrem de mult si ce am aflat si stilul autorurului, dar si continuarea ( uptodate ) lui Nicolas Pelham, ambii reporteri ai unor publicatii de referinta in Orientul Mijlociu.

[Ivan · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Letto nell'edizione SEI, anno 1993)
Pubblicato dall'autore nel 1991, fu edito in Italia per la prima volta nel 1993. E' quindi naturalmente un testo per certi aspetti più che datato, ma sempre molto interessante. Il pregio maggiore dell'opera, per me, è l'aver focalizzato quasi tutta la sua attenzione sul XIX secolo e soprattutto sul XX secolo, tra l'inizio e la fine del colonialismo, la caduta dell'impero ottomano e il sorgere degli stati "nazionali", fino agli anni Novanta. In tal modo evita di diventare un malloppo corposo e ci presenta un quadro sufficentemente esauriente della moderna geopolitica del Medioriente e dei suoi problemi, connessi in primo luogo alla vicenda Israele- Palestina, non solo, ma anche alla rivoluzione khomeinista, etc. Il libro delinea anche il sorgere lo svilupparsi dell'integralismo islamico e del jihadismo, ma si arresta agli inizi degli anni Novanta con la prima guerra del Golfo.

[Tammam Aloudat · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a journey this book has been. I have read multiple accounts of the history of Arabs and the Middle East including A History of the Arab Peoples, History of the Arabs, A Concise History of the Arabs, and A Concise History of the Middle East written by a mix of Arab and foreign authors, yet, this account stands out very well for being balanced, extensive, and accurate as far as I know.

First, the form, I am impressed by masterful mix of neutral language and readability that the book manages to put together very well. It is not a biased book although some reviewers noted that it sounds less favourable to the West, but looking at the history of the region not being completely favourable to the West is not a biased position. The book author(s) do not really have favourites in their account of the turbulent history of the region. The sequence is good and has managed to mix what is essentially multiple histories in one narrative that addresses all of them with a reasonable balance. Naturally, the account is not entirely chronological inside every chapter or time period as a completely sequential account would have forced a lot of jumping from one context and storyline to the other. Hence, there is a sustaining of narratives with some zig-zagging in years. This required focus but was rendered easier by the containment of chapters within one period or one context.

Second, transition of authors, while Mansfield has written the entirety of the first part, my understanding is that Nicolas Pelham has continued it in at least the second to this fourth edition updating the timeline into its current end in 2013. To his credit, with some syntactical and form minor differences, I feel that Pelham has kept to the intention and tone of Mansfield in writing his chapters. The book isn't entirely seamless as Pelham is more colourful in his choice of words but the seams are well hidden and cause no disruption in the reading.

Third, the content. Here I have many praises and a few complaints. To start with the downside, no 500 page book can expect to cover the diverse and long history of the Middle East in any level of depth, however, the account is a little thin in places and the choice of focus is not always clear. For example, Muhammad Ali's reign gets more description and analysis than that of Nasser. I agree that Muhammad Ali's actions have drawn the beginning of the line on which Egypt, and the region indeed, had to walk, but few can argue that Nasser had a smaller part to play. Similarly, the account of the PLO and Arafat took only a few pages. At a point, it felt that the book started comprehensively and then the author realised they will reach their word count quota soon and started writing more concisely. To compensate, there is a comprehensive and rich list of further reading at the end of the book.

The praises are mainly to the objectivity of the text. As I said, it sounds neutral yet readable and interesting and it states facts (as far as facts can be asserted in the Middle East) and the authors do not hesitate to mention their uncertainty when that is due.

Secondly, while the last part on regime change is short and lacks in details, it is a good preliminary reading on what has happened in the Arab awakening and the revolutions against the autocratic regimes of the region. My hesitance is that it does give the impression that the rebellions are entirely between the dictators and the Islamic inspired movements and spares only a few words for the civil uprising by secular youth in the region except a few words about that in Egypt. For more information about the Arab uprisings, this is not the place, especially that the book ends in 2013 before the Brotherhood president was overthrown in Egypt and the war in Syria took the many turns it did to the worse. The last part is short, feels disrupted, and doesn't give a clear account. I think I would look forward to reading it again in the fifth edition.

There are several options for reading about the history of the Middle East as I mentioned above, Hourani's account is sublime and a must, but Mansfield is more oriented to the modern and recent history of the region and gives a clear and concise idea about what happened in the past few centuries which is essential to understanding what is happening now. Very highly recommended.

[Justin Tapp · Rating 3 out of 5]

One critic has suggested the book "be re-named as A Western History of the Middle East" but I would suggest perhaps "A Political History of the Middle East." It is definitely the view from 10,000 feet, focusing mostly on political maneuvering and power struggles. This makes sense given that Mansfield wrote for papers like The Economist and the Financial Times in the mid-20th century; the majority of the book is devoted to the 20th century. Mansfield largely sets aside theology, almost ignoring any role it may play in dividing relations between Iran and the Saudis, for example. Why are Shia largely repressed and marginalized in Saudi Arabia while Sunnis and Kurds face difficulties in Iran? He devotes a few paragraphs on major Shia-Sunni differences, but only after he reaches the end of the 19th century. What are Alawites, Druze, Coptics? What is the interplay of Lebanese Christians alongside Palestinian Arab refugees and Shia militia? This level of detail is not really found. Given his financial journalistic background you would think he would have included more details on demographics, economic growth, and other such aspects of the Middle East but these are also largely left out.

Tamim Ansary's Destiny Disrupted is a world history through the eyes of Islam, which is a decent book to read in contrast to this work, and is much more detailed in terms of religion and culture. Other books that I read prior to this include Albert Hourani's History of the Arab Peoples, The Cambridge History of Turkey vol. 1 and 2, Paul Johnson's History of the Jews, Anderson's Lawrence in Arabia, Kissinger's World Order, Kinzer's Reset (on relations between Turkey, Iran, and the US), and Salim Yuqub's Great Courses lecture series on The United States and the Middle East from 1914-2001. Yaroslav Trofimov's The Seige of Mecca is also an important work on events in 1979 that have much to do with 2016. All of these provide details that Mansfield book does not, but I find Mansfield largely hits the high points and gives a good overview of life until 1991.

One major weakness of this book is that Mansfield dismisses the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (1960s) and events such as the attack on The Grand Mosque in 1979 by a multiethnic group of Wahabbists as simply dead-enders showing they have nothing large to offer the larger populace and being henceforth rejected and never of any real significance. He writes in the closing chapter that Saddam Hussein proved "Arab nationalism and Islam cannot be mutually exclusive," citing Saddam's ability to muster Arab support for his "jihad" against Iran. His view from 1991 was that oil prices would again rise and the Middle East would again "be important" as its dictators again had oil riches and complaints. As a result, the reader might imagine that the US would end up returning to Iraq to face off against Saddam one day, and that Saudi Arabia and Iran would fight proxy wars someplace like Yemen, but you would not imagine that Saudi-inspired terrorists were already plotting attacks against the US even as this book went to publication or that by 2016 there would be an international war in several countries battling violent Islamists that showed a remarkable ability to recruit internationally by the tens of thousands. (It is similar to the mistake US policymakers and diplomats made in not properly seeing the undercurrents before the Iranian Revolution and being surprised as it unfolded. Even that episode is treated rather politically, Mansfield doesn't bother explaining that Iranians were outraged that the Shah went to America for treatment--an act they saw as an intentional harboring of the puppet.) That is the danger of pulling religion/theology and the underlying values and culture out of a book that aims to be a sweeping history.

The author begins with a rapid run from about 0 BCE to the founding of the Ottoman caliphate. On one hand, it is nice that he does not look at the region in previous times but focuses on the period when the Arabs developed. There is little information available from around the time of Muhammed and rather than speculate, he just speeds forward. On the other hand, many events around the time of Mohammed are important and provide context both to the formation and spread of Islam as well as modern-day struggles (see Tom Holland's The Shadow of the Sword). Mansfield then gives a decent overview of Ottoman life and policy, highlighting various aspects of the long decline. In 1497, the Portugese bypass the Cape of Good Hope and the New World takes away the monopoly the Ottomans had on trade and the Western economy. Rather than innovate in the face of competition, the structures of the empire impeded progress and as it declined economically the idea of the Caliphate was revived in order to push its influence over Islam in its territories.

There was an ongoing struggle between the Sultan and Mohammed Ali of Egypt which the British and French were able to exploit, as well as the rise of Mohammed Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, who invaded and occupied Syria in 1831. In the midst of this came various Western missionaries who built schools, hospitals, and brought Western ideas (I recommend American missionary Roger Goodell's work on his stay in Beirut during this period) as well as mass-printed books. (It was not until the late 1800s that the Ottomans allowed the Koran to be printed and the printing press was not used widely in the Ottoman Empire.) The 1838 Anglo-Turko treaty and an increasing amount of Russian meddling in the "Holy Land" eventually led to the Crimean War. During this period, young Turks were finally allowed to travel abroad and study in Western schools; they returned with bold ideas for reform and democracy. The Young Turks pushed constitutional reform on Abdul Hamid II in 1876 only to later see counter-reforms and a strengthening of the autocracy two years later.

According to Mansfield, Armenian revolutionary movements aiming for independence grew during the late 1800s. The slaughter of many in Eastern Anatolia was reciprocated by an Armenian terrorist attack in Istanbul, followed by a further pogrom of Armenians from that city. In Egypt there were likewise nationalist movements aiming at self-determination. There was an open Britain-France-Nationalist-Ottoman struggle for Egypt which eventually led to British occupation because the Suez was too important to fall into enemy hands. Mansfield also mentions the ongoing struggle between Sudan and Egypt, a point of contention between Egypt and Britain.

In the 1890s, the Ottoman Empire could not stand long against the Young Turks in Istanbul or the growing Arab nationalism in its territories. Places like Lebanon, inhabited by both Western Christian missionaries, Druze, and others with more ideas of democratic capitalism, the Sultan's stifling grip on either ideas or commerce began to chafe. Hamid brought Hussein and the Hashemites to Istanbul as part of the court in an effort to keep his friends close but his enemies closer. After he pivoted toward Germany for aid and the construction of railroads, the Young Turks managed to overthrow Abdul Hamid in 1908, only to see the further slaughter of Armenians in a conservative counter-coup. Nonetheless, the Young Turks restored the constitution and its reforms, particularly for women's rights and education.

After Mansfield briefly describes the major differences between Sunni and Shia Islam, he explores the history of the Safavid Dynasty of Persia and the development of unique Persian/Iranian nationalism. One of the founders of the Pan-Islamist movement of the late 1800s was Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani was invited to Iran by Shah Nasser ad-Din where his popular preaching calling for reforms, resistance to Western influence and a return to Islamic principles, caused the Shah to eventually deport him in 1891. As elsewhere across the Middle East there was a growing movement against Western colonialism, and al-Afghani's disciples would eventually oppose British exploitation of Iran's oil resources.

Once the time line goes to World War I, the British outrage many in the Middle East with the Balfour Declaration and the eventual resettlement of Jews into Palestine under a British Mandate. There is a good explanation of how the mandate worked along with the chronicling of the Arab rejection of various offers for a divided state and the fraught immigration of Jews into an increasingly dangerous Palestine. The rivalry for power and independence in the Levant is well-documented in Anderson's Lawrence in Arabia and other works. The Hashemites versus the French, Ibn Saud, and others. Early on in the 1900s there was not a notion of an Arab nation-state or states in the Middle East, but there was clearly a strong pan-Arab, pan-Islamic tide through which various tribal powers appealed to a common base against Western influences.

Ibn Saud forges his still-so-consequential alliance with ibn Al-Wahhab and Reza Shah taks the throne in Iran and both Saudi Arabia and Iran enjoy selling oil to Western markets and rivalry with one another. In Egypt there is the education of Abdul Nasser and an increase in nationalism. Kemal Atatürk remakes Turkey into a secular democracy while the author really misses Reza Shah's envy of the secular aspect of Atatürk's country as he pays a visit (see Kinzer's work for this subject). WWII simply delays the inevitible as eventually Nasser and Sadat succeed in overthrowing their British yoke in 1952. The British and Americans made sure not to allow Iran slip out of their influence by overthrowing Mohammed Mosaddegh in 1953. Iraq's nationalist generals cooperated with Germany to move toward independence, but Allied victory in WWII maintained it in the British camp until a 1958 coup installed a monarch who dissolved the Baghdad Pact. Eventually Egypt tries a pan-Arab union with Syria, but Mansfield writes that the bourgeois opposed Nasser's strong socialism and the alliance collapses into Nasser-Baathist rivalry, a Syrian-Iraqi union at Nasser's expense. Meanwhile, Faizal creates a conservative Islamic front in Saudi Arabia against Nasser. The French and British basically withdraw from the Middle East and Northern Africa.

Eventually, America stops viewing anyone who is not in the pro-America camp as a communist; Kennedy embraces Nasser and Johnson continues the support. The incredible defeat of allied Arab forces against Israel in 1967 have wide repercussions, along with ending Nasser's rule and creating more political squabbling among the Arab states. Anwar Sadat tries to get the US to take Egypt more seriously and starts the Yom Kippur war, leading to greater Israeli insecurity and a more hawkish attitude toward the Arabs, particularly in the form of making ties with US politicians. In the 1960s-1970s, everything seems to center around oil. The Saudis have five-year plans for infrastructure and use oil funds to eventually mount a joint effort to build Dubai. OPEC becomes the household word in the West. Jimmy Carter's foreign policy is humiliated by the overthrow of the Shah, which eventually leads to US engagement in the Iran-Iraq war as the Saudis increasingly have to balance the domestic pressures of a growing Salafist movement opposed to the House of Saud with proxy struggles with Iran. Mansfield essentially dismisses the conservative Islamist seige of Mecca in 1979 as the last gasp of the conservative religious movement on the road to greater secularization.

Mansfield cruises through the 1980s, ultimately building up to the 1991 Gulf War, the results of which were not complete by the time the book was published. Saddam had both gathered Arab sympathies in his war with Iran and tried to boost his credibility as a force to be reckoned with by "retaking" Kuwait, perhaps this is similar in Mansfield's eyes as Sadat's attempt to get Western attention via the Yom Kippur War. He speculates on what would happen if the USSR breaks up-- the Middle East and central Asia would likely grow closer due to its pan-Islamic ties, and Turkey would also be involved due to the pan-Turkic relationship. But Turkey looks to be moving more westward than eastward in 1991.

"The Middle East will not be ignored," concludes the author as he forecasts a return of oil prices closer to pre-1980s levels and a return to power of the monarchs and dictators that rule the region in a great rivalry. In all, I give it 3.5 stars out of 5. There is no ancient history, little treatment of the ethnic histories and religious undertones that clearly mean so much today, no understanding of the demands of jihadi fighters returning from Afghanistan, and no imagination that the pan-Islamism we would see just two decades later was one united in a violent struggle not just among Sunnis and Shias but also between Sunni powers.

[Victor Bălăcescu · Rating 4 out of 5]

O carte bună din care am înțeles mult mai bine cum s-a creat Orientul Mijlociu în forma de astăzi, dar și cum funcționează statele care îl compun. Cu toate acestea, am simțit în foarte multe momente lipsa reperelor temporale (până la urmă e o carte de istorie, ar trebui ca toate evenimentele să fie plasate în timp, prin paranteze sau în altă manieră), dar și a hărților (există câteva hărți, însă sunt doar la începutul cărții și cu siguranță nu sunt suficiente). Sincer, dacă aș fi editor, aș refuza cărțile de istorie care nu conțin hărți și repere temporale acolo unde e necesar. Până la urmă, oricine trebuie să înțeleagă cât mai bine conținutul, chiar dacă persoana respectivă nu este inițiată la începutul lecturii și nu ar trebui ca cititorul să trebuiască să se întrerupă frecvent pentru a completa informațiile cu date de pe Internet. Atunci care mai e rolul cărții? Am putea să stăm toți pe Internet și să ne luăm informațiile doar de acolo. 😁

[Tim · Rating 4 out of 5]

A superb sweep across thirty-six centuries of human history around the Fertile Crescent and the Levant, largely focusing on political and social developments within the last two hundred years. Peter Mansfield's summary and interpretation of events is very neatly written, largely dispassionate, and organized in comprehensibly divided chapters - in my eyes the key characteristics of good historical non-fiction.

This work is a corner stone to understanding why so many states of the Middle East held (and still hold) a firm, autocratic grip over their populace, and why Islamic fundamentalism and nationalism in form of f.e. Al-Qaida or the Hizbollah are both a reaction to (American) interventionism and the vacuum left by the ashes of European and Ottoman colonial rule. Mansfield further explains the different secular and fundamental currents within Islam in general, providing the reader with a brilliant guide to the current situation in the many Arab states in the Levant; not skipping the relatively short history of the Zionist state, Israel. Be it Gadaffi, Assad, Nassr, Saddam, Erdogan, Khomeini, Mohammed VI, the Saudis, Netanyahu, Bin Laden, and countless more, they're all portrayed in depth.

Maybe a sample of Mansfield's concise, and at times terse, writing:

At least a 100'000 Algerians were killed in the 1991 bloodshed, and millions displaced. But in some ways their [FIS activists] recourse to violence enabled an intensification to military rule. It allowed the army elites, first in Algeria, then in Egypt and Israel, to treat Islamist dissident as a security and not as a political problem, and thereby spare the establishment of sharing power. (p. 414)

or another:

Spared Western sanctions in the 1990s, President Ali banned Tunisia's Islamist party, al-Nahda, abolished human rights groups, shackled the press, and rigged elections. Tunisians, who then boasted the Arab world's highest literacy rate and its largest middle class, were subdued by a system called Khubzism (after an Arabic word for bread, khubz), which roughly translated as "eat and shut up".

[Caleb Loh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some interesting tidbits:

1. In the Middle East region (approximately the stretch from Morocco to Iran), there were three large groups that were never successfully assimilated into Arab customs: the Armenians, the Berbers, and the Kurds. The Armenians have historically been dominant economically, but the opportunity for mass emigration by the 1800s meant that their importance to Middle Eastern affairs declined (their importance overseas has been muted by intermarriages and their small numbers). The Berbers have never been dominant politically or economically due to their nomadic lifestyle, but have filled power vacuums in some cases (e.g., after the Arab Spring in Libya). The Kurds, as the largest stateless nation in the world, exert great influence on events in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

2. When the Ottoman Empire was in decline, European states generally artificially sought to prop it up in order to counterbalance opposing interests in the Middle East. The UK was a late supporter of Greek independence because it wanted to keep Ottoman control there intact; Russia offered support to put down an Egyptian revolt led by Muhammad Ali Pasha against the Ottomans; and France and the UK supported the Ottomans in the Crimean War to ensure that the Eastern Orthodox Church did not hold sway over Christians in Ottoman territory.

3. Muhammad Ali Pasha, an Ottoman commander who took control of Egypt and subsequently revolted against the Ottomans, was an ethnic Albanian. He started a royal bloodline in Egypt that ended with Farouk I in 1952. His royal family were nominally under Ottoman control, but acted independently of it - while the Ottoman empire was generally pro-Germany and approved a train line from Baghdad to Berlin, the Egyptian royal family was Francophile and offered a French engineer the Suez canal project (though the UK would exert much greater influence over it through purchasing shares for the project).

4. A big part of the problem in the Israel-Palestine conflict can be traced back to the ambiguous wording of the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The Declaration promises the formation of "a national home in Palestine" for the Jews on the premise that the Ottomans would be defeated. It was largely meant to placate a number of political constituencies, including the economically powerful Jewish community in the UK, the American Jewish, pro-Zionist diaspora, and even to a "fifth column" of Jewish socialists in Russia. The words "in Palestine" was meant to limit British commitments because it implied that not all of Palestine would be covered by the new country; the original wording outright designating Palestine as a national Jewish home was deemed too impracticable.

5. After World War II, when the independence of Israel was declared in 1947, neighbouring Arab states launched a full-scale invasion. At the time, some of the Arab states were actually still under British command and tutelage, having been under British colonisation after World War I and being used as bulwarks against German interests in Iran in World War II. Transjordan was still led by a British commander during its involvement in what is now called the First Israel-Palestine War.

6. The Six-Day War in 1967 is probably a turning point in Middle Eastern affairs, similar in importance to the Sykes-Picot arrangement (which demarcated post-WW1 borders between French and British areas of influence), or the subsequent Arab Spring. The failure of Egypt to invade Israel led to Nasser losing his de facto leadership of the Arab world, while at the same time Egypt lost the friendship of the Western allies gained during the 1956 Suez crisis. The enthusiasm in the Arab world led to Muammar Gaddafi coming to power in Libya by overthrowing King Idris I. Yasser Arafat took charge of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which had previously been a peripheral organisation led by other Arab states.

7. The Lebanon Civil War was collateral damage to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Israel had long preferred a fully independent, Christian-majority state in Lebanon as a buffer against Lebanese Muslims who were more closely aligned with Syria. Both Israel and Syria entered Lebanon's territory to forestall a possible attack. In part because of Syria's alignment with Iran due to their joint Shia heritage, Iran was able to strengthen its position in Lebanon with the formation of Hezbollah, which became embroiled in the later half of the Lebanon Civil War and in the 2006 war.

8. One key motivation for the rise of political Islam, particularly of a Sunni confessional lineage, was the belief that after World War II, the Arab world was for the first time ruled fully by non-Sunni leaders. In Lebanon, the French had accorded power to the Maronite Christians; in Syria, the Shia Alawite tribe had gained power; in Turkey, the military ruled with Ataturk-inspired secularist reforms; and in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, there was intense security cooperation with the US. This is a major motivating factor for movements like Al-Qaeda, and for why many Arab states have been forced to accommodate more conservative Islamic movements.

9. In the late 1990s, London was actually known as the heart of terrorism in Al-Qaeda circles due to its lax asylum laws and the fact that they were accepting those politically persecuted in the West due to human rights concerns. In 1999, most of Osama bin Laden's phone calls were made to London contacts.

10. In the last two decades, democracy in the Middle East has tended to result in the election of more conservative Islamic governments, a trend inaugurated by the unsatisfactory post-WW2 arrangement of governance and accelerated by media like Al Jazeera. The election of the Muslim Brotherhood after the fall of Mubarak in Egypt in 2011 is a famous example, before the Muslim Brotherhood was toppled by el-Sisi. The Arab Spring has clearly not produced the democratic outcomes that were initially hoped for.

I hope to read more of these Penguin History books in the future, though not too often, for the font size is very small and the books are really thick. Some reviews say that the later chapters are not as strong as the earlier ones, but I find that the quality is not much different.

[Ahmed · Rating 3 out of 5]

قرأت منه نسخة مترجمة قديمة فى مشروع مكتبة الأسرة ..
الكتاب به معلومات و أحداث كثيرة جدا و لكنه يصلح كمرجع سريع لأحداث لأنه يتبع أسلوب غطى أكبؤ قدر ممكن من الأحداث و لكن بتفاصيل مختصرة ..
تعلمت منه أن التاريخ خدعة كبيرة و أن التاريخ الذى تعلمناه فى المدارس كارثى .. كم من مؤمرات و خيانات خانها المصريون لوطنهم على مر التاريخ الحديث .. لا عجب لحالنا الأن فهو نتيجة حتمية لهذا التاريخ المؤسف
تعلمت منه أيضا أن المستعمر مازال هو نفس المستعمر لكن بقناع جديد و أساليب جديدة .. المستعمر يعمل دائما على تأمين مصالحه فى أراضى لا يملكها من الأساس من مستعمر أخر لا يسنحق هذه الأرض و الخاسر هو المواطن البسيط الذى يعيش على هذه الأرض التى تمثل رقعة من رقاع الشطرنج بالنسبة لجنرالات الأستعمار
هناك سرد أيضا لفترة حكم محمد على و الأمبراطورية العثمانية و كيف انهارت لتصبح رجل أوروبا المريض .

[Kate · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'll admit, it got a little dry at times, and I felt like maybe I was being forced to read it for a class, but I wasn't. After you get past the first few chapters, where it blows through like 1500 years of history (and then this Sultan, and then this Sultan, and then yet another Sultan...), it gets more interesting. It gets especially interesting when you start connecting the dots and seeing how 20th century events led to what is going on now in the Middle East. I read it because I didn't really feel very well-informed about the middle east, and I'm glad I did. Now time to read something a little fluffier.

[Wendy Jackson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is probably the most important book I have read this year. My understanding of regional politics - and my appreciation for their complexity - has grown immensely. The news makes so much more sense to me now.

I read an older edition of the book, which I do not think makes a huge difference because the history of the region is so long. However, now I am keen to find a newer edition, in order to get more of Mansfield's accessible and well-written account of the last twenty years of Middle East history.

[Walter Victor · Rating 4 out of 5]

Another one full of so much info that you know you’re not going to retain all of it but retaining as much as you can is still good enough. Of course the book starts with the dawn of civilization “as we know it” with the Sumerians in Mesopatamia. But it quickly skates a few thousand years forward to begin to focus on the Ottoman Empire, an empire that has always been a little lost in me. I found it interesting to get more information on Muhammad Ali and even more so to find out he was Albanian and not Egyptian lol. And to realize the importance of the Suez Canal to the Europeans and the Levant. How the Industrial Revolution really gave way for the Europeans to take over and colonize multiple countries in the Middle East. And how far it could have* gone. Who knows what happens is Napoleon would’ve actually got control of Egypt when he tried.

Once these countries finally got their independence the same old story repeats itself. It’s a struggle for power and sustained progression, which is always easier said than done. There was also more enlightenment on how once free, it was hard for the all* of the Arab nations to come together at once. It always seemed a little lopsided. And no surprise to see who America’s favorite Middle Eastern country is and why they seem to go undefeated. It seems as if the US will never cut off their supply.

In the case of the Islamic Revolution in Iran it’s interesting to see how the US could come together with Iraq to suppress Iran from expanding and trying to reform Iraq. But as soon as the Iran/Iraq war subsided, Iraq tries to annex Kuwait and the gulf war breaks out. These countries need each other only for a specific reason for a specified amount of time. Once a situation is resolved it’s as if everything resets and once again it’s every country for themselves moving within their best interest.

[Razvan Zamfirescu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Spicuiri din recenzia finala care se gaseste pe blogul meu



..........................................
Marele avantaj al cărții lui Mansfield este tocmai această complexitate și extrem de elaborata sinteză a Orientului Mijlociu. Observațiile economice, sociale și culturale transformă această lume aparent înspăimântătoare datorită evenimentelor sângeroase din ultimii ani, într-o entitate concretă care poate fi înțeleasă și de europeanul de rând. Apariția fundamentalismului islamic, evoluția și impactul asupra lumii arabe este analizată cu lux de amănunte, fapt care ajută foarte mult un cititor ca mine care nu prea are cunoștințe despre Orientul Mijlociu și care mai degrabă cunoaște lumea orientală din știrile internaționale. Trebuie neapărat să vă spun că drumul către Orientul Mijlociu cel de astăzi trece prin istoria Imperiului Otoman și depinde de influența acestuia asupra statelor arabe pe care le cunoaștem astăzi, istorie a unui imperiu fabulos care a ajuns bolnavul continentului european atât ajutat de către europeni, cât și datorită incapacității conducătorilor otomani de a se adapta la nou. Incredibil de fascinantă este incursiunea în măruntaiele acestui imens imperiu care se lupta să țină în frâu dorința națiunilor de sub el pentru libertate.
.......................................

[Sajad · Rating 3 out of 5]

پیتر منسفیلد که از 1955م تا پایان عمرش-1996- به مطالعه و تحقیق درباره مسائل خاورمیانه پرداخته است در این کتاب به اتفاقاتی که در این منطقه جغرافیایی رخ داده است-خصوصا در قرن بیستم- می پردازد.او با مقدمه ای کوتاه تاریخ خاورمیانه از دوران باستان تا ابتدای قرن نوزدهم را شرح می دهد.
وی با نگاهی به امپراطوری عثمانی و حضور دولت های استعماری درمناطق تحت تسلطش و نهایتا فروپاشی آن به سال های بین دو جنگ جهانی میرسد.سپس پیامد های جنگ جهانی دوم و ظهور ناسیونالیسم در کشورهای خاورمیانه وعصر ناصر و به صحنه آمدن دوباره ی اسلام و انقلاب ها و جنگ های رخ داده تا زمان بیرون راندن عراق از کویت را بررسی می کند.
منسفیلد در چند فصل کتاب به ایران می پردازد که از دوران باستان تا چند سال پس از پایان جنگ ایران و عراق را در بر می گیرد و نگاهی کوتاه به سیر تحول ایران در قرن بیستم می اندازد.
پیتر منسفیلد دیدی بی غرض دارد و در کتاب وابستگی های فکری او به چشم نمی خورد.او روایات را پیوسته بیان می کند و همین میتواند باعث شود گهگاهی سردرگم شوید و نیازمند این باشید که مطلب خوانده را دوباره بخوانید ولی این بدان معنا نیست که کتاب فصیح و ساده و روان نباشد که البته هست.
خلاصه اینکه "تاریخ خاورمیانه" میتواند یک دید کلی نسبت به خاورمیانه و مسائل آن به ویژه در قرن بیستم به خواننده بدهد و پیش زمینه ای کلی نسبت به آنچه امروز در خاورمیانه میگذرد برای وی ترسیم کند.

[Mircea Poeana · Rating 5 out of 5]

De la cultura Feniciei, Mesopotamiei si a Persiei la cultul petrolului.
De la poezia si filosofia Levantului la lupta tribala pentru putere.
Orientul Mijlociu - locul unde 22 de state arabe isi cauta individualitatea si independenta, de multe ori cu pretul unor crime care contrazic progresul civilizatiei umane.
State care s-au razboit cu "imperialismul" si in final au dat nastere unor dictatori cumpliti, unor regimuri aberante si unor miscari extremiste.
O lume uneori inabordabila, cu dogme si reguli cimentate in credinte musulmane greu de cuprins.
O lume sfartecata de un conflict interior tesut in jurul unei intrebari care inca nu si-a gasit raspunsul:
A lasat Muhammad un urmas de drept sau nu?
Pana vor dezlega enigma, orice pace, orice razboi sunt de prisos.

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

I started reading this a couple years ago and abandoned it. I'm glad I finally picked it up again because it was worth reading. It was very interesting, and I didn't find it dry at all. The problem with at lot of books I've been reading is that they are trying to cover thousands of years of history in a few hundred pages. In this case 5000 years of the entire history of the middle east in 500 pages leaves a lot to be desired. That being said, this is a really good general history that puts a lot into perspective. If someone told me they just wanted to get a better understanding of the middle eastern conflicts, and a general history without getting bogged down in details, I'd recommend this book first.

[Russell Chee · Rating 3 out of 5]

No offence to Mr Pelham, but it's like I'm reading two separate books - and one is far superior to the other. In fact, were I to review Mr Mansfield's original first edition, I would unhesitatingly accord this book a solid four-star rating. These first 12 chapters are absolutely brimming with notable positives, yet everything seems to fall apart in the newly appended chapters.

Mr Mansfield has 5000 years of history to cover, but he does it brilliantly, judiciously selecting several key events to construct a coherent, cogent narrative of Middle Eastern history; his brief discussion, at the very beginning, about the veracity of the term itself, is quite the gem, and something well worth considering. His story begins with a subtly flowing first chapter, which in 40 pages manages to cover Middle Eastern history from the time of the Assyrians, touching upon Alexander the Great's Hellenistic influence in the region, expounding upon the rise of Islam and the Islamic Golden Age, and then its slow decline relative to the rise of Europe. It is not faultless, though - given that Mr Mansfield proceeds to spend entire chapters on Egypt (Muhammad Ali's Egypt and Britain in Egypt, for example), it is rather curious how sparsely he mentions Egypt in this initial chapter. I might argue the same for Persia/Iran, whose rich history surely deserves at least merits some discussion. Nonetheless, the chapters only get stronger, with a comprehensive overview of the struggles of the main regional powers - Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Persia - in the difficult transition from the 19th to 20th century. Chapters 9 and 11 are particularly worth salivating over; we learn much about Sykes-Picot, the unique situation of the colonial 'mandates' over the newly created republics in the Middle East and how the Israel-Palestine struggle long predates the founding of Modern Israel in 1948 which most of us instinctively turn to. We are also treated to an insightful discussion of the role of Oil and the reversal of fortunes for certain countries in light of this unique natural resource. Chapter 10 is perhaps less stellar, seemingly almost two chapters stuffed together - I feel the argument about the rise of nationalism, pan-Arabism and Islam is certainly persuasive though the causative links to World War 2 are not always elucidated with utmost clarity. Chapter 11, though, is the crown jewel of the entire book - Mr Mansfield masterfully ties together 20 years of history into what he terms the "Nasser Era". Though I was indeed aware from previous reading that Gamal Abdel Nasser was certainly the dominant figure of this period, Mr Mansfield is so utterly convincing that one truly gets a sense of the electric atmosphere of the period, supercharged and sustained by Nasser's unique presence. Nonetheless, in the spirit of criticism - I feel Mr Mansfield (perhaps arising from his British perspective) does overly privilege the Israel/Palestine imbroglio at times; certainly, it is one of the pivotal conflicts of the region, yet do other issues not merit more discussion? Mr Mansfield rather skates over the saga of Yemen and its civil war (as well as its disastrous implications for Nasser) by simply terming it "Egypt's Vietnam", without ever really explaining why. Nonetheless, a gorgeous chapter; a stunning paean to the common struggle for nationhood, identity and development among these states during this period and making the entire book worth it. Chapter 12 is no slouch, although in the 1970s narrative strands start to multiply exponentially, inevitably weakening the coherence of Mr Mansfield's narrative. He covers all the bases - the rise of the Gulf states and city-states; the change in Egyptian leadership and a Westward turn under Sadat; the continuation of the Arab/Israeli crisis (although perhaps more could have been said about the magnitude of the 1973 Arab Oil crisis, which is only mentioned in passing) and the disastrous implications for poor Lebanon; the signal sea-change of the Iranian revolution (again, perhaps meriting further discussion?) and rise of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. A fantastically comprehensive chapter, though one that threatens a lack of coherence due to the absence of a common underlying thread of analysis.

And then we enter the second book. Without meaning to sound like I'm nitpicking, these chapters are riddled with spelling errors, grammatically unsound phrases and embarrassing mistakes (just imagine repeated phrases for a start). This strikes me as editorial failure, and is symptomatic of the content and writing of these chapters as well. For a start, the titling of the chapters strikes me as odd - Chapter 13 is bequeathed with the overused phrase "Pax Americana", yet the chapter mostly exposes the spuriousness of this attribution, with its narration progressing from America's shock-and-awe victory in the Gulf War, the unravelling of the Oslo Accords, the continued subjugation of Iraq by an inhumane American sanctions regime, the false starts at democratisation in the period and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the period. If Pax Americana is intended to be a sardonic title, Mr Pelham simply does not make it clear enough. And the oddities only continue to pile up - Chapter 14 attempts to focus on American influence in the Middle East in this period without in fact comprehensively covering America's role - the "surge", for example, is barely touched upon - and the description of the rising America-Iran contestation seems a trifle contrived. Nonetheless, there are precious details - the two sub-chapters covering Sunni and Shia regional movements, for example, are a testament to jihadism before IS and people power before the Arab Spring, which we tend too often to neglect. Chapter 15, discussing the Arab Spring, all too abruptly reverses Mr Pelham's American interventionist lens - though there is at least some information about America's role (which it must be remembered was rather pivotal at times, especially in Libya), Mr Pelham completely avoids discussion of Europe's role (suggesting rather speciously that they simply refrained from intervention, a complete falsehood - just look at competing European interests in Libya as one instance) and adopts a much more parochial, state-by-state approach: even the competing interests of the Gulf powers in influencing the Revolutions and their aftermath is whitewashed. He does, however, accord ISIS its appropriate space for discussion (neither too lengthy nor too brief) and is presicent in his accusation of Sunni hypocrisy. Where, however, is the discussion of the disaster that unfolded in Libya? Surely this was one of the greatest disasters of the Arab Spring, and merits more than simply passing mention. Chapter 16 is also slightly more redeeming, managing to (rather successfully, in my opinion) drag the narrative of the Middle East out of the struggle of the 2000s and early 2010s into a stabler though no less authoritarian late 2010s. The events that lead to the crushing of the brief democratic interludes in Egypt and Turkey and the dubiousness of Tunisia's democratic revolution are well-explicated, while I greatly enjoyed his page-turning thriller of a narrative regarding the ultimately reassuring conclusions of the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars - though perhaps more could've been said about the unfolding geopolitical contest in the region? And that's the last weakness of Chapter 16 - the final resolution is just too contrived. Mr Pelham neatly elides the implications of growing violence and the contest for regional influence between a confused America, a resurgent Iran and an uncertain Saudi Arabia. This strikes me as especially true with the artifice of Israel's supposed "tolerance" Mr Pelham alludes to - any awareness of today's Israeli politics instantly contradicts this conclusion; Israel is drifting almost inexorably rightward, further and further from even the tiniest semblance of tolerance.

This is thus the greatest contrast I felt: Mr Mansfield succeeds (to great effect) twofold: firstly, in weaving an entirely coherent narrative and secondly, doing this in a winningly convincing lens of analysis. Mr Pelham, on the other hand, seems rather arbitrary in his decisions of narrative omission, and is rather unsure with his analytical tools as well. He makes a stunningly aware observation about the overturning of religious mores in the region and the weak or absent foundations of democracy even in the wake of the Arab Spring, yet fails to analyse these trends or their possible implications for the region, instead diving into his contrived conclusions as examined above. You'll certainly have a sovereign grasp of Middle Eastern history up to the 1990s if this is the only book you've read on the region, but your analysis of events post-Gulf War might be incoherent and unclear; find another book for that.

[Dominic Muresan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nu-i asa lunga pe cum arata timpul care mi-a trebuit ca sa o citesc, dar simpla incercare de a reda istoria moderna a unei zone atat de complexe cum e Orientul mijlociu, nu poate da nastere decat la o carte destul de grea.

Peter Mansfield incepe relatarea istoriei cam de la Napoleon, trecand in revista toate personalitatile principale - Muhammad Ali, Şarif Hussein, Atatürk, Nasser, Rabin, Assad etc. Foarte personal in relatare, autorul te face sa te identifici cu personalitatile, sa crezi in cauzele lor, oricat de criminale - fortate - dictatoriale ar fi. Nu pot sa cred decat ca asta vine dintr-o copioasa intelegere a mentalitatii orientale pe care fara dar si poate autorul o are.

Istoria in sine trece printr-un proces de segregare - de la una din cele mai diverse regiuni de pe glob (religios si etnic), regiune in care toti traiau impreuna - la un "spatiu" desertic marcat doar de ziduri de beton ce folosesc la delimitarea a ceea ce e "al nostru" vs "al lor". Motivele sunt multiple - religia nu este niciodata factorul primar, iar decizile marilor puteri occidentale leaga si desfac aproape totul.

Cartea nu se termina pe o nota negativa - Mansfield insusi nu apuca sa vada orientul dupa 2017, asa ca ea e completata cu inca doua capitole de catre Nicolas Pelham. Finalul e pozitiv - dupa un secol in care au murit zeci de milioane de oameni, in sute de razboaie interne, Orientul pare sa se deschida din nou la ceea ce fusese odata - un spatiu al libertatii, al coabitarii. Sigur si asta e doar o parere, pe care istoria ramane sa o confirme sau nu.

[Dalius · Rating 5 out of 5]

Daug atsakymų slypi istorijoje. Tačiau problema, kad jos pasakotojų yra daug.

[Amr Reda · Rating 5 out of 5]

Compact and to the point.

[Alex · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'd have wished for this to be more focused on medieval history, but I won't blame the author for writing a book slightly different from the one I expected and hoped for. As it is, the focus clearly lies on the 19th century onward, with the preceeding chapters giving a quick overview over the Middle East. Not too quick, however; we are still talking 150 pages or so here. That is a lot of context, but it's precisely the context you should be thankful for when you read about countries you may never have heard of.

Even so, I think that the author glosses over a few highly important episodes, while spending too much time with political intrigues. The Mount Lebanon Famine is mentioned in a sidenote, the Armenian Genocide is treated like a rather minor incident (he did mention the prior progroms against the Armenians under the Ottomans, however). Politics are given a very prominent role, while the spiritual life in the Middle East is neglected. I mean, can you not give Saint Charbel a mention? Even some Muslims adore him.

All in all, the book is fairly balanced. A little too critical of the crusades, I think he also bought into the false notion of the Islamic "Golden Age", but those are minor problems. I heard complaints that the book is unfavorable to Israel, and while this may be true, it didn't strike me as biased in this regard.

Now, let's move on to the more interesting question: What can you learn from this book?

After reading it, you will understand why Egypt features so heavily in movies or show about the Victorian Age: Because of the occupation of Egypt under Napoleon, which sparked a fascination with everything Egyptian, reminiscent of the fascination with everything Roman during the Rennaissance, with everything Indian for the fascists, and with everything Japanese today. You will hear about the history of Lebanon and its unique character, its civil war and the role Israel played in it. You will finally get the difference between Shiites and Sunnites, both historically and in their different attitudes. I knew I struggled with this, but now I understand the Shiites to be a little closer to Catholicism. You will learn how Saddam came to power, and that the rise of corrupt regimes like his is not due to Islam just randomly messing up (sadly, that's the post-9/11 narrative), but because Middle Easterners shared our fascination for Enlightenment-values and socialism and tried to implement them in their own countries. In short, you get a good overall history of the Middle East.

If it was up to me, this would be mandatory reading for US soldiers going on tours to Iraq or Afghanistan. A very fine book with a few weaknesses.

[Shaun · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid and helpful overview and works well in a pair with Eugene Rogan's The Arabs with each complementing the other with different focuses (Mansfield doesn't get as bogged down with the Ottoman internal politicking to the same degree so it's a clearer starting point there but I did like the detail in Rogan's side).

[Ramil Kazımov · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good book but covers the political matters of Middle East very Western-point

[Rares Antonio · Rating 4 out of 5]

“You may put the people in chains, but you cannot kill freedom.’ - Musani Kadivar

“Yearning to return to their land somehow is supposed to fade away in roughly eighty years in a manner that the Jewish people’s never did, even after two thousand years”
- Hussein Agha

“Asked on American television whether the starvation of 500,000 people was justified, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared it was “worth It””

“I would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years, and meanwhile we would have half a million people in Judea and Samaria (The West Bank)’ - Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli President’s confession, discussing peace and the creation of a Palestinian state.

Some Quotes.

[Brian Griffith · Rating 3 out of 5]

A fairly comprehensive survey, highly informative, but more about power politics than culture and society.

[Inge · Rating 4 out of 5]

wat een kluif om dit allemaal te lezen.....
3 sterren afgerond naar 4 voor zowel de moeite van de auteur als mijn leesarbeid

[Raluca · Rating 4 out of 5]

The developed countries in this world are the ones that had the time to develop by themselves, through trial and error, trying out things and establishing what is good for them.

Unfortunately, these developed countries are now spending a lot of time not letting other people develop.

The history of the Middle East, presented in this book with loads of accuracy and objectivity is showing us what happens when for various reasons areas are not allowed to develop by themselves. At first it was the Christianity vs Islam aspect, then there was the Israel aspect, then there was the oil aspect.

For various reasons and for the sake of the interests of countries far away from the Middle East, the Middle East is now the mess that it is. It is a mess of the making of the "Great Powers" (first the British, then the Americans).

Yes, there's nothing that we can do about what's done. But it would be great if we at some point started learning from this. Rather than doing that, we keep on insisting on not letting them be and then we wonder why organizations like ISIS manage to recruit so many people. Well, if someone came and bombed me and sabotaged me at any turn for the sake of interests that are not mine, I may join military resistance myself.

It would be great if some of the leaders of today were aware of that.

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have always been fascinated with the origins of people and the middle east, for me, is rather fascinating in terms of geography, cuisine, cultures, language, religion, extremes, or lack of religion. I have been fortunate enough to have travelled a little in that region and while there is commonality with Arabic as a language, there is also Persian Farsi, French used in lebanon etc. There are also Arab Jews, Christians and Muslims who also inhabit the region. Then there is a history of terrorism and ridiculous oil wealth. So what, where, how, and why?

This book will appeal to anyone intetested in the middle east. The first 10 pages are devoted to ethnic origins I would say, then next 40 or so pages dedicated to Islam, it's evolution and its influence within that region. The next 150 or more pages to the Ottoman empire, the French, British influence and more. Then oil history onwards.

My only criticism of the book is that the very early history of the region was only about 10 pages long. Maybe more isn't known with certainly about that segment hence the brevity.

A thoroughly enjoyable read in my opinion for learning about the region, it's history, politics and evolution.