This was not an easy book to read, and I feel like it took me a long time to read, and I am not sure how much I will retain. However, it was fascinating and illuminating, reminding me of how much I do not know about the world and history. The book also helped me understand current events in Afghanistan, although the book was published in 2012. I liked that the author, who was born in Kabul, but came to the U.S. as a teenager and has mostly lived in America, inserted bits of his own personal history, and that of his family members. The author also sucessfully ties in world events. I have added some of Ansary's other books to my tbr. And I want to reread The Kite Runner.
The country of Afghanistan is approximately as old as the United States. However, in the country's life (so far), various outside nations have tried to control and/or guide Afghanistan. Included are Great Britain, Soviet Russia, Pakistan/Taliban, and the United States. None it seems learned from the mistakes of its predecessors, seeming to ignore the history and customs of Afghan natives.
There are many things I want to remember from reading this book, indicated by the referenced quotes.
Around 1880, "Counting colonized subjects, the British government ruled about a quarter of the people on Earth." (73)
"But how could any king assert day-to-day authority over a people who honored over a people who honored only the dictates of religion, custom, culture, tribe, clan, village, and family? This was the problem that preoccupied Afghan rulers over the next half century, a quest that divided Afghanistan into two cultural worlds." (86)
"The Iron Amir set the parameters of a struggle in Afghanistan, between forward-looking change led by a central government and an urban elite, and backward-looking stasis vested in the villages and traditional leaders of the country, a struggle that would have profound consequences not just for Afghanistan itself but for attempts by foreign powers to intervene in the affairs of the country over the next century." (99)
"For the most part, the Family's [Musahibban - Nadir Shah: King 1929-1933; Zahir Shah, his son: King 1929-1973] combination of repressive brutality, cultural grace, and domestic diplomacy kept Afghanistan remarkably calm for the remainder of the thirties, throughout the forties and fifites, and deep into the sixties." (137)
"As a rule, however, Afghan peasants didn't see their life in terms of class interests. They saw their world layered and compartmentalized by ethnic, tribal, and religious factors. Peasants were often the poor relations of wealthy local khans. Even leaving blood ties out of account, rich and poor were commonly bound together by mutual obligations and ties embedded in centuries of family history, personal interactions, and emotions." (183)
"The regime was inviting them into a framework where affiliations would be based on policies rather than blood, history, and personal connections. It has no chance of working." (184)
"The Taliban espoused the same doctrine as the Mujahideen [Islamic resistance who fought the Soviets in the 1980's], only more so. On every point, they were more literal, more simplistic, more extreme. In their own view, what they were was more pure." (238)
In 1998 - "But US policy makers went the other way. They narrowed the scope of their approach, excluding social, political, cultural, and economic factors from consideration to focus tightly on Islamism as a military problem. They also narrowed down their definition of the military problem finally to one man: Osama Bin Laden. By implication, neutralizing him would end the threat." (249)
"In the decades of turmoil, the smartest move for any Afghan had been to trust in guns, distrust neighbors, and cluster under the protection of the nearest strongman of familiar ethnicity." (275)
In the early 2000's - "In short, one unit of [foreign] technical expertise roaming the Afghan landscape represented nearly $1 million on the hoof. [salary, lodging, security, vehicle, interpreter, etc.] Meanwhile, locals hired to do the physical labor were paid on the local scale of forty to seventy dollars a week. So million-dollar units were managing the work of people breaking rocks for five to ten dollares a day. That's a prescription for trouble." (296)
"Today, the term 'Taliban' casually lumps together all sorts of figures from drug-mafia captains to local religious zealots to foreign Jihadists radicals to former honchos of the Mujahideen movement that fought the Soviets." (315)
"The Talibanist insurgency thus came to present the same challenge to NATO and the United States as the Mujahideen insurgency had posed for the Soviet Union in the 1980's and as Afghan tribesmen had posed for Britain in the Anglo-Afghan war of a century earlier. The British gave up on trying to defeat the insurgency of their time and simply pulled out of Afghanistan the moment they found someone to whom they could hand the reins, a man tough enough to dominate the country yet canny enough to act as Britain's partner of international, strategic matters. America would be wise to do the sam if only it could find a man like Abdu'Rahman [The Iron Amir, reigned 1880-1901], but no one on the Afghan political scene right now seems to fit that description." (322)
"The real problem for NATO was that its troops couldn't distinguish the people they were fighting against from the people they were fighting to protect. This wasn't their fault. One had to be on the inside to know the difference, and even there the boundaries were often blurred." (328)
"The killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, should have marked a turning point, given that when the United States went into Afghanistan in 2001, capturing Bin Laden and defeating al Qaeda were the avowed purpose of the war. The Taliban came into it only because they had abetted Bin Laden. As for the Afghans in general, they were defined as the intended beneficiaries of the intervention. Bin Laden's mysterious escape in 2001 and his subsequent silence left the War on Terror in Afghanistan without a marker than could define victory." (329)
"The world's greatest powers have a choice. They can take turns trying to conquer Afghanistan, or they can act together as neutral referees to promote Afghan reconciliation." (348)
"The real question for the United States, then, is not how America can forge true democracy in Afghanistan or end corruption in Afghanistan or change the status of Afghan women: those questions are for Afghans to settle, and Afghans will settle them if left to their own devices. The real question for the United States is how to liberate Afghanistan from the United States - and all other outside powers." (348)