Dated but still interesting observation of the beginning of Syria's civil war in the wake of the Arab Spring. Lesch does his job contemplating the evolution of Bashir, his search for "reform," and the frustrations of Syria's masses meeting the old regime and the promise of 2011. He notes that Bashir al-Assad's "reform process" (ie, introduction of pro-Western capital investment) led to increasing inequality and corruption, yet conveniently blames this on "crony capitalism" rather than the market mechanism itself. I can't see where cronyism plays any greater role in Syria than in "really existing capitalism" in the US, Europe, or elsewhere. The reforms themselves led to destabilization; while those who egged the demonstrations on, flush with the victory of global color-coded revolutions and the then-apparent successes of Tunisia and Libya, were drooling for Bashir's fall like some overripe fruit. The Syrian opposition was unrealistically hopeful that the West would come to its rescue in assisted regime-change intervention. Given Obama's early opposition to the fiasco that is now Iraq, this would not happen.
Professor Lesch is an experienced policy analyst funded by several European institutes and was prophetic in noting the likelihood of civil war if things got out of hand with powerful Islamist forces waiting in the wings to exploit it. Yet he seems unable to connect his own dots at certain points, such as the contradictory nature of market reform noted above. He compares Bashir's failure to Gorbachev's "success," yet Gorbachev did *not* succeed in reforming the USSR but leading to its transition to something quite different. This was and remains the stated Western policy goal in Syria, as enunciated by the ever-blunt Hillary Clinton in 2011. However, Bashir and his security-military apparat were not going to quietly crumble and cede power because Westerners think it necessary they do so. The middle class reformers, with their Western educations and orientation, which Westerners pin such hopes upon, have no mass base in the streets or villages. Hence their easy muscling aside by populist Islamists - with aid from Saudi Arabia, which the West seemed loath to block. Dr. Lesch's hope that Syria could "morph into something resembling a democratic, open society" (p. 124) is to repeat the naivite that thought Tiananmin Square could "democratize" China.
Lesch takes dictators like Qaddafi, Saddam, and the Assads to task for "just not getting it;" for living in their own sycophantic little worlds, blinding them to how out of touch they are with the people they misrule. There is truth in that, but I rather think that Dr. Lesch and the "democratizers" don't get it. These men truly believe they have the right to rule, given them by God, history, the people (at some point) or their own struggles to attain power. They refuse to surrender their life's meaning, work, and very identity, like an old farmer standing with his shotgun in the path of an oncoming highway bulldozer. Call them stubborn and misguided; but we yet remember the 300 Spartans and the Maccabbees.
So what should the "international community" - that is, the US and NATO - "do?" Professor. Lesch should be enough of a historian to know that revolutions cannot be made from outside without foreign intervention, in which case they become dependent satellite regimes. Oppositionists so certain that Syria was Tunisia, egged on by a West anxious to remake the Middle East, did as much as Assad to create the stalemate that spawned ISIS. Perhaps it was best they do nothing. The outcome could not have been worse for the Syrian people.