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Dignity: Its History and Meaning
Dignity plays a central role in current thinking about law and human rights, but there is sharp disagreement about its meaning. Combining conceptual precision with a broad historical background, Michael Rosen puts these controversies in context and offers a novel, constructive proposal. Drawing on law, politics, religion, and culture, as well as philosophy, Rosen shows how modern conceptions of dignity inherit several distinct strands of meaning. This is why users of the word nowadays often talk past one another. The idea of dignity as the foundation for the universal entitlement to human rights represented the coming together after the Second World War of two extremely powerful Christian theology and Kantian philosophy. Not only is this idea of dignity as an “inner transcendental kernel” behind human rights problematic, Rosen argues, it has drawn attention away from a different, very important, sense of the right to be treated with dignity, that is, with proper respect. At the heart of the argument stands the giant figure of Immanuel Kant. Challenging current orthodoxy, Rosen’s interpretation presents Kant as a philosopher whose ethical thought is governed, above all, by the requirement of showing respect toward a kernel of value that each of us carries, indestructibly, within ourselves. Finally, Rosen asks (and answers) a surprisingly puzzling why do we still have a duty to treat the dead with dignity if they will not benefit from our respect?
200 pages, Hardcover
First published March 20, 2012
9 people are currently reading
148 people want to read
About the author
Michael E. Rosen
10 books6 followersMichael E. Rosen is a British political philosopher who is active in the traditions of analytic philosophy and continental European intellectual thought. He is currently a professor at Harvard University.
Rosen holds a B.A. in philosophy, awarded in 1974, and a D.Phil. awarded in 1980, both from Balliol College, Oxford. Prior to joining Lincoln College, Oxford, he served as a lecturer in politics at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1980 to 1981, an assistant professor of philosophy at Harvard from 1981 to 1982, a special fellow in politics at Merton College, Oxford, from 1982 to 1985, and a lecturer in philosophy at University College London from 1986 to 1990.
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name. See this thread for more information.
Rosen holds a B.A. in philosophy, awarded in 1974, and a D.Phil. awarded in 1980, both from Balliol College, Oxford. Prior to joining Lincoln College, Oxford, he served as a lecturer in politics at Magdalen College, Oxford, from 1980 to 1981, an assistant professor of philosophy at Harvard from 1981 to 1982, a special fellow in politics at Merton College, Oxford, from 1982 to 1985, and a lecturer in philosophy at University College London from 1986 to 1990.
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name. See this thread for more information.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
April 7, 2022
This is a book by Michael Rosen (no, not that Michael Rosen) appertaining to the meaning and history of dignity, with an argument for a certain form of dignity as the last chapter. The first chapter is mostly history, the second delves into legal disputes and cases appertaining to dignity (with, specifically, Kantian and Catholic dignities being foremost), and we already know the final: it is an argument for dignified conduct to others even when those others are not agents that can experience (viz., to bury corpses or not flush an aborted fetus down the toilet).
In the first chapter, we gain insight into Kant, Schiller, and Neitzche with discussions about Catholics like Pope Leo XIII and John Paul II showing up, too. I loved this chapter; I think it is my favorite part of the book. As we shall be talking about all but Neitzche and Schiller in the next paragraph, I shall describe their philosophies, as best I can, here: Schiller thinks of dignity in the sense that we are acting against our own will, or acting against our own self-interest; Neitzche considers dignity to be a foolish concept that acts against purposes of life. Schiller also has a concept of grace--or, in other words, to act dignified without the self-conflict--but Kant rejects this. He seems to suggest a disinclination to the idea of grace insofar as a duty should not be enjoyed (because it has a constraint), and that grace does away with this.
The book defines a more Kantian view of dignity and a more Catholic view of dignity as being the prevalent forms found in modern society. In the first, we see that Kant seemed to believe that dignity derives itself from a certain something inherent to humanity (but which is not humanity), and that this certain something is our capacity for morality (our capacity to self-law); this dignity is inviolable and eternal (and thus we cannot do anything to it), but we must act appropriately to it (or, in other words, to ourselves and those around us). Rationality is a very serious underpinning of this philosophy in the sense that moral oughts are brought about through their contradiction (or lack thereof) to themselves. (If every promise was a lie, the promise is contradictory it self; thereby, one should be truthful when promising.) But, according to Rosen, his philosophy's metaphysics is not as rationalist as the above example may seem. The Catholic view of dignity is more-or-less that we as human beings fit within a partition of a world created by God. There is a natural hierarchy that we act diginified in if we act in our place, and, in modern Catholicism, this is applied somewhat to Kant's view, insofar as human beings must be treated case-by-case as their position within the hierachy demands.
This Catholic and Kantian form of dignity is shown to be part of particular rights legislation, this is critiqued and discussed, and then we get to the third chapter.
In it, Rosen tries to argue that we have a duty to be respectful/dignified even to those things that have no ability to understand it. Human corpses is a go-to example. This is because, more-or-less, he agrees with the idea that humanity has some sort of internal humanness that is lesseneed by treating these things without that respect. He also suggests that, although sometimes treating people without dignity (respectful dignity, not obligations) must be allowed (at least by the state, if not by morality), and that this respect-dignity is still important, for it seems clear that humans are beings who will be much more likely to harm those who we dehumanize than otherwise.
I do not service to this book reviewing it; it is not my cup of tea to some extent (his conclusions as to some discussion on human rights are not what I find to be convincing), but it is also clearly a well-written book of 'pop'-philosophy.
In the first chapter, we gain insight into Kant, Schiller, and Neitzche with discussions about Catholics like Pope Leo XIII and John Paul II showing up, too. I loved this chapter; I think it is my favorite part of the book. As we shall be talking about all but Neitzche and Schiller in the next paragraph, I shall describe their philosophies, as best I can, here: Schiller thinks of dignity in the sense that we are acting against our own will, or acting against our own self-interest; Neitzche considers dignity to be a foolish concept that acts against purposes of life. Schiller also has a concept of grace--or, in other words, to act dignified without the self-conflict--but Kant rejects this. He seems to suggest a disinclination to the idea of grace insofar as a duty should not be enjoyed (because it has a constraint), and that grace does away with this.
The book defines a more Kantian view of dignity and a more Catholic view of dignity as being the prevalent forms found in modern society. In the first, we see that Kant seemed to believe that dignity derives itself from a certain something inherent to humanity (but which is not humanity), and that this certain something is our capacity for morality (our capacity to self-law); this dignity is inviolable and eternal (and thus we cannot do anything to it), but we must act appropriately to it (or, in other words, to ourselves and those around us). Rationality is a very serious underpinning of this philosophy in the sense that moral oughts are brought about through their contradiction (or lack thereof) to themselves. (If every promise was a lie, the promise is contradictory it self; thereby, one should be truthful when promising.) But, according to Rosen, his philosophy's metaphysics is not as rationalist as the above example may seem. The Catholic view of dignity is more-or-less that we as human beings fit within a partition of a world created by God. There is a natural hierarchy that we act diginified in if we act in our place, and, in modern Catholicism, this is applied somewhat to Kant's view, insofar as human beings must be treated case-by-case as their position within the hierachy demands.
This Catholic and Kantian form of dignity is shown to be part of particular rights legislation, this is critiqued and discussed, and then we get to the third chapter.
In it, Rosen tries to argue that we have a duty to be respectful/dignified even to those things that have no ability to understand it. Human corpses is a go-to example. This is because, more-or-less, he agrees with the idea that humanity has some sort of internal humanness that is lesseneed by treating these things without that respect. He also suggests that, although sometimes treating people without dignity (respectful dignity, not obligations) must be allowed (at least by the state, if not by morality), and that this respect-dignity is still important, for it seems clear that humans are beings who will be much more likely to harm those who we dehumanize than otherwise.
I do not service to this book reviewing it; it is not my cup of tea to some extent (his conclusions as to some discussion on human rights are not what I find to be convincing), but it is also clearly a well-written book of 'pop'-philosophy.
February 19, 2019
Thought provoking at every turn. Addresses philosophical and legal ideas about dignity. Engages Kantian and Catholic ideas the most.
May 31, 2023
for my thesis.
January 20, 2024
Rosen presented his ideas clearly. A wonderful exploration of dignity.
Read
March 13, 2024for school.
February 3, 2025
An intriguing and thoughtful survey of various traditions of dignity. Idk what the German courts are smoking these days.
January 7, 2013
In this short, thoughtful work, Michael Rosen attempts to show that 'dignity' is a philosophically coherent and useful concept. Rosen identifies several strands in dignity's historic and current meaning -- as social status; as inherent value; as behavior that is dignified; and as a constraint placed on behavior to ensure that it respects another person (whether as a duty to that person, or a duty by the actor). The author discusses German legal cases interpreting dignity as a fundamental right, and compares them to Kantian and Catholic theories. He concludes with an analysis on dignity as 'duty to humanity', offering a specific interpretation of Kant as a guide to what we should mean when we speak of dignity today.
The writing is admirably clear, good-humored, and free of cant. Rosen's touchstones here - Kant and Catholic ethics - are quite different from mine (Humean empiricism, utilitarians,and pragmatists), so as I read, I kept needing to suppress a tendency to say, incredulously, 'why would a person think that?' If you can follow Rosen's lead, and accept his foundational assumptions (which he articulates cleanly), he does an excellent job of explaining how a Kantian could work through any of several different conceptions of dignity. Because of where it's coming from, this is a different book than I hoped it would be; but it's a fine, intelligent read, and I'm grateful for it.
A few steps in Rosen's arguments still lost me. For example, he rejects the argument, made by philosopher Ruth Macklin and psychologist Steven Pinker, that dignity is just a muddier word for autonomy. To make his point, Rosen examines Catholic and Kantian arguments against suicide as a response to painful, debilitating disease. After noting that supporters of a right to suicide often speak of 'death with dignity', Rosen examines the alternate view: "[t]he Catechism of the Catholic Church makes it very clear that, on the Catholic view, human beings have no right to choose to end their own lives: '...We are obliged to accept life gratefully and preserve it for [God's] honor and the salvation of our souls. We are stewards, not owners, of the life God has entrusted to us. It is not ours to dispose of.' Clearly, this is a substantive ethical dispute involving different senses of dignity," Rosen concludes, not an argument about autonomy. But it's not clear to me that this is true, judging from the text Rosen quotes. A Catholic who believes our lives belong to God might just as well view suicide as an autonomy issue, while insisting that the autonomy to continue or end our lives is God's. In fact, that appears to me to be exactly what the quoted passage of the catechism says. I'd like for Rosen to be right here - and I don't think it threatens the value of the rest of his analysis if he's not - but I don't see that he's really shown that, at least in Catholic ethics, dignity must be interpreted as something other than autonomy. In the scheme of Rosen's book, it's a minor point, and one that might fade on another re-reading.
The writing is admirably clear, good-humored, and free of cant. Rosen's touchstones here - Kant and Catholic ethics - are quite different from mine (Humean empiricism, utilitarians,and pragmatists), so as I read, I kept needing to suppress a tendency to say, incredulously, 'why would a person think that?' If you can follow Rosen's lead, and accept his foundational assumptions (which he articulates cleanly), he does an excellent job of explaining how a Kantian could work through any of several different conceptions of dignity. Because of where it's coming from, this is a different book than I hoped it would be; but it's a fine, intelligent read, and I'm grateful for it.
A few steps in Rosen's arguments still lost me. For example, he rejects the argument, made by philosopher Ruth Macklin and psychologist Steven Pinker, that dignity is just a muddier word for autonomy. To make his point, Rosen examines Catholic and Kantian arguments against suicide as a response to painful, debilitating disease. After noting that supporters of a right to suicide often speak of 'death with dignity', Rosen examines the alternate view: "[t]he Catechism of the Catholic Church makes it very clear that, on the Catholic view, human beings have no right to choose to end their own lives: '...We are obliged to accept life gratefully and preserve it for [God's] honor and the salvation of our souls. We are stewards, not owners, of the life God has entrusted to us. It is not ours to dispose of.' Clearly, this is a substantive ethical dispute involving different senses of dignity," Rosen concludes, not an argument about autonomy. But it's not clear to me that this is true, judging from the text Rosen quotes. A Catholic who believes our lives belong to God might just as well view suicide as an autonomy issue, while insisting that the autonomy to continue or end our lives is God's. In fact, that appears to me to be exactly what the quoted passage of the catechism says. I'd like for Rosen to be right here - and I don't think it threatens the value of the rest of his analysis if he's not - but I don't see that he's really shown that, at least in Catholic ethics, dignity must be interpreted as something other than autonomy. In the scheme of Rosen's book, it's a minor point, and one that might fade on another re-reading.
January 17, 2017
One of the merits of this book is its brevity. It is 160 pages, and the pages are quite small (4 1/2" x 7 1/2"). Rosen does an excellent job of reviewing the history of the concept of dignity, and in particular, how Kant has influenced our thinking on this subject. He teases apart the distinct meanings of dignity as (1) the status or rank proper to human beings just as human beings, (2) intrinsic worth, (3) measured and self-possessed behavior, and the claim that (4) people should be treated with dignity, that is, respectfully.
Having distinguished these different meanings in Chapter 1, Rosen seems to ignore these distinctions in Chapter 2. After presenting a French case in which the issue was whether legislation banning dwarf throwing violates human dignity, Rosen acknowledges that the behavior is undignified. However, undignified behavior comes under the third meaning, whereas the French case clearly has to do with (1), (2), and (4). That dwarf tossing might be undignified in the way that much behavior that goes on in bars and clubs late at night is undignified is scarcely relevant to dignity as a matter of status, intrinsic worth, or respectful treatment.
Moreover, Rosen's characterization of dignity in sense (3) strikes me as a cliché. He thinks that the character trait rules out acting on occasion in playful and non-stuffy ways. Yet President Obama is regarded by most people as an exemplar of dignity, despite the fact that he sometimes gets down on the floor to play with children.
Despite these quibbles, Rosen has written a valuable book It is well worth reading not only for those interested in dignity, but also in the foundation of morality itself.
Having distinguished these different meanings in Chapter 1, Rosen seems to ignore these distinctions in Chapter 2. After presenting a French case in which the issue was whether legislation banning dwarf throwing violates human dignity, Rosen acknowledges that the behavior is undignified. However, undignified behavior comes under the third meaning, whereas the French case clearly has to do with (1), (2), and (4). That dwarf tossing might be undignified in the way that much behavior that goes on in bars and clubs late at night is undignified is scarcely relevant to dignity as a matter of status, intrinsic worth, or respectful treatment.
Moreover, Rosen's characterization of dignity in sense (3) strikes me as a cliché. He thinks that the character trait rules out acting on occasion in playful and non-stuffy ways. Yet President Obama is regarded by most people as an exemplar of dignity, despite the fact that he sometimes gets down on the floor to play with children.
Despite these quibbles, Rosen has written a valuable book It is well worth reading not only for those interested in dignity, but also in the foundation of morality itself.
Read
November 27, 2012"Rosen, a political philosopher at Harvard with whom I edited The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy a number of years ago, traces the history of the idea of “dignity” from its origins in aristocratic cultures through its re-appropriation and re-invention in the work of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and the tradition of Catholic social thought, to its central role in domestic and international law today. He demonstrates that the concept, despite its varied history, has more coherence and significance than some writers have supposed. Rosen writes extremely well and the book is full of interesting examples, drawn from the law and from European history—most memorably, a French lawsuit by a dwarf contesting a ban on dwarf-tossing!" - Brian Leiter
June 23, 2013
In ethics and political life, issues of philosophical principle press on us whether we like it or not. Many appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more precise notions or mere slogans that add nothing to the understanding of the topic; this text adds plenty. Dignity originated as a concept that denoted high social status and the honors and respectful treatment that are due to someone who occupied that position. However its use and interpretation now varies widely.
July 10, 2012
I really enjoyed reading this. It provokes good questions about the meaning of "dignity" particularly in Catholic, Kantian, and German legal contexts.
September 7, 2013
Essentially a long essay, beautifully composed, on dignity, its meaning, and how it affects different aspects of our lives.
July 31, 2014
I found this short book helpful when I was writing a piece related to the subject and therefore consider it a good reference.
December 18, 2014
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Expanded my relationship to/with dignity…should be read by all who think there is any justification regarding torture…or abortion…
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December 18, 2014
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Expanded my relationship to/with dignity…should be read by all who think there is any justification regarding torture…or abortion…
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December 17, 2023
it was fine.
April 30, 2025
hoppades på ett tydligare svar på vad det innebär att behandla någon respektfullt
intressant. tyskt, västligt, fokus. lättläst och tillgängligt - inte svårt akademiskt språk
intressant. tyskt, västligt, fokus. lättläst och tillgängligt - inte svårt akademiskt språk
Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews