America's foremost authority on Russian communism—the author of the definitive studies The Russian Revolution and Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime— now addresses the enigmas of that country's 70-year enthrallment with communism.
Succinct, lucidly argued, and lively in its detail, this book offers a brilliant summation of the life's work of "one of America's great historians" ( Washington Post Book World ).
"The author has distilled his arguments concerning several key Why did tsarism fall? Why did the Bolsheviks triumph? Why did Stalin succeed Lenin? The book, based on lectures given at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, has a nicely colloquial feel, clarity, and vigor. At the heart of the answers to the first two questions is Pipes's assertion that, far from being the product of large, impersonal forces of history, the fall of the tsar and the rise to power of the Bolsheviks (in, he reminds us, a coup d' tat largely unsupported by the Russian people) were the result of the old regime's clear failings and Lenin's genius for manipulation and appetite for total power. Stalin succeeded Lenin, Pipes asserts, because Lenin had so successfully suppressed all elements of democracy that no alternatives were possible.... A concise and eminently straightforward summary of current research on the rise and nature of Communism in Russia." — Kirkus
Born in Poland, Richard Pipes fled the country with his family when Germany invaded it in 1939. After reaching the United States a year later, Pipes began his education at Muskingum College, which was interrupted in 1943 when he was drafted into the Army Air Corps and sent to Cornell to study Russian. He completed his bachelor's degree at Cornell in 1946 and earned his doctorate at Harvard University four years later.
Pipes taught at Harvard from 1950 until his retirement in 1996, and was director of Harvard's Russian Research Center from 1968-1973. A campaigner for a tougher foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in 1976, he led a group of analysts in a reassessment of Soviet foreign policy and military power. He served as director of Eastern European and Soviet affairs at the National Security Council from 1981 until 1983, after which he returned to Harvard, where he finished his career as Baird Professor Emeritus of History.
Essentially one long rant provided with no accompanying sources or footnotes and written with a bizarre combination of smugness and bitterness. Pipes lauds it over the collapse of the Soviet Union yet also seeks to shut down any ‘revisionist’ historians that disagree with his apparently unpopular theories. At one point Pipes describes these historians’ ‘disgust with America’s role in Vietnam and its allegedly provocative pursuit of the Cold War’. Having recently read Vincent Bevins’ ‘The Jakarta Method’ about the extent to which the US intervened in nearly every democratic process in South America and supported the mass slaughter of millions in Indonesia the use of the word ‘allegedly’ only proves either how deluded or psychotic this former national security advisor to Reagan was.
You can really tell this work was written following Fukuyama’s proclamation of ‘the end of history’; Pipes intends to hammer excess nails into the coffin of the Soviet Union, whilst simultaneously dancing a jig on its grave before a quick victory lap around the cemetery.
This book is extremely biased and the ego of the author makes it kind of hard "most authors say this BUT I have concluded that and it's right bc I'm the only one who says so :)". I wouldn't recommend it that much thanks to the way it's written. I hope it wasn't so vague all the time, and he tackles so much down in every one of the three questions that I couldn't consistently answer you any of them, each point gets lost. the fact he is American and worked for president Regan tells you enough on his view on Russia in general.
Pipes proposes interesting arguments which make for a good read. However, the amount of ego in the writing made it very difficult to enjoy. More focused on forcing in his own experiences, Pipes goes to the ends of the Earth to fit in anecdotes which don't make logical sense or correlation. The general wordiness of the book also troubled me. What he wanted to put across could be said in a clearer way. Furthermore, aside from the 3 broad chapters, there are no other breaks in the book. It flows haphazardly and I often found myself wondering what year is being discussed. The book reads more as a train of intelligent thought rather than a historical inquest.
Pipes, who was a noted conservative, lays into these three questions:
1/ Why did Tsarism fall? 2/ Why did the Bolsheviks triumph? 3/ Why did Stalin succeed Lenin?
What he shows is the contingent, almost accidental nature of the revolution, propelled by the political willpower of the weakest side (Lenin and the Bolsheviks) at the most critical moments. He doesn't even call it a revolution; without mass support, he calls it a coup d'etat. He is also utterly decided on the malevolence of Lenin; never interested in Russia, his key goal was worldwide revolution and that goal only came unstuck after the debacle/miracle on the Vistula. After that, the violence of the Communists being directed inwards, a war against its own population, Stalin's ascension became inevitable; the only question among the three with an 'inevitable" response. In Pipes' view, the first two were not only NOT pre-ordained, they were also unnecessary.
I first read Richard Pipes’ book Three “Whys” of the Russian Revolution in high school, back in the late 1990’s, after I took an excellent class called “Russia in the 20th century,” which piqued my interest in Russian history. I re-read Pipes’ book this winter, and I was impressed by his analysis of the Russian Revolution.
Three “Whys” of the Russian Revolution is a short book, just 84 pages long, and it’s a distillation of some of the ideas that Pipes presented in his 1991 book The Russian Revolution. The three questions that Pipes seeks to answer in the book are:
1. Why did tsarism fall? 2. Why did the Bolsheviks succeed? 3. Why did Stalin succeed Lenin?
Pipes argues that there was nothing inevitable about the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, making the point that even Vladimir Lenin predicted in January 1917 that he would not live to see a revolution in Russia. (p.12)
Pipes also makes a compelling case for the Bolsheviks’ triumph as being one of a cunning coup d’état mixed with good luck, rather than a genuine popular uprising. Pipes writes: “The Bolsheviks seized power in Russia because it had become available for a power seizure. Were the choice up to them, they would much rather have taken over Germany or England.” (p.65) Certainly Karl Marx would have been shocked to learn that the first Communist government in the world was instituted in Russia.
Pipes is very anti-Communist, and is one of the more conservative historians of the Russian Revolution. In his answer to why Stalin succeeded Lenin, he writes: “I have yet to see a satisfactory Marxist explanation why history, after the death of Lenin, took a thirty-year detour by vesting what Lenin himself had called ‘unbounded power’ in a despot whom the revisionists regard as a traitor to the cause of Leninism.” (p.64) Pipes writes that Stalin was the most competent Communist politician, and thus a somewhat logical choice to succeed Lenin. Pipes also writes that “Lenin does not seem to have penetrated Stalin’s personality and noticed the mass killer lurking in his black soul.” (p.83)
Three Whys of the Russian Revolution is a good, short introduction to some of the most interesting questions surrounding the Russian Revolution. I’d recommend it to anyone interested in Russian history.
Succinct answers to some important questions about the early development of communist rule in Russia. First, the Tsarist fall was neither preordained or inevitable. Second, the Bolshevik victory was not a “revolution” — ie, a result of a popular uprising — but a coup d’etat by a small cadre of revolutionaries. Third, Stalin was not a betrayal of Lenin’s principles but was the logical consequence of the state system that Lenin set up (correspondingly, Lenin was much closer to Stalin than he was to Trotsky). I was unaware of much of this, and, as the author admits, his views are somewhat unorthodox, though he claims source material found in opened Soviet archives. Right or wrong, this is an interesting take on events that had massive impact on subsequent world events, resonating even today. Worth the short read.
The Bolsheviks took power, the Czar fell and--after Lenin dies--Stalin takes control. Inevitable? Only the most dogmatic determinist would say so, yet Pipes shadowboxes with unnamed ‘revisionist’ historians in these three short polemical lectures of 1995. Anti-Communist Pipes is the father of the anti-Muslim Daniel Pipes, which may explain such judgments as when describing Czarism’s top-down rule: “In this respect, Russian was very Oriental.” Hmm. Still, here are interesting arguments drawing on newly-opened Soviet archives and Pipes’ lifetime of scholarship. Most of the sacred stories of the Revolution--the mass revolt, Bolshevik popularity, Lenin’s bravery, Stalin’s dissonance with Lenin, even the storming of the Winter Palace--all inventions of Bolshevik propaganda. Best line: “Only intellectuals have universal grievances…believe that nothing can change unless everything changes.” But with such polemics against bad left historiography footnotes and a bibliography might have helped.
Fantastic if you’re using his work for a history essay. His ideas are very easy to rebuff due to the shear amount he ignores about the causes of the February Revolution in 1917. Reading the book you have the feeling that he didn’t even bother looking at the Soviet Archives because he knew some part of his theory would be disproved in some way and he clearly wouldn’t be able to handle that. However, to his credit his opinions on the First World War being a major cause of the February Revolution are mostly correct and can be very useful when writing an essay. Only thing you need to get past if his arrogance.
Written at a time when Pipe's point of view became "Oldschool". This short book is him posturing against the "revisionist" movement. Which in reality, and the opinion of this review, his opinion is old school. He disregards so many dynamics that shaped the destruction of the Tsar and the rise of the Bolsheviks. Even though many of his takes come to similar opinions of many western "revisionist" historians, how he comes to his points is negligent. He ignores economic and social movements and events of the time out of spite of what he deems as "Marxist" opinions.
I loved this book because I hated this book: I felt like I had to engage with every point made by Pipes. He downplays the significance of Bukharin, exaggerates the inevitability of Stalin and wrongfully scorns the role of popular rather than political discontent in February. I would recommend Sheila Fitzpatrick’s history for a more comprehensive, matter of fact account, and this book if you want to truly understand your opinions on the whole thing.
More of a political text than an historical work. One could assign this to students to demonstrate bias and selective reading of evidence in historical scholarship.
Firstly this is not a history book, for history books on the Russian revolution Pipes suggests us his most important history books on the subject: The Russian Revolution and Russia under the Bolshevik regime. I personalty think this book requires some long books on Russian rev to be read beforehand (not necessarily Pipes's) This book is a conclusion, or an interpretation of given historical facts done by the author. This book is meant to be biased and to accuse it of that means you are silly, if you agree or not with the author that is also a personal choice. Historical facts have a limit of clarity they can give us, we can not truly know what an individual thought or not, erratic or surprising decisions made by individuals have reasons that can be deduced, but never in an objective manner. And historians have and always did try a guess. Pipes goes on to suggest that macro-trends in history are not explanation for historical upheavals: The fact that the Russian society had grievances against the state dose not warrant the conclusion that the Bolshevik regime was inevitable. He suggests that despite those macro trends it is individuals with power or who seek power, who act or do not act who make history. The trends in society are not to be ignored but they must be positioned behind the actions of key individuals, or as I understand it to view it as the background music . (Spoilers !!!) Thus despite the evident decay of Tsarism, the fall was due to the in-action of individuals in power to reform the state. The Bolsheviks were not seen as salvation by the population yet they by the clever strategy and manipulation orchestrated especially by Lenin and Trotsky took power in a coup d`etat and destroyed their opposition. Stalin is where Pipes appears to make an concession from his mode of viewing history. Yet claiming that Stalinism was inevitable and it is a rightful heir (ideologically) to Leninism strikes at the heart of the entire marxist narrative and also at the image of Lenin. But even here it was Stalin the individual who understood the bureaucratic needs of a planed economy and who was willing to preserve the communist experiment at all cost. Pipes has a clear goal to denounce the Bolsheviks in their entirety. Some may argue that he is unjust, and that is because he judges actions and results, not ideological purity or those bolsheviks who thought they were fighting for freedom (as they understood it) but then felt betrayed (Victor Serge as an example).
Pipes has an extreme bias which he allows to influence how he presents the Bolsheviks. It seems as though he is writing to give people exactly what they want to hear rather than analysing the time period. He presents the Bolsheviks like cartoonish villains.
In the chapter, 'Why Did the Bolsheviks Triumph?', he straight up changed the Lenin quote on page 32 to fit his own narrative. Lenin was talking about how the ruling class disguises themselves to be the 'will of the majority', and Pipes used this out of context and changed the wording to make Lenin seem like his intention is for the minority to take over the majority.
I read the book casually and I only picked up on this blatant lie because I have read Lenin's works during this time period. It makes you wonder how many times Pipes has changed quotes for his own gain.
This is a transcript of 3 lectures Pipes delivered on what he considered the 3 most important question to ask about the Russian revolution, Why did tsarism fall virtually overnight? Why did the Bolsheviks - the smallest of the three main Russian radical parties - triumph? Why did Stalin succeed Lenin? On all 3 Pipes diverges from the popular consensus of western historians. There's a combative and slightly bitter tone to these 3 lectures that may not be for everyone. I adore it though, if you're going to engage in revisionist history you may as well take a few wild swipes at the unnamed establishment dupes.
I'm looking forward to Pipes' much longer (and actually sourced) writings for a more grounded take.
Вторая русская революция - одна из нераскрытых загадок современной истории. Историки до сих пор спорят: почему Керенский и временное правительство так долго тянули с созывом учредительного собрания, почему вообще временное правительство образовалось, почему Ленин с небольшой кучкой леворадикалов захватил власть якобы для постройки то ли народной демократии, то ли диктатуры пролетариата. Он сам не мог определиться, как лгать народу для установления собственной диктатуры. Ричард Пайпс раскрыл эти вопросы в своей небольшой книге, посвящённой русской революции 1917 года.
The three "whys" in this slim volume are - Why did tsarism fall? Why did the Bolsheviks triumph? Why did Stalin succeed Lenin?
I did lear a few things I didn't know before, but while some of the points get into quite a lot of detail, others are somewhat generalized and unexplained. I guess I need to keep reading Pipes and others to learn more about the history of the October Revolution, which, according to Pipes, went somewhat unnoticed and people didn't realize what had happened until it was too late to do anything about it.
Maybe it warrants more than 3 stars- but it is really just a quick - almost newspaper column sized - review of his well-documented arguments in his 3 big books of the russian revolution. However, spouse read it and loved it because she hadn't read those books. Fair enough. Without the lengthy context and documentation of the other books though, this book could come off as just a conservative talking smack about the communists.
This was very interesting, read it alongside my WWI reading. It was pretty heady, and you need background of the Russian Revolution times before it makes much sense. Some of it did kind of go over my head but I found it all quite interesting.
Умению автора делать чёткие аргументированные выводы из массива фактов можно восхищаться. Лаконичность, отсутствие воды и выпячивания "авторского я", которым страдают многие историки - так же важные штрихи к портрету Пайпса.
For an 84 page book it sure felt dense and like a history book sometimes. Still, you can tell Pipes knows his stuff and gives some interesting insights into 1917 - 1923 Russia + some of Stalin’s early years.