Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars

by Barbara F. Walter

Why do some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others are fought to the finish? Numerous competing theories address this question. Yet not until now has a study combined the historical sweep, empirical richness, and conceptual rigor necessary to put them thoroughly to the test and draw lessons invaluable to students, scholars, and policymakers. Using data on every civil war fought between 1940 and 1992, Barbara Walter details the conditions that lead combatants to partake in what she defines as a three-step process--the decision on whether to initiate negotiations, to compromise, and, finally, to implement any resulting terms. Her key rarely are such conflicts resolved without active third-party intervention.

Walter argues that for negotiations to succeed it is not enough for the opposing sides to resolve the underlying issues behind a civil war. Instead the combatants must clear the much higher hurdle of designing credible guarantees on the terms of agreement--something that is difficult without outside assistance. Examining conflicts from Greece to Laos, China to Columbia, Bosnia to Rwanda, Walter confirms just how crucial the prospect of third-party security guarantees and effective power-sharing pacts can be--and that adversaries do, in fact, consider such factors in deciding whether to negotiate or fight. While taking many other variables into account and acknowledging that third parties must also weigh the costs and benefits of involvement in civil war resolution, this study reveals not only how peace is possible, but probable.

Genres: Political Science, International Relations, Nonfiction, War

216 pages, Paperback

First published December 26, 2001

About the author

Barbara F. Walter is the Rohr Professor of International Relations at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Walter helps to run the award-winning blog Political Violence at a Glance and has written for The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Reuters, and Foreign Affairs.

Reviews

[Greg · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a larger treatment of her article "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement". The findings indicate that security guarantees are the crucial determinant of a successful settlement of a civil war. It relies on rational choice theories of conflict and is heavy on game theory. The quantitative analysis seems to support the theory that in the absence of third-party security guarantees, civil wars are unlikely to end.

[Mike Edwards · Rating 5 out of 5]

Using a combination of game theory, statistical modeling, and historical analysis, Walter argues that a credible third-party guarantor dramatically increases the likelihood of success for any civil war peace agreement. Walter notes that conflicts and tensions will necessarily arise between any factions who are enemies one day, and forced to coexist peacefully the next day. Without a third-party to monitor and/or enforce the agreement, those conflicts are much more likely to escalate into a full-blown resumption of hostilities. It's a simple theory, explained in a clear and convincing manner, and is an important step forward in our understanding of conflict.

[C.]

Things ain't looking up