Kierkegaard: Construction de l'esthétique

by Theodor W. Adorno, Eliane Escoubas (Traductrice)

Construction of the Aesthetic intends to recuperate the sphere of the aesthetic from the dialectic of existence: 'not to forget in dreams the present world, but to change it by the strength of an image.'

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Art, Theory

311 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1933

About the author

Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno was one of the most important philosophers and social critics in Germany after World War II. Although less well known among anglophone philosophers than his contemporary Hans-Georg Gadamer, Adorno had even greater influence on scholars and intellectuals in postwar Germany. In the 1960s he was the most prominent challenger to both Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. Jürgen Habermas, Germany's foremost social philosopher after 1970, was Adorno's student and assistant. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the interdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt School to which he belonged. It also stems from the thoroughness with which he examined Western philosophical traditions, especially from Kant onward, and the radicalness to his critique of contemporary Western society. He was a seminal social philosopher and a leading member of the first generation of Critical Theory.

Unreliable translations hampered the initial reception of Adorno's published work in English speaking countries. Since the 1990s, however, better translations have appeared, along with newly translated lectures and other posthumous works that are still being published. These materials not only facilitate an emerging assessment of his work in epistemology and ethics but also strengthen an already advanced reception of his work in aesthetics and cultural theory.

Reviews

[James · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was Adorno's doctoral thesis written under the direction of Paul Tillich. Adorno attempted to write this in a completely decentered fashion, so that every sentence carried equal weight. He nearly succeeded -- perhaps every ten pages you'll hit one sentence that especially strikes a chord. This features makes the book very difficult to read. However, after reading this and reading some Kierkegaard it'll be very easy to see how strongly Kierkegaard influenced Adorno's later thought, including Dialectic of Enlightenment.

[William West]

That special feeling when your reading a book written in the 1930s, and the author casually drops the word "diapsalm" and you look it up and the internet claims that word became archaic around 1703.

That's a pretty good illustration of why I don't feel qualified to offer a "synopsis" of this text. But for all of its impenetrability, I won't say I got no pleasure from reading (well, "reading") it. Adorno is a singular and unique literary stylist. Who can deny passages like,

"Aestheticism... has both it's hour and place: the early history of the metropolis. It is there, like artificial street lighting, in the twilight of incipient despair, that this... form emits its beam to eternalize, garishly, life as it slips away."

...and...

"...it is not the total self and its total structure, but exclusively the fragment of collapsing existence, free of all subjective "meaning" that is a sign of hope..."
???

God like!

[Gideonleek · Rating 5 out of 5]

“My life is absolutely meaningless. When I consider the different periods into which it falls, it seems like the word schnur in the dictionary, which means in the first place a string, in the second, a daughter-in-law. The only thing lacking is that the word schnur should mean in the third place a camel, in the fourth, a dust-brush.”

[Wanyoung Kim · Rating 1 out of 5]

His understanding of Kierkegaard is entirely based on poor German translations that did not capture crucial Danish nuances important to grasp to understand Kierkegaard at all outside of mere structuralism.

[Volbet · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book that’s basically anything but what it says on the tin. Theodor W. Adorno promised that this would be a purely philosophical critique of the works of Søren Kierkegaard’s works and the way that Kierkegaard separated the aesthetic and the religious, but it’s more so a work of both early critical theory and cynical politics.

First off, neither Adorno nor I are helped by only reading translated sources. In Adorno’s case that means that he only had access to the limited translations of Kierkegaard into German, and in the beginning of the 20th century those were rough translations, man. And it doesn’t help that I read Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic (Volume 61) translated into English. It’s layers upon layers of concepts lost in translation.

Kierkegaard in many ways is very much an Adorno work, it’s a work of philosophy that seeks to save the philosophical tradition by destroying whatever stands in the way of that salvation. And in the face of Kierkegaard as both a philosopher and theologian being used to bolster the proto-fascism of the Weimar Republic, Adorno saw no other solution but to try and dismantle Kierkegaard’s philosophical project. But the way it’s done is not only unfair to Kierkegaard, it reflects horribly on Adorno as a serious researcher and commentator.
Or it would if Adorno wasn’t so damn good at making his case. Like, Adorno is very much wrongheaded in his critique, but it’s argued in just the right way for it to be something the reader at least has to think about. Even if Adorno didn’t, couldn’t or wouldn’t understand Kierkegaard, nothing in Kierkegaard can be dismissed out of hand.

[Gemma]

me morí y luego renací

[Pierre E. Loignon · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dans cette thèse de doctorat qui fera connaître son auteur, Adorno aborde Kierkegaard en fonction de la « loi de la forme philosophique » qui « exige l’interprétation du réel dans la connexion concordante des concepts » (p,11). Cela ne revient pas seulement à éviter de partir de la lettre kierkegaardienne, mais correspond à lire Kierkegaard à l’inverse de la manière dont il se donne. Alors que pour Kierkegaard la subjectivité est la vérité, pour Adorno elle est plutôt volonté d’objectivité qui doit être mise en doute et critiquée.
L’existence n’est donc jamais prise en compte par Adorno, au profit du système (ou langage) de l’existence qu’il reconstruit à partir des écrits kierkegaardiens entièrement dans la réflexion, dans l’immanence de la pensée, de manière à pouvoir « le tenir dans le terrier de l’intériorité indéfiniment réfléchie »(p.25).
C’est ainsi que, pour prendre un exemple précis, sur le plan esthétique, alors qu’une lecture de Kierkegaard comme philosophe de l’exception montrera les idées esthétiques comme des passions subjectives pouvant être conditionnées différemment dans l’immédiat selon les époques, Adorno comprendra les appréciations subjectives kierkegaardiennes sur l’art comme des dogmes esthétiques, des « universalia post rem, obtenus par élimination des éléments historiques spécifiques » (p.40).
Pour prendre un autre exemple, alors que, pour Kierkegaard, l’existence vivante de l’exception, en travail au présent vers son idéal est le seul a priori qui soit digne d’être pris en considération, Adorno parle du sujet et de l’objet exclusivement dans l’histoire et en fait « la présupposition concrète du discours kierkegaardien sur l’existence humaine » (p.50). Il n’y a ainsi aucune transcendance possible pour Adorno, de sorte que la dialectique kierkegaardienne est un « mouvement que la subjectivité accomplit pour récupérer le « sens » à partir d’elle et en elle », dans « l’immanence de « l’intériorité » (p.54-55).
Ou encore, Adorno écrit que le « concept kierkegaardien d’existence ne coïncide pas avec la simple existence, mais avec une existence qui, dans son mouvement intérieur, s’empare d’un sens transcendant qui serait qualitativement différent de l’existence »(p.119). Par ce passage, Adorno distingue l’existence comme exception (liée à un sens transcendant) de l’existence comme subjectivité immédiate ou naturelle (la simple existence). Cette distinction est toutefois faite en parlant problématiquement d’un « concept », et Adorno d’ajouter que cette question se pose en fonction non pas « de l’existence pure et simple, mais comme question de l’existence historique »(p.119). La règle réduit ainsi l’exception à la seule vérité qui soit possible dans l’immanence de la pensée.
Bien qu’on ait montré l’insuffisance des traductions à partir desquelles Adorno a travaillé et l’importance des circonstances historiques particulières où son travail sur Kierkegaard a été conduit (voir Marcia Morgan, Adorno’s Reception of Kierkegaard: 1929-1933, Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, Number 43, septembre 2003, p.8-12), ce n’est pas l’incohérence qui en ressort pour moi, mais plutôt une formidable lecture de l’exception par la règle. Adorno conclut d’ailleurs en avouant que son projet critique consiste à cristalliser une ontologie « à partir de la philosophie de Kierkegaard, en contradiction avec l’intention dominante de celle-ci »(p.235).
Et cette contradiction n’est pas réconciliée, de sorte qu’elle nous laisse dans l’alternative entre, ou bien l’absence de l’exception dans l’immanence de la pensée médiatisée, ou bien la possibilité de l’exception, dans la vie présente, comme immédiateté seconde.

[Vigilius Haufniensis · Rating 4 out of 5]

He's a little bit obtuse, and you have to interpret all the Hegelian jabborwocky, but I see now where he's coming from, and perhaps where he's going.

I originally read this, because I am a Kierkegaard afficionado, however I am doing a research project on Adorno. I believe this was his phd thesis. Gives kind of an introduction to where he was at, and may help people get where he was going.