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De beaux rêves Obstacles philosophiques à une science de la conscience
La conscience est un champ de bataille où s'affrontent les idées, en un tumulte sur lequel continuent de planer les ombres du Théâtre Cartésien. Les certitudes en apparences les plus fortes, ancrées dans des notions qui tendent à préserver l'esprit de tout modèle qui nous en délivrerait, continuent de dispenser un brouillard que Daniel Dennett s'efforce de dissiper, en tournant le dos aux convictions les plus tenaces, et en faisant appel au à l'hypothèse de la ''célébrité cérébrale'', soit une substitution de la notoriété et de de la concurrence entre une pluralité d'atomes cognitifs, à la représentation de la chambre des machines par un centre souverain.
315 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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1165 people want to read
About the author
Daniel C. Dennett
80 books3,063 followersDaniel Clement Dennett III was a prominent philosopher whose research centered on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He was the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett was a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 35 reviews
May 7, 2010
Something has been bugging me more and more about Dennett recently. The more I read about consciousness, whether it be from the perspective of neuroscience, philosophy, or psychology, the more I think there is a real question that needs to be answered about qualia. Qualia, the character of subjective experience. The redness of red. The smell of a rose. The feeling of anger or love, and the experience of pain. Chalmers dubbed this the "hard problem of consciousness", referring to the problem of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences. And many brilliant philosophers have expended much energy trying to explain (or explain away) these qualia states in terms of the underlying nuerological processes. Some saying that eventually neuroscience can provide a complete explanation, and on the other extreme, those espousing dualistic theories that state quaila are a real *thing*, separate from physical matter, and most likely not in the purview of science.
Dennett thinks there is no conversation to be had. Qualia do not exist. He spends a lot of time criticizing different views of qualia, stating that the fact that there is no clear consensus in regards to what philosophers mean by qualia is a huge problem for the debate (rightly so). He provides thought experiment after thought experiment that showcase the many errors in logic that go into our normal conception of what qualia is. These are all valid criticisms, but criticizing the logic behind various conceptions of qualia does not change the fact that I have subjective experience, and right now neither philosophy nor neuroscience can explain how this subjective experience is substantiated by neuronal firing. This is an important question, one which we may never have an answer to for all I know. But denying that there is a question in the first place doesn't make any sense to me. One example that Dennett uses is an experiment where a series of alternating pictures are presented to subjects. The pictures are identical accept for one small part which is changed in color. Subjects are asked to push a button when they become aware of the difference in pictures (which takes people a long time). He then asks if before you were aware of the difference, if your color qualia was changing (as the image that falls on your retina, and sent to your visual cortex is obviously changing). He then proceeds to outline all sorts of problems with whatever answer you give. That’s all fine and good, but it doesn’t change the fact that I experienced *something* and Dennett cannot explain how that experience is substantiated in an organism.
I'm as strong a materialist as Dennett is (I guess until Chalmers convinces me otherwise), so to me, I have an even more vested interest in thinking that there needs to be an explanation for how and why qualia exists. Explaining how our neurophysiology substantiates experience, meaning, and a unified conscious experience is to me the holy grain of consciousness research. Whether we will ever get there is up for debate, but pretending the problem doesn’t exist doesn’t make sense to me. Am I missing something? Does Dennett know something I don’t (well, almost certainly he knows a WHOLE BUNCH that I don’t, but I really think he’s wrong to dismiss the importance of qualia)?
Maybe he’ll actually address this as the book goes on (I’m only 2/3rds in). But from what I remember of consciousness explained, it doesn’t seem like he feels any need to. Dennett is great about pointing out logical fallacies in regards to all sorts of theories of consciousness, but seems to be quite content to leave all sorts of vague holes in his theories. Is it because he doesn’t know how to fill in those holes, or doesn’t know that those holes exist?
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Finished, review to come shortly...
Dennett thinks there is no conversation to be had. Qualia do not exist. He spends a lot of time criticizing different views of qualia, stating that the fact that there is no clear consensus in regards to what philosophers mean by qualia is a huge problem for the debate (rightly so). He provides thought experiment after thought experiment that showcase the many errors in logic that go into our normal conception of what qualia is. These are all valid criticisms, but criticizing the logic behind various conceptions of qualia does not change the fact that I have subjective experience, and right now neither philosophy nor neuroscience can explain how this subjective experience is substantiated by neuronal firing. This is an important question, one which we may never have an answer to for all I know. But denying that there is a question in the first place doesn't make any sense to me. One example that Dennett uses is an experiment where a series of alternating pictures are presented to subjects. The pictures are identical accept for one small part which is changed in color. Subjects are asked to push a button when they become aware of the difference in pictures (which takes people a long time). He then asks if before you were aware of the difference, if your color qualia was changing (as the image that falls on your retina, and sent to your visual cortex is obviously changing). He then proceeds to outline all sorts of problems with whatever answer you give. That’s all fine and good, but it doesn’t change the fact that I experienced *something* and Dennett cannot explain how that experience is substantiated in an organism.
I'm as strong a materialist as Dennett is (I guess until Chalmers convinces me otherwise), so to me, I have an even more vested interest in thinking that there needs to be an explanation for how and why qualia exists. Explaining how our neurophysiology substantiates experience, meaning, and a unified conscious experience is to me the holy grain of consciousness research. Whether we will ever get there is up for debate, but pretending the problem doesn’t exist doesn’t make sense to me. Am I missing something? Does Dennett know something I don’t (well, almost certainly he knows a WHOLE BUNCH that I don’t, but I really think he’s wrong to dismiss the importance of qualia)?
Maybe he’ll actually address this as the book goes on (I’m only 2/3rds in). But from what I remember of consciousness explained, it doesn’t seem like he feels any need to. Dennett is great about pointing out logical fallacies in regards to all sorts of theories of consciousness, but seems to be quite content to leave all sorts of vague holes in his theories. Is it because he doesn’t know how to fill in those holes, or doesn’t know that those holes exist?
-----------------------------
Finished, review to come shortly...
January 29, 2014
After finishing Consciousness Explained recently and liking it very much, feeling convinced Dennett tackles the issues in the appropriate way, I felt a need to read this one next. Here, Dennett elaborates on his ideas that in order to understand consciousness, we need to take empirical findings seriously and if we do, we realize that there is no room for any center of consciousness in the brain. Rather, we find that activities are spread out over different areas having different functional roles, somehow adding up to conscious experiences. He sketches a theory of how and why certain activities result in conscious awareness, reshaping his earlier attempts through the multiple drafts model and fame models of consciousness, into the fantasy echo theory, according to which our consciousness is explained in terms of our ability to recall experiences which results in episodic memories being possible. As I understand Dennett here, he calls attention to an important difference between lower forms of attention, such as that exhibited by lower forms of life who we agree do not enjoy consciousness, at least not of our kind, and higher forms of attention that requires the ability to form experiences of episodes. It is just this ability to experience not just simple inclinations towards reacting in certain ways in response to perceptions, but complete episodes that can be memorized and recalled that explains our conscious experiences. An important aspect of the theory is that any conscious experience consists simply in a multitude of lower, unconscious states in the mind which come together to form the experience and that there is no one moment in which something enters into consciousness but that there is competition at any moment between different sets of lower brain states to rise in activity.
The different models come together more or less, and can be seen as elaborations on each other. In the multiple drafts model, Dennett made the analogy to academic articles. There are often no one canonical version of the article, it can be in circulation as one or several different drafts, be published in a conference proceedings and then in a slightly different version in a journal and so on. There simply is no answer to the question of when the article is officially published and Dennett suggested, by his multiple drafts model, that there similarly is no answer to the question of when a something first enters into consciousness. It is a gradual process of many lower brain states being activated together yielding conscious experiences that arise as "drafts" that get revised multiple times. The fame model describes the situation in other terms: different conscious experiences have a potential at any moment to arise from the activity of the brain, with these potential experiences competing for the "fame" of attention. In the fantasy echo model, Dennett seems to focus on another aspect of this. With the previous models, he attempted to explain how there is no one moment when something reaches a point of awareness, that there's an ongoing process by which conscious experiences shifts and changes gradually. Now, he lays down a theory of how conscious experiences are explained by focusing on our ability to recall events, to shape memories and experiences into episodes, which supposedly is meant to explain how we get rich experiences and not merely the primitive responses of unconscious life forms (let's take bacteria, for an uncontroversial example of a responsive yet unconscious life form).
The other side of this view of conscious experiences is that they are analyzable, at least potentially, in terms of lower, unconscious brain states and this is where Dennett spends a lot of time, I think rightly, to attack the idea of qualia and to show what goes wrong if some intuitions are left unexamined when considering some classic thought experiments meant to prove the existence of qualia. Philosophical zombies and Mary the color scientist are treated at length and the analysis seems to hold, but I'm not going to try to summarize them here now.
In conclusion, Dennett is to the point, unimpressed by intuitions, and carefully considerate of scientific results. His models are attempts to account for something beyond that which science can currently investigate fully, but he provides suggestions informed by scientific results for where to look for a theory of consciousness rather than, as Chalmers and others seem to be doing, suggest that consciousness is some sort of fundamental building block in our ontology such that no scientific, third-person, investigation can ever explain it. It's a lovely book further explaining Dennett's views of consciousness, perfect reading for anyone who has already read Consciousness Explained. The only reason I'm giving it only four stars (and I would have given it four and a half if that had been possible) is that there are times when Dennett writes tiny dialogues in which he pits his views against those of his opponents. Such passages can be enlightening and interesting (as we know from Plato...) but Dennett does not do a very good job with them. Even though I agree with most of his conclusions and think he does a good job of defending himself against his opponents, I think he does so best when he quotes them and picks apart their arguments one by one. In the dialogues though, he mostly succeeds in creating straw men that are way too easily defeated. I think the qualia people are misguided and confused but, as is shown when Dennett does quote them, their arguments take some time to pick apart and he does not do any of his opponents justice by making them go down so quickly as he does in the dialogues. Thankfully, these passages are few and short so they do not harm the reading experience too much, but it's enough that the rating needs to fall short of the full five stars. Another, tiny, flaw is that there are several passages that are repeated twice (and some, if I remember correctly, thrice). Dennett comments on this in one chapter, attributing it to the text of that chapter being a revised version of a lecture he gave which included material from the papers being the bases of the other chapters. This is understandable, but I'm pretty sure there was another repetition or two in the latter chapters. Perhaps this comment by Dennett was meant to apply to several of the last chapters. In any case, it doesn't matter much but the repetition was a minor annoyance which, in combination with my comment above on the badly written dialogues, necessitated the four out of five stars. I do, nevertheless, consider it a must read for anyone interested in theories of consciousness.
The different models come together more or less, and can be seen as elaborations on each other. In the multiple drafts model, Dennett made the analogy to academic articles. There are often no one canonical version of the article, it can be in circulation as one or several different drafts, be published in a conference proceedings and then in a slightly different version in a journal and so on. There simply is no answer to the question of when the article is officially published and Dennett suggested, by his multiple drafts model, that there similarly is no answer to the question of when a something first enters into consciousness. It is a gradual process of many lower brain states being activated together yielding conscious experiences that arise as "drafts" that get revised multiple times. The fame model describes the situation in other terms: different conscious experiences have a potential at any moment to arise from the activity of the brain, with these potential experiences competing for the "fame" of attention. In the fantasy echo model, Dennett seems to focus on another aspect of this. With the previous models, he attempted to explain how there is no one moment when something reaches a point of awareness, that there's an ongoing process by which conscious experiences shifts and changes gradually. Now, he lays down a theory of how conscious experiences are explained by focusing on our ability to recall events, to shape memories and experiences into episodes, which supposedly is meant to explain how we get rich experiences and not merely the primitive responses of unconscious life forms (let's take bacteria, for an uncontroversial example of a responsive yet unconscious life form).
The other side of this view of conscious experiences is that they are analyzable, at least potentially, in terms of lower, unconscious brain states and this is where Dennett spends a lot of time, I think rightly, to attack the idea of qualia and to show what goes wrong if some intuitions are left unexamined when considering some classic thought experiments meant to prove the existence of qualia. Philosophical zombies and Mary the color scientist are treated at length and the analysis seems to hold, but I'm not going to try to summarize them here now.
In conclusion, Dennett is to the point, unimpressed by intuitions, and carefully considerate of scientific results. His models are attempts to account for something beyond that which science can currently investigate fully, but he provides suggestions informed by scientific results for where to look for a theory of consciousness rather than, as Chalmers and others seem to be doing, suggest that consciousness is some sort of fundamental building block in our ontology such that no scientific, third-person, investigation can ever explain it. It's a lovely book further explaining Dennett's views of consciousness, perfect reading for anyone who has already read Consciousness Explained. The only reason I'm giving it only four stars (and I would have given it four and a half if that had been possible) is that there are times when Dennett writes tiny dialogues in which he pits his views against those of his opponents. Such passages can be enlightening and interesting (as we know from Plato...) but Dennett does not do a very good job with them. Even though I agree with most of his conclusions and think he does a good job of defending himself against his opponents, I think he does so best when he quotes them and picks apart their arguments one by one. In the dialogues though, he mostly succeeds in creating straw men that are way too easily defeated. I think the qualia people are misguided and confused but, as is shown when Dennett does quote them, their arguments take some time to pick apart and he does not do any of his opponents justice by making them go down so quickly as he does in the dialogues. Thankfully, these passages are few and short so they do not harm the reading experience too much, but it's enough that the rating needs to fall short of the full five stars. Another, tiny, flaw is that there are several passages that are repeated twice (and some, if I remember correctly, thrice). Dennett comments on this in one chapter, attributing it to the text of that chapter being a revised version of a lecture he gave which included material from the papers being the bases of the other chapters. This is understandable, but I'm pretty sure there was another repetition or two in the latter chapters. Perhaps this comment by Dennett was meant to apply to several of the last chapters. In any case, it doesn't matter much but the repetition was a minor annoyance which, in combination with my comment above on the badly written dialogues, necessitated the four out of five stars. I do, nevertheless, consider it a must read for anyone interested in theories of consciousness.
July 24, 2008
While Dennett's magnificent opus "Consciousness Explained" is still the crown jewel of his naturalist take on philosophy, Sweet Dreams is a well constructed follow up, a rebuttle to those who have taken issue with his almost undisputed masterpiece.
Dennett's writing is as sharp as ever, but there is something to be said of Sweet Dreams that cannot be said of Consciousness Explained: it is concise. The gift in writing non-fiction is to be able to get a point across simply, and Dennett does that with his Fame in the Brain model.
While it may seem necessary to read Consciousness Explained before settling in to this subsequent piece, Dennett's first few chapters are more-or-less independent, and one barely even needs a familiarity with naturalist philosophy to understand what he is saying as he addresses the philosophical concepts of qualia.
Overall, Dennett's recasting of the Multiple Drafts Model for consciousness is worth taking a long hard took at, and Dennett's assault on the esoteric, less concrete philosophers of his generation is, as always, brilliant.
Dennett's writing is as sharp as ever, but there is something to be said of Sweet Dreams that cannot be said of Consciousness Explained: it is concise. The gift in writing non-fiction is to be able to get a point across simply, and Dennett does that with his Fame in the Brain model.
While it may seem necessary to read Consciousness Explained before settling in to this subsequent piece, Dennett's first few chapters are more-or-less independent, and one barely even needs a familiarity with naturalist philosophy to understand what he is saying as he addresses the philosophical concepts of qualia.
Overall, Dennett's recasting of the Multiple Drafts Model for consciousness is worth taking a long hard took at, and Dennett's assault on the esoteric, less concrete philosophers of his generation is, as always, brilliant.
February 7, 2014
Le programme des premières sciences cognitives est de réhabiliter, contre le béhaviorisme, l'intentionalité, les croyances et la signification, en procédant dans les termes de la définition renouvelée des concepts mécanistes offerte par l'intelligence artificielle. Pour le fonctionnalisme computationnel avec lequel ce programme a largement coïncidé, chaque partie d'un système cognitif se définit par ce qu'elle accomplit en terme causal plutôt que par ses attributs matériels ("L'habit ne fait pas le moine"). Relativement à ce point de vue, les concepts réhabilités le sont pour autant, et dans la mesure où ils cadrent avec des processus et mécanismes qui leur sont antérieurs et qui sont dépourvus d'intentionalité (de conscience, de signification). Selon une formulation célèbre de cette thèse (la thèse de 'l'identité phénoménale' ci-après), les propriétés syntaxiques 'retracent' (track) les 'propriétés sémantiques' (Fodor, Putnam, Marr).
Les secondes sciences cognitives sont nées, prétendument, de l'échec de l'identité phénoménale ; il est apparu à un nombre croissant de ses adversaires et partisans que (a) l'indifférence du rôle causal envers les propriétés matérielles (chimiques et anatomiques en l'occurrence) était tout simplement fausse, et (b) qu'un décalage restait béant par rapport au caractère sui generis de la conscience.
Dans cet ouvrage, Dennett s'attache à défendre les secondes sciences cognitives en réduisant la portée des critiques qui les ont fait naître, de manière à préserver le programme mécaniste - naturaliste dans ce qu'il a parfois de plus contre-intuitif.
Il reconnaît que l'indifférence au sens de (a) a donné lieu à des critiques justifiées, mais que, pour autant, la prise en compte des hypothèses neuro-anatomiques ou neuro-chimiques a seulement renforcé l'orientation fonctionnaliste, au lieu du contraire (p.44, p.248).
Ses répliques à (b) forment l'essentiel du livre. Ce point est l'essentiel du problème avec les sciences cognitives, et plus largement avec la métaphysique atomiste comme telle.
Selon les critiques (Chalmers, Nagel, Levine...), les sciences cognitives substituent des zombies aux humains concrets-réels : elles nous décrivent comme des individus présentant tout les attributs matériels et fonctionnels que supposent la vie et la conscience - moins la vie et la conscience. Elles portent uniquement sur des processus et mécanismes antérieurs à, et dé-pourvus de, conscience, mais mécanismes et processus dont elles prétendent qu'ils épuisent l'explication (la production) de la conscience.
Dennett défend cette ambition incriminée au nom d'une hétérophénoménologie (sciences cognitives deuxième manière) selon laquelle nos propres croyances et théories populaires (sur nous-mêmes, notre pensée et notre conscience) constituent un matériel incontournable dans la construction théorique. Essentiels en tant que 'données brutes' enregistrées, au même titre que des 'événements physiques, chimiques, hormonaux', par des capteurs sensoriels, des appareils de mesure, et par quiconque est capable d'enregistrer, comme nous, des régularités dans l'environnement physique ("nos collaborateurs Martiens" par exemple, p. 50-59). Le passage des données brutes de la communication en l'expression de croyances "exige que l'on adopte la posture intentionnelle" (p.69), en traitant les sujets émetteurs de bruits (de communication) "comme s'ils étaient des croyants et des désirants, capables d'exécuter des actes de langage pourvus de significations volontaires" (ibid.). Ces communications sont considérées comme l'expression de ce que croient les sujets sur eux-mêmes, et maintenues en-dessous de ce que les sciences cognitives disent que ces derniers sont : des zombies (des êtres chez qui la prétention ressentie à la vie consciente et intentionnelle n'est l'expression de rien sinon d'événements et processus impersonnels, objectifs et non-conscients).
L'hétérophénoménologie est ainsi un détour pour brouiller les tensions : adopter la posture intentionnelle (qui est l'un des multiples noms de ce qu'il convient justement d'expliquer), un être dépourvu de conscience en est capable, selon Dennett (p.50-51). Ce résultat surprenant (ou logiquement désastreux) s'obtient par le recours à une expérience de pensée : la théorie cognitive doit être similaire à la description que produiraient des Martiens à notre sujet. Ceux-ci "ont déjà trouvé la façon d'adopter la posture intentionnelle" à notre égard, en traitant nos bruits comme des croyances (et en particulier comme des croyances sur notre conscience), "mais je ne présuppose pas qu'ils sont eux-mêmes conscients" au sens de nos croyances et de notre compréhension ordinaire de nous-mêmes (ibid).
L'expérience de pensée du "collaborateur Martien" permet à Dennett de présenter comme une évidence méthodologique ce qui passe autrement pour un contre-sens ou un illogisme monstrueux, tout en prétendant que le problème loge dans l'esprit des critiques de la théorie cognitive. Notamment dans l'expérience de pensée par laquelle ces derniers, depuis Frank Jackson, soutiennent l'irréductibilité des "qualia" (pluriel de Quale, terme latin pour qualité, avec lequel les philosophes se réfèrent globalement au caractère subjectif de toute expérience, et plus exactement, à l'individuation unique des événements intentionnels, de "Ce que cela me fait d'éprouver cette douleur" par exemple).
Soit l'expérience de pensée de Jackson : un enfant, Marie, grandit dans un décor a-chromatique parfait, ne voyant en tout et pour tout que du noir et du blanc, mais elle dispose comme lecture d'une description scientifique complète des couleurs. Passée la lecture de ces traités, alors qu'elle est exposée pour la première fois à des couleurs, Marie éprouvera-t-elle une surprise ?
Pour Dennett, les partisans d'une réponse affirmative à cette question, soit les avocats des qualia, commettent l'erreur de prendre pour une évidence ce qu'ils ne savent pas (dans les termes de la théorie cognitive en vigueur) expliquer : l'évidence de la surprise présumée, étant donné l'unicité d'une expérience subjective que le terme qualia ne qualifie pas davantage qu'il ne la rend ineffable.
Il soutient : non. Une théorie scientifique complète est possible, théorie qui permettrait à Marie de créer intégralement, sans reste et sans résidu, dans son esprit ce qu'il y a à savoir et à vivre en terme de "voir des couleurs". Exposée pour la première fois de sa vie à des couleurs, elle n'est pas surprise - elle sait déjà de quoi il en retourne.
S'il est possible de vivre intégralement ("sans résidu") l'expérience subjective des couleurs sans vivre l'expérience subjective des couleurs, avec une description en troisième personne des ondes lumineuses, de leur réfraction dans l'appareil visuel etc., pourquoi ne pas construire la théorie scientifique des couleurs directement sans l'expérience des couleurs elles-mêmes ? Cette tâche pourrait être confiée à la "Marie-Robot" propre à la version-maison (à la Dennett) de l'expérience de pensée de Jackson. Ainsi, le pas qui sépare l'hétérophénoménologie de la pensée magique ("wishful thinking") serait franchi.
Ce que le philosophe présente comme le point capital de son oeuvre, la théorie ou Modèle des versions multiples, est sa répudiation présumée de la conscience comme Théâtre cartésien. Aucun des arguments par lesquels le philosophe français séparait en substance la matière pensante et la matière étendue n'est pris à parti ni discuté, mais essentiellement, le modèle de Dennett substitue à la théorie de la conscience comme englobement d'une machinerie organique bornée par un centre unique de pensée, la représentation du cerceau comme multiplicité "d'événements conscients" se livrant une compétition pour la notoriété, pour l'attention. Certains "contenus" se "livrent une lutte pour le contrôle du corps" et pour "monopolise[r] le temps sous les feux de la rampe" (257).
Il est indéniable que la notion de machine à laquelle Descartes se référait (la machine de Vaucanson) a été bouleversée mainte fois jusqu'à nous, et en particulier jusqu'aux machines réputées traiter ou manipuler de l'information (comme un boulier traite ou manipule le mouvement). Mais il est également clair que nous n'avançons guère dans l'élucidation par une manoeuvre de multiplication. Pourquoi une pluralité de "processus" et de "contenus" conscients se livrant une compétition (une compétition pour contrôler le corps) est-elle plus explicable (en terme mécanistes et impersonnels) qu'un seul centre conscient ?
Dans un autre ordre d'idée, l'observation d'une portion illuminée de mon cerveau sur le pet scan, interprétée comme activation d'un processus de pensée au détriment d'un autre ou de plusieurs autres, nous dira-t-il qu'il s'agit de "moi décidant d'aller souper au lieu de regarder des photos, de jouer du piano ou de répondre à mes courriels" ?
N'est-ce pas moi et surtout, si j'ai des invités pour le souper, le contexte environnant qui décide de ce qu'il en retourne ? Qui décide de quel "processus" ou "contenus" prime sur un autre ?
Que l'on tranche en faveur ou à la défaveur de l'instantiation multiple (un même calcul peut se réaliser sur différents substrats physiques, l'habit ne fait pas le moine), la capacité de la concurrence dans le modèle dennettien à faire l'économie d'une méta-cognition (qui décide de la priorité) est entièrement problématique et questionnable. Il en va exactement ainsi en supposant que cette priorité a été décidée dans l'EEA (l'environnement évolutif d'adaptation du Pléistocène).
Nos "collaborateurs martiens" en jugeront - nous à qui la théorie de la conscience en troisième personne offre de nous accepter comme des zombies et des moulins à la Leibniz (des pièces qui poussent les unes sur les autres sans rien offrir qui s'apparente à une pensée).
Après une période de sympathie envers les sciences cognitives et envers leur refondation évolutionniste en particulier, j'en suis venu à les rejeter à peu près totalement, comme étant une version sophistiquée de ce que nos vieux sociologues et anthropologues disent que nous (humains primitifs comme modernes) faisons : comprendre la "nature" dans les termes des seules réalités que nous connaissions (les relations sociales).
Dennett atteste à son corps défendant de la pérennité de ce que la tradition naturaliste-atomiste tente de nier et réfuter, avec un succès surtout publicitaire et déclamatoire à mon avis : les ordres émergents.
Les secondes sciences cognitives sont nées, prétendument, de l'échec de l'identité phénoménale ; il est apparu à un nombre croissant de ses adversaires et partisans que (a) l'indifférence du rôle causal envers les propriétés matérielles (chimiques et anatomiques en l'occurrence) était tout simplement fausse, et (b) qu'un décalage restait béant par rapport au caractère sui generis de la conscience.
Dans cet ouvrage, Dennett s'attache à défendre les secondes sciences cognitives en réduisant la portée des critiques qui les ont fait naître, de manière à préserver le programme mécaniste - naturaliste dans ce qu'il a parfois de plus contre-intuitif.
Il reconnaît que l'indifférence au sens de (a) a donné lieu à des critiques justifiées, mais que, pour autant, la prise en compte des hypothèses neuro-anatomiques ou neuro-chimiques a seulement renforcé l'orientation fonctionnaliste, au lieu du contraire (p.44, p.248).
Ses répliques à (b) forment l'essentiel du livre. Ce point est l'essentiel du problème avec les sciences cognitives, et plus largement avec la métaphysique atomiste comme telle.
Selon les critiques (Chalmers, Nagel, Levine...), les sciences cognitives substituent des zombies aux humains concrets-réels : elles nous décrivent comme des individus présentant tout les attributs matériels et fonctionnels que supposent la vie et la conscience - moins la vie et la conscience. Elles portent uniquement sur des processus et mécanismes antérieurs à, et dé-pourvus de, conscience, mais mécanismes et processus dont elles prétendent qu'ils épuisent l'explication (la production) de la conscience.
Dennett défend cette ambition incriminée au nom d'une hétérophénoménologie (sciences cognitives deuxième manière) selon laquelle nos propres croyances et théories populaires (sur nous-mêmes, notre pensée et notre conscience) constituent un matériel incontournable dans la construction théorique. Essentiels en tant que 'données brutes' enregistrées, au même titre que des 'événements physiques, chimiques, hormonaux', par des capteurs sensoriels, des appareils de mesure, et par quiconque est capable d'enregistrer, comme nous, des régularités dans l'environnement physique ("nos collaborateurs Martiens" par exemple, p. 50-59). Le passage des données brutes de la communication en l'expression de croyances "exige que l'on adopte la posture intentionnelle" (p.69), en traitant les sujets émetteurs de bruits (de communication) "comme s'ils étaient des croyants et des désirants, capables d'exécuter des actes de langage pourvus de significations volontaires" (ibid.). Ces communications sont considérées comme l'expression de ce que croient les sujets sur eux-mêmes, et maintenues en-dessous de ce que les sciences cognitives disent que ces derniers sont : des zombies (des êtres chez qui la prétention ressentie à la vie consciente et intentionnelle n'est l'expression de rien sinon d'événements et processus impersonnels, objectifs et non-conscients).
L'hétérophénoménologie est ainsi un détour pour brouiller les tensions : adopter la posture intentionnelle (qui est l'un des multiples noms de ce qu'il convient justement d'expliquer), un être dépourvu de conscience en est capable, selon Dennett (p.50-51). Ce résultat surprenant (ou logiquement désastreux) s'obtient par le recours à une expérience de pensée : la théorie cognitive doit être similaire à la description que produiraient des Martiens à notre sujet. Ceux-ci "ont déjà trouvé la façon d'adopter la posture intentionnelle" à notre égard, en traitant nos bruits comme des croyances (et en particulier comme des croyances sur notre conscience), "mais je ne présuppose pas qu'ils sont eux-mêmes conscients" au sens de nos croyances et de notre compréhension ordinaire de nous-mêmes (ibid).
L'expérience de pensée du "collaborateur Martien" permet à Dennett de présenter comme une évidence méthodologique ce qui passe autrement pour un contre-sens ou un illogisme monstrueux, tout en prétendant que le problème loge dans l'esprit des critiques de la théorie cognitive. Notamment dans l'expérience de pensée par laquelle ces derniers, depuis Frank Jackson, soutiennent l'irréductibilité des "qualia" (pluriel de Quale, terme latin pour qualité, avec lequel les philosophes se réfèrent globalement au caractère subjectif de toute expérience, et plus exactement, à l'individuation unique des événements intentionnels, de "Ce que cela me fait d'éprouver cette douleur" par exemple).
Soit l'expérience de pensée de Jackson : un enfant, Marie, grandit dans un décor a-chromatique parfait, ne voyant en tout et pour tout que du noir et du blanc, mais elle dispose comme lecture d'une description scientifique complète des couleurs. Passée la lecture de ces traités, alors qu'elle est exposée pour la première fois à des couleurs, Marie éprouvera-t-elle une surprise ?
Pour Dennett, les partisans d'une réponse affirmative à cette question, soit les avocats des qualia, commettent l'erreur de prendre pour une évidence ce qu'ils ne savent pas (dans les termes de la théorie cognitive en vigueur) expliquer : l'évidence de la surprise présumée, étant donné l'unicité d'une expérience subjective que le terme qualia ne qualifie pas davantage qu'il ne la rend ineffable.
Il soutient : non. Une théorie scientifique complète est possible, théorie qui permettrait à Marie de créer intégralement, sans reste et sans résidu, dans son esprit ce qu'il y a à savoir et à vivre en terme de "voir des couleurs". Exposée pour la première fois de sa vie à des couleurs, elle n'est pas surprise - elle sait déjà de quoi il en retourne.
S'il est possible de vivre intégralement ("sans résidu") l'expérience subjective des couleurs sans vivre l'expérience subjective des couleurs, avec une description en troisième personne des ondes lumineuses, de leur réfraction dans l'appareil visuel etc., pourquoi ne pas construire la théorie scientifique des couleurs directement sans l'expérience des couleurs elles-mêmes ? Cette tâche pourrait être confiée à la "Marie-Robot" propre à la version-maison (à la Dennett) de l'expérience de pensée de Jackson. Ainsi, le pas qui sépare l'hétérophénoménologie de la pensée magique ("wishful thinking") serait franchi.
Ce que le philosophe présente comme le point capital de son oeuvre, la théorie ou Modèle des versions multiples, est sa répudiation présumée de la conscience comme Théâtre cartésien. Aucun des arguments par lesquels le philosophe français séparait en substance la matière pensante et la matière étendue n'est pris à parti ni discuté, mais essentiellement, le modèle de Dennett substitue à la théorie de la conscience comme englobement d'une machinerie organique bornée par un centre unique de pensée, la représentation du cerceau comme multiplicité "d'événements conscients" se livrant une compétition pour la notoriété, pour l'attention. Certains "contenus" se "livrent une lutte pour le contrôle du corps" et pour "monopolise[r] le temps sous les feux de la rampe" (257).
Il est indéniable que la notion de machine à laquelle Descartes se référait (la machine de Vaucanson) a été bouleversée mainte fois jusqu'à nous, et en particulier jusqu'aux machines réputées traiter ou manipuler de l'information (comme un boulier traite ou manipule le mouvement). Mais il est également clair que nous n'avançons guère dans l'élucidation par une manoeuvre de multiplication. Pourquoi une pluralité de "processus" et de "contenus" conscients se livrant une compétition (une compétition pour contrôler le corps) est-elle plus explicable (en terme mécanistes et impersonnels) qu'un seul centre conscient ?
Dans un autre ordre d'idée, l'observation d'une portion illuminée de mon cerveau sur le pet scan, interprétée comme activation d'un processus de pensée au détriment d'un autre ou de plusieurs autres, nous dira-t-il qu'il s'agit de "moi décidant d'aller souper au lieu de regarder des photos, de jouer du piano ou de répondre à mes courriels" ?
N'est-ce pas moi et surtout, si j'ai des invités pour le souper, le contexte environnant qui décide de ce qu'il en retourne ? Qui décide de quel "processus" ou "contenus" prime sur un autre ?
Que l'on tranche en faveur ou à la défaveur de l'instantiation multiple (un même calcul peut se réaliser sur différents substrats physiques, l'habit ne fait pas le moine), la capacité de la concurrence dans le modèle dennettien à faire l'économie d'une méta-cognition (qui décide de la priorité) est entièrement problématique et questionnable. Il en va exactement ainsi en supposant que cette priorité a été décidée dans l'EEA (l'environnement évolutif d'adaptation du Pléistocène).
Nos "collaborateurs martiens" en jugeront - nous à qui la théorie de la conscience en troisième personne offre de nous accepter comme des zombies et des moulins à la Leibniz (des pièces qui poussent les unes sur les autres sans rien offrir qui s'apparente à une pensée).
Après une période de sympathie envers les sciences cognitives et envers leur refondation évolutionniste en particulier, j'en suis venu à les rejeter à peu près totalement, comme étant une version sophistiquée de ce que nos vieux sociologues et anthropologues disent que nous (humains primitifs comme modernes) faisons : comprendre la "nature" dans les termes des seules réalités que nous connaissions (les relations sociales).
Dennett atteste à son corps défendant de la pérennité de ce que la tradition naturaliste-atomiste tente de nier et réfuter, avec un succès surtout publicitaire et déclamatoire à mon avis : les ordres émergents.
December 13, 2022
As always, Dennett is incisively critical of the stalking horses that haunt philosophy of mind: zombies, qualia, phenomenality, Mary the color scientist, the "hard" problem of consciousness... This book exposes the lurking incoherencies in these concepts and contrasts them with the mind-boggling successes of the physicalist programs working on understanding the mind: neuroscience, computer science, cognitive science, psychology... It's an excellent piece of work that quotes and takes antiphysicalists about the mind at their word, plainly following through their commitments and deriving the contradictions that arise if they could have consciousness their own way.
My favorite chapter is 4, Are Qualia What Make Life Worth Living? The trilemma Dennett poses to believers in qualia by making use of the cognitive phenomenon of change blindness is hilarious, exhilarating, enriching, and a pleasure to read and reread all the way through. Chapter 2, A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness, and 6, Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? are close runner-ups, functioning as more constructive works towards building a science of consciousness.
With that being said, there are some negatives. Chapters 3 and 8 are totally dispensable, only serving to offer analogies to stage magic and folk-economics; not much argumentation there. Some of the content is also repeated across the book, word for word, which comes across as lazy. The book could definitely be 2/3 as long by cutting down on these extraneous features, but it is still absolutely worth reading. Dennett has and will always be one of the strongest defenders of physicalism, and his interdisciplinary style makes his works a treasure to come across.
My favorite chapter is 4, Are Qualia What Make Life Worth Living? The trilemma Dennett poses to believers in qualia by making use of the cognitive phenomenon of change blindness is hilarious, exhilarating, enriching, and a pleasure to read and reread all the way through. Chapter 2, A Third-Person Approach to Consciousness, and 6, Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? are close runner-ups, functioning as more constructive works towards building a science of consciousness.
With that being said, there are some negatives. Chapters 3 and 8 are totally dispensable, only serving to offer analogies to stage magic and folk-economics; not much argumentation there. Some of the content is also repeated across the book, word for word, which comes across as lazy. The book could definitely be 2/3 as long by cutting down on these extraneous features, but it is still absolutely worth reading. Dennett has and will always be one of the strongest defenders of physicalism, and his interdisciplinary style makes his works a treasure to come across.
May 7, 2019
Sweet Dreams serves as Daniel Dennett's recent follow-up to Consciousness Explained. In both books, he discusses a number of issues currently plaguing the philosophy of mind and primary theories of consciousness. In Sweet Dreams, Dennett revisits many of the same topics not always with the same amount of depth. This text, a compilation of previously published essays and talks given by Dennett after the publication of Consciousness Explained but before 2005, showcases the author's sense of humor and depth of thought when divulging upon the philosophies that constitute his relatively lengthy career.
Starting out on a particularly strong chapter, which lays the groundwork for what the author believes to be traditional myths surrounding the theories of consciousness, like the Cartesian Theater, Dennett also explores approaches to a theory of consciousness, such as first-, second-, or third-person perspectives -- the latter being Dennett's preference, through which he propounds a specific approach through the scientific-method-based heterophenomenology. Additional topics include a holistic discussion of qualia, the "stuff" that "makes life worth living," Chalmers' Hard Problem, the zombie paradox as well as Dennett's defense of the approach of the Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness.
This book does a fine job bringing those who may already be familiar with the philosophy of mind up to date with current discussions and approaches to the controversies permeating the field. Dennett possesses a keen sense for sniffing out unsupported assumptions and thinking outside the box -- a true testament to his old mentor, indeed.
Starting out on a particularly strong chapter, which lays the groundwork for what the author believes to be traditional myths surrounding the theories of consciousness, like the Cartesian Theater, Dennett also explores approaches to a theory of consciousness, such as first-, second-, or third-person perspectives -- the latter being Dennett's preference, through which he propounds a specific approach through the scientific-method-based heterophenomenology. Additional topics include a holistic discussion of qualia, the "stuff" that "makes life worth living," Chalmers' Hard Problem, the zombie paradox as well as Dennett's defense of the approach of the Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness.
This book does a fine job bringing those who may already be familiar with the philosophy of mind up to date with current discussions and approaches to the controversies permeating the field. Dennett possesses a keen sense for sniffing out unsupported assumptions and thinking outside the box -- a true testament to his old mentor, indeed.
July 3, 2017
Dennett is required reading for those looking forward to uploading "themselves" following singularity. His rejection of dualism and arguments supporting consciousness as a set of features enjoyed by the subject are compelling. As much as I'd like to believe I'm "me" and couldn't be reproduced or experience things in the same way if I were a robot with the same programming, I am supportive of Dennett's materialist approach. I don't know if the "mystery" of consciousness will be solved, but I don't think it's unsolvable.
November 2, 2016
It is somewhat like a big party, which is coming to an end, many have gone and those that are still there are sitting down. D. C. Dennett is sitting in his armchair and recounts the evening, for those who will listen. As usual he rummages a lot, talks of the recent news, the last youtube meme, but it illustrates his view, and we wonder with him, about the evening, if it was unique (after all, we were all there!), or if it was just a party, a simple mechanical party.
January 6, 2019
I like reading Dennett generally.
This book was alright. Some of the material is repeated however, and my overall sense is that the book ought to be about a half or a third of the size.
Dennett's critiques are solid, but the positive theory of conscious to the end was weakly presented in my opinion. It didn't have the solid, well-thought-out, feel that much of his other writing has. It felt incomplete, and as if it could fall to the same style of critique he levels at others.
If someone simply wants to read some Dennett I wouldn't recommend this book except perhaps the first or second chapter. This book is more for someone who has read a lot of Dennett's other work, and wants to read more.
This book was alright. Some of the material is repeated however, and my overall sense is that the book ought to be about a half or a third of the size.
Dennett's critiques are solid, but the positive theory of conscious to the end was weakly presented in my opinion. It didn't have the solid, well-thought-out, feel that much of his other writing has. It felt incomplete, and as if it could fall to the same style of critique he levels at others.
If someone simply wants to read some Dennett I wouldn't recommend this book except perhaps the first or second chapter. This book is more for someone who has read a lot of Dennett's other work, and wants to read more.
January 15, 2021
"colors, such as the luscious yellow you enjoy when you look at a ripe lemon"
You can't fool me Zombie Dan, you can stare at luscious lemons all you want, we both know you can't see colors!
No, come on, think about it. It's the best explanation why he's like this! I mean see how hard he's trying to not act suspicious, staring at lemons and all that.
The book is very well written otherwise, easy and pleasant to read. I'm sure he's a great guy to stare at lemons with. His theory is pure scientism nonetheless.
You can't fool me Zombie Dan, you can stare at luscious lemons all you want, we both know you can't see colors!
No, come on, think about it. It's the best explanation why he's like this! I mean see how hard he's trying to not act suspicious, staring at lemons and all that.
The book is very well written otherwise, easy and pleasant to read. I'm sure he's a great guy to stare at lemons with. His theory is pure scientism nonetheless.
March 17, 2020
The chapters do overlap in some aspects, and Dennett does have a tendency to repeat himself. I picked up on this probably because I am already somewhat familiar with his stance on consciousness.
His thought experiments are powerful, and explanations are succinct and coherent.
An enjoyable read. Dennett is analytical, humorous and direct. I very much agree with his philosophical viewpoint.
His thought experiments are powerful, and explanations are succinct and coherent.
An enjoyable read. Dennett is analytical, humorous and direct. I very much agree with his philosophical viewpoint.
December 11, 2018
A segment of people tend to heap on Dennett for being "counterintuitive," but when he writes that my brain is a "Joycean machine made of memes" it's like he knows me personally.
December 13, 2019
Great insights! Thanks, Dan!
March 11, 2021
For the academic. Not the casual. A lot of the passages are repeated throughout the book.
February 4, 2016
I find it interesting that I agree with most of Dennett's conclusions but find many of his arguments misleading and use debater's tricks and a bit of philosophical legerdemain.
It starts with the familiar photo experiment where a picture of a kitchen with one door panel painted white like all the others alternating with the panel being painted brown. It often takes subjects 30 seconds to realize the difference. Dennett's gives us three possible choices; yes your qualia were changing in that region before you noticed the panel changing colour, no your qualia were not changing, or you don't know. He leaves out the correct answer which is that there were no relevant qualia for that region. When you look at a photo of a scene you only take in the details of a small area. Most of the scene has just a basic sketch and you brain fills in a feeling that you are seeing the details even though you are not. Since the subject knows there is a difference they start scanning sections of the photos one area at a time, gaining new qualia as they go. That is why it can take a while to see even an obvious change like a different colour door panel. Dennett uses this to call into question what is even the meaning of qualia, although I think most of us are clear on the concept.
Another misleading argument is the popular Mary thought experiment. Mary is a super scientist locked in a black and white room with only a black and white monitor to see the world. From her room she learns every physical fact about how the brain sees colour. When she is released from her room we intuit that she learns something, the subjective experience of colour. Therefore, physicalism is false. This contradicts Dennett's contention that all can be learned about consciousness through third party observation. One of his rejoinders is to set up a robot Mary who using her complete knowledge reprograms herself to have the same brain state as someone who has experienced colour. If you are a materialist like me you can easily accept that roboMary now has a subjective knowledge of colour. The problem is, that was never at issue. The issue was whether Mary could get subjective knowledge through third party objective data.
There are many more examples. These misleading and manipulative arguments weaken Dennett's case.
It starts with the familiar photo experiment where a picture of a kitchen with one door panel painted white like all the others alternating with the panel being painted brown. It often takes subjects 30 seconds to realize the difference. Dennett's gives us three possible choices; yes your qualia were changing in that region before you noticed the panel changing colour, no your qualia were not changing, or you don't know. He leaves out the correct answer which is that there were no relevant qualia for that region. When you look at a photo of a scene you only take in the details of a small area. Most of the scene has just a basic sketch and you brain fills in a feeling that you are seeing the details even though you are not. Since the subject knows there is a difference they start scanning sections of the photos one area at a time, gaining new qualia as they go. That is why it can take a while to see even an obvious change like a different colour door panel. Dennett uses this to call into question what is even the meaning of qualia, although I think most of us are clear on the concept.
Another misleading argument is the popular Mary thought experiment. Mary is a super scientist locked in a black and white room with only a black and white monitor to see the world. From her room she learns every physical fact about how the brain sees colour. When she is released from her room we intuit that she learns something, the subjective experience of colour. Therefore, physicalism is false. This contradicts Dennett's contention that all can be learned about consciousness through third party observation. One of his rejoinders is to set up a robot Mary who using her complete knowledge reprograms herself to have the same brain state as someone who has experienced colour. If you are a materialist like me you can easily accept that roboMary now has a subjective knowledge of colour. The problem is, that was never at issue. The issue was whether Mary could get subjective knowledge through third party objective data.
There are many more examples. These misleading and manipulative arguments weaken Dennett's case.
July 5, 2011
I was disappointed with this follow up to Dennett's landmark 'Consciousness Explained' (1991).
Compiled in 2004 from articles and lectures that he gave 8-13 years after this prior work, this is an interesting update. He revisits some of the debates that he has had with philosophers over since 'Consciousness Explained', but adds very little to his original thesis.
The main focus of this book is:
- defense of heterophenomenology as a method for investigating consciousness
- attack of the use of zombies as an intuition pump
- sustained denial of the any subjective point of view in conscious experience
Where Dennett was strongest before was in his solid naturalist, reductionist, materialist account of consciousness. While I never went with him all the way on his thesis, his dissection of the different aspects of subjectivity, his denial of the 'Cartesian Theatre', his creation of the Multiple Drafts model (here simply repackaged as a 'Fame' model) and his hypothesis of a virtual machine running on the neural hardware were all genuinely useful contributions to the understanding of consciousness.
Unfortunately, he has lost his patience with his detractors (e.g. Searle, Chalmers, Nagel, Fodor, Wright, Vorhees.....) in the intervening years and has entrenched his position to a point where consciousness is identical simply to thought. Quote: "consciousness is a physical, biological phenomenon— like metabolism or reproduction or self-repair—that is exquisitely ingenious in its operation, but not miraculous or even, in the end, mysterious". Here I believe that Dennett is being disingenuous and is pulling the wool over his own eyes.
As a book, it is poorly compiled. Some sections are repeated - verbatim - three times over; 30% of the book could have been scrapped.
Compiled in 2004 from articles and lectures that he gave 8-13 years after this prior work, this is an interesting update. He revisits some of the debates that he has had with philosophers over since 'Consciousness Explained', but adds very little to his original thesis.
The main focus of this book is:
- defense of heterophenomenology as a method for investigating consciousness
- attack of the use of zombies as an intuition pump
- sustained denial of the any subjective point of view in conscious experience
Where Dennett was strongest before was in his solid naturalist, reductionist, materialist account of consciousness. While I never went with him all the way on his thesis, his dissection of the different aspects of subjectivity, his denial of the 'Cartesian Theatre', his creation of the Multiple Drafts model (here simply repackaged as a 'Fame' model) and his hypothesis of a virtual machine running on the neural hardware were all genuinely useful contributions to the understanding of consciousness.
Unfortunately, he has lost his patience with his detractors (e.g. Searle, Chalmers, Nagel, Fodor, Wright, Vorhees.....) in the intervening years and has entrenched his position to a point where consciousness is identical simply to thought. Quote: "consciousness is a physical, biological phenomenon— like metabolism or reproduction or self-repair—that is exquisitely ingenious in its operation, but not miraculous or even, in the end, mysterious". Here I believe that Dennett is being disingenuous and is pulling the wool over his own eyes.
As a book, it is poorly compiled. Some sections are repeated - verbatim - three times over; 30% of the book could have been scrapped.
January 6, 2019
This is such a great book! I read Dennett's book Consciousness Explained (CE) right before I read Sweet Dreams (SD). Sweet Dreams answered many of my questions after reading CE. I highly recommend both books. I don't see why other people find it so hard to not completely buy into their intuitions regarding consciousness when trying to explain it. If we are looking to explain consciousness, why on Earth would we assume that there MUST be "intrinsic" "phenomenal" qualities that are only accessible from a first-person perspective? If you say that it is a possibility that there are such qualities, okay fine. However, I think that old philosophical traditions, the "method" of phenomenology and the framing of the philosophy of mind by newer philosophers has led to utter confusion regarding how to think about the human mind. I used to agree with David Chalmers and John Searle that subjectivity itself just simply could not be explained using third-person methods. However, Dennett is a bright and funny philosopher who helped me see the flaws in my thinking from multiple angles. It was a delight to read both CE and SD. Dennett goes beyond the obsession philosophers have had with mere conceptual analysis, intuition, assumptions based purely on first-person experience, thought experiments that are supposed to prove something on their own and what is "just obvious"for too long. By the way, his use of intuition pumps/thought experiments are just to help you think differently and combat other flawed intuition pumps. They aren't considered arguments on their own! He is ahead of his time. Now, I'm on to read a book by a neuroscientist who was inspired by Dennett's way of thinking: Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene!
November 1, 2007
He is trying to equate science and scientific principles and takes on reality synonymously with the 3rd person concept and then universal reality. This move by Dennett is a sly illusiatory slide of the philosophic hand in this “philosophic” magic trick. He is sneakily trying to reduce universal reality and understanding to the 3rd person concept, then in turn reducing this to within the physicalist paradigm and then further down to scientific parameters. Of course all this trickery seems to be going on below the surface, at the surface level… you have Martian’s because these beings would be presumably very different then us… so to have information that could be shared and attained synonymously between the two species would be non subjective information, this information would then be “objective” information. This objective information we brand as 3rd person perspective or community information, this is the type of information that science is concerned with, the objective. So if the Martians had scientist they then would be concerned with this type of 3rd person perspective information not this qualia stuff. The thing that Dennett’s science presupposes is rationality, so the Martians would be rational too. Consequently the Martians scientists would be acquainted with the “intentional stance” when trying to predict and understand observable phenomena. Again the Intentional stance is a predictive tool or position, where one makes the assumption (or gives ascription to) of rationality to an entity outside of ones consciousness, for the purpose of predictive behavior of that exterior entity (i.e. computers, aliens, humans, mice, and maybe bats)
January 8, 2017
It appears to me, that many philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, and others that have some stake in the business of the philosophy of mind or general consciousness studies, just publish the same book over and over again.
What I mean by this, is that a philosopher (or whoever), that has a stance on the question of the mind, generally publish a great book explaining their point of view and explain how it is the gospel of the question of the mind and how is dissolves the mind-body problem or how it is the groundbreaking work for the progress of consciousness studies. Generally speaking, these books are great for people that agree with their stance (much like anything that agrees with your point of view), and you'll say that "it's a fantastic read", and you, the fine reader, will help spread the gospel of this stance in the philosophy of mind.
I, however, have a problem when these philosophers of mind who just peddle the same idea in books of varying sizes that -more often than not- contain the same information from earlier works. I get that a book, say 100 pages is better than say a book 300 or 400 pages long, but reading a smaller and more condensed version of an earlier work that -more often than not- is denser than the condensed version is much more appealing to the general public and more appealing for book sales, the people that are really into this field of study are the ones that get hurt.
That's how I feel about this book. Granted, these were lifted from lectures, but I feel it hardly warrants a book, well, in my opinion, that is.
What I mean by this, is that a philosopher (or whoever), that has a stance on the question of the mind, generally publish a great book explaining their point of view and explain how it is the gospel of the question of the mind and how is dissolves the mind-body problem or how it is the groundbreaking work for the progress of consciousness studies. Generally speaking, these books are great for people that agree with their stance (much like anything that agrees with your point of view), and you'll say that "it's a fantastic read", and you, the fine reader, will help spread the gospel of this stance in the philosophy of mind.
I, however, have a problem when these philosophers of mind who just peddle the same idea in books of varying sizes that -more often than not- contain the same information from earlier works. I get that a book, say 100 pages is better than say a book 300 or 400 pages long, but reading a smaller and more condensed version of an earlier work that -more often than not- is denser than the condensed version is much more appealing to the general public and more appealing for book sales, the people that are really into this field of study are the ones that get hurt.
That's how I feel about this book. Granted, these were lifted from lectures, but I feel it hardly warrants a book, well, in my opinion, that is.
January 18, 2010
Dennett makes a compelling case against a number of widespread, non-optimistic philosophical objections to the third-person study of consciousness. It comes off as an advertisement for Dennett's long-standing blend of first and third-person study (heterophenomology) for consciousness research.
The collection comes recommended for those who already are familiar with the common philosophy of mind objections to mixing science and consciousness research. If you're unfamiliar with some of the classical philosophical arguments of consciousness, it's best to get a primer before reading through Dennett's analysis. Most of his material is in response to previously established ideas.
Highlights include his analysis and counterarguments on Philosophy of Mind classics such as uni-chromatic Mary (i.e. limits of knowledge w.r.t experience) and discouraging one's inclination toward buying into the Zombie arguments of Chalmers (the "Zombie Hunch"). I found his eloquent and playful manner of writing refreshing and, surprising for the content, not too heavy. Dennett shines through as a real optimist, convinced that science's approach is the most balanced and informed way to unearthing understanding of consciousness.
One criticism of this collection of essays is that much of the material repeats itself, begging the question why some further editing wasn't done before releasing it.
The collection comes recommended for those who already are familiar with the common philosophy of mind objections to mixing science and consciousness research. If you're unfamiliar with some of the classical philosophical arguments of consciousness, it's best to get a primer before reading through Dennett's analysis. Most of his material is in response to previously established ideas.
Highlights include his analysis and counterarguments on Philosophy of Mind classics such as uni-chromatic Mary (i.e. limits of knowledge w.r.t experience) and discouraging one's inclination toward buying into the Zombie arguments of Chalmers (the "Zombie Hunch"). I found his eloquent and playful manner of writing refreshing and, surprising for the content, not too heavy. Dennett shines through as a real optimist, convinced that science's approach is the most balanced and informed way to unearthing understanding of consciousness.
One criticism of this collection of essays is that much of the material repeats itself, begging the question why some further editing wasn't done before releasing it.
June 8, 2014
Dennett certainly writes better than most academic philosophers. That's a pretty small achievement, but he gets there pretty comfortably.
I'm sympathetic to the spirit of his attempt to call off the search for some mysterious essence of consciousness, though I can't think clearly enough about it to accept or reject it.
I read about half of the book diligently and then - in the chapter "What RoboMary Knows" - I started getting a little bored, at which point I went into rapid skim mode.
Which would be unforgivable if I were being paid for this review, but as I'm not, it seemed like the best approach given the tight limits on my remaining time on earth.
The end.
I'm sympathetic to the spirit of his attempt to call off the search for some mysterious essence of consciousness, though I can't think clearly enough about it to accept or reject it.
I read about half of the book diligently and then - in the chapter "What RoboMary Knows" - I started getting a little bored, at which point I went into rapid skim mode.
Which would be unforgivable if I were being paid for this review, but as I'm not, it seemed like the best approach given the tight limits on my remaining time on earth.
The end.
May 19, 2012
Was a good followup to Consciousness Explained. If you were not convinced by the first book, this book is helpful. It makes some expansions on the original ideas, and covers some of the experiments that have been done since then. It also clarifies some meanings of words that from Dennett's point of view have been confusing since the philosophers were not using the same meanings that the scientists were.
It is much more of a reflection on the past and a defense against critics of the first book than it is groundbreaking (as the first book was).
It is much more of a reflection on the past and a defense against critics of the first book than it is groundbreaking (as the first book was).
August 15, 2010
I like Daniel Dennet. As a philosophy student, I study his work quite a bit, and have come to enjoy his pieces. He can be persuasive, in a funny way, but mainly his character is the sort that you know he is a philosopher. One of my professors who worked with him (they were subjects of a perception experiment) says he is very opinionated, and will argue with you to the death because he feels/knows he is "right". I think that translates in his work.
February 9, 2011
This is a good interesting book. I wish he spent more time actually discussing what it is that composes consciousness rather than arguing with philosophers about how consciousness doesn't have an intrinsic "specialness" to it. This is especially true in the second half of the book where he gets kind of repetitive and has clearly made his point shutting down the people that disagree with him.
Nonetheless really interesting, glad I read it, and not very long.
Nonetheless really interesting, glad I read it, and not very long.
August 7, 2008
This is a collection of essays, talks and theories from throughout Dennett's career as a metaphysical materialist in theory of mind. He continues to be considered one of the world's foremost philosophers and cognitive theorists, and this book is an excellent survey of his thoughts of everything from qualia to free will.
April 25, 2008
A concise and clever summary of the ongoing conflict between some philosophers (consciousness is mysterious) and neuroscientists (consciousness is physical and explainable).
Very agile writing but Dennett has a weakness for unnecessary double negatives which hurt my brain.
Very agile writing but Dennett has a weakness for unnecessary double negatives which hurt my brain.
August 13, 2015
Like most philosophy buffs I know or have read works by, this guy liked to explain himself explaining a little too much. Pretty sure this book could have been cut in half and still posses all the key points.
July 17, 2013
No Hard Problem? I can dig it, I never thought there was.
This books goes a long way toward showing why Dennett ranks near the top on my short list of favorite philosophers, despite our absolute disagreement over Free Will.
This books goes a long way toward showing why Dennett ranks near the top on my short list of favorite philosophers, despite our absolute disagreement over Free Will.
July 2, 2008
This is the sequel to Consciousness Explained, which Im currently reading. The author responds to criticism of Consciousness Explained and incorporated some new neurological research into the theory.
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