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After the Spring: Economic Transitions in the Arab World
The Arab Spring constitutes perhaps the most far-reaching political and economic transition since the end of communism in Europe. For too long, the economic aspirations of the people in the region, especially young people, have been ignored by leaders in Arab countries and abroad. Competing views as to how best to meet these aspirations are now being debated in the region. The outcome will shape Arab societies for generations to come.
The authors of this book argue that significant economic reforms must accompany the major political transitions that are underway. Although each country has a different economic structure and history and must make its own way forward, there are spill-overs from trade and investment linkages, the contagion of news cycles, interaction of people and sharing of expectations that are too great to ignore. Some common foundation of the new Arab economies is needed. Towards that end, this volume addresses four central challenges of economic reform in the Arab world. First, with two-thirds of the population under the age of 30, the disproportionate burdens of unemployment and poor education can no longer be heaped on youth. Second, while some government policies may have improved the living standards of Arab citizens in the past, they have also entrenched cronies, enriched a small elite, and become unaffordable. Third, if Arab economies are to compete in the 21st century they cannot depend solely on oil and gas money, remittances, and tourism, but will require active, independent private sectors. And finally, the relative isolation of Arab economies--both from each other and from the world--must end.
Rather than providing specific lists of recommendations, this book sets forth a set of guidelines and priorities for reformers who will begin creating new opportunities for youth, rebuilding the institutions of the state, diversifying the private sector, and cooperating with each other and integrating with the world economy.
The authors of this book argue that significant economic reforms must accompany the major political transitions that are underway. Although each country has a different economic structure and history and must make its own way forward, there are spill-overs from trade and investment linkages, the contagion of news cycles, interaction of people and sharing of expectations that are too great to ignore. Some common foundation of the new Arab economies is needed. Towards that end, this volume addresses four central challenges of economic reform in the Arab world. First, with two-thirds of the population under the age of 30, the disproportionate burdens of unemployment and poor education can no longer be heaped on youth. Second, while some government policies may have improved the living standards of Arab citizens in the past, they have also entrenched cronies, enriched a small elite, and become unaffordable. Third, if Arab economies are to compete in the 21st century they cannot depend solely on oil and gas money, remittances, and tourism, but will require active, independent private sectors. And finally, the relative isolation of Arab economies--both from each other and from the world--must end.
Rather than providing specific lists of recommendations, this book sets forth a set of guidelines and priorities for reformers who will begin creating new opportunities for youth, rebuilding the institutions of the state, diversifying the private sector, and cooperating with each other and integrating with the world economy.
192 pages, Paperback
First published February 29, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 18, 2022
I really enjoyed reading this book. My automatic thought of Arab countries is connected to politics (and usually negative) so economics serves as a great equalizer in the sense that it helps understand trends and allows us to compare without talking solely about politics (with some limitations, ofc).
Published in 2012, this short book looks at the Arab countries’ economies after the Arab Spring. In this sense, it’s a very hopeful book- it offers policy suggestions for fixing the problems, especially of the youth. It seems to presume that a new era is coming. Of course, in 2022, it also feels like an alternative universe as Yemen and Syria’s civil wars drag on.
So what did I learn?
The Arab world is interesting because economic liberation did not come with political liberation. States realized that the state-organized economy was not working but did not want to give up on political power. Therefore, they balance between no political rights and limited economic rights. This differs them from countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
The Arab world suffers from a weak private sector but there are a few distinctions between oil-rich Arab countries and those that are not. Oil rich countries have managed to silence masses yearning for more rights by showering them with public spending. Such countries also suffer often from the Dutch Disease (as much as I complain about economics, the Dutch disease is such a great name, good job, economists). Poorer countries have also utilized finance in order to control the public though patronage of influential figures. This formula worked great until it stopped working. In some ways, Jordan’s relative stability is a product of this policy while Syria’s collapse can be seen as its failure.
The weakness of the Arab private sector is a problem in of itself but it is also the source of many other problems. For example, the competition is low so ineffective firms remain in the market. There’s a great loss of potential due to this. Many missed opportunities for innovation and development. Presumably, this also means the public sector can't rely on the private sector (I have a course next semester solely about privatization and ngl, I'm excited).
Moreover, this means that most people want to work in the public sector. So universities become a diploma machine meant to give graduates the document necessary for public sector employment, rather than actual education (I say as my degree is also basically a “you can now work in the public sector” document). This leads to high levels of unemployment among graduates as there aren’t enough jobs in either sector. Graduates are stuck in a limbo of waiting for public employment. They think their education will open public sector opportunities but it just doesn't.
Youth unemployment across MENA has only gotten worse since this book was published. Generally, it is shocking to see that unemployment across the Arab world has just gotten worse. When this book was written, things weren't good but now they're just terrible.
An interesting insight from this is that countries don’t necessarily have a clear path of liberalization. The reforms have often led to a lack of progress in other arenas. It’s challenging to find a blend of policies which will address all of the challenges faced. In theory, liberalization sounds so simple but in practice, policies need to solve so much without causing additional damage.
The end of the book looks at the future. Reforms can be made. There are lots of ideas on what can be done. The authors presume that the political future will be better and this is a tricky assumption. With 2022 vision, it seems that there’s a cycle of economic and political discontent. They depend on each other.
Alas, things have only deteriorated in MENA. I'm too lazy to add photos but if we look at growth of GDP per capita, there's a clear distinction between the oil-rich countries who have some growth and the poorer countries who seem to have no growth. It is normal for economies to grow and shrink but still, so little growth does imply a continuous issue.
I found it fascinating that apparently, Arab markets aren’t very well connected. Certainly, the Arab labor market is important but beyond that, Arab countries do not utilize the potential. This is wild- there's a shared language, much shared culture and a shared sense of peoplehood and yet, the economics don't quite reflect it. I wonder if stronger economic ties might help political challenges- this is a common international relations argument. If there’s more cooperation, there’s less war as countries depend on each other.
It was really interesting (but unsurprising) to see that economic problems that I associate with the Palestinian economy are actually broader Arab economies problems. The unemployment of university graduates, the immigration, the brain drain. Moreover, compared to the rest of the Arab world, things in the Palestinian territories are good. I’m used to comparing Israel and Palestine and seeing the Palestinian economy as terrible but that’s just because Israel's is very good compared to the Middle East.
And this, to me, gives some form of hope. The Arab world has a ton of potential- maybe we’ll one day reach a time where all this potential is being used. Obviously, I don’t want to say that GDP= using people’s potential but yes, I do hope that these countries with so much to offer will be able to utilize it.
To conclude, this book might be a smidge outdated but it raises dynamics that still seem relevant to this day. I have failed 2 economics courses (and hopefully, not three, dear god). So take anything I wrote in this review with a grain of salt. Economics scares me but also, I am so excited that I can read this book and understand it. This is because of my Finance and International Political Economics classes, no thanks to Economics.
What I'm Taking With Me
- I wish I took notes while reading this cause I'm def missing stuff
- Ahh, I want to know more about aid and what it does to economies.
- And do MENA countries have to industrialize in order to reach economic gain? Egypt has a population of 100,878,000, of which 25% are illiterate. So why is the product manufacturing so low in Egypt? Couldn’t Egypt theoretically compete with countries like Bangladesh who are further from Europe (so cheaper costs)? Is industrialization a necessary step for economic growth?
- the growth of the Israeli and the Palestinian economy reflect each other and the conflict. Like, you can literally see the second intifada hitting us both. You can see the 2014 war. You can see how quickly the Israeli economy recovers while the Palestinian one drags behind.
- Fuck, I want to visit Syria and Lebanon before I die.
- I’ve understood that it pisses off some people in the Arab world when Israelis enthusiastically say we’re neighbors but lol, we are and I want to learn more about my neighbors- this feels like economics that I can tolerate and even enjoy (gasp).
---------------
I'm a ball of stress but this book reminded me that economics, despite everything, can be kind of cool. I needed that. Review to come!
Published in 2012, this short book looks at the Arab countries’ economies after the Arab Spring. In this sense, it’s a very hopeful book- it offers policy suggestions for fixing the problems, especially of the youth. It seems to presume that a new era is coming. Of course, in 2022, it also feels like an alternative universe as Yemen and Syria’s civil wars drag on.
So what did I learn?
The Arab world is interesting because economic liberation did not come with political liberation. States realized that the state-organized economy was not working but did not want to give up on political power. Therefore, they balance between no political rights and limited economic rights. This differs them from countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
The Arab world suffers from a weak private sector but there are a few distinctions between oil-rich Arab countries and those that are not. Oil rich countries have managed to silence masses yearning for more rights by showering them with public spending. Such countries also suffer often from the Dutch Disease (as much as I complain about economics, the Dutch disease is such a great name, good job, economists). Poorer countries have also utilized finance in order to control the public though patronage of influential figures. This formula worked great until it stopped working. In some ways, Jordan’s relative stability is a product of this policy while Syria’s collapse can be seen as its failure.
The weakness of the Arab private sector is a problem in of itself but it is also the source of many other problems. For example, the competition is low so ineffective firms remain in the market. There’s a great loss of potential due to this. Many missed opportunities for innovation and development. Presumably, this also means the public sector can't rely on the private sector (I have a course next semester solely about privatization and ngl, I'm excited).
Moreover, this means that most people want to work in the public sector. So universities become a diploma machine meant to give graduates the document necessary for public sector employment, rather than actual education (I say as my degree is also basically a “you can now work in the public sector” document). This leads to high levels of unemployment among graduates as there aren’t enough jobs in either sector. Graduates are stuck in a limbo of waiting for public employment. They think their education will open public sector opportunities but it just doesn't.
Youth unemployment across MENA has only gotten worse since this book was published. Generally, it is shocking to see that unemployment across the Arab world has just gotten worse. When this book was written, things weren't good but now they're just terrible.
An interesting insight from this is that countries don’t necessarily have a clear path of liberalization. The reforms have often led to a lack of progress in other arenas. It’s challenging to find a blend of policies which will address all of the challenges faced. In theory, liberalization sounds so simple but in practice, policies need to solve so much without causing additional damage.
The end of the book looks at the future. Reforms can be made. There are lots of ideas on what can be done. The authors presume that the political future will be better and this is a tricky assumption. With 2022 vision, it seems that there’s a cycle of economic and political discontent. They depend on each other.
Alas, things have only deteriorated in MENA. I'm too lazy to add photos but if we look at growth of GDP per capita, there's a clear distinction between the oil-rich countries who have some growth and the poorer countries who seem to have no growth. It is normal for economies to grow and shrink but still, so little growth does imply a continuous issue.
I found it fascinating that apparently, Arab markets aren’t very well connected. Certainly, the Arab labor market is important but beyond that, Arab countries do not utilize the potential. This is wild- there's a shared language, much shared culture and a shared sense of peoplehood and yet, the economics don't quite reflect it. I wonder if stronger economic ties might help political challenges- this is a common international relations argument. If there’s more cooperation, there’s less war as countries depend on each other.
It was really interesting (but unsurprising) to see that economic problems that I associate with the Palestinian economy are actually broader Arab economies problems. The unemployment of university graduates, the immigration, the brain drain. Moreover, compared to the rest of the Arab world, things in the Palestinian territories are good. I’m used to comparing Israel and Palestine and seeing the Palestinian economy as terrible but that’s just because Israel's is very good compared to the Middle East.
And this, to me, gives some form of hope. The Arab world has a ton of potential- maybe we’ll one day reach a time where all this potential is being used. Obviously, I don’t want to say that GDP= using people’s potential but yes, I do hope that these countries with so much to offer will be able to utilize it.
To conclude, this book might be a smidge outdated but it raises dynamics that still seem relevant to this day. I have failed 2 economics courses (and hopefully, not three, dear god). So take anything I wrote in this review with a grain of salt. Economics scares me but also, I am so excited that I can read this book and understand it. This is because of my Finance and International Political Economics classes, no thanks to Economics.
What I'm Taking With Me
- I wish I took notes while reading this cause I'm def missing stuff
- Ahh, I want to know more about aid and what it does to economies.
- And do MENA countries have to industrialize in order to reach economic gain? Egypt has a population of 100,878,000, of which 25% are illiterate. So why is the product manufacturing so low in Egypt? Couldn’t Egypt theoretically compete with countries like Bangladesh who are further from Europe (so cheaper costs)? Is industrialization a necessary step for economic growth?
- the growth of the Israeli and the Palestinian economy reflect each other and the conflict. Like, you can literally see the second intifada hitting us both. You can see the 2014 war. You can see how quickly the Israeli economy recovers while the Palestinian one drags behind.
- Fuck, I want to visit Syria and Lebanon before I die.
- I’ve understood that it pisses off some people in the Arab world when Israelis enthusiastically say we’re neighbors but lol, we are and I want to learn more about my neighbors- this feels like economics that I can tolerate and even enjoy (gasp).
---------------
I'm a ball of stress but this book reminded me that economics, despite everything, can be kind of cool. I needed that. Review to come!
Read
March 22, 2013330.91749 A2589 2012
April 26, 2013
This book provides a good background to the economic issues surrounding the Arab spring, as well as steps to improving the economic and political policies of countries affected by the Arab Spring.
July 2, 2014
Quanto mi fai schifo libro. Ti odio.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews