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Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.
- GenresPhilosophy
340 pages, Paperback
First published February 24, 1989
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About the author
David O. Brink
9 books1 followerDavid Oliver Brink is a professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He works in the areas of moral, political, and legal philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
July 28, 2011
It seems this is the first review of this book here on Goodreads. Lucky me then!
Brink's book is a highly lucid and technical exposition of a robust moral realism (the view itself, as found in Brink, Boyd and Sturgeon is known as Cornell Realism after the relation those philosophers have to Cornell University) in which he picks out, for the sake of defence: a strong cognitivism about ethical sentences, where ethical sentences express propositions that are truth-apt; ethical naturalism about moral properties, which holds these propositions to be made true by certain natural features of the world -though saying much of the supervenience relation would be difficult here- and a coherentist view of moral epistemology that lets him avoid intuitionism (still saying something in defence of the latter view against the typical line of objections) and ground his view's awareness on considered moral beliefs, which aim for a familiar "reflective equilibrium", however, significantly avoiding the constructivism of Rawls and others.
In addition, Brink defends for instructive purposes and to bear out the unique structural features of his view of realism, a teleological view of utilitarianism that encompasses an objective theory of value and avoids many of the typical objections against utilitarianism by construing it as a criteria or standard of rightness, rather than a decision procedure.
This is only a little of the full story, but it is enough here just to hint at what else is in store. For instance, Brink gives an account of the is/ought thesis and not only provides grounds on which it might be avoided or deflected, but goes on to accept it in his own view and show why it will not undercut moral realism in the desired way.
What's interesting about his defence is that he leaves many threads unravelled for the reader to pick up and run with and, rather than commit himself unduly to specific positions, outlines a myriad of possibilities and expounds upon but a few and what we might make of them with future study. Interestingly, his defence of realism is available to non-naturalists and supernaturalists and he makes this explicit, but he also gives a very peculiar view of moral realism that breaks quite radically with how it has so often been conceived. Provisionally, his Cornell Realism is not explanatorily impotent in the manner that opponents of moral realism have often claimed about earlier views and indeed owes much to recent work in the philosophy of science and language.
This is not a layperson's book and I recommend some introductory sources prior to reading this, but it is a very rewarding engagement with what is a particularly relevant position in contemporary metaethics.
Brink's book is a highly lucid and technical exposition of a robust moral realism (the view itself, as found in Brink, Boyd and Sturgeon is known as Cornell Realism after the relation those philosophers have to Cornell University) in which he picks out, for the sake of defence: a strong cognitivism about ethical sentences, where ethical sentences express propositions that are truth-apt; ethical naturalism about moral properties, which holds these propositions to be made true by certain natural features of the world -though saying much of the supervenience relation would be difficult here- and a coherentist view of moral epistemology that lets him avoid intuitionism (still saying something in defence of the latter view against the typical line of objections) and ground his view's awareness on considered moral beliefs, which aim for a familiar "reflective equilibrium", however, significantly avoiding the constructivism of Rawls and others.
In addition, Brink defends for instructive purposes and to bear out the unique structural features of his view of realism, a teleological view of utilitarianism that encompasses an objective theory of value and avoids many of the typical objections against utilitarianism by construing it as a criteria or standard of rightness, rather than a decision procedure.
This is only a little of the full story, but it is enough here just to hint at what else is in store. For instance, Brink gives an account of the is/ought thesis and not only provides grounds on which it might be avoided or deflected, but goes on to accept it in his own view and show why it will not undercut moral realism in the desired way.
What's interesting about his defence is that he leaves many threads unravelled for the reader to pick up and run with and, rather than commit himself unduly to specific positions, outlines a myriad of possibilities and expounds upon but a few and what we might make of them with future study. Interestingly, his defence of realism is available to non-naturalists and supernaturalists and he makes this explicit, but he also gives a very peculiar view of moral realism that breaks quite radically with how it has so often been conceived. Provisionally, his Cornell Realism is not explanatorily impotent in the manner that opponents of moral realism have often claimed about earlier views and indeed owes much to recent work in the philosophy of science and language.
This is not a layperson's book and I recommend some introductory sources prior to reading this, but it is a very rewarding engagement with what is a particularly relevant position in contemporary metaethics.
March 12, 2023
Pretty good defense of moral realism. He laid out the issues and objections. His positive contribution with utilitarianism as the first order application of externalist moral realism is kinda goofy
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews