The Killing Ground by Tim Travers

by Tim Travers

This books explains why the British Army fought the way it did in the First World War. It integrates social and military history and the impact of ideas to tell the story of how the army, especially the senior officers, adapted to the new technological warfare and asks: Was the style of warfare on the Western Front inevitable?

Genres: History, Military History, World War I

Paperback

First published February 19, 2009

About the author

Tim Travers is a professor emeritus of history at the University of Calgary.

Reviews

[Dimitri · Rating 2 out of 5]

What gives ? Chapters on British Army tactics 101 & a lot of second-rate Haig-bashing. Totally unlike the painstakingly technical detail of How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dated and myopic

An interesting analysis of the pre war Edwardian structure and thinking prevalent in the British army that contributed so heavily to deeply flawed leadership, a near total lack of strategy and a contempt for intelligence and adaptive learning. My chief disappointment in the book was the total lack of contrary examples of leadership and tactics among officers and men of Canadian and especially Australian and New Zealand armed forces in the war. Most notably absent from Travers’ thesis is the John Monash whose conduct, leadership and style were diametrically opposite Haig’s. It would have been a 5 star book if that contrary example of how the war could have been fought on the Western Front (Hamel and Amiens in 1918) had been set alongside Haig’s deeply flawed, stubborn, intellectually depauperate, wasteful, and nearly ruinous maneuvers at the Somme and Passchendaele.

Monash actually achieved Haig’s long sought “breakthrough” at Amiens in August 1918 and it went unexploited, lengthening by many bloody months a war that could have been ended then, because of Haig’s (and his Staff’s) profound disregard of colonials, technology, and communications with the front.

[gargamelscat · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not a general history but for a limited academic analysis this is a good read. Its largely about the dysfunctional relationships amongst the BEF high command and the limitations of their outlook.

[Phillip Sawyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Marvelous look at the British Army in WW1 and an astute analysis of the major problems encountered trying to win the war.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

When WWI began in 1914, the British Army was one of the most professional in the world with recent experience in Africa and Asia. In late 1918, it was one of the most efficient armies ever, using Innovative Artillery, the recently invented Tank, and infiltration/light machine gun tactics to dismember the collapsing Imperial German Army. But between those periods- after the tiny little professional army was ground to bits in the first trenches- and before real modernity finally arrived in the late summer of 1918- there were many blunders- and an astonishing amount of human life lost for minimal or no effect. Tim Travers, a professor and writer on this era, takes a closer look at this period, using the wealth of extant records, diaries, letters and documents- as well as the post war writings and memoirs of the prime Command actors. It's a bit more complex than the "Lions Led By Donkeys" theory of the war- but not as far off as you might think. It's a tough read, as all the foreseeable mistakes cost thousands of lives, but it does make the reader more aware that ALL armies were struggling with their little profession being industrialised.

Travers uses three main events , the Somme offensive of 1916, the Passchendaele/Ypres offensive of 1917, and the near collapse in the face of the German "Michael" Offensive in March 1918 to illustrate the passage from Victorian/Georgian Colonial Army to more modern efficiency. All the class/social stratification issues that held back British society were made more dangerous when Military Specialists like Artillerymen and Engineers were considered "tradesmen" to be commanded but not consulted. The basic tactical and grand-tactical ideas that would win the war WERE within the organisation from the start -Travers shows how internal Politics/Rivalries impacted their bubbling to the surface to be used effectively. Much of the friction was very understandable- once Travers lays it out- but still not forgivable with all that blood on the floor.

The prose is dense and academic, and the subject matter violent with adult themes, so this is best tackled by the Junior reader at least 12-13, with a period interest. For the Gamer/Modeler/Military Enthusiast an interesting read. Not much for the Gamer, except in help tightening up one's technique for All-Arms coordination. The Modeler might get some ideas for Command Dioramas, but not too many. It is the Enthusiast who really gets something here, as modern readers have often had trouble understanding why WWI commanders were content to slug it out in straight attrition battles. Travers shows how pre-war ideas of moral struggle, petty rivalries, and some failures to learn costly lessons dogged the British Imperial war effort as everyone in the world tried to grapple with modern industrial warfare. Not an easy read- but a very illuminating book.

[Matt Caris · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this along with another of Travers' works, How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917-1918 and found the two of them an excellent account of how the British Army evolved into the BEF of 1914-15 and then beyond, through the Somme and Passchendaele into the force that led the final campaigns of 1918. Much like Gordon's The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, Travers emphasizes the importance of the Victorian upbringing of Britain's military leaders and the Edwardian social order in how they acted and thought. In particular, the argument that the emergence of new technologies - the machine gun especially, but others as well (the airplane and, late in the war, the tank) - clashed so heavily with the senior officers' conviction that war remained a moral test of wills, with a central, immutable human element, regardless of what technological changes to weaponry may occur, is a convincing one. Travers traces how Haig and other senior BEF leaders, steeped in military traditions dating back to Wellington and beyond, slowly adapted to conditions of the Western Front, but never fast enough to prevent the various offensive bloodbath failures, and always through trying to fit in the new technologies into their existing paradigms of warfare and victory by offensive infantry action and cavalry exploitation, never through reworking the paradigm.

When read in tandem with "How the War Was Won," the latter almost seems like an anti-climax; of course Haig and other senior BEF leaders followed up the Amiens victory with a reversion to the traditional (i.e., less-mechanized) ways; they had never truly changed their visions at all.

[Tripp · Rating 4 out of 5]

Five stars for the first section on the Edwardian Army. His analysis of how social bias and Darwinism, well-bred vs expert biases and a strong anti-intellectual bias created and nurtured the destructive cult of the offensive in the British Army is outstanding. The latter sections are less engaging. Get the book and read the first section, the latter if they interest you.

[Robin W · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the best writers on the Great War. This is a military history and not a political one. Travers is critical of the top leadership of the British army in this conflict. Well worth a read even if you are not a serious student of the conflict of 1914-18.

[Andy Sims · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book in indispensable in understanding the first world war. It gives a thorough background on the Edwardian style of warfare the British employed,and this allows the reader better context when reading on the decisions Haig and other generals made.

[Sean Chick · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brilliant book if at times hard to read.