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Molinism: The Contemporary Debate
Molinism, named after the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, re-emerged in the 1970s after it was unwittingly assumed in versions of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense against the Logical Argument from Evil. The Molinist notion of middle knowledge--and especially its main objects, so-called counterfactuals of (creaturely) freedom --have been the subject of vigorous debate in analytical philosophy of religion ever since. Is middle knowledge logically coherent? Is it a benefit or a liability overall for a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this collection examine the status, defensibility, and application of Molinism. Friends and foes of Molinism are well represented, and there are some lively exchanges between them. The collection provides a snap-shot of the current state of the Molinism Wars, along with some discussion of where we've been and where we might go in the future. More battles surely lie ahead; the essays and ideas in this collection
are likely to have a major impact on future directions. The essays are specially written by a line-up of established and respected philosophers of religion, metaphysicians, and logicians. There is a substantive Introduction and an extensive Bibliography to assist both students and professionals.
are likely to have a major impact on future directions. The essays are specially written by a line-up of established and respected philosophers of religion, metaphysicians, and logicians. There is a substantive Introduction and an extensive Bibliography to assist both students and professionals.
- GenresTheologyPhilosophy
330 pages, Hardcover
First published November 24, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
April 30, 2013
Chapter 1: "The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals." William Hasker spends space reviewing the complex debate over Molinism. He presses some unique objections to the Molinist view and advises new horizons for all combatants. Hasker's criticisms of counterfactuals, along with those of Robert Adams, have always been the most troubling for me. In particular is the troubling grounding objection, which purports to show that true counterfactuals require and yet lack metaphysical grounds. Consider a proposition like 'P':
(P) A bunny is white
This proposition is true only if (a) there is a bunny, (b) there is whiteness, and (c) the bunny possesses the property 'whiteness'. It isn't initially problematic to think that similar conditions are necessary for other true propositions, including counterfactual ones. But what grounds counterfactual truths? Not God, since they're true logically prior to God's causal activity; not the agents of whom they're true, since those agents (in many cases, and in almost all cases logically prior to creation) don't exist to bring about the counterfactual truths.
Flint (1998) offers what I regard as a pretty decisive response to this objection. He argues that, in the same way that nothing in the actual world grounds all propositions which could be true (e.g., what about the actual world makes it possible for 'unicorns exist' to be true?), so nothing in the actual world renders counterfactuals true. Each truth is grounded in the possible world in which it occurs. Thus, 'If S were in C at t, then S would do A at t' is grounded in the world in which C is true at t, and S would do A at t.
What is interesting to me is this: Even if we don't consider Flint's response decisive, it is interesting that Hasker regards the debate over the grounding objection to be a stalemate. Missing from Hasker's historical survey is the problem this poses for anti-Molinists: if the grounding objection was the toughest weapon in their arsenal, and if their toughest weapon has been defused enough to permit a stalemate, then isn't it true that Molinism is at least much more plausible than it was previously? It isn't true that everyone now believes that the grounding objection fails; but it is now true that nearly everyone believes that we shouldn't yet conclude that the grounding objection succeeds.
This aside, shouldn't Hasker acknowledge, at least from his perspective as an armchair historian, that there are likely many more Molinists today than there were in previous days, when the grounding objection was not so clearly a stalemate?
(P) A bunny is white
This proposition is true only if (a) there is a bunny, (b) there is whiteness, and (c) the bunny possesses the property 'whiteness'. It isn't initially problematic to think that similar conditions are necessary for other true propositions, including counterfactual ones. But what grounds counterfactual truths? Not God, since they're true logically prior to God's causal activity; not the agents of whom they're true, since those agents (in many cases, and in almost all cases logically prior to creation) don't exist to bring about the counterfactual truths.
Flint (1998) offers what I regard as a pretty decisive response to this objection. He argues that, in the same way that nothing in the actual world grounds all propositions which could be true (e.g., what about the actual world makes it possible for 'unicorns exist' to be true?), so nothing in the actual world renders counterfactuals true. Each truth is grounded in the possible world in which it occurs. Thus, 'If S were in C at t, then S would do A at t' is grounded in the world in which C is true at t, and S would do A at t.
What is interesting to me is this: Even if we don't consider Flint's response decisive, it is interesting that Hasker regards the debate over the grounding objection to be a stalemate. Missing from Hasker's historical survey is the problem this poses for anti-Molinists: if the grounding objection was the toughest weapon in their arsenal, and if their toughest weapon has been defused enough to permit a stalemate, then isn't it true that Molinism is at least much more plausible than it was previously? It isn't true that everyone now believes that the grounding objection fails; but it is now true that nearly everyone believes that we shouldn't yet conclude that the grounding objection succeeds.
This aside, shouldn't Hasker acknowledge, at least from his perspective as an armchair historian, that there are likely many more Molinists today than there were in previous days, when the grounding objection was not so clearly a stalemate?
August 12, 2014
This is a great survey of the contemporary debate. I especially enjoyed the exchanged between Hasker and Merricks as well as the one between Craig and Zimmerman. It's a dense read, and it helped to have taken a class with one of the contributors of the volume; I would not have understood what they were talking about or appreciated the moves they were making without it. Not for the feint of heart, but recommended, nonetheless.
February 28, 2013
If you're interested in what's being said these days about Molinism, then this is a great place to start. There are some great contributions in here but also some not so great ones, on both sides of the debate.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews