Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications?
In this book, Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy.
I think I did not really like the set up of this book, it just not did not work for me. The authors start by defending popular dogmas about shame, even though their real message is that these dogmas are flawed. They only turn to their own conceptualization of shame halfway through the book. The advantage could be that as a reader, you by then found out that the dogmas are flawed and that you automatically agree with their reasoning, but it didn't work that well for me. Furthermore, I had expected a lot from the last two chapters where their ideas are linked to the practice of criminal justice (sentencing, restorative justice, etc), but it felt that a lot of the most interesting were easily dismissed.
The first two chapters of the book provided an excellent summary of the literature, and I found them to be quite enlightening. The authors did a great job in the beginning, but I believe that the chapters where they explained their formulation of shame were weak. Their formulation needed more detailed explanation and elaboration. Although the starting points were great, I found the closing remarks to be unsatisfying.
This is not a practical book. This is a philosophical exercise in futility, a means of climbing the academic ladder or at least become an expert on something, a talking head. A sad text from some sad, loser minds.
Coincido muchísimo con esta aproximación al sentimiento de la vergüenza y su relevancia en el campo moral. Sin embargo, creo que no llega a establecer la similitud de este enfoque con el de Platón o Hume. Los dos últimos capítulos me han parecido bastante aburridos en comparación con el resto del libro.