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Oxford Studies in International History
The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order
On March 21, 1968, Yasir Arafat and his guerrillas made the fateful decision to break with conventional guerrilla tactics, choosing to stand and fight an Israeli attack on the al-Karama refugee camp in Jordan. They suffered terrible casualties, but they won a stunning symbolic victory that transformed Arafat into an Arab hero and allowed him to launch a worldwide campaign, one that would reshape Cold War diplomacy and revolutionary movements everywhere.
In The Global Offensive , historian Paul Thomas Chamberlin offers new insights into the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization in its full international context. After defeat in the 1967 war, the crushing of a guerrilla campaign on the West Bank, and the attack on al-Karama, Arafat and his fellow guerilla fighters opened a global offensive aimed at achieving national liberation for the Palestinian people. In doing so, they reinvented themselves as players on the world stage, combining controversial armed attacks, diplomacy, and radical politics. They forged a network of nationalist revolutionaries, making alliances with South African rebels, Latin American insurrectionists, and Vietnamese Communists. They persuaded the United Nations to take up their agenda, and sent Americans and Soviets scrambling as these stateless forces drew new connections across the globe. "The Vietnamese and Palestinian people have much in common," General Vo Nguyen Giap would tell Arafat, "just like two
people suffering from the same illness." Richard Nixon's views mirrored Giap's: "You cannot separate what happens to America in Vietnam from the Mideast or from Europe or any place else."
Deftly argued and based on extensive new research, The Global Offensive will change the way we think of the history of not only the PLO, but also the Cold War and international relations since.
In The Global Offensive , historian Paul Thomas Chamberlin offers new insights into the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization in its full international context. After defeat in the 1967 war, the crushing of a guerrilla campaign on the West Bank, and the attack on al-Karama, Arafat and his fellow guerilla fighters opened a global offensive aimed at achieving national liberation for the Palestinian people. In doing so, they reinvented themselves as players on the world stage, combining controversial armed attacks, diplomacy, and radical politics. They forged a network of nationalist revolutionaries, making alliances with South African rebels, Latin American insurrectionists, and Vietnamese Communists. They persuaded the United Nations to take up their agenda, and sent Americans and Soviets scrambling as these stateless forces drew new connections across the globe. "The Vietnamese and Palestinian people have much in common," General Vo Nguyen Giap would tell Arafat, "just like two
people suffering from the same illness." Richard Nixon's views mirrored Giap's: "You cannot separate what happens to America in Vietnam from the Mideast or from Europe or any place else."
Deftly argued and based on extensive new research, The Global Offensive will change the way we think of the history of not only the PLO, but also the Cold War and international relations since.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published August 17, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
June 3, 2022
A compelling and well-argued study of the PLO's global strategy between the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and 1976. This was a pivotal period not just in Middle Eastern history but for the PLO, which adopted new strategies that vaulted it to independence from Arab powers as well as global prominence. PTC argues that the PLO succeeded in framing its struggle against Israel as a succeeding wave of decolonization and anti-imperialism. It gained the sympathy of the vast majority of the Global South, which gave it both tangible support and the recognition it needed to turn Israel into a pariah at the UN. This status then enabled it to at least make a claim on recognition by the US and to demand a seat at the negotiating table, although it failed to achieve these goals formally until the 1980s.
This was the PLO's big failure, which was abetted by several flaws: 1. They remained ambiguous about their goals: at the start of this period, they demanded a single state over all of Israel that would be dominated by Palestinian Arabs, which essentially meant the elimination of Israel. They moderated this during the decade covered in this book and tilted toward accepting a two-state solution, but their end goals remained ambiguous enough to play into U.S. and Israeli hands, who could credibly portray the PLO as seeking the erasure of Israel. 2. They failed to control the true radicals in their movement, including Black September and the PFLP. Of course, I do consider the PLO to be a terrorist group, but in the early 1970s they at least tried to roll these tactics back a bit. The problem was that these other groups continued to launch horrific attacks on Israeli targets all around the world, which again undercut the PLO's legitimacy and made Israel even less likely to negotiate. Israel, to be fair, could not know if the PLO would be able to commit to any peace deal because they couldn't or wouldn't stop the real crazies from attacking Israel, so it avoided direct negotiations with the PLO, preferring to hold onto the territory it gained in 1967 as a security buffer.
Of course, Chamberlin also shows how the Israelis made mistake and held unrealistic views about peace. They were riding high post-1967 and turned down several good opportunities to talk from a position of strength. They seemed to believe that Palestinian nationalism could be put down forever, that Palestinian nationhood could be accommodated within the kingdom of Jordan, and that ultimately they could manage the Pals through the military rather than seeking a diplomatic outcome. Chamberlin is pretty even-handed between these groups, which you can't say of a lot of historians.
I buy the basic claims of this book, which is extremely well researched and a great example of the new global history in the diplomatic field. I will say, I have limited attention span for the ins and outs of diplomatic negotiations, especially in the incredibly complex IS-PAL conflict, so I didn't always love those parts, although to be fair PTC keeps the story moving at a good pace.
My only significant problem with this book was the eschewing of the term terrorism in the analysis. PTC argues that this word is so heavily politicized that it is not useful analytically; instead he approaches terrorism as a historical construct, showing how/why particular actors adopted that term and how they understood it. This is all well and good, and I do this in my own research. However, there are 3 ways to approach terrorism as a concept: 1. Legal: terrorism as a violation of international law or a form of criminal behavior. 2. Analytical: Terrorism as a distinct category of violence, usually defined as deliberate attacks on non-combatant targets for the purposes of weakening an adversary, changing policy, promoting one's views, gaining exposure for one's cause, etc. 3. Strategic: terrorism as a distinct asymmetrical strategy of non-state actors who attack critical nodes/symbols in society as well as vulnerable civilian populations in order to gain leverage over a powerful state or states, to change their policies, etc.
Terrorism is often used as nothing more than a moral cudgel or a term of delegitimization: even totalitarian regimes accuse peaceful protestors of being terrorists. However, just because the term is often abused doesn't mean it can't be used more objectively. The first category makes sense but is inconsistently applied; states are rarely accused of "terrorism" even though they can obviously commit terroristic acts for the sake of cowing a larger population. You could say something similar for the second category. However, as an asymmetrical strategy terrorism really only makes sense for weaker, usually non-state actors who choose to strike vulnerable, non-combatant targets, usually rather infrequently, to achieve a host of goals through the inflicting of terror on a population they would otherwise be unable to achieve. This, I think, describes much of the strategy of groups like the PLO, BSO, and PFLP, not to mention more indiscriminate and notorious groups like Hamas or Al Qaeda.
PTC settles for the terms "guerrilla operations" or "external operations" to describe hijackings, civilian massacres, and assassinations by the Palestinian groups. The latter is pure euphemism, almost Orwellian; it could describe almost anything, and it reifies the sanitized language used by the Pal groups themselves to refer to horrific crimes. You can't eschew the term terrorism and lean on "external operations" as a substitute. The second maybe works; some theorists describe terrorism as a form of globalized insurgency. However, a distinction again needs to be made: guerrilla warfare strikes mainly against military targets, whereas terrorism strikes mainly at civilians; that's a crucial moral, legal, and analytical difference. Again, this doesn't mean states cannot commit terrorist acts; it means that as a strategy terrorism is fundamentally different for non-state actors than it is for states. That would be my big critique of this book: it needs to think through terrorism as a strategy more clearly. Other than that, it's excellent global history that I would consider assigning to a grad seminar.
This was the PLO's big failure, which was abetted by several flaws: 1. They remained ambiguous about their goals: at the start of this period, they demanded a single state over all of Israel that would be dominated by Palestinian Arabs, which essentially meant the elimination of Israel. They moderated this during the decade covered in this book and tilted toward accepting a two-state solution, but their end goals remained ambiguous enough to play into U.S. and Israeli hands, who could credibly portray the PLO as seeking the erasure of Israel. 2. They failed to control the true radicals in their movement, including Black September and the PFLP. Of course, I do consider the PLO to be a terrorist group, but in the early 1970s they at least tried to roll these tactics back a bit. The problem was that these other groups continued to launch horrific attacks on Israeli targets all around the world, which again undercut the PLO's legitimacy and made Israel even less likely to negotiate. Israel, to be fair, could not know if the PLO would be able to commit to any peace deal because they couldn't or wouldn't stop the real crazies from attacking Israel, so it avoided direct negotiations with the PLO, preferring to hold onto the territory it gained in 1967 as a security buffer.
Of course, Chamberlin also shows how the Israelis made mistake and held unrealistic views about peace. They were riding high post-1967 and turned down several good opportunities to talk from a position of strength. They seemed to believe that Palestinian nationalism could be put down forever, that Palestinian nationhood could be accommodated within the kingdom of Jordan, and that ultimately they could manage the Pals through the military rather than seeking a diplomatic outcome. Chamberlin is pretty even-handed between these groups, which you can't say of a lot of historians.
I buy the basic claims of this book, which is extremely well researched and a great example of the new global history in the diplomatic field. I will say, I have limited attention span for the ins and outs of diplomatic negotiations, especially in the incredibly complex IS-PAL conflict, so I didn't always love those parts, although to be fair PTC keeps the story moving at a good pace.
My only significant problem with this book was the eschewing of the term terrorism in the analysis. PTC argues that this word is so heavily politicized that it is not useful analytically; instead he approaches terrorism as a historical construct, showing how/why particular actors adopted that term and how they understood it. This is all well and good, and I do this in my own research. However, there are 3 ways to approach terrorism as a concept: 1. Legal: terrorism as a violation of international law or a form of criminal behavior. 2. Analytical: Terrorism as a distinct category of violence, usually defined as deliberate attacks on non-combatant targets for the purposes of weakening an adversary, changing policy, promoting one's views, gaining exposure for one's cause, etc. 3. Strategic: terrorism as a distinct asymmetrical strategy of non-state actors who attack critical nodes/symbols in society as well as vulnerable civilian populations in order to gain leverage over a powerful state or states, to change their policies, etc.
Terrorism is often used as nothing more than a moral cudgel or a term of delegitimization: even totalitarian regimes accuse peaceful protestors of being terrorists. However, just because the term is often abused doesn't mean it can't be used more objectively. The first category makes sense but is inconsistently applied; states are rarely accused of "terrorism" even though they can obviously commit terroristic acts for the sake of cowing a larger population. You could say something similar for the second category. However, as an asymmetrical strategy terrorism really only makes sense for weaker, usually non-state actors who choose to strike vulnerable, non-combatant targets, usually rather infrequently, to achieve a host of goals through the inflicting of terror on a population they would otherwise be unable to achieve. This, I think, describes much of the strategy of groups like the PLO, BSO, and PFLP, not to mention more indiscriminate and notorious groups like Hamas or Al Qaeda.
PTC settles for the terms "guerrilla operations" or "external operations" to describe hijackings, civilian massacres, and assassinations by the Palestinian groups. The latter is pure euphemism, almost Orwellian; it could describe almost anything, and it reifies the sanitized language used by the Pal groups themselves to refer to horrific crimes. You can't eschew the term terrorism and lean on "external operations" as a substitute. The second maybe works; some theorists describe terrorism as a form of globalized insurgency. However, a distinction again needs to be made: guerrilla warfare strikes mainly against military targets, whereas terrorism strikes mainly at civilians; that's a crucial moral, legal, and analytical difference. Again, this doesn't mean states cannot commit terrorist acts; it means that as a strategy terrorism is fundamentally different for non-state actors than it is for states. That would be my big critique of this book: it needs to think through terrorism as a strategy more clearly. Other than that, it's excellent global history that I would consider assigning to a grad seminar.
November 17, 2017
Honestly one of the best history books I've ever read. It does such a good job of placing the reader "in the moment" at different pivotal periods in the Palestinian liberation struggle between 1967 and 1975 - the historical events that were salient at a given moment (e.g., the Lod massacre, a UN resolution, or developments in Vietnam), the support/condemnation that other states were giving to the PLO at that moment (e.g., Moscow deciding to recognize the PLO and call for a Palestinian state), the rhetoric that Israel/the PLO was employing (specifically, comparing the rhetoric of Fatah with that of the PFLP), etc. So good.
August 23, 2017
It's boring as all get-out. If you want a book you need a physical copy of, and need to take damn notes for, it is entirely possible to read this book and learn some shit.
If you're looking for rhetoric, a story, philosophy, or basically anything you can just listen to the audiobook for -- skip this, that is not what this is. This is one of those painful books a certain class college teachers assigns -- notice I didn't use the word "professor", because their sort don't profess shit.
It's not a bad book, and the information is good, and so is the research, but it would be much more fun to learn this stuff the same way the author did, rather than reading his book. Because it's boring. Which is kinda inexcusable; it doesn't take much narrative craft to turn something this dramatic into a powerful story. Trying to remove all humanity from the topic is all it takes to make it painful to listen to tho.
That's my real problem with it -- this comes from the 'acts and the facts' camp of historicity. Which is not what history is. At all. Not even a little bit. History is 100% about the story. It isn't a science, and it isn't set in stone, and it sure as flying fuck isn't a-political. It's human, and everything that comes with that.
I have the same problem with economics really. They rob themselves of all that make them true in the effort to be scientific, and fail at both science and their actual purpose.
If you're looking for rhetoric, a story, philosophy, or basically anything you can just listen to the audiobook for -- skip this, that is not what this is. This is one of those painful books a certain class college teachers assigns -- notice I didn't use the word "professor", because their sort don't profess shit.
It's not a bad book, and the information is good, and so is the research, but it would be much more fun to learn this stuff the same way the author did, rather than reading his book. Because it's boring. Which is kinda inexcusable; it doesn't take much narrative craft to turn something this dramatic into a powerful story. Trying to remove all humanity from the topic is all it takes to make it painful to listen to tho.
That's my real problem with it -- this comes from the 'acts and the facts' camp of historicity. Which is not what history is. At all. Not even a little bit. History is 100% about the story. It isn't a science, and it isn't set in stone, and it sure as flying fuck isn't a-political. It's human, and everything that comes with that.
I have the same problem with economics really. They rob themselves of all that make them true in the effort to be scientific, and fail at both science and their actual purpose.
July 8, 2017
A really good book that gives great insights into the history behind the Arab Israeli / Israeli/Palenstinian crisis. I have been interested in this area of history since studying it in high school, in the late 80s...and this book went along way to filling some of the gaps in my knowledge. This was written fairly non-judgementally, and offered quite a balanced view of the issues, ie: there was no blame attached, just stating the facts. Well researched and well presented. Good stuff.
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July 16, 2025Chamberlin's storytelling abilities, at least in this text, aren't first rate, but the material is very interesting nonetheless. Shows, as most points do, how little room to maneuver Palestinians have had, and how consistently American and Israeli leadership has worked against their self-determination. The ways in which the response to the PLO played a role in the development of global discourses on terrorism is also an interesting wrinkle.
February 27, 2018
Another book to my collection of so called American "democracy" (with the help of Israel terrorists this time).
July 24, 2020
Very good. Would have given it 5 stars if it was 100 pages shorter.
September 6, 2017
This is a pretty respectable entry in the new global history. Chamberlin argues that the self-assertion of the PLO -- a non-state actor on behalf of a non-recognized nation -- prized open apertures in the international system in the 1970s that help lay the groundwork for the way international politics would go once the Cold War was over. There's some illuminating stuff here involving the Nixon White House's ambitions in the Middle East and the way they essentially tried to institutionalize their denial about the way the Palestinian question disrupted Kissinger's little Risk board, and about the zillion threads (from Arab state rivalries to spiraling radicalization inspired by camp conditions) Arafat had to manage. Stuff like airline hijackings, which struck me as tactically foolish even leaving the morals aside, make some more sense now- airlines operate (legally) in the transnational space the Palestinian guerrillas did (illegally), the place where they felt they could get some kind of leverage, however tenuous.
The book has some of the disadvantages of the new global history, though. In many respects, it deploys breadth of archival research -- the sheer "wow" factor of using archives from multiple countries and languages -- in exchange for analytical depth. Most of these books are built-up dissertations, and it shows in terms of their argumentative tentativeness, even as the subtitles some publisher slaps on promises big things. There's also a dissertation-esque kitchen-sink quality to the source usage- every time the PLO makes a splash, we hear what Tunisians thought about it and what Ghanaians thought about it and French and Indians and so on and so on. The global state of opinion about Israel/Palestine is important to Chamberlin's story, but there have to have been more elegant ways of conveying that. One more little niggle- the Palestinians weren't the first to do transnational insurgency. The Irish Fenians, the Armenian Dashnak, Macedonian rebels, and at least to an extent Zionists all had transnational resistance networks well before the PLO was formed... to say nothing about anarchist and communist groups. Still and all, worth reading if you're interested in diplomatic history of the late 20th century, especially history that takes non-state actors into account. ***'
https://toomuchberard.wordpress.com/2...
The book has some of the disadvantages of the new global history, though. In many respects, it deploys breadth of archival research -- the sheer "wow" factor of using archives from multiple countries and languages -- in exchange for analytical depth. Most of these books are built-up dissertations, and it shows in terms of their argumentative tentativeness, even as the subtitles some publisher slaps on promises big things. There's also a dissertation-esque kitchen-sink quality to the source usage- every time the PLO makes a splash, we hear what Tunisians thought about it and what Ghanaians thought about it and French and Indians and so on and so on. The global state of opinion about Israel/Palestine is important to Chamberlin's story, but there have to have been more elegant ways of conveying that. One more little niggle- the Palestinians weren't the first to do transnational insurgency. The Irish Fenians, the Armenian Dashnak, Macedonian rebels, and at least to an extent Zionists all had transnational resistance networks well before the PLO was formed... to say nothing about anarchist and communist groups. Still and all, worth reading if you're interested in diplomatic history of the late 20th century, especially history that takes non-state actors into account. ***'
https://toomuchberard.wordpress.com/2...
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October 10, 2013327.73056 C4439 2012
February 19, 2022
absurd and repetitive. for all the work chamberlin did recruiting seldom-considered sources, he glossed over basically the entirety of israeli history.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews