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Sun Tzu at Gettysburg: Ancient Military Wisdom in the Modern World
“The world’s most fascinating battles and how they were won or lost, according to the Chinese sage.”― Kirkus Reviews Imagine if Robert E. Lee had withdrawn to higher ground at Gettysburg instead of sending Pickett uphill against the entrenched Union line. Or if Napoléon, at Waterloo, had avoided mistakes he’d never made before. The advice that would have changed these crucial battles was written down centuries before Christ was born―but unfortunately for Lee, Napoléon, and Hitler, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War only became widely available in the West in the mid-twentieth century. As Bevin Alexander shows, Sun Tzu’s maxims often boil down to common sense, in a particularly pure and clear form. When Alexander frames these modern battles against 2,400-year-old precepts, the degree of overlap is stunning.
18 maps
18 maps
306 pages, Paperback
First published May 31, 2011
18 people are currently reading
163 people want to read
About the author
Bevin Alexander
14 books35 followersBevin Alexander is an American military historian and author. He served as an officer during the Korean War as part of the 5th Historical Detachment. His book Korea: The First War We Lost was largely influenced by his experiences during the war.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
Bevin has served as a consultant and adviser to several groups due to his military expertise, including work for the Rand Corporation, work as a consultant for military simulations instituted by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and as director of information at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. .
He was formerly on the president’s staff as director of information at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., and is a retired adjunct professor of history at Longwood University, in Farmville, Virginia.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
May 10, 2013
If you think Bobby Lee walks on water - you're probably not going to like this book. If you're a fan of Stonewall Jackson - well you'll be happy.
The author takes Sun Tzu's Art Of War and examines several battles/wars including the 1862 spring campaigns in the Virginia theater of the American Civil War and Gettysburg in 1863.
As the author points out Sun Tzu's military maxims were based on common sense. It appears Robert Edward Lee - the saint of the South - lacked some common sense.
A Confederate soldier was more likely to end up wounded and dead fighting under Lee than in any other Southern army. Why? Because Lee liked to attached - straight ahead like an angry bull.
The author compares that to the brilliant Valley Campaign of Stonewall Jackson. Avoid strength, strike weakness, deceive, confuse - Jackson understood there were .
And then we have Gettysburg - Longstreet understood what Jackson did: make the enemy come to you, on the ground of your choice. But Lee was in charge so the Rebel army attacked straight ahead.
And the results?
The author takes Sun Tzu's Art Of War and examines several battles/wars including the 1862 spring campaigns in the Virginia theater of the American Civil War and Gettysburg in 1863.
As the author points out Sun Tzu's military maxims were based on common sense. It appears Robert Edward Lee - the saint of the South - lacked some common sense.
A Confederate soldier was more likely to end up wounded and dead fighting under Lee than in any other Southern army. Why? Because Lee liked to attached - straight ahead like an angry bull.
The author compares that to the brilliant Valley Campaign of Stonewall Jackson. Avoid strength, strike weakness, deceive, confuse - Jackson understood there were .
And then we have Gettysburg - Longstreet understood what Jackson did: make the enemy come to you, on the ground of your choice. But Lee was in charge so the Rebel army attacked straight ahead.
And the results?
April 29, 2020
The book convincingly answered my some questions, especially about the US revolution war, civil war and WWII.
November 2, 2011
Bevin Alexander does a materful jog of applying the wisdom of Sun Tzu (The Art Of War) to significant battles/campaigns. Alexander demonstrates that the application or failure to apply common sense principles led to success or inevitable disasters in some of history's most important battles/campaigns.
The only thing that kept this from being a five star book was the lack of good maps. There were maps of each campaign, but they were frequently inadequate in helping the reader following the battles.
The only thing that kept this from being a five star book was the lack of good maps. There were maps of each campaign, but they were frequently inadequate in helping the reader following the battles.
October 27, 2011
Enjoyed the "what if" approached the author used to provide insight to Sun Tzu principles. Most of what was reviewed has been repeated frequently by modern historians, but the comparing and contrasting the principles make the "Art of War" much easier to appreciate and cause wonder in any student of military history looking to utilize the maxims in modern society, whether in the courtroom or boardroom.
April 1, 2013
His presentation was precise and the examples were good. My problem with the book is that he continually compared the battle situations to Sun Tzu and how the leader failed to heed the maxims.In the battles presented the military leaders of the day had not heard of Sun Tzu and thus should not be measured against his works.
August 15, 2011
Made me see many of the wars I have always taken for granted in a whole new light. It should required reading for all military academies.....it might end-up saving lives.
February 16, 2016
1CSun Tzu at Gettysburg 1D by Bevin Alexander
If you hate and/or fear war, 1CSun Tzu at Gettysburg 1D by Bevin Alexander will not assuage your misgivings. Alexander argues that while it is possible for a general to engage in battle in such a way that he preserves his army and his soldiers 19 lives as much as possible (while however, destroying his enemy 19s soldiers unless his counterpart is wise enough to see that he must withdraw or surrender when the outcome of the battle becomes a foregone conclusion), the overwhelming majority of generals have not understood this and most likely still do not understand; they have often developed fixed ideas about warfare that are not true and that lead to the entirely unnecessary slaughter of their own troops. This is a fact that does not yield confidence in generals.
Generals with the greatest prestige and even those who have won the love and respect of their troops have nevertheless too often been men who did not see, for example, that a frontal attack on their enemy 19s strongest position, to paraphrase Alexander, calls upon the valor of his troops to compensate for the general 19s lack of imagination. George Washington, Robert E. Lee, and Omar Bradley, were generals who meant no harm to their men but often made them pay for tremendous errors in judgment. (Washington, in my view, was half a good general because at least he knew when to withdraw from a losing battle, and he also knew how to deceive the enemy 14a trait every good general should have in Alexander 19s view.)
This book recounts the histories of several military campaigns from the American War of Independence, to the Napoleonic wars of early nineteenth century Europe, to the American Civil War, and on down to the twentieth century. As he describes each campaign or battle, Alexander keeps a translation of an ancient Chinese book, The Art of War, at his elbow ands tells us what he thinks the legendary author, Sun Tzu, might have said about the historic campaigns and battles under examination. (In a footnote, Alexander admits that Sun Tzu cannot be proven to have existed, and his book might actually be a collection of anonymous military aphorisms.) Alexander says that there is no other book on military strategy quite like The Art of War. Alexander compares it to Western texts on war and finds them inadequate. Most Western writers on war have written longer books than The Art of War without saying so much.
Sun Tzu 19s basic ideas are that the general should see quickly where the enemy 19s strengths and weaknesses are and evaluate what the enemy is trying to do: what is his plan or strategy? Then act to attack the weaknesses, not the strengths, and always attack the enemy 19s strategy rather than attack the enemy himself. This kind of common sense is often avoided by generals, even great ones. Gen. Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate forces in Virginia during the American Civil War, was a brave man and was respected by his men and even his enemies, but he had a bad habit of attacking any army he saw; the bigger the enemy forces, the more he wanted to attack them. And he wanted to attack them in their middle where they were strongest.
At the Battle of Gettysburg, in early July of 1863, Lee 19s subordinate, Gen. James Longstreet, advised Lee to go around the Union Army and put the Confederates between the Union troops and Washington, DC. The idea was to panic the Union generals into thinking that the Confederates were going to attack Washington, something they were frightened the Confederates might do. (Sun Tzu advises the wise general to find out what the enemy holds dear and use it.) The Confederates could find defensive positions along the way so that when the Union Army inevitably attacked them, the Confederates would win. (Six out of seven times, during the Civil War, when one side attacked the other while the defenders were in any kind of fortified position, the defenders won.) Instead, Lee declared that he could see the enemy, and he would attack them directly. In other words, Lee became the attacker against the Union 19s defensive positions, and the odds were that the defenders would win, which they did. The Confederates suffered heavy losses that they could ill afford. The Civil War dragged on for two more years, but it really ended on July 3, 1863 at Gettysburg.
One of Sun Tzu 19s basic tactical formulae is the zheng/qi combination. It is a kind of one-two punch. The zheng movement is a conventional attack or provocation toward the enemy 19s strong point, but the idea is not to make a real attack. The goal is to get the enemy to bring all of his resources to bear at the point where he thinks your main move is going to be. He is wrong, however, because the zheng is followed by a qi move, often an end-run around the enemy 19s weakest flank or some similar attack on a 1Cvoid 1D in the enemy 19s defense. This can be summed up by the advice to 1Chit 19em where they ain 19t. 1D
At the outbreak of World War I, the German 19s reached into a cubbyhole in their war department and pulled out a two-decades-old plan for defeating France. The idea of the von Schlieffen Plan was to feint an invasion into France with a few divisions to draw the French army to the German border, then send most of the German Army around through Belgium, into France behind the French Army, go around behind Paris and then hit the French Army from behind, catching them between the two parts of the German Army.
Alexander thinks it was a very good plan and that Sun Tzu would have agreed. Many historians and military experts concluded that it was a bad plan, however, because it collapsed and was followed by a terrible stalemate that went on for years, soldiers on each side facing each other from rows of permanent parallel trenches, dying from disease as often as weaponry. But, points out Alexander, it wasn 19t the plan that failed; it was General Helmuth von Moltke. Not to be confused with his uncle who was of the same name but a superior strategist, the Moltke of World War I looked at the Schlieffen Plan and failed to understand it. Instead of feinting a direct attack while making a strategic end-run, Moltke modified the plan drastically by making the direct invasion his real strategy. He put most of his troops into the zheng move while sending only a token force to do the qi or end-run move.
Not understanding why the Schlieffen Plan actually failed, most of the military thinkers of the early twentieth century concluded that trench warfare must be inevitable and would be the shape of warfare far into the future. So it was at the outset of World War II. However, a lowly major general in the German Army was not fooled by the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan and realized that something like it could work; he recommended a variation on the Schlieffen Plan only with fast-moving tanks in the qi movement. This is what came to be called the German Bliztkrieg or 1Clightning war 1D that defeated the French within weeks in 1940. The French and their British allies never saw it coming because they had convinced themselves that it had failed before because there was something wrong with the plan, not something wrong with the general who had botched it the first time. Later, during World War II, Gen. George Patton recommended a similar end-run around the German Army in France. Alexander believes that if Gen. Dwight Eisenhower had given the go-ahead, Patton 19s strategy would have ended the war a year or two earlier.
Gen. Omar Bradley was the chief general in the field during the Allied invasion of German-held France. He does not come off well in Alexander 19s book. Certainly a man who loved his troops, Bradley was nevertheless too unimaginative to recognize that Patton 19s bold plan to encircle the German army and press into Germany itself could have brought a swift end to the war. Likewise, when General Douglas MacArthur proposed what in Alexander 19s view was a brilliant plan to invade Korea at Inchon and cut off the North Korean army, Bradley was against it. When MacArthur was given his head anyway, Bradley was mystified that the plan worked and attributed MacArthur 19s victory to luck. Alexander attributes it to a sound plan that would have received the approval of Sun Tzu. Unfortunately, MacArthur himself followed up with a plan to invade North Korea. This time the genius was absent, and the plan failed for reasons that Sun Tzu would have predicted.
It is striking that only the rare general (Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Thomas 1CStonewall 1D Jackson, Patton), on his own, has come up with similar insights to those of Sun Tzu. In the Far East, however, it is no accident that generals have these insights because they have read Sun Tzu 19s book. During the American involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. military came up against the North Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Giap whose military success has been attributed to his knowledge of the Chinese strategy game called go, and his familiarity with the teachings of Sun Tzu. At one point, American Gen. William Westmoreland thought he could lure Giap into a pitched battle, but Giap easily foresaw that it was a trap. Westmoreland wanted the enemy to do what he expected them to do; when they did not, he had no plan B. If he had read Sun Tzu, he would have known better. The Art of War advises the wise general to know what his enemy is actually doing and not engage in wishful thinking.
Sun Tzu 19s strategies could be applied not only to war but to any competitive endeavor including business, politics, sports and other games. During the debate over the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, most of the opponents of the proposed national charter complained about the implications of its structure for domestic policy. The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, straightaway advanced arguments for the Constitution based on its foreign policy implications, arguing that the fledgling United States needed the document 19s strengthening of the national government in dealing with foreign political and economic as well as military threats. The Federalists were hitting the Anti-federalists where they weren 19t; it was an end-run around their arguments. There is no evidence that Hamilton, Madison or Jay had ever read Sun Tzu, but neither had Napoleon Bonaparte, Stonewall Jackson or George Patton; they hit upon similar insights by using common sense, which is what most of The Art of War is. Unfortunately, as 1CSun Tzu at Gettysburg 1D demonstrates, common sense is not always common.
In his final chapter, Alexander summarizes the lessons of each battle he has examined and remedies the books tendency to present Sun Tzu on the fly rather than systematically. The author breaks down Sun Tzu's art into the basic maxims: Don't go to war if there is an honorable way to avoid it, figuring out the enemy's strategy not your own is key because you will win by defeating his strategy, don't attack the enemy at his strongest point but attack at the weakest, an all purpose tactic is to present the enemy with an apparent frontal attack but then go around the enemy and surprise-attack his rear or flank, make sure all commanders understand these principles and are intelligent. Good examples of the last point are Napoleon and Hitler. Napoleon was a good commander but he was so insecure about rivals that he promoted generals who were obedient but stupid. Hitler thought he could micromanaged a world war from his bunker and incompetently drove his army to defeat, ignoring the judgment of his more competent generals.
If you hate and/or fear war, 1CSun Tzu at Gettysburg 1D by Bevin Alexander will not assuage your misgivings. Alexander argues that while it is possible for a general to engage in battle in such a way that he preserves his army and his soldiers 19 lives as much as possible (while however, destroying his enemy 19s soldiers unless his counterpart is wise enough to see that he must withdraw or surrender when the outcome of the battle becomes a foregone conclusion), the overwhelming majority of generals have not understood this and most likely still do not understand; they have often developed fixed ideas about warfare that are not true and that lead to the entirely unnecessary slaughter of their own troops. This is a fact that does not yield confidence in generals.
Generals with the greatest prestige and even those who have won the love and respect of their troops have nevertheless too often been men who did not see, for example, that a frontal attack on their enemy 19s strongest position, to paraphrase Alexander, calls upon the valor of his troops to compensate for the general 19s lack of imagination. George Washington, Robert E. Lee, and Omar Bradley, were generals who meant no harm to their men but often made them pay for tremendous errors in judgment. (Washington, in my view, was half a good general because at least he knew when to withdraw from a losing battle, and he also knew how to deceive the enemy 14a trait every good general should have in Alexander 19s view.)
This book recounts the histories of several military campaigns from the American War of Independence, to the Napoleonic wars of early nineteenth century Europe, to the American Civil War, and on down to the twentieth century. As he describes each campaign or battle, Alexander keeps a translation of an ancient Chinese book, The Art of War, at his elbow ands tells us what he thinks the legendary author, Sun Tzu, might have said about the historic campaigns and battles under examination. (In a footnote, Alexander admits that Sun Tzu cannot be proven to have existed, and his book might actually be a collection of anonymous military aphorisms.) Alexander says that there is no other book on military strategy quite like The Art of War. Alexander compares it to Western texts on war and finds them inadequate. Most Western writers on war have written longer books than The Art of War without saying so much.
Sun Tzu 19s basic ideas are that the general should see quickly where the enemy 19s strengths and weaknesses are and evaluate what the enemy is trying to do: what is his plan or strategy? Then act to attack the weaknesses, not the strengths, and always attack the enemy 19s strategy rather than attack the enemy himself. This kind of common sense is often avoided by generals, even great ones. Gen. Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate forces in Virginia during the American Civil War, was a brave man and was respected by his men and even his enemies, but he had a bad habit of attacking any army he saw; the bigger the enemy forces, the more he wanted to attack them. And he wanted to attack them in their middle where they were strongest.
At the Battle of Gettysburg, in early July of 1863, Lee 19s subordinate, Gen. James Longstreet, advised Lee to go around the Union Army and put the Confederates between the Union troops and Washington, DC. The idea was to panic the Union generals into thinking that the Confederates were going to attack Washington, something they were frightened the Confederates might do. (Sun Tzu advises the wise general to find out what the enemy holds dear and use it.) The Confederates could find defensive positions along the way so that when the Union Army inevitably attacked them, the Confederates would win. (Six out of seven times, during the Civil War, when one side attacked the other while the defenders were in any kind of fortified position, the defenders won.) Instead, Lee declared that he could see the enemy, and he would attack them directly. In other words, Lee became the attacker against the Union 19s defensive positions, and the odds were that the defenders would win, which they did. The Confederates suffered heavy losses that they could ill afford. The Civil War dragged on for two more years, but it really ended on July 3, 1863 at Gettysburg.
One of Sun Tzu 19s basic tactical formulae is the zheng/qi combination. It is a kind of one-two punch. The zheng movement is a conventional attack or provocation toward the enemy 19s strong point, but the idea is not to make a real attack. The goal is to get the enemy to bring all of his resources to bear at the point where he thinks your main move is going to be. He is wrong, however, because the zheng is followed by a qi move, often an end-run around the enemy 19s weakest flank or some similar attack on a 1Cvoid 1D in the enemy 19s defense. This can be summed up by the advice to 1Chit 19em where they ain 19t. 1D
At the outbreak of World War I, the German 19s reached into a cubbyhole in their war department and pulled out a two-decades-old plan for defeating France. The idea of the von Schlieffen Plan was to feint an invasion into France with a few divisions to draw the French army to the German border, then send most of the German Army around through Belgium, into France behind the French Army, go around behind Paris and then hit the French Army from behind, catching them between the two parts of the German Army.
Alexander thinks it was a very good plan and that Sun Tzu would have agreed. Many historians and military experts concluded that it was a bad plan, however, because it collapsed and was followed by a terrible stalemate that went on for years, soldiers on each side facing each other from rows of permanent parallel trenches, dying from disease as often as weaponry. But, points out Alexander, it wasn 19t the plan that failed; it was General Helmuth von Moltke. Not to be confused with his uncle who was of the same name but a superior strategist, the Moltke of World War I looked at the Schlieffen Plan and failed to understand it. Instead of feinting a direct attack while making a strategic end-run, Moltke modified the plan drastically by making the direct invasion his real strategy. He put most of his troops into the zheng move while sending only a token force to do the qi or end-run move.
Not understanding why the Schlieffen Plan actually failed, most of the military thinkers of the early twentieth century concluded that trench warfare must be inevitable and would be the shape of warfare far into the future. So it was at the outset of World War II. However, a lowly major general in the German Army was not fooled by the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan and realized that something like it could work; he recommended a variation on the Schlieffen Plan only with fast-moving tanks in the qi movement. This is what came to be called the German Bliztkrieg or 1Clightning war 1D that defeated the French within weeks in 1940. The French and their British allies never saw it coming because they had convinced themselves that it had failed before because there was something wrong with the plan, not something wrong with the general who had botched it the first time. Later, during World War II, Gen. George Patton recommended a similar end-run around the German Army in France. Alexander believes that if Gen. Dwight Eisenhower had given the go-ahead, Patton 19s strategy would have ended the war a year or two earlier.
Gen. Omar Bradley was the chief general in the field during the Allied invasion of German-held France. He does not come off well in Alexander 19s book. Certainly a man who loved his troops, Bradley was nevertheless too unimaginative to recognize that Patton 19s bold plan to encircle the German army and press into Germany itself could have brought a swift end to the war. Likewise, when General Douglas MacArthur proposed what in Alexander 19s view was a brilliant plan to invade Korea at Inchon and cut off the North Korean army, Bradley was against it. When MacArthur was given his head anyway, Bradley was mystified that the plan worked and attributed MacArthur 19s victory to luck. Alexander attributes it to a sound plan that would have received the approval of Sun Tzu. Unfortunately, MacArthur himself followed up with a plan to invade North Korea. This time the genius was absent, and the plan failed for reasons that Sun Tzu would have predicted.
It is striking that only the rare general (Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Thomas 1CStonewall 1D Jackson, Patton), on his own, has come up with similar insights to those of Sun Tzu. In the Far East, however, it is no accident that generals have these insights because they have read Sun Tzu 19s book. During the American involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. military came up against the North Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Giap whose military success has been attributed to his knowledge of the Chinese strategy game called go, and his familiarity with the teachings of Sun Tzu. At one point, American Gen. William Westmoreland thought he could lure Giap into a pitched battle, but Giap easily foresaw that it was a trap. Westmoreland wanted the enemy to do what he expected them to do; when they did not, he had no plan B. If he had read Sun Tzu, he would have known better. The Art of War advises the wise general to know what his enemy is actually doing and not engage in wishful thinking.
Sun Tzu 19s strategies could be applied not only to war but to any competitive endeavor including business, politics, sports and other games. During the debate over the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, most of the opponents of the proposed national charter complained about the implications of its structure for domestic policy. The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, straightaway advanced arguments for the Constitution based on its foreign policy implications, arguing that the fledgling United States needed the document 19s strengthening of the national government in dealing with foreign political and economic as well as military threats. The Federalists were hitting the Anti-federalists where they weren 19t; it was an end-run around their arguments. There is no evidence that Hamilton, Madison or Jay had ever read Sun Tzu, but neither had Napoleon Bonaparte, Stonewall Jackson or George Patton; they hit upon similar insights by using common sense, which is what most of The Art of War is. Unfortunately, as 1CSun Tzu at Gettysburg 1D demonstrates, common sense is not always common.
In his final chapter, Alexander summarizes the lessons of each battle he has examined and remedies the books tendency to present Sun Tzu on the fly rather than systematically. The author breaks down Sun Tzu's art into the basic maxims: Don't go to war if there is an honorable way to avoid it, figuring out the enemy's strategy not your own is key because you will win by defeating his strategy, don't attack the enemy at his strongest point but attack at the weakest, an all purpose tactic is to present the enemy with an apparent frontal attack but then go around the enemy and surprise-attack his rear or flank, make sure all commanders understand these principles and are intelligent. Good examples of the last point are Napoleon and Hitler. Napoleon was a good commander but he was so insecure about rivals that he promoted generals who were obedient but stupid. Hitler thought he could micromanaged a world war from his bunker and incompetently drove his army to defeat, ignoring the judgment of his more competent generals.
May 21, 2017
The premise is fascinating - What would or might have happened in major western battles if the generals had applied strategy according to the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu?
In execution, the concept works a little less well. Alexander tends to focus on a few select principles of Sun Tzu, to the point of repetition. This is not to say that Sun Tzu's principles are not applicable, but the same ones may not be applicable in each battle. Or, if the same principle is right for every battle, perhaps we are not looking at a good sample of battles.
To his credit, Alexander reflects wisely on the Sun Tzu principle that war must be entered into with a clear sense of what one wants from a war and that one's strategy in war must align with the aims. However, too often in Alexander's world, "what if" becomes "should have been". At some point, this becomes less analysis and simply speculation. Alas, with Alexander, a bit too much speculation.
In execution, the concept works a little less well. Alexander tends to focus on a few select principles of Sun Tzu, to the point of repetition. This is not to say that Sun Tzu's principles are not applicable, but the same ones may not be applicable in each battle. Or, if the same principle is right for every battle, perhaps we are not looking at a good sample of battles.
To his credit, Alexander reflects wisely on the Sun Tzu principle that war must be entered into with a clear sense of what one wants from a war and that one's strategy in war must align with the aims. However, too often in Alexander's world, "what if" becomes "should have been". At some point, this becomes less analysis and simply speculation. Alas, with Alexander, a bit too much speculation.
May 29, 2024
Easy read. The author stroke the right balance of presenting his argument without boring the readers.
My problem with the analysis is the inconsistency in the hierarchy of principles. Sun Tzu begins with, as Clausewitz puts it, "war is a continuation of politics", and the author agreed this is a fundamental principle in the introduction. But then in Chapter 9, in defense of Patton, he forgot that a big chunk of Eisenhower's responsibility is to keep the alliance going. I am not convinced that Eisenhower lacked strategic imagination as result of it; on the contrary, as cold war has shown, US needed the backing of European allies, and so should not place this priority behind Patton's ambitions.
I can't help but notice that the author is found of the indirect approach, a school of thought in warfare. For a review of this school's merits and limitations (among other strategies), I recommend Dr. Lawrence Freedman's book, Strategy: A History.
My problem with the analysis is the inconsistency in the hierarchy of principles. Sun Tzu begins with, as Clausewitz puts it, "war is a continuation of politics", and the author agreed this is a fundamental principle in the introduction. But then in Chapter 9, in defense of Patton, he forgot that a big chunk of Eisenhower's responsibility is to keep the alliance going. I am not convinced that Eisenhower lacked strategic imagination as result of it; on the contrary, as cold war has shown, US needed the backing of European allies, and so should not place this priority behind Patton's ambitions.
I can't help but notice that the author is found of the indirect approach, a school of thought in warfare. For a review of this school's merits and limitations (among other strategies), I recommend Dr. Lawrence Freedman's book, Strategy: A History.
January 17, 2018
In this book, Alexander evaluates how well several modern generals applied the principles of warfare as articulated by the 6th century B.C. Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu. As part of my military training, I had previously read Sun Tzu's Art of War and I found it very interesting to learn how Mr. Alexander's applied these principles to 19th and 20th century warfare. According to Alexander, some of our well-known generals were masterful at Sun-Tzu type tactics (particularly Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, MacArthur at Inchon, and Patton). Other were not (spoiler alert- this book may be difficult for those who greatly admire Robert E. Lee).
Even if you are not so much interested in Sun-Tzu's philosophy of warfare, you may still enjoy this book if you like history and are fascinated by the tactical and strategic thinking of great generals.
Even if you are not so much interested in Sun-Tzu's philosophy of warfare, you may still enjoy this book if you like history and are fascinated by the tactical and strategic thinking of great generals.
May 30, 2025
Read this and On Tactics in the past week and liked them both. As I said I have read a great deal of military history but to be honest not much on the maxims, theory and practice of warfare so both books were enjoyable. I defintely do not consider myself an expert or even very knowledgeable about military history so this book filled in a lot for me. I particularly liked the chapter on Lee and Jackson and the battles and campaigns prior to Gettysburg. US history might be decideley different if Jackson had been in command.
December 20, 2024
Despite some repetitiveness, simply a fantastic book. Made me want to go back and re-read some histories of Civil War and WW2 battles and campaigns that I thought I knew. Highly highly highly recommend.
June 2, 2019
Enjoyable read. Certainly nothing groundbreaking but solid tactics and points made with Sun Tzu axioms to ground each point made.
Beyond the summaries of each war, I like the format of the book. Having quick summaries of each conflict allows a reader to clearly see the technological evolution and its impact (or not) on warfare. That so many strategists, generals and leaders could not adopt their tactics for such innovations is amazing to behold.
Beyond the summaries of each war, I like the format of the book. Having quick summaries of each conflict allows a reader to clearly see the technological evolution and its impact (or not) on warfare. That so many strategists, generals and leaders could not adopt their tactics for such innovations is amazing to behold.
April 11, 2023
This book was a misnomer. I took it out of the library because I thought it was about the tactics of Sun Tzu either being used or not being used at Gettysburg. The book was actually about numerous battles from the American Revolution to now. The book did however include good and bad tactics from the Battle of Gettysburg as well as “the campaigns of 1862” from the American Civil War’s Eastern Campaign.
The author made a point to show that Stonewall Jackson was a better strategic commander than Robert E. Lee. I have always been an acolyte of Lee, I believe that he is the most talented military officer in American history. Suffice it to say that this book made me think that maybe Jackson was the brains behind the operation after all. I can’t say anything definitively, these battles occurred 150 years ago. I will say that this book piled on a lot of faults for Gettysburg on Lee’s part yet never mentioned the biggest fault on the southern side in this campaign. That being that General J.E.B. Stuart was out showboating and getting his name in the papers instead of doing what cavalry was supposed to do back then, be scouts, be the eyes and ears of his army. Back then if an army didn’t get intel from its cavalry then it was just moving blind and hoping for the best, which is the situation that Stuart put Lee in at Gettysburg.
A very impressive interpretation of D-Day, the French Front after D-Day and Inchon that really left me thinking.
The author was very critical of commanders in these battles but not without merit.
The author made a point to show that Stonewall Jackson was a better strategic commander than Robert E. Lee. I have always been an acolyte of Lee, I believe that he is the most talented military officer in American history. Suffice it to say that this book made me think that maybe Jackson was the brains behind the operation after all. I can’t say anything definitively, these battles occurred 150 years ago. I will say that this book piled on a lot of faults for Gettysburg on Lee’s part yet never mentioned the biggest fault on the southern side in this campaign. That being that General J.E.B. Stuart was out showboating and getting his name in the papers instead of doing what cavalry was supposed to do back then, be scouts, be the eyes and ears of his army. Back then if an army didn’t get intel from its cavalry then it was just moving blind and hoping for the best, which is the situation that Stuart put Lee in at Gettysburg.
A very impressive interpretation of D-Day, the French Front after D-Day and Inchon that really left me thinking.
The author was very critical of commanders in these battles but not without merit.
October 4, 2021
Not really "Sun Tzu at Gettysburg," as this book's title is but one chapter of ten, each giving the history of a battle and showing how the generals either did, or did not (mostly the latter) flow the principles of Sun Tzu's Art of War. Heavy on battle details, and where generals went wrong, rather light on Sun Tzu theories, although final chapter highlights Art of War key principles. As entire libraries have been written on some of the battles mentioned, eg Waterloo, this book gives you the just the overarching battle details, gives a brief overview of the personalities involved, and how and where the generals failed or succeeded, based on the author's overlaying of Sun Tzu.
October 16, 2012
Fascinating analysis of select moments in modern warfare from the perspective of Sun Tzu, who wrote the ancient Chinese text The Art of War in the 5th c. B.C.E. The author examines military situations from the American Revolution to the Korean War, and others in between, analyzing the decisions made by the commanders in these situations and explaining their success or failure by how closely they adhered to Sun Tzu's maxims. Thus, Robt. E. Lee is deemed to have lost the battle of Gettysburg through his insistence on repeatedly attacking strong Union positions directly instead of bypassing the Union concentration and attacking the undefended underbelly of the Union, then forcing Meade to attack him on defensible ground of his own choosing. Napoleon's weakness for not employing strong sub-commander--for fear that they, like he did, might seek to rise to power by coup d'etat--leads to his defeat at Waterloo despite failures by the Duke of Wellington in the Sun Tzu playbook. Douglas MacArthur first plans and executes a brilliant Sun Tzu qi stroke at Inchon Harbor in the Korean War, cutting off the supplies of the North Korean armies in the south at Puson, then inexplicably sets his sights on the annihilation of the North Korean forces and unification of the Korean peninsula, fatefully drawing the Chinese into the conflict and leading to 2 1/2 more years of pointless, bloody conflict. Through these modern examples, familiar to many readers, the author shows how Sun Tzu developed one of the only (if not THE only) comprehensive views of warfare, its application, and its consequences. My only criticism is that, in the author's analysis of the situations and his pointing out of the failures of various commanders from an Art of War perspective, he ignores in some cases the fact that the commanders did not have the benefit of the hindsight that history has provided. Had Lee, for example, had the benefit of knowing the exact positions of the Union armies, which J.E.B. Stuart was tasked with providing, he might not have chosen to concentrate his forces at the nearest possible juncture, instead of, as the author suggests he could have, continuing north to attack Baltimore or Philadelphia, cutting off Washington, D.C. and inducing such an outcry from the northern populace that Lincoln would be forced to sue for peace. All in all, though, a thoroughly enjoyable read for those interested in the application of Sun Tzu's principles.
July 4, 2015
Very engrossing and highly detailed examination, applying Sun Tzu tenets of war for ten battles from the modern age. Of course it is easy to see in retrospect, but some of it is shockingly bad, uncovering the major blunders from our military leaders. The most shocking to me, also the most current one discussed, was the Korean war. It hailed MacArthur's strategy of isolating the North Koreans on the Pusan peninsula as they tried to take South Korea, but the vilified him for stupidly massing towards the North trying to take North Korea; totally disregarding warnings from Beijing that they would retaliate. The Chinese army moved under cover of darkness, moving out of the way of the advancing MacArthur, allowing him far above the 38th parallel, while fortifying the high grounds on either side of the army and then crushed them. It was an absolute failure that rests solely on Gen MacArthur shoulders.
May 27, 2015
Different approach to modern warfare from the view of ancient military philosophy. Critical of modern commanders like Lee and Eisenhower for their lack of "common sense." According to the author, based on Sun Tzu's advice, Gettysburg was a battle that should never have been fought, "attack the strategy of the enemy." "Secure intelligent commanders" is another Sun Tzu point that is charged against Lee and Eisenhower. Interesting book is so many ways.
March 10, 2016
Good book of arm-chair quarterbacking about famous battles. I read it out of order, and finished the least interesting chapters last. The author rips up General Lee for his stupidity at Gettysburg, and again for Lee's lack of vision earlier in the 1862 campaign of Gen. Jackson. The author, Bevin Alexander, gives high praise and blame for the same person--Gen Douglas McArthur. Praise for his Sun Tzu like attack at Inchon, blame for his fool-hardly attack against North Korea. Recommended.
January 4, 2013
I really enjoyed this book on military strategy. It looks at some of the most famous battles in the last 200 and looks through the lens of the Art of War by Sun Tzu. It really change my opinion of General Lee in particular and his blunder at Gettysburg. Hitler is portrayed as downright awful as a military leader.
July 5, 2016
The title is very deceptive. Only 20 pages were devoted to Gettysburg and as a fan of the battle, I was very disappointed and felt cheated. It was well written, it just wasn't what I expected it to be.
January 13, 2015
Excruciatingly pedantic and repetitive
June 14, 2015
Bevin Alexander once again demonstrates his ability to not only give factual information but also to get his point across and for people to understand the meaning.
October 30, 2016
10/30/2016
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