Thesis: We can't feed everyone cheaply right now because even though there is enough food to go around, important world players look at food as a source of revenue, pricing out small farms and driving up commodity prices by speculation in the futures market.
Note: this author somewhat casually mentions several farmer suicides in the first section of the book.
Smaller takeaways:
"I view what we're working on as widgets... I think being an employee at an exchange is different from adding value to the food system" (232). Similarly to previous experience in speaking with mathematicians who create predictive policing models, the consequences of the system you create cannot be left to the politicians or sociologists: It is also up to you as a creator of that system.
"More money did not mean better food for more people" (187), said during Frank's questioning of Bill Gates' Purchase for Progress program. Sometimes we inherently believe that throwing money at a system will improve it, or that the only solution is charity, but in this case, the underlying issues will be solved by neither.
Sheeran from the WFP: "Since money gad become the key to the hunger problem, the key to the hunger solution could be summed up in one word: markets... the WFP would guarantee a market where none now existed" (134). The program, Purchase for Progress (P4P), entailed the WFP committing to buy food from small scale farmers, while in parallel creating a country-wide commodity exchange so that small farmers could experience the same gains commodity traders do.
"Food is not like other commodities. No matter what the supply, demand remains the same" (138) discussing the price inelasticity of food using the example of the 1730 Osaka rice market, in which prices were fluctuating and people were going hungry until the government set a price for rice.
"Disease resistance, it turned out, did not have the same appeal for multinational food producers as it did for Ronald and UC-Davis, perhaps because Monsanto and Pioneer were already enjoying windfall profits from more lucrative agritech innovations, such as their roundup ready crops" (106). If new strains of food aren't clearly profitable (even if they are useful to the food market for consumers) they likely won't get produced.
"The global food game has become a property and information game" (106).
Sustainability metrics are difficult not because of a lack of data (although who owns the data once collected is polemic), the issue is how to *define* sustainability. If you measure farmers across different landscapes on the same questions (how much water do you use, etc.) is that fair to the farmers in dry landscapes where water usage is a huge deal vs wet landscapes where you can use water more freely? etc.
Have the limits of growth been reached? We see starvation everywhere, but also we have plenty of food. Frank thinks "the dispute comes down to the question of sustainability" (41). You have the "large scale agriculture is our only hope to feed the world" (41) view vs the "have farmers become ecosystem managers as well as producers" (43) pro small, local organic farms view.
"It was not the most gigantic food producers and distributors I should be trailing in my search for inexpensive, healthy, and delicious food for everyone, but the most efficient food producers -- and not just in terms of labour and output but in as complete and totalized as fashion as possible" (45).
Farms are wary of sharing their sustainability related information because it might give away their business practices (ex. how much fertilizer they use of what types, when).
Sustainability is hard to quantify, but industry is trying to do it, both because it could save them money and so that the government doesn't do it for them.
Large players like Walmart are investing a lot into this field, and looking at some key farms as examples.