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Phenomenology
Shaun Gallagher offers an exciting contemporary perspective of the subject by retrieving many important insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers, updating some of these insights in innovative ways, and showing how they directly relate to ongoing debates in philosophy and psychology.
- GenresPhilosophy
250 pages, Paperback
First published September 18, 2012
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About the author
Shaun Gallagher
33 books29 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
January 27, 2021
This book really is comprehensive in its scope. Not only the author traces back to the development of phenomenology but also makes it relevant to contemporaries. Although Husserl's original project of establishing transcendental phenomenology as a foundation of science and knowledge, his successors adopt a much more broader conception of phenomenology that can be applied within a framework of natural attitude. Sartre and especially Merleau-Ponty both incorporate empirical psychology as an important field from which one can gain useful insights. Ponty suggests that "the distinction between phenomenology and psychology must not be presented as a rigid distinction". However, it would be a mistake to equate psychological phenomenology with empirical psychology. The former is still closely related to Husserl's original insight. Contemporary phenomenologists have more-or-less the same attitude as Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenologist like Dreyfus influenced neuroscientists and cognitive scientists concerning the theoritical account of enactivism which in turn can be found in Husserl's operative intentionality. Gallagher also presents this text from particular standpoint called embodied cognition(a kind of enactivism).
It would be difficult to summarize this book since it covers a lot of ground both in and out of phenomenology. I will only mention particular issue which I found to be relatively easy to articulate unlike broader concepts like enactive concept of Hiedegger's being-in-the-world/being-with or Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness or why eidetic variation is limited and how stimulation model of empirical science can be of help with respect to such limitations. It seems to me that the objections raised against phenomenology conflating between two kinds of objectivity. The whole idea of phenomenological reduction is never a mere subjective introspection. One should note that although it studies phenomenon as such from first person point of view, it is never confined to egocentrism as one might find in traditional Lockean account or even in Brentano's notion of intentionality. For Brentano, the relation between intentional object and real or perceived object is intermediate in the sense that intentional object has its own existence only in the mind and it's a product of psychological state caused by the interaction between subject and perceived object. For Husserl intentional object is perceived object itself and we have direct access to the object. Back to objectivity, the idea of PR is that not only it's not merely a subjective introspection it's objective in one sense that it suspends all the natural attitudes we have toward the surrounding world. We will never be able to understand how consciousness works if we are entitled ourselves to third-person approach that claims to provide objectivity. These two senses of objectivity is essential in understanding the methodological plane of both approaches. If only one knew how important intersubjective consensus is to phenomenology, one won't arbitrary object phenomenology as mere subjective opinion which can be reduceable to trivial relativism. Another interesting point here is that author offers a Gibsonian notion of affordance (what is more to directed- towards-object is subject's own cognitive abilities)as alternative interpretation of intentionality against Fregean and East Coast interpretation of intentional structure.
Gallagher is a careful writer who cares about his readers and this book has changed the way I see phenomenology not only as a discipline relevant to contemporary cognitive science but also as an inspiring philosophical method that influenced subsequent intellectual movements. I believe one will gain essential and necessary background needed for further study in this book.
It would be difficult to summarize this book since it covers a lot of ground both in and out of phenomenology. I will only mention particular issue which I found to be relatively easy to articulate unlike broader concepts like enactive concept of Hiedegger's being-in-the-world/being-with or Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness or why eidetic variation is limited and how stimulation model of empirical science can be of help with respect to such limitations. It seems to me that the objections raised against phenomenology conflating between two kinds of objectivity. The whole idea of phenomenological reduction is never a mere subjective introspection. One should note that although it studies phenomenon as such from first person point of view, it is never confined to egocentrism as one might find in traditional Lockean account or even in Brentano's notion of intentionality. For Brentano, the relation between intentional object and real or perceived object is intermediate in the sense that intentional object has its own existence only in the mind and it's a product of psychological state caused by the interaction between subject and perceived object. For Husserl intentional object is perceived object itself and we have direct access to the object. Back to objectivity, the idea of PR is that not only it's not merely a subjective introspection it's objective in one sense that it suspends all the natural attitudes we have toward the surrounding world. We will never be able to understand how consciousness works if we are entitled ourselves to third-person approach that claims to provide objectivity. These two senses of objectivity is essential in understanding the methodological plane of both approaches. If only one knew how important intersubjective consensus is to phenomenology, one won't arbitrary object phenomenology as mere subjective opinion which can be reduceable to trivial relativism. Another interesting point here is that author offers a Gibsonian notion of affordance (what is more to directed- towards-object is subject's own cognitive abilities)as alternative interpretation of intentionality against Fregean and East Coast interpretation of intentional structure.
Gallagher is a careful writer who cares about his readers and this book has changed the way I see phenomenology not only as a discipline relevant to contemporary cognitive science but also as an inspiring philosophical method that influenced subsequent intellectual movements. I believe one will gain essential and necessary background needed for further study in this book.
April 8, 2025
I often say that I draw on phenomenology or that I use phenomenological methods in my research, but I have never really interrogated what that meant for me beyond researching "people's experiences, not as objective but as subjectively construed." Thus, reading this was a great primer to enter the world of phenomenological research. Instead of getting bogged down in a Husserliana or Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, this book takes a look at key concepts in phenomenology as articulated by Husserl and Heidegger, yes, but also a variety of other scholars who have contributed to and critiqued the tradition. It was certainly a time trying to wrap my head around some concepts in this book (the noemic and noetic aspects of experience certainly had me rereading), but the prose is very approachable with a good sense of humor about it. It gave me plenty of ideas on how to use phenomenology in a more informed way, and I very much appreciated the addition of the critical phenomenology chapter as it reviews how this approach can be used in a decolonial and feminist epistemology. Overall, very digestable as one's first encounter with phenomenology, and not a hard read if one puts a little work into it.
July 20, 2017
Good overview, but could have been a bit longer and fuller.
June 15, 2021
A must-read for those who want to learn about qualitative research, particularly the phenomenological method.
January 16, 2022
Every now and then he throws down a succinct brilliant sentence. Other times is a little harder reading. Overall really good.
February 7, 2014
Phenomenology made current.
In this book Shaun Gallagher gives us an introduction to Phenomenology that stands apart from others in the field. Many other books in this area take an approach based on the key figures (eg. Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty). These works also sometimes present it as an old and outdated philosophy, or if there is an attempt to make it current, it is not until the final chapter where new research is presented.
Gallagher takes a different approach in regards to both. First, instead of being based on particular figures, each chapter focuses on a major theme of phenomenology (eg. transcendentalism, intentionality, and temporality). Second, each chapter begins by looking at the approaches taken by its early practitioners (with emphasis on key figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty), and then progresses to debates that are taking place in this area by modern practitioners. The benefit of this approach is that the reader can find a topic which interests them, and then get a complete overview of where this idea originated from and how it is studied and practiced today.
It should be noted that Gallagher comes at this project from a particular viewpoint - that of embodied/enactive cognition (a relatively new and growing field within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and one in which Gallagher is an acknowledged expert). Thus the reader gains not only an understanding of phenomenology as practiced in the past, but how it is practiced now and in conjunction with another new and growing area of research (see some of Gallagher's other books for further understanding of the field of embodied cognition).
Thus, this book can be of value to several different audiences. First, newcomers with little direct knowledge in phenomenology, but interested in learning about what it is will be well served by this book. Second, it also will be of use to phenomenologists interested in seeing how it can be applied in the area of embodied cognition. Finally, those in the field of embodied cognition can benefit from seeing how phenomenological ideas can benefit their research with its new insights. Highly recommended.
In this book Shaun Gallagher gives us an introduction to Phenomenology that stands apart from others in the field. Many other books in this area take an approach based on the key figures (eg. Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty). These works also sometimes present it as an old and outdated philosophy, or if there is an attempt to make it current, it is not until the final chapter where new research is presented.
Gallagher takes a different approach in regards to both. First, instead of being based on particular figures, each chapter focuses on a major theme of phenomenology (eg. transcendentalism, intentionality, and temporality). Second, each chapter begins by looking at the approaches taken by its early practitioners (with emphasis on key figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty), and then progresses to debates that are taking place in this area by modern practitioners. The benefit of this approach is that the reader can find a topic which interests them, and then get a complete overview of where this idea originated from and how it is studied and practiced today.
It should be noted that Gallagher comes at this project from a particular viewpoint - that of embodied/enactive cognition (a relatively new and growing field within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and one in which Gallagher is an acknowledged expert). Thus the reader gains not only an understanding of phenomenology as practiced in the past, but how it is practiced now and in conjunction with another new and growing area of research (see some of Gallagher's other books for further understanding of the field of embodied cognition).
Thus, this book can be of value to several different audiences. First, newcomers with little direct knowledge in phenomenology, but interested in learning about what it is will be well served by this book. Second, it also will be of use to phenomenologists interested in seeing how it can be applied in the area of embodied cognition. Finally, those in the field of embodied cognition can benefit from seeing how phenomenological ideas can benefit their research with its new insights. Highly recommended.
March 25, 2016
This book covers a large amount of ground in and around the area of phenomenology while remaining concise, very clear and well written. It also left me with around 4,600 words of quotes and notes.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews