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The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe
This is a major new approach to the military revolution and the relationship between warfare and the power of the state in early modern Europe. Whereas previous accounts have emphasised the growth of state-run armies during this period, David Parrott argues instead that the delegation of military responsibility to sophisticated and extensive networks of private enterprise reached unprecedented levels. This included not only the hiring of troops but their equipping, the supply of food and munitions, and the financing of their operations. The book reveals the extraordinary prevalence and capability of private networks of commanders, suppliers, merchants and financiers who managed the conduct of war on land and at sea, challenging the traditional assumption that reliance on mercenaries and the private sector results in corrupt and inefficient military force. In so doing, the book provides essential historical context to contemporary debates about the role of the private sector in warfare.
448 pages, Hardcover
First published March 8, 2012
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 4, 2025
In this work David Parrott is on a mission to debunk simplistic understandings of the evolution of the European nation-state, variously captured by the aphorism that "war made the state and the state made war" on one hand, and taking too seriously the self-serving propaganda put out by absolutist governments that really bore little resemblance realities on the ground on the other. What that means here is that for all the claims about "mercenaries" being an inefficient and dangerous solution to a given government's military issues, Parrott finds that the hiring of military entrepreneurs and contractors often made the most sense for a government that had chosen or had been forced to go to war because only the contractors had the connections to mobilize the financial sinews that made effective military action possible, and this was a reality until the rise of real mass armies after the French Revolution.
As a point of contrast Parrott often turns to his previous work on how the French attempted to make war without native-born officers who were personally invested in their units, and who could depend upon their investment being recognized by the state. This made for haphazard success until the regime of Louis XIV embraced full-scale venality of the operational command structure in his army. This both recognized the monetary costs imposed on the nobility (whose wealth could not otherwise be accessed), while paying back the nobility in the coin that really mattered to them; recognition and social influence. The last section of this study is largely dedicated to examining social contracts such as these, as though the contractor generals of the Thirty Years War who raised armies as a speculative profit-making venture were gone, it doesn't mean that the military entrepreneur had disappeared with the Peace of Westphalia; it just means that the cut of their coat had changed.
While this should probably not be the first book one reads on the subject I found it very illuminating, particularly since as it appears that the era of the mass army as the expression of a nation-in-arms has ended and the military contractor has again become a viable instrument of state.
Originally written: April 25, 2019.
As a point of contrast Parrott often turns to his previous work on how the French attempted to make war without native-born officers who were personally invested in their units, and who could depend upon their investment being recognized by the state. This made for haphazard success until the regime of Louis XIV embraced full-scale venality of the operational command structure in his army. This both recognized the monetary costs imposed on the nobility (whose wealth could not otherwise be accessed), while paying back the nobility in the coin that really mattered to them; recognition and social influence. The last section of this study is largely dedicated to examining social contracts such as these, as though the contractor generals of the Thirty Years War who raised armies as a speculative profit-making venture were gone, it doesn't mean that the military entrepreneur had disappeared with the Peace of Westphalia; it just means that the cut of their coat had changed.
While this should probably not be the first book one reads on the subject I found it very illuminating, particularly since as it appears that the era of the mass army as the expression of a nation-in-arms has ended and the military contractor has again become a viable instrument of state.
Originally written: April 25, 2019.
August 30, 2012
Dr David Parrott, a Fellow and Lecturer at New College, University of Oxford, provides a revisionist study concerning private contractors or military enterprisers and their role in early modern warfare. He is known for articles on the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe, and his outstanding study Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642 (2001).
Early modern historians have traditionally stressed the transition from rulers and warlords relying on military contractors and mercenaries in the fifteenth century to the establishment of state-recruited and state-administered standing armies in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This has been seen as part of the Military Revolution in early modern Europe. Parrott, however, challenges this accepted viewpoint. He shows through meticulous research that rulers and warlords in western Europe continuously relied on military enterprisers (private contractors that organized and waged warfare) throughout the early modern era. Military enterprisers played a major role in the recruitment, organization, and deployment of military forces. Rulers and warlords, however, kept control of the military might to meet their ultimate aims and objectives.
Parrott breaks down this analytical study into two parts. In the first part, the author examines the foundations and expansion of military enterprise. He begins by looking at military resources for hire, including the Italian condottieri, Swiss infantry, as well as German Landsknechte and Reiters from 1450 to the end of the Habsburg-Valois Wars (1559). The author then focuses on military contracting in the galley squadrons of the Mediterranean, the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598), Dutch Revolt (1568-1609), and the Long Turkish War (1593-1606), before concentrating on the Thirty Years War. This long-lasting conflict, fought by numerous belligerents, over a large geographic area focused mainly on Germany, was the proving ground for the further development of military enterprise. Parrott discusses the military enterprising of Bernhard von Saxe-Weimar, Albrecht von Wallenstein, and others. The author clearly shows that there was no single model for the organization of military might. He proves that there was no inevitable development towards a state-run, state-controlled army during the Thirty Years War. States, by themselves, lacked the financial resources and organization to create a large army and sustain it in the field.
In the second part of this study, Parrott explores the operations of military contractors at war. He shows, contrary to what many historians believe, that contracted armies were experienced and effective in the field. They were the quality forces that were usually the focal point of one’s military capability. The author goes on to show the importance and effectiveness of private contractors that equipped and supplied armies and navies in the early modern era. Parrott professes that military enterprisers were usually highly motivated in wartime to receive rewards, including lands, titles, and money.
Parrott stresses the long-lasting influence of the military enterpriser. The author disagrees with Fritz Redlich’s German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force (1964-65) and stresses the importance military enterprise past the Thirty Years War to the Wars of Louis XIV and beyond. He calls for historians to examine more closely the role of military enterprisers in future studies. Parrott believes: “The devolution of military organization and control into the hands of private contractors was hugely more diverse, effective and adaptable as a means to organize and deploy military force than previous historical accounts have indicated. Far from being a marginal and transient phenomenon in the history of European warfare, it was a lasting and successful set of mechanisms which, in various relations with rulers and their authority, lay at the heart of war-waging for centuries” (p.308).
Early modern historians have traditionally stressed the transition from rulers and warlords relying on military contractors and mercenaries in the fifteenth century to the establishment of state-recruited and state-administered standing armies in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This has been seen as part of the Military Revolution in early modern Europe. Parrott, however, challenges this accepted viewpoint. He shows through meticulous research that rulers and warlords in western Europe continuously relied on military enterprisers (private contractors that organized and waged warfare) throughout the early modern era. Military enterprisers played a major role in the recruitment, organization, and deployment of military forces. Rulers and warlords, however, kept control of the military might to meet their ultimate aims and objectives.
Parrott breaks down this analytical study into two parts. In the first part, the author examines the foundations and expansion of military enterprise. He begins by looking at military resources for hire, including the Italian condottieri, Swiss infantry, as well as German Landsknechte and Reiters from 1450 to the end of the Habsburg-Valois Wars (1559). The author then focuses on military contracting in the galley squadrons of the Mediterranean, the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598), Dutch Revolt (1568-1609), and the Long Turkish War (1593-1606), before concentrating on the Thirty Years War. This long-lasting conflict, fought by numerous belligerents, over a large geographic area focused mainly on Germany, was the proving ground for the further development of military enterprise. Parrott discusses the military enterprising of Bernhard von Saxe-Weimar, Albrecht von Wallenstein, and others. The author clearly shows that there was no single model for the organization of military might. He proves that there was no inevitable development towards a state-run, state-controlled army during the Thirty Years War. States, by themselves, lacked the financial resources and organization to create a large army and sustain it in the field.
In the second part of this study, Parrott explores the operations of military contractors at war. He shows, contrary to what many historians believe, that contracted armies were experienced and effective in the field. They were the quality forces that were usually the focal point of one’s military capability. The author goes on to show the importance and effectiveness of private contractors that equipped and supplied armies and navies in the early modern era. Parrott professes that military enterprisers were usually highly motivated in wartime to receive rewards, including lands, titles, and money.
Parrott stresses the long-lasting influence of the military enterpriser. The author disagrees with Fritz Redlich’s German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force (1964-65) and stresses the importance military enterprise past the Thirty Years War to the Wars of Louis XIV and beyond. He calls for historians to examine more closely the role of military enterprisers in future studies. Parrott believes: “The devolution of military organization and control into the hands of private contractors was hugely more diverse, effective and adaptable as a means to organize and deploy military force than previous historical accounts have indicated. Far from being a marginal and transient phenomenon in the history of European warfare, it was a lasting and successful set of mechanisms which, in various relations with rulers and their authority, lay at the heart of war-waging for centuries” (p.308).
October 21, 2022
A phenomenal study of early modern warfare that examines the nuts and bolts of how monarchs raised and financed armies. A continent-wide marketplace of colonel-contractors, mercenary soldiers, financiers, and weapons manufacturers provided Europe the men and materiel for the wars of the period. The financial and organizational details are interesting in their own right, but they also explain a lot of the tactical changes that took place in the period.
A few assorted points that stood out:
-How mercenary contracts evolved during the Habsburg-Valois wars. As armies grew in size and wars grew in duration, the burden of financing troops fell more on state finances than on individual contractors' personal credit.
-The most destructive phase of the Thirty Years' War (up to the mid-1630s) was in some sense the result of a financial bubble: speculator contractors raised larger and larger forces in the hopes of seeing a return through plunder of conquered territories.
-The positional warfare that dominated the later 17th century was not just a product of strategic priorities, but also a result of provisioning contracts - it was easier and cheaper to provision a fixed region than an army on the march.
The book is very detailed, perhaps more than the casual reader might want, but Parrott's writing style is a pleasure to read and is well worth the effort.
A few assorted points that stood out:
-How mercenary contracts evolved during the Habsburg-Valois wars. As armies grew in size and wars grew in duration, the burden of financing troops fell more on state finances than on individual contractors' personal credit.
-The most destructive phase of the Thirty Years' War (up to the mid-1630s) was in some sense the result of a financial bubble: speculator contractors raised larger and larger forces in the hopes of seeing a return through plunder of conquered territories.
-The positional warfare that dominated the later 17th century was not just a product of strategic priorities, but also a result of provisioning contracts - it was easier and cheaper to provision a fixed region than an army on the march.
The book is very detailed, perhaps more than the casual reader might want, but Parrott's writing style is a pleasure to read and is well worth the effort.
July 31, 2023
A fascinating and revisionist book on the involvement of private interests in European warfare even after their supposed heyday. We are talking not just mercenaries, but suppliers, logistics facilitators, financiers, shipwrights, and "military enterprisers" such as the colonels of mixed public-private regiments. The most surprising part for me was the author's take on venal offices, including the much maligned selling of officer positions referenced in literature set in the 18th and 19th centuries, as being a conscious adaptation on the part of government to access the wealth of non-taxed elites for supporting the military forces. The author has that rare capacity to combine the dry and dispassionate narrative of a serious academic study with the flair of a writer for a non-academic audience. Consequently, the book is serious and heavy, yet still approachable and understandable for the layman, who will feel gratified (and relieved) at having finished it.
October 8, 2024
for people who like this sort of thing, this is just the sort of thing that they will like
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews