A thought-provoking exploration of the American-Iranian relationship, from the 1940s through the Iran-Contra affair and its aftermath. James Bill, a well-known authority on the Middle East, has not only lived in Iran but also closely observed U.S. policy-making toward that country. He draws on interviews with many of the key American and Iranian figures, embassy files, Persian sources, archival records, and other sources from both countries to write this definitive analysis of American-Iranian relations. “A surprisingly fresh rendition of events. … Bill’s well-constructed narrative will hold the non-expert reader’s interest.”―Jim Hoagland, Washington Post Book World “A searching study of America’s relations with Iran since World War II. … A powerful book that should be widely read and taken seriously.”―John C. Campbell, Foreign Affairs “Essential reading.”―Andrew Gowers, Financial Times “By far the most searching study of contemporary United States-Iranian relations I have encountered.”―George W. Ball “A carefully documented hard-hitting case study of the reasons behind America’s trials and tribulations in the Third World.”―Melvin R. Laird “The most detailed and vivid account yet of America’s encounter with Iran.”―Fouad Ajami, New York Times Book Review Selected by Library Journal as one of their Best Books of 1988.
If a tree falls in the woods when nobody is around, does it make a sound?
the Iranian revolution, growing from below the pro Pahlavi elite which in turn isolated the U.S. both within Iran and in the concerning federal departments of Washington, was like that.
James A. Bill was one of the academic Iran specialists of the 60s-70s, which both peppers his work with delightful anecdotes and a sense of mea culpa; it is not clear from writing in 1988 whether he was ahead of the curve.
The entourage of the U.S president in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief and the regime controlling the Islamic Republic are at war in March 2026. I hope somebody will soon explain to me in a similar vein how blind both sides are this time around. Probably the Mossad will get the paranoid overextended credit the CIA 'enjoyed' ever since Mossadeq.
Got some information about what was happening in Iran during the 1960s--the part of the book I read--but beyond that, not impressive. The book bogs down in the details of personal relationships between Iranians and American diplomats, pop psychology about LBJ, with a lot of repetition. The moral is clear: the US made a hash of its relationship with the Shah. Still looking for a source that goes deeper.
The Eagle and the Lion is Professor James Bill's well-rounded study of American and Iranian relations from pre-WWII to post-revolution in the 1980s. Professor Bill draws together several themes and how they develop and are related between the US Government, the Shah of Iran, and the people of the mosques and bazaars of Iran until the culmination in the 1978 revolution.
The late Professor Bill was one of my college professors and I took his Persian Gulf Politics class in the Spring semester of 2003 at The College of William & Mary. His passion for the people and politics of Iran comes through in this book, as well as his well-reasoned criticisms of US Government policies. Having listened to him and read his book, I believe that Professor Bill thought that the US was a force for good in the world, even if it was sometimes misguided.
Themes that Professor Bill draws out are Iranian distrust of US intelligence agencies, commercial interests in selling arms to Iran, powerful individuals influencing US policies who believed that Shah to be an immovable ally of US interests, the superficial understanding of Iranian politics by US foreign service officers, and competition between the CIA, State Department, and National Security Council to form US policy and pursue competing interests.
This book is not written for the mass market; it is academic in tone and requires some persistence to get through it. I think it requires more than one read to fully understand its message.
The author seems to be very knowledgeable of Iran, but his delivery is as dry as the desert sand. He makes a valid point that the US made several foreign policy blunders in dealing with Iran; however, his argument comes across as fairly lopsided making the author appear as an apologist for post-revolutionary Iran and Khomeni. The book does not contain a single entry regarding Iran’s state support of terrorism, which has been a major obstacle in the US normalizing relations with Iran. Some interesting info but it’s a labor to read.