How Spies Think Ten Lessons in Intelli gence Hardcover 29 Oct 2020

by David Omand

From the former director of GCHQ, learn the methodology used by the British intelligence agencies to reach judgements, establish the right level of confidence and act decisively.Intelligence officers discern the truth. They gather information - often contradictory or incomplete - and, with it, they build the most accurate possible image of the world. With the stakes at their absolute highest, they must then decide what to do. In everyday life, you are faced with contradictory, incomplete information, too. Reading the news on social media, figuring out the next step in your career, or trying to discover if gossip about a friend is legitimate, you are building an image of the world and making decisions about it.Looking through the eyes of one of Britain's most senior ex-intelligence officers, Professor Sir David Omand, How Spies Think shows how the big decisions in your life will be easier to make when you apply the same frameworks used by British intelligence. Full of revealing examples from his storied career, including key briefings with Prime Ministers from Thatcher to Blair, and conflicts from the Falklands to Afghanistan.

Genres: Nonfiction, Psychology, Politics, Espionage, Military Fiction, History, Audiobook

Hardcover

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 3 out of 5]

The image we have of spies has long been tarnished by Bond. It is not a glamourous job and often involves long hours watching and waiting for a target or asset to make a move. For those that collates the information gather from signals intelligence or actual observations have to try and place the pieces together is some semblance of order. This is not particularly easy, especially when you don’t know what the full picture is nor do you know if the snippet of information in front of you actually relates to the task in hand.

Somehow they manage to pull together a picture of what is happening. So how do they do it? One of the methods that they use is the SEES model

Situational Awareness
Explanation
Estimates
Strategic Notice

The first part is gaining a fuller understanding as you are able to of what is happening. The second part is a deep understanding as to why it is happening and the various motivations behind any parties involved. From that, you need to assess different scenarios of what might happen if events unfold in particular ways. The final element is the assessment of any issues that might affect the item under consideration, including events that might be considered as outliers at the moment.

Even though these four stages sound fairly simple, they can absorb a lot of time and effort and things still get missed. It is also important to think of all possible outcomes as the assumptions that are made are often not bold enough. In this book, Omand takes us through the process behind this system in ten lessons and provides lots of examples of how he used these techniques in his time in government and as the director of GCHQ.

It is very detailed, which is kind of what I would expect from someone of his calibre and experience in the role. There are some really useful lessons in here, especially the final lesson on digital subversion and sedition and that seeing is not always believing, especially with the sophisticated. Parts of the book did feel like there were more of a memoir of his time in various government departments and was loosely linked to the lesson being discussed. That was a minor detail though, there are lots of details to take away here and use.

[Kate Potapenko · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ten brilliant lessons in intelligence that are definitely worth learning!

I was always interested in all kind of investigation, disinformation, intelligence etc. Now I use quite a bit of it in my line of work.

However lessons learnt here would be handy for anyone, be it for life or work.

Book gives us an insight into different problems, breaks down techniques and explores outcomes. In a way it teaches you to approach problem solutions differently along with telling us about fake news, elections campaigns, cold wars etc.

It took me a while to read it as I would often get sucked into Google, researching cases mentioned and getting more details here and there.

But generally very enjoyable.

[Igor Putina · Rating 3 out of 5]

Captivating. I enjoyed the book very much.

Although familiar with the SEES model, the author does a fantastic job explaining it.

He touches briefly on:
- bayesian thinking
- heuer tables for analysis of competing hypotheses
- game theory (very little)

The last three chapters ruined the read substantially. David Omand seems to engage in exactly the sorts of flawed thinking practices he warns against. For this reason it gets 3 stars from me.

It’s a thought provoking book and I highly recommend it. Do take his conclusion and prescriptions with a good spoonful of salt.

[Adam · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent read. The meat of the content is contained in the first 4 chapters, where the author expresses their explanatory 'SEES' model. There are some nice anecdotes from Sir David's long career and his references to intelligence methods (E.g. Heuer tables, Bayesian thinking (although the content on the latter is overwrought)) are insightful.

My main issue is towards the end, where I think he cops-out from the logical conclusion of his analysis. As a securocrat, it makes sense for him to primarily be occupied with the downsides of the digitalisation of our lives.

However, on my reading his response to the threat of disinformation is to promote (or endorse) actions by states and social-media corporations to crack down on the telling of mistruths. Obviously this isn't a costless solution, risking a chilling effect on the online exchange of ideas that is the key benefit of the Internet.

Sir David highlights how sensitive the difference between misinformation and disinformation is, and how even the veteran intelligence officer—let alone the garden-variety Twitter midwit—only ever deals with incomplete (and often contradictory) information when assessing the world. However, he ducks the question of whether governments and time-pressured moderators are best placed to judge whether said midwits are Russian bots, or simply misinformed.

This seems important: in seeking to heal civil society of the sickness of disinformation, Sir David et al. should be careful they don't promote a medicine that does much worse harm to the patient!

Having said all that (and despite a treatment of James Angleton's career which is surprisingly vicious and uncharitable), I would recommend this as a useful book for anyone interested in intelligence and/or the science of prediction.

[John Fullerton]

I can imagine that the publishers were dazzled by the author's background and qualifications: a former director of GCHQ, seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee, permanent secretary at the Home Office and a professor of war studies.
Impressive stuff, indeed.
And there are of course reviews one would expect for an establishment figure...a tour de force...fascinating...a rare insight...a brilliant book...etcetera.
So let's look at some of his pearls of wisdom, taken at random.
'Intelligence agencies prefer to keep quiet about success...'
'Reality is what it is.'
'Context is therefore needed to infer meaning...'
'In all sustained thinking, assumptions do have to be made...'
'The best way to secure situational awareness is when you can see for yourself what is going on...'
'A well-studied lesson of the dangers of misinterpreting complex situations is the "security dilemma" when rearmament steps taken by one nation with purely defensive intent trigger fears in a potential adversary...'
'Do not believe what you want to believe until you know what you need to know...'
'...we are all liable to wrestle with inconsistent beliefs, often suffering stress as a result.'
'intelligence communities have the duty of trying to forestall unwelcome surprises by spotting international developments that would spell real trouble.'
No shit, Sherlock.
Then, for the academically minded reader, there's plenty of gobbledygook to keep her/him amused:
'The analysis of computing hypotheses using Heur tables is an example of one of the structured analytic techniques in use today...'
And if that isn't enough:
'The Bayesian method of reasoning therefore involves adjusting our prior degree of belief in a hypothesis on receipt to form a posterior degree of belief in it...'
Final observation: while this book is entitled 'How Spies Think' - it really isn't. The title is frankly misleading. It's really how the suits - Whitehall analysts, managers and those charged with assessing intelligence - might, could or should, think (but usually don't). Spies are people who collect intelligence ie. facts - and the latter - God help us all - then provide an interpretation.
Spies don't, and shouldn't assess, their own material. Obviously.
And perhaps it's a little odd that Professor Omand does not take the trouble to list the several failures of the JIC over the years, regardless of his beautiful formula: p(N)/E=p(N.(p(E/N/p(E)
I didn't finish it. Hence no rating.

[Katarzyna Nowicka · Rating 3 out of 5]

"Jak nie dać się zmanipulować i okłamać - radzi doświadczony agent wywiadu". Przyznam, że ten tytuł mocno mnie zainteresował, bo jak radzić sobie w świecie zglobalizowanej informacji, gdzie dzień w dzień zasypywani jesteśmy ogromem wiadomości z różnych dziedzin życia.
Jak nie dać się zmanipulować i jak nie dać się okłamać, to dylematy każdego z nas.
Jednak, czy ten poradnik faktycznie jest dla każdego?
Kariera Davida Omanda jest imponująca, to były pracownik brytyjskiego wywiadu. W swojej pracy zajmował się gromadzeniem informacji, weryfikowaniem ich wiarygodności i prognozowaniem jak one mogą wpłynąć na przebieg różnych wydarzeń.
Jego wiedza i doświadczenie są ogromne, i to widać na kartach tego poradnika.
Przykłady z książki bazują przede wszystkim na doświadczeniach z jego pracy.
I choć czytałam je z dużym zainteresowaniem, to mózg mi parował w przyswajaniu tego wszystkiego i próbie przekonwertowania na moje życie codzienne. Czasem dawałam radę, a czasem nie.
Na pewno jednym z najbardziej interesujących zagadnień jest problem misinformacji, dezinformacji i fake-newsów.
Ten problem bardzo łatwo przełożyć na naszą codzienność, praktycznie spotykamy się z nim każdym kroku.
Rozpowszechnianie materiałów starannie sfabrykowanych i wykorzystywanie do tego cieszących się zaufaniem kanałów komunikacyjnych jest bardzo powszechne. Łatwo jest wprowadzić człowieka w błąd, a w dzisiejszym cyfrowym świecie, łatwo jest manipulować informacjami i łatwo je nagłaśnieć.
Z dezinformacji korzystają rządy, ruchy polityczne, środowiska handlowe, ale i my zwykli ludzie.
A fałszywe informacje, nawet jak zostaną podważone to wciąż krążą.
Jak się przed tym uchronić? Może znajdziecie odpowiedź właśnie w tej książce, choć to nie będzie łatwe zadanie.
Ja na pewno potrzebuję przemyślenia, przeanalizowania i poukładania ogromu informacji i dostosowania ich do swoich potrzeb. Z ostrożnością, z dystansem i rozwagą będę starała się podchodzić do wszelkich wiadomości, choć na super agenta i analityka nie mam zadatków😉.

[Truls Ljungström · Rating 4 out of 5]

En tät och lärorik bok i informationshantering. Innehåller både modeller för beslutsutvärdering och underlagsvärdering. Inte speciellt lättillgänglig, men däremot värd ansträngningen. Kan rekommenderas.

[Petri · Rating 4 out of 5]

It’s really a book on structured thinking under uncertainty and adversity. The interesting context of cold war makes for a nice read. I think that this would have been a great easy read on a transatlantic flight, were we not in the middle of the pandemic.

[Imran Ahmed · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's not easy giving Omand's "How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence" three stars but the work doesn't quite reach four stars.

The book is a gallant effort by an accomplished intelligence professional. There are attempts to organize the author's thinking in a systematic manner for the benefit of the reader. Unfortunately, the framework is neither clean nor elegant.

Instead, the work comes across more like a professional autobiography (of course of an individual who has reached the pinnacle within his industry).

To be sure, the book is sprinkled with insights which the reader finds throughout the work. Indeed, for those interested in analytical thinking, especially pertaining to national security considerations, Omand's book will be useful.

[Jo Berry ☀️ · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’m not sure what to rate this book, so I’ve given it four stars, but I don’t think I’m quite the right audience for it.

It’s a serious and rather dry sort of book, and I sometimes felt as if I was reading a set text for an undergraduate course. There are some interesting examples of the use of intelligence and what happens when things go wrong, but the general discussions of how intelligence operatives think didn’t strike me as any sort of special thinking - it’s really just the decision making skills of any intelligent person, so I felt the author was explaining the obvious sometimes.

[W Barr · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting insight into the real world of intelligence, dispelling myths of Bourne and Bond. It starts off with very practical advice on training your mind to think more critically and methodically, interspersed with anecdotes from Omand’s long career within UK government. In the end the balance of his theories on intelligence officer mindset with his real lived experiences was off. This was more apparent when speaking on the digital landscape which he didn’t have as much firsthand knowledge of. But still an eye opening book which helps us question critical the information around us.

[Remy Webb · Rating 5 out of 5]

Decent book not just on intelligence but also provides great lessons on critical thinking and information subversion

[Sebastian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sir David Bruce Omand (1947) is, met meer dan een halve eeuw praktijkervaring, een icoon in de inlichtingen- en veiligheidswereld. De Britse econoom, wiskundige en natuurkundige trad in 1969 als jongeman in dienst bij het roemruchte Global Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Als directeur van GCHQ, het Britse equivalent van de Amerikaanse National Security Agency, zou hij in de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw zijn organisatie als een van de eerste inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten het internettijdperk inleiden. Behalve voor GCHQ werkte Omand vele jaren voor het Britse ministerie van Defensie en was hij Permanent Secretary of the Home Office (1997-2000). Daarna maakte hij zeven jaar deel uit van het UK Joint Intelligence Committee. Na de terroristische aanslagen op de Verenigde Staten (‘9/11’) werd hij bovendien als eerste UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator namens de Britse premier verantwoordelijk voor “the professional health” van de Britse inlichtingengemeenschap. Hij werd in die hoedanigheid tevens de geestelijke vader van de Britse Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST).

Omand is een klassiek voorbeeld van de ‘professional turned scholar’. Sinds het einde van zijn loopbaan in overheidsdienst geeft hij als buitengewoon hoogleraar college aan onder meer het prestigieuze Kings College in Londen. Als zodanig treedt hij geregeld op bij conferenties en denktanks en is een veelgevraagd commentator in de media. Zijn wetenschappelijke activiteiten komen verder tot uitdrukking in artikelen en inmiddels een drietal boeken. In 2010 publiceerde hij Securing the State over de relatie tussen veiligheid en inlichtingen. In 2018 schreef hij, samen met Mark Phythian, Principled Spying over de ethiek van geheime inlichtingen. En nu ligt, voorzien van een opvallende oranje omslag, zijn derde boek in de schappen: How Spies Think: Ten Lessons in Intelligence (gepubliceerd door Penguin Random House in 2020).

Omand weet dus waar hij het over heeft, kan putten uit een rijke ervaring en beschikt over een scherpe, analytische geest. How Spies Think is de weerslag van meer dan vijftig jaar praktijkervaring en denkwerk. Wie belang stelt in het werk van inlichtingendiensten en van hun interactie met beleidsmakers en besluitvormers kan, kortom, niet om dit boek heen. How Spies Think is bovendien goed geschreven en zorgvuldig opgebouwd. Omand put daarbij rijkelijk uit zijn lange loopbaan, met boeiende anekdotes en ‘participerende observaties’ over de Falklandoorlog, de hoogtijdagen van de Koude Oorlog, de val van de Sovjet-Unie, de Irak-oorlog, de burgeroorlogen in Noord-Ierland en Bosnië en het internationale terrorisme. Wie verwacht dat de ‘spionnen’ uit de titel van het boek lijken op de personages uit de boeken van Ian Flemming of John le Carré, komt bedrogen uit, al komen Le Carré’s belangrijkste personage George Smiley en diens roman Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy kort even om de hoek kijken wanneer Omand beschrijft hoe inlichtingenanalisten hun hypotheses voortdurend aan nieuwe informatie toetsen (148-9). De inlichtingenfunctionaris die in How Spies Think centraal staat, is de analist. Omand richt zijn aandacht op de uitdagingen van hun werk. Het zijn de inlichtingenanalisten wier taak het is wijs te worden uit de vaak tegenstrijdige en onvolledige informatie die hen door anderen wordt aangereikt. Omands inzichtrijke beschrijving van hun methodes en van de vele valkuilen die zij moeten omzeilen, bepaalt, samen met de vele praktijkvoorbeelden over de interactie van inlichtingendiensten met de wereld van de politiek, de toegevoegde waarde van zijn boek.
How Spies Think is onderverdeeld aan de hand van tien ‘lessons in intelligence’ in vier delen. In het eerste deel (“ordering our thoughts”) introduceert hij een analytisch denkmodel waarvoor hij het acroniem SEES hanteert. Wat ziet de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsanalist? Beter nog, wat zou hij of zij moeten zien? Als rechtgeaard inlichtingenman met een wiskundige en academische inslag, onderstreept Omand het belang van “a systematic way of unpacking the process of arriving at judgements and establishing the appropriately level of confidence in them” (9). Zijn SEES-model laat in wezen zien wat analisten doen als zij ontwikkelingen en gebeurtenissen in de wereld onderzoeken. Het vertegenwoordigt de vier soorten informatie waaruit een inlichtingenproduct kan bestaan en de verschillende analyseniveaus waaruit ze zijn afgeleid. Het acroniem SEES staat voor:

· Situational awareness of what is happening and what we face now;
· Explanation of why we are seeing what we do and the motivations of those involved;
· Estimates and forecasts of how events may unfold under different assumptions;
· Strategic notice of future issues that may become a challenge in the longer term. (9)
Dus: weten, begrijpen, voorzien en tijdig waarschuwen. Het stelsel van dekkingsgraden dat de Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten hanteren, is met dit model grotendeels in overeenstemming.

Omand gaat in vele pagina’s dieper in op het verschijnsel analyse en beoordelingen. Hij zoomt in op de aannames die daaraan noodzakelijkerwijs ten grondslag liggen en de analytische methoden die analisten gebruiken om bruikbare beoordelingen en analyses met voorspellende waarde te produceren. Hypothesevorming en permanente toetsing zijn belangrijk elementen in zijn betoog. Zo behandelt hij ‘Ockhams scheermes’, genoemd naar de veertiende-eeuwse Franciscaner monnik William of Ockham (ca. 1287-1347) die de zogenaamde wet van de spaarzaamheid hanteerde en als eerste het kentheoretische uitgangspunt formuleerde dat de simpelste verklaring meestal de juiste verklaring is.

Omand besteedt daarnaast veel tijd aan de logica van gehanteerde aannames en gevolgtrekkingen (“assumptions and inferences”). Om grip te krijgen op hypothetische uitspraken waarvan de waarheid onzeker is, pleit hij voor gebruik van de Bayesiaanse methode, genoemd naar de achttiende-eeuwse wiskundige en theoloog Thomas Bayes, waarbij de waarschijnlijkheid (= relatieve kans) van een bepaalde gebeurtenis of ontwikkeling telkens wordt herzien op basis van beschikbaar gekomen nieuwe informatie. Deze methode weerspiegelt de inlichtingenpraktijk van veel westerse inlichtingendiensten. De methode draagt ertoe bij dat de beschikbaarheid van wezenlijk nieuwe informatie metterdaad leidt tot aanpassing van analyses of, in de termen die de Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten hanteren, van het ‘normbeeld’.

Dit is echter geen vanzelfsprekendheid, wat Omand er in deel twee (over “checking our reasoning”) toe brengt aandacht te besteden aan mentale belemmeringen als tunnelvisie, groepsdenken en allerlei vormen van onbewuste bias, zowel op persoonlijk als op institutioneel niveau. “We do not have to be so surprised by surprise,” luidt zijn belangrijke vierde les. Over de mondiale coronapandemie schrijft hij bijvoorbeeld dat er voldoende signalen waren om beter beslagen ten ijs te komen: “the COVID-19 outbreak should not have caught us unprepared”. (90) De tekortkomingen van het menselijke brein blijven niettemin een belangrijke hinderpaal voor analisten, beleidsmakers en besluitvormers. Om deze tekortkomingen tegen te gaan, wijst Omand net als Edward Syed in Rebel Ideas op het belang van cognitieve diversiteit in een organisatie: “In group discussions it helps to have one or more contrarians, those who by inclination like swimming against the tide and thus help surface all the relevant arguments” (123). Niet voor niets beschikt de Nederlandse Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD) sinds de Irak-oorlog over een ‘devil’s advocate’, een functionaliteit waarvan ook Omand het belang onderschrijft.
In het derde deel (“making intelligent use of intelligence”) verlegt Omand zijn aandacht naar de gebruikers van inlichtingenanalyses. Vergaring en verwerking van geheime informatie dient immers geen enkel doel als de afnemer niet wordt bereikt of er niet mee uit de voeten kan. Dit vereist van inlichtingendiensten begrip voor en inlevingsvermogen in het werk van de beleidsmaker en besluitvormer. Ook mag hun betrouwbaarheid en professionaliteit nooit ter discussie staan. Wederzijds vertrouwen en aantoonbare betrouwbaarheid zijn volgens Omand overigens ook onontbeerlijk voor het smeden van succesvolle partnerschappen in internationale inlichtingenkringen. Hij put daarbij vooral uit zijn diepgaande inzicht in de werking van de Angelsaksische ‘Five Eyes’-gemeenschap. Betrouwbare, wederkerige relaties zijn voor inlichtingendiensten belangrijker dan de ‘quid pro quo’-balans in enge zin. “Intelligence agencies have learned more than most the lesson that strong partnerships add value,” aldus Omand. (209) Hij corrigeert daarmee het heersende transactionele beeld als zou internationale inlichtingensamenwerking vooral gelijkenis vertonen met het ‘ruilen van postzegels’. Het sociologische perspectief op internationale inlichtingensamenwerking is tot dusver in de wetenschap onderbelicht gebleven. Omands relaas biedt goede aanknopingspunten voor een dergelijk perspectief.

Behalve aan het werk van inlichtingendiensten, besteedt Omand in het laatste deel van zijn boek uitvoerig aandacht aan de verstrekkende, nadelige politieke en maatschappelijke gevolgen van de informatierevolutie. In hoofdstuk 7 maakt hij een verhelderend onderscheid tussen ‘misinformation’ (i.e. ‘information in circulation that turns out not to be true, or only a misleading part of the truth’), ‘disinformation’ (i.e. ‘information that is known to be false before it is circulated’ – ook wel bekend als nepnieuws) en ‘malinformation’ (i.e. ‘deliberate us of true information obtained covertly that was never intended to become public’, zoals de persoonlijke e-mails van presidentskandidaat Hillary Clinton). Omand is uiterst bezorgd over de gevolgen voor democratische samenlevingen van het huidige informatietijdperk, met zijn social media, filter bubbles en echo chambers. Deze samenlevingen zijn bij uitstek vatbaar voor manipulatie door kwaadwillenden. “Combating modern subversion and sedition must ... be a properly funded component part of national security effort for the democracies,” aldus Omand. (284) Hij deinst daarbij niet terug voor scherpe kritiek op de Amerikaanse oud-president Donald Trump. De bestorming van Capitol Hill door Trump-aanhangers in Washington DC op 6 januari 2021 kwam te laat om te worden opgenomen in Omands boek, maar past naadloos in diens analyse. Ook de Britse premier Boris Johnson valt overigens een kritische bejegening ten deel, vooral wegens diens rol in de Brexit-saga.

How Spies Think heeft veel te bieden. Omand schrijft goed, heeft een heldere redeneertrant en verwoordt zijn meningen zorgvuldig. Enige geconcentreerde aandacht is vooral in de eerste hoofdstukken vereist, maar gelukkig doorspekt hij zijn betoog met talloze aansprekende voorbeelden uit de praktijk. Omand eindigt optimistisch in zijn afsluitende vierde deel: “A final lesson in optimism”. De wil om optimistisch te eindigen lijkt hier misschien wat sterker te zijn geweest dan de kracht van de analyse. Omand vertrouwt op de redelijkheid, de integriteit en de bekwaamheid van westerse overheden, met inbegrip van hun inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten. Hij gaat daarbij voorbij aan het gegeven dat de inspanningen van goedwillende, integere mensen nog geen garantie geven op een goed resultaat. Wielrenners kennen het begrip ‘vals plat’: een klim die visueel niet meteen als zodanig valt te onderkennen totdat kuitspieren en longen de eerste protesten doorgeven. Het hellende vlak kan als tegenhanger daarvan worden beschouwd; het kan even duren voordat de neergaande ervaring als zodanig wordt onderkend, maar dan is de afbrokkeling al wel een feit en is men dus te laat. Van westerse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten wordt daarom niet alleen permanente alertheid gevraagd om bedreigingen te onderkennen. Er is ook permanente alertheid geboden om de eigen professionaliteit en integriteit te bewaken. De tien lessen van Omand zijn bij deze opgave een uitstekende raadgever, in het belang van de democratische rechtsorde.

[Sonia Williams · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have taken time to read and digest the lessons in this book and this was time well spent. As a librarian I was intrigued to discover that skills used by 'spies' are often put in to play by librarians the world over. I live in a world of information, sifting through searches, verifiying the source, ferreting out that elusive connection to a enquiry uses many of the skills of an information analyst.
There are traps the unwary can fall in to when sifting through information and the two most important ones highlighted by the author are:
1. No one cat foretell the future - the unexpected happens and all our careful plans can go out the widow
2..The consensual hallucination - group belief and telling our bosses what they want to hear not what they should hear.
The author leads us thorugh the process of critical thinking and analysis in a accessible way and the cases provided as examples often sent me down the rabbit hole of Google/ Firefox .
Thanks to the publisher and Netgalley for the opportunity to review this book, all views are my own.

[Gerrit G. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first and third part of the book are its strength. The former essentially is a write-up what one would also get to know from "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" by Heuer — an excellent, well-known work. The latter part teaches practical knowledge of handling humans in the contemporary times, touching topics such as fake news, modern sedition and subversion campaigns, as well as the cold war. In summary, one finds valuable reflections about both very important and very actual topics about humans in cyberspace in this book; that alone is worth the read.

Can be classified as pragmatic-analytical. As fiction gets mixed with reflections, historical accounts, reflections on the level of concepts as well as on political happenings in the then and now, the book is quite hard to read, or at least it requires some "mental agility" from the reader.

[Waseem Attili · Rating 1 out of 5]

The writer is pro government and he is similar to those who believe in conspiracy theory with everything but with the opposite way which he says that there are no conspiracies.

The author is a professional lier as well by saying the USA war on Iraq happened because of confirmation bias with intelligence information and I would like to ask the author if that right then the USA doesn’t care about people lives when they attack a country that could launch mass destruction weapons against people which is the reason stopped you from attacking the USSR during the Cold War.

I don’t recommend reading this book because it won’t tell anything new because the book main purpose is to deliver the American propaganda that their actions even the espionage are for the good and they are good people.

[Mika · Rating 3 out of 5]

I like the way Omand's book uses the logics of intelligence to foster critical, scientific modes of inquiry for everyone. There is relatively little new here for anyone familiar with scientific inquiry, heuristics, Bayesian inference, or cognitive biases, on the one hand, or the history of intelligence in the twentieth century, especially of Anglo-American history. But the book is well-written and thoughtful. Omand's hypotheticals are a bit contrived, not because they are implausible, but because they feel simplistic — exactly what the rest of the book argues against.

[Tudor · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not exactly what I was expecting from the book. Was looking forward to some spy stories/lessons but those parts made up a small portion of the book, while the rest was more focused on theory which was a little bit boring and sometimes repetitive. The topics it touched upon were not new or revelating, the author just put a name on things that most people would call common sense.
The information could have been condensed in half the pages and then I guess it would have been worth reading.

[Patrick Fay · Rating 4 out of 5]

Practical tips on how to make decisions based on incomplete and potentially unreliable information. My biggest take aways are the desire to take a course in logic (get more practice with Bayesian Inference) and go with the theory that has the least factors seeming to disprove it - not the one with the most supporting evidence.

[Mohamed E · Rating 2 out of 5]

By the end of the second part of this book, I had already got over the choice of silly title and was ready to give it a four-star rating as I found it quite insightful. But then I read parts three and four, where things turned to a turgid south and found it deserving of no more than a two-star rating.

[Alexander Hunt · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting topic, I got this as an audiobook and I would not recommend as there is content that is more suited to reading (i.e. formulas)

[Books Mademoiselle · Rating 1 out of 5]

Lord have mercy

[Robert Cain · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a leading director at the UK’s GCHQ, David Omand pursued a deep and involving career with intelligence. With his latest book, he’s sharing some of this experience with the public to excellent effect.

Across five decades, intelligence, its uses and pervasion in public society have been shaped and altered by a wide array of world events and technological advances. With ten chapters, David delivers almost a dozen important lessons that anyone, not just analysts, can apply in today’s context. These range from critical thinking skills to varying up your approach when it comes to greater problem solving and considering every item of evidence available to you. Bullet-pointed summaries at the end of each chapter allow the reader to easily take in these insights.

Each lesson is grounded in case studies such as the UK’s flawed anticipation of the Falklands invasion in 1982. These build to more contemporary examples such as Russian disinformation campaigns in the US and French general elections. With this grounding in place, Omand goes on to explain mistakes made and why they matter to the bigger picture. The real meat and potatoes of the book is Chapter 10; here the author embarks on a deeper dive into modern subversive tactics on the internet. The problems he describes should matter to all of us in the west; this section spins the most comprehensive web of intrigue.

While the book does look to the past, it is also very considerate of current and future challenges; the ten lessons are designed to combat the mistruths we see circulating on social media while also projecting an ideal solution to tackling issues of the digital age.

Recommended?

YES: How Spies Think is truly essential reading for anyone looking to understanding our modern, digitised world. Omand relays his knowledge so skilfully, blending it with both real world history and situations we may encounter in our own lives. The book leaps beyond sharing his extensive expertise and provides a compelling examination of today’s tenuous, often unpredictable landscape. Pick up this one as soon as you can

[Susanna Bloderer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Former Director of the British Intelligence Services tells anecdotes from his life working for the UK government, the decisions he and his colleagues made, how they arrived at them and predictions on what the future might look like.

This book was difficult to read, and it wasn't at all what I expected. About 50% of the book were historic tales that happened 20 years before I was born, so I couldn't relate to them at all.

Another 20% were dedicated to name-dropping and sharing how much the author admired certain people (Imagine unironically being a fan of Margaret Thatcher).

20% of the book were hysteria about Russian disinformation and the call for censorship and a digital ID in the future - in the name of democracy, of course. He called Edward Snowden unethical, despite conceding the information he released to the public was authentic and true.

As someone who lives in Ireland, I found the description of the Irish Republicans cynical and he even admitted the Good Friday agreement was based on manipulation by British Intelligence. It's clear, if you read between the lines, that the author is pro-Israel, that he dislikes both the right-wing and far-left and seems to believe reliable information only comes from a TV.

In general, the author comes across as condescending, dishonest and I am pretty sure he dislikes anyone younger than 40 years old.

If you want to hear a wealthy, Conservative, old White British guy ramble on for 250+ pages, then you go right ahead.

I personally didn't think there were any revolutionary life lessons in the book, the book is clickbait with a hardcover and I wouldn't recommend it to the following people: people belonging to the far left, people belonging to the far right, conspiracy theorists, pro-Palestine supporters, Irish Republicans, Trump fans, Russians, Edward Snowden & whistleblower supporters or anyone under the age of 40...

[Pedro Pinto · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting book on the art of intelligence.

The part one (chapter 1 to 4) is where I found more value mainly on:
1- The framework presented SEES:
a) Situational Awareness - what is happening and what we face now
b) Explanation - why are we seeing what we do and the motivation of those involved
c) Estimates and Forecasts - how events may unfold under different assumptions
d) Strategic Notice - of futures issues that may come to challenge us in the longer term

2 - The relevance of Bayesian thinking in the overall framework, mainly on first 3 stages

3- The choice of facts is not neutral, nor do facts speak for themselves

4- Importance to express predictions and forecasts as probabilities

5- The strategic Risk Equation - Risk = likelihood * vulnerability * impact

Relevant Quotes:

" As a general rule it is the explanatory hypothesis with the least evidence against it that is most likely to be the best one for us to adopt. The logic is that one strong contrary result can disconfirm a hypothesis. Apparently confirmatory evidence on the other hand can still be consistent with other hypotheses being true..."

"...reducing the ignorance of the decisionmaker does not necessarily mean simplifying..."

"...For analytic thinkers the equivalent ability is tolerating the pain and confusion of not knowing, rather than imposing ready-made or omnipotent certainties on ambiguous situations or emotional challenges..."

"...where there is a choice of explanation apply Occam's Razor (named after the fourteenth-century Franciscan friar William of Occam) and favor the explanation that does not rely on complex, improbable or numerous assumptions..."

[Remco · Rating 5 out of 5]

I enjoyed this book. As a former head of GCHQ in the UK, David Omand shares how analysts in intelligence agencies approach how to assess information on its merits methodologically. In particular the SEES model with four phases: Situational awareness, Explanation, Estimates and forecasts and Strategic Notice.

The book also contains some interesting 'inside track' on successes and failures in the work of intelligence agencies as well as making clear what the fact patterns were behind some spy events that made headlines, like the poisonings of Sergei Skripal and his daughter and Alexander Litvenenko. It was fascinating to learn how a successful recruitment of a Russian FSB agent was an imporant factor for the success in establishing a good relationship with Russia under Mikhail Gorbatschev.

However, the main overall message in the book is that we should now recognise that sedition and subversion have now gone digital. Sedition and subversion have happened throughout history between and by nations, but the fact that it now no longer requires agents on the ground has changed the game. This has dangers that democratic societies should be aware of and arm themselves against. The 2016 US elections, the French elections and the Brexit referendum have all seen digital influencing by Russia. If democracy as a form of society to survive and thrive, then measures will have to be taken to protect it.

[JP · Rating 2 out of 5]

We always tend to believe that people working in intelligent department use different ways of thinking actually not. It is just an extension of critical thinking and moreover they listen to their enemy or event information with utmost care.
They know that most of their enemy's information is false. hence they most of the time misinformed or the person will be Double-Agent.

This book tries to explain 10 methods of thinking. Actually you never get thrilled if you're a watcher of spy movies or television spy serial coz most of the methods are covered, hence the book looks simply-outdated.

Book explains,
Spies have to practise a unique way of thinking. 
They just listen to a given situation and they know their first perception always goes wrong. 
Generally the event or person never disclose the real truth coz you always see through your linear mind.

Another important lesson is that every fact should support proper explanation and every prediction should support valid data. There is no such proper explanation and valid data unless you go through the process.

He lectures, we never know why we think in such a pattern and the patterns are nothing but our demons influences and based on that we jump into predetermined solutions. 

You are always biased unknowingly and you're flooded with deceptive information. 

All these ideas are not new to readers 
But still the events covered are explained neatly...

[Lilla · Rating 2 out of 5]

The title of this book, How Spies Think, immediately drew my eye in a charity shop. At first flip through it appeared that the author, David Omand, former director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK, would be teaching valuable lessons on overcoming emotionally charged thinking in favor of seeking the truth. One chapter that drew me in was "Lesson 5: It is our own demons that are most likely to mislead us." However, what this book is mostly about is critical thinking and the importance of calculating probability based on stark evidence (or lack thereof). Omand introduces us to the SEES method (situational awareness, explanation, estimation, and strategic notice) that intelligence analysts use to help their nations' leaders make appropriate decisions on behalf of their people. There was a surprising amount of math at the start of the book, and far fewer examples of the method's application to reality than I was anticipating. The structure of the book, though it boasts to be a simple 10-lesson plan, is a bit awkward, and even some sentences felt as though they had been translated from a foreign language into English via Google Translate. While there were some fascinating anecdotes from Omand's professional career, I didn't think that the step-by-step plan to sound situation management was anything revolutionary. Odds are most of us already unknowingly use this way of thinking in our daily decision making.

[Gregg · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm going to start with a petty annoyance about the book. The book is not about how "spies" think, it's about how "analysts" think, in particular intelligence analysts. I suspect the publisher thinks that being a spy is sexier than being an analyst, so using "spies" makes sense from a marketing perspective. But there is a big difference in the two analytical perspectives.

That said, I was drawn to the book because I'm interested in models of critical thinking, which the book offers. The author offers a nice, four-part critical thinking approach in the first section of the book and warns about cognitive biases in the second section. The third section seems to cover some miscellaneous thoughts that didn't fit in other places, but, importantly, it includes an application of the author's critical thinking process to dangers of social media for democracy.

The book is not as thorough in the discussion of the author's critical thinking approach as I would like, but it's certainly enough to get interested readers started in the approach. A highlight of the book, though, is all the "war stories" the author tells from his decades of service in the UK intelligence and defense communities.

Overall, I enjoyed reading the book, and I did learn a few nuggets that I will take with me in my thinking about critical thinking.

[Nick Gaskell · Rating 5 out of 5]

SEES Model:

1. Situational awareness
2. Explanation
3. Estimation of what next (predictions)
4. Strategic notice & action


2. Explanations

Bayesian reasoning (pg48)

Use Heur tables to test how consistent the evidence collected from situational awareness is with your explanayory hypothesis

Prefer the explanation with the least evidence against it...this heuristic reduces the risk of confirmation bias

Explanations must be transparent to how sensitive they are to assumptions and if they were different whether they would change your explanation

Skipping from (1) situational awareness to (3) estimations and prediction is a common error typically in the form of extrapolating the situation being observed (inductive fallacy)

3. Estimation (predictions)

Predictions and forecasts should always be expressed as a range of possible outcomes with associated probabilities


4. Strategic notice & action

Strategic notice of a future risk is not the same as prediction...Strategic notice enables us to anticipate and prepare for a future risk, prediction is used to assess the likelihood of it materialising

Strategic notice & action = preparedness

Strategic shocks are often associated with long-tail events...its important to consider the expected magnitude of the risk, as low probability events with high impact are often overlooked (black swan events)