Once solely the province of ivory-tower professors and college classrooms, contemporary philosophy was finally emancipated from its academic closet in 2010, when “The Stone” was launched in the New York Times . First appearing as an online series, the column has since attracted millions of readers through its accessible examination of universal topics like the nature of science, consciousness, and morality, while also probing more contemporary issues such as the morality of drones, gun control, and the gender divide. Now collected for the first time in this beautifully designed volume, The Stone Reader presents 133 deeply influential pieces, placing nearly the entirety of modern philosophical discourse at a reader’s grasp. With an introduction that details the column’s founding and distinct editorial process, this collection promises to become an intellectual landmark and the centerpiece of discussions for years to come.
These essays may at times seem too truncated and the editorial policy of the New York Times, where they first appeared in a column called The Stone, may be partially at fault. However, for someone who quickly glazes over at the massed abstractions of the Great Systematizers, I find the better essays clear and cogent. Here's my crème de la crème so far. My gratitude to the editors for their approach which touches on current social, political and cultural issues. You may be able to Google many of these articles on the New York Times site.
"Of Cannibals, Kings and Culture: The Problem of Ethnocentricity" —Adam Etison "The Limits of the Coded World"—William Egginton "On Modern Time"—Espen Hammer "Stormy Weather: Blues in Winter"—Avital Ronell "On Ducking Challenges to Naturalism"—Timothy Williamson "The Core of Mind and Cosmos"—Thomas Nagel "Things Fall Apart"—Philip Kitcher "Bursting the Neuro-utopian Bubble"—Benjamin Y. Fong "Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?"—Eddy Nahmias "Is the 'Dumb Jock' Really a Nerd?"—Jason Stanley and John W. Krakauer "The Dangers of Certainty: A Lesson from Auschwitz"—Simon Critchley "The Importance of the Afterlife. Seriously."—Samuel Scheffler "Why I Love Mormonism"—Simon Critchley "The Light at the End of Suffering"—Peg O'Conner "Should This Be the Last Generation?"—Peter Singer "Questions for Free-Market Moralists"—Amia Srinivasan "What is Economics Good For?"—Alex Rosenberg and Tyler Curtain "The Taint of 'Social Darwinism'"—Philip Kitcher
The American philosopher Stanley Cavell aptly defined philosophy as "education for grown-ups". This recent collection of essays, "The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments" (2016) shows how philosophical thinking may be practiced by reflective individuals who do not necessarily have philosophical or even higher academic education. The book is part of a long series of efforts by philosophers to persuade lay readers of the vitality and breadth of the passion for philosophical reflection. The book is an anthology of 133 articles from a series "The Stone" (after the proverbial Philosopher's Stone) that has been published in the New York Times beginning in 2010. The Stone series is the work of New York Times editor Peter Catapano and philosopher Simon Critchley who jointly also edited this volume.
The essays in this volume fulfill their promise of making philosophical thought accessible. The essays are short, well-written and argued, provocative, broad in scope, and snappy. They combine admirably thought and journalistic style. The book will help show readers how they often raise and explore philosophical questions in their own lives, sometimes without being aware that they are doing so. I was reminded of the book, "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" (1892) by the American idealist thinker, Josiah Royce, which is a series of lectures on philosophy, its history, and its issues that Royce delivered to lay audiences. Royce too wanted to show non-specialists the pervasive character of philosophical reflection.
The book is divided into four large sections, each of which receives a brief introduction by Simon Critchley. The four sections are further divided into manageable subsections. The first section of the book is titled simply "Philosophy" and it explores a range of questions about what Critchley describes as "the nature scope and identity of the discipline" and why it matters. Many of the essays take a broad approach to the question using, for example, questions posed by the ancient Greeks, while others bring in topical, contemporary issues, such as the status of women in philosophy. Throughout the volume, I found the essays of the former scope far more interesting than the topical essays. Among the essays I most enjoyed in this part of the book were "Philosophy as an Art of Dying" by Costica Bradatan and "Spinoza's Vision of Freedom and Ours" by Steven Nadler.
The second section, titled "Science" explores competing views on the nature of science and, as Critchley asks, on whether science "can explain everything". The essays explore the strengths and weaknesses of philosophical naturalism and discuss matters such as the nature of mind, evolution, neurology, and computer science in exploring what is left for thought separate from scientific investigation. A group of related opening essays by Timothy Williamson, Alex Rosenberg, Thomas Nagel, and Philip Kitcher explore the questions of naturalism at the broadest and, for me, were the highlight of this section.
The third section of the book "Religion and Morals" discusses questions surrounding the existence of God and the importance, if any, for religious belief to ethical behavior. In this section as well, the essays range from broad philosophical reflection on matters such as the existence of evil to current topical and political issues. Among the many fine essays in this section, I enjoyed Time Crane's "Mystery and Evidence", "Morals without God" by Frans de Wall, and Steven Asma's "The Myth of Universal Love".
The final section of the book, "Society" explores philosophical thinking on the nature of the good society, a question which was explored by philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza. There are some broad, insightful essays in this part of the book together with several essays that I liked less well. The weakest parts of this book are the essays dealing with topical American political issues such as feminism, the nature of marriage, (or as a contributor calls it "marriage") race relations, immigration, and gun control. These essays are marred because they are polemical, politically correct, and uniform -- all the contributors rush to say essentially the same types of things. I found most of these essays unconvincing and little better than the political speech that may readily be found elsewhere. Philosophers display no special competence on specific political issues. There are still some outstanding essays in this part of the book, including the final three: "The Myth of Just Do It" by Barbara Gail Montero, "How to Live Without Irony" by Christy Wampole, and Navigating Past Nihilism" by Sean Kelly. These essays, far more than the polemics, helped me think about contemporary life.
I want to mention as well the several essays in this book by Gay Gutting and by Simon Critchley himself, all of which are thoughtful and rewarding. Gutting's essays include "Is Our Patriotism Moral", one of the relatively few works which sound a note different from political correctness. An example of Critchley's essays is "Why I Love Mormonism" from the section of the book on Religion and Morals.
"The Stone Reader" is a fine, thoughtful book for readers wishing to engage in philosophical thinking. The essays are challenging and many of them deserve to be read more than once. The book shows the virtues of a definition of philosophy as "education for grown-ups".
Beginning in 2010 The New York Times's online format began publishing a series devoted to contemporary philosophy called The Stone. It proved so popular it was soon included in the paper's print edition. It's devoted to examining a wide range of contemporary issues from the context of philosophical argument as well as older, universal philosophical questions considered in the light of modern practice. Therefore, discussions in a discipline which is both changing and unchanged since the time of Socrates and on such topics as the morality of using drones alongside those pertaining to truth or knowledge mean the ideas deliberated here are both old and new.
As the title indicates, editors Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley have assembled a selection of 133 of the Stone essays divided into 4 broad sections: Philosophy, Science, Religion and Morals, and Society. Within those divisions are subsections which focus on distinctive issues. Beginning with "What Is a Philosopher?" and ending with the 133d essay, "Navigating Past Nihilism," 97 philosophers of our time write about modern ideas and affairs within a philosophical perspective, from the current meaning of freedom to racial democracy in America to the threat of global warming to the need for creating moral machines as we approach the onset of artificial intelligence to how much better literature makes us to the meaning of time. The fascinating list goes on.
Each of the essays is brief, only a few pages. They're accessible to any interested reader and thankfully free for the most part of philosophy's knottier idioms and terms which confuse laymen like me. I think it remarkable, given the large number of individuals writing here, that each piece is comprehensible and lacking in academic aridity.
I became attracted to the book because I'm attracted to the subject, but the format also lends itself to the slow, reflective read I had in mind. I kept to my plan of reading an essay a day so that over the course of those 133 days my deliberate pace allowed me to move slowly through the most interesting, important, and complex topics we live with today. Finished, I regret there aren't more. But the volume is so huge and inclusive that it seems bottomless, meaning I can return to it whenever I want as well as investigating the online essays available. I highly recommend this.
It is wise to know when one is ignorant said Socrates in Plato's dialogue, "The Apology" and this book reaffirmed my ignorance in many thought provoking philosophical debates.
The desire to finish this book was motivated by the Japanese word "Kaizen" , a Desire to improve, hopefully I have improved myself by reading this, though I cannot be sure, LOL....
This was a pleasant listen on audible; overall a bit dated; not all the essays are great, some are rather trite, banal; often I found authors overly self absorbed and smug; but then there are some gems to be found in this extensive collection, in particular the essays in the last third of the book were notably of better quality.
Calling this 'modern philosophy' seems a bit of a stretch. These are mostly glorified op-ed columns, some of which lean towards the philosophical, many of which are more about various political policy debates, or religion, or gun rights or whatever. It felt like half of them were some variation of a discussion on why we should be interested in philosophy in the first place. Can't say I read many of these short essays to the end. Usually a page would be enough, and I'd skip to the next one.
As with any book with 113 distinct essays, there will be some that stand above the others but, in general, this is a very nice collection from public intellectual philosophers. I'm thinking, actually, of using some of these essays to supplement the harder core primary readings that I assign my students.
This book is a collection of 133 philosophical essays originally published in the New York Times. The book was edited by Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley. Even if you don’t like philosophy, or if you don’t believe that philosophers have anything relevant to say in the 21st Century, you might change your mind after reading about some of the topics that are discussed by the various philosopher-authors, and by the force of their arguments. Some of the essays are refreshing, thought-provoking and enlightening. Others – not so much. One essay that I found to be especially compelling is titled "The Enlightenment's 'Race' Problem, and Ours" by Justin E. H. Smith, in which he discusses the differences between race and culture. It is lucid and well argued.
Less compelling, in my view, is the essay by Huw Price titled "Cambridge, Cabs and Copenhagen: My Route to Existential Risk." In it, the author argues for the existential risk of uncontrolled Artificial Intelligence (AI). He has completely ignored the fact that humans have risen to dominance, not solely due to their large brains, but also because of their hands with opposable thumbs, their eyes with the ability to discern color and distance, their ears that can hear and detect many forms of danger, their mouths that allow efficient communication with others of their species, and their fine motor control that enables them to build sophisticated and very small machines like watches and microprocessors. When artificially intelligent machines develop these same capabilities, I might worry a bit. That will, IMO, be a long distance into the future.
Simon Critchley’s essay on Mormonism is a fascinating and thought-provoking analysis of some of the philosophical roots of that religion. His thoughts arose from a series of lectures that he delivered at BYU in 1994, and from questions and comments that he received from his audiences. I found it to be well worth reading.
Another great essay is the one by Joseph Levine regarding the claim that Israel has a “right to exist.” The author points out that, although the Jewish people have a right to exist, the Jewish state does not. I interpreted his words to imply that lending credence to the claim that Jews have a right to their own state is to concede, for example, that Mormons might also have a right to their own state. After all, there are about the same number of Mormons in the world as there are Jews. His argument is forceful.
In her thoughtful and compelling essay titled “Think Before You Breed,” Christine Overall raises philosophical and ethical questions regarding whether, when, and how many children people should bear and rear. Amia Srinivasan, in an essay titled “Questions for Free Market Moralists” raises interesting and important points regarding the one topic that seems to be dominating political discourse in America today: Income Inequality. In an essay titled “The Veil of Opulence,” author and philosopher Benjamin Hale introduces the concept of a “veil of opulence” that should replace the “veil of ignorance” that has been debated by philosophers for decades when discussing the philosophy of economic justice. I found it to be insightful and incisive. It accurately describes and complements modern-day economic and political debates between liberals and conservatives.
In contrast to most of the other essays, I found that some of them, and especially those regarding race relations in the United States and elsewhere, and those on the issues of gun control, to be based on questionable premises, and tenuous logic. Some appeared to be not particularly well thought-out. In short, I found them to be less than compelling. Upon reading a couple of them, I was reminded of the story of the three blind men and the elephant. To me, the reasoning seems similarly faulty. All of the essays in the book have been ordered by thematic content, rather than chronologically, so this might be the reason why these particular essays are near the end of the book.
The essay “Who Needs a Gun?” by Gary Gutting is an example of one such weak argument. It rests on a shaky foundation. Gutting says that “[u]nless you live in (or frequent) dangerous neighborhoods or have family or friends likely to threaten you, it’s very unlikely that you’ll need a gun for self-defense.” He conveniently ignores the fact that crime has spread outwards from the inner-city, and that many, many of us now face threats from potential home invaders who enter our homes by force and brutally attack our residents. We can be sitting peacefully watching television, eating our dinners, or reading a book when criminals burst through the door and assault us, injuring and sometimes killing us. It happens. Guns are the only defense such victims might have because the perpetrators are able to wreak their violence, steal what they can grab, and are gone long before police can arrive. Mr. Gutting also has not addressed issues of car-jacking, road rage, terrorism attacks, or just plain random violence that can make victims of us regardless of our stations in life, or of the places where we happen to be eating or shopping when an attack takes places. His argument is naïve, at best. In the view of many, the only way that such potential victims can effectively defend themselves is through the use of guns. Gutting’s analysis is surprisingly shallow.
In his essay titled “The Weapons Continuum,” Michael Boylan continues Gutting’s philosophical arguments against gun ownership. His position is almost as weak as that of Gutting, resting on premises that are misleading or inaccurate. Fermin DeBrabander then goes on in the same vein in his essay titled “The Freedom of an Armed Society.” He uses much of the same sort of fuzzy and misleading terminology, such as “high caliber weapon.” Never mind that none of these authors has defined this term. Never mind that the word “clip” is used incorrectly by them. Never mind that the small caliber .223 (5.56mm) is a very potent and potentially deadly weapon that can readily deal death and destruction, and that it is the weapon of choice for such shooters as Adam Lanza (Sandy Hook Elementary School), James Holmes (Aurora, CO movie theater), Syed Farook (San Bernardino, CA), to name just three. Many other mass shooters have also chosen this small caliber weapon as the instrument of their evil deeds. For philosopher authors such as Gutting, Boylan and DeBrabander to rest their positions on such false and misleading premises weakens their arguments and contributes nothing meaningful to the national discourse on gun control. Perhaps they should have done their homework before writing their essays. You should, however, read them and judge for yourself.
DeBrabander goes on to decry the Oklahoma law that legalized “open carry,” in which guns can be carried openly, visible to all. He somehow seems to believe that a gun that can be seen by everybody is somehow more dangerous than a gun that is concealed from view. How does that make any sense at all? He appears to be making a distinction without a difference. In my view, the essay by Todd May titled “Is American Nonviolence Possible?” is a much more carefully analyzed and presented argument for gun control. In it, the author digs more deeply into the roots of gun violence in America, and presents weightier questions than those to be found in the latest TV news sound bites. In his essay, May avoids the use of trite and false gun terminology such as that often heard on TV news shows. He looks much more deeply into the causes of violence, and not just into the use of guns. I found his essay to be definitely worth reading.
John Kaag and Sarah Kreps wrote an essay titled “The Moral Hazard of Drones,” in which they argue the immorality of the use of drones in warfare. Never mind that the same sort of argument can be made against the use of aircraft of any kind in warfare, including those with pilots. The same logic used by these authors to argue against the use of drones could be employed against the use of any kind of aircraft against soldiers on the ground, or against the use of tanks or other armored vehicles against unarmored infantry soldiers, or against the use of machine guns against riflemen. It could apply to a large and strong soldier in unarmed combat against a smaller, weaker soldier. The entire argument can be reduced to absurdity. The authors also use an anecdote about a mythical figure named Gyges who supposedly finds a ring that can make him invisible and subsequently uses it to murder a king. They use the story to support their assertion that the use of drones is immoral. I found it to be a thin and unconvincing argument. In fact, it is ludicrous.
J.M. Bernstein wrote an interesting analysis of why the Tea Party and its individual members seem to be so angry. The essay is appropriately titled “ The Very Angry Tea Party.” It is worth reading and considering. Although written almost six years ago, it neatly and convincingly describes the reasons for the rise of Donald Trump in our American politics of 2016.
Readers will probably find that, depending on their individual perspectives, some of the essays might be more interesting and stimulating than others. At 133, there were far too many of them for me to comment on all of them. Most of them, however, were quite thought-provoking, even though I chose only a few on which to comment. I hope that readers of this review might gain a flavor for the contents of the book and appreciate some of the essays I described.
This is a truly excellent book. Even though at 775 pages it is hardly light reading, it is worth the effort for anybody interested in philosophic arguments, and especially as those arguments might apply in the modern era.
Philosophy for the everyman, New York Times, newspaper column, contemporary social issues, political issues, economic issues
Who thought philosophy could be easy to read? The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments presents philosophical exploration of contemporary social, political, and economic issues in bite-sized morsels that anyone can read, find interesting and, dare I say it, find entertaining.
I tried to read a few of the essays out of sequence and it didn't work. Too often, when I randomly selected an essay to read, it referred back to an earlier column and I felt I should to go back and read the referred column first.
The variations in voice from column to column keeps the reading from getting tedious.
Because each essay started out as a newspaper column, none of them is particularly long. One can sit down and read an essay on a ten or fifteen minute break. The brevity allows readers to stop and think about each essay, too, because there's a natural stopping point at the end of each focused idea. Too often today we read stuff and move on immediately to whatever is next. It's good to stop and think.
As one would expect from any collection of essays by philosophers, navel gazing is a problem. I am guessing that philosophers have a much higher opinion of themselves than most non-philosophers have for them so the philosophers feel a little defensive.
I haven't actually read this book from-cover-t0-cover, but I look forward to pulling it off the shelf now and then to read a random essay and think further on it. I will nab a copy of editor Peter Catapano's Question Everything: A Stone Reader as well since it builds on the same collection of philosophy columns from the New York Times but, apparently, sorts them more systematically into contemporary topics of interest.
This book is a collection from NY Times' online columns on "The Stone", most of the works dated around 2010. It is organized as short essays covering a wide range of topics, mostly "practical" as per NY Times' core reading constituents. The articles have a general consistency of lengthy, tone, and brevity, and facile breeziness for the medium they were originally presented. One imagines the academics holding their assignments with editorial injunctions for word counts, contents, and tonal preferences.
For this reader, the value of this voluminous book is to find a few voices that provide deeper insights. Here they are:
Jim Holt : for questioning the literature quality in contemporary philosophic writing. Quoting others, the prevailing style is "correct, scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid", "a kind of all-purpose solvent", "long haul of technical reflection".
Tim Crane: on Mystery and Evidence, tackling the issue of scientific process versus religious myths. He thinks "while religious thinking is widespread in the world, while scientific thinking is not. I don't think that this can be accounted for merely in terms of the ignorance or irrationality in human beings. Rather, it is because of the kind of intellectual, emotional and practical appeals that religion has for people, which is very different from the kind of appeal that science is."
Simon Critchley: a very thorough review of Kierkegaard's "Works of Love", stating that "It is very hard to be Christian ... Kiekegaard writes, 'you have absolutely nothing to do with what others do to you, essentially, you have only to do with yourself before God.'" Hence the social relationship of man-vs-man becomes man-God-man, where the relationship is anchored by God in the middle. The central theme comes from Matthew 7:3 And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? We can not judge others, our relationship with them can not be defined by the quid pro quo, that is the main point of Critchley's "Rigor of Love".
Let me preface this review by saying that the two stars are more a reflection of me than of the content of this book. I am not the target audience for this book--I don't know a Kant from a Kierkegaard, but I'm open to learning more about the basics of philosophy. However, I think the contributors to this book assume a hefty bit of background knowledge. I did not read every essay in the book, rather I chose the ones whose subjects interested me (and skipped essays that didn't pique my interest after a paragraph or three).
That being said, I found some of the essays to be very thought provoking, particularly the sections on contemporary interpretations of philosophy as a discipline ("New Impressions of an Old Profession"), contemporary American political thought ("Politics and Economics"), and what science can, can't, should, and shouldn't do ("Can Science Explain Everything?"). Also, each essay is available online (where they were originally published on the New York Time's website) so I can cite them when getting into arguments with strangers online...I mean, re-read and cite my favorite pieces.
A compilation of 133 essays. My favorite was the last: Navigating Past Nihilism by Sean D Kelly:
Herman Melville articulated and hoped for the possibility of a different kind of happiness from that which the Judeo-Christian epoch of Western history sustained, writing 30 yrs before Nietzsche, in Moby Dick, “lower the conceit of attainable felicity.” Find happiness and meaning not in some universal religious account of the order of the universe that holds for everyone at all times, but rather in the local and small-scale commitments that animate a life well-lived. The meaning that one finds in a life dedicated to “the wife, the heart, the bed, the table, the saddle, the fireside, the country.” -- these are genuine meanings.
Someone else with radically different commitments might nevertheless be living in a way way that deserves one’s admiration
There are many different lives of worth, and no single principle or source or meaning in virtue of which one properly admires them all.
Disappointing. Very few insights, and very uneven writing. There were a few nice pieces worth discussing, but there was too much else to wade through to get to the gems.Towards the end, when the subject was society, many of the articles really should have been on the op-ed page; they were just the writers' political opinion, lacking in the careful thinking I would expect of a philosopher. This book does not motivate me to look for the Stone column in the NY Times.
I need to own the book as it is one that cannot be enjoyed when the library gives you two weeks to read. It is a book you put up and down. It is a book that draws you to the essays you think you will enjoy reading the most first. You want time to mull them over. But the book is almost forty bucks so will check it out a couple of more times when in the mood.
Quite laughable in retrospect, but it made me furious with its poor and/or inane arguments. It does have some respected writers, like Critchley and Avital Ronell, so I can only assume it is the online newspaper format that leads to idiocy.
I was motivated enough by the contents to comment upon 28 of the essays. Imagine my disappointment when I found that my full review could not be posted here due to a word count limit. I guess that just is the nature of life and experience, to be disappointing. From the 28 full reviews that I have written, I could only post a sample of 10.
See pp. 278 – 291 - The two essays on AI, ‘The Future of Moral Machines’ by Colin Allen (pp.278 – 283) and ‘Cambridge, Cabs and Copenhagen: My Route to Existential Risk’ by Huw Price (pp. 284 – 291). Both essays are very well done but my question is about the AI risk that went unmentioned and was only touched upon by Huw Price. I do not think there is much risk from AI dominating humanity in terms of smart machines and robots taking over the planet and enslaving the human race The risk comes from us in the form of augmented human beings. I look to the quest for the electric car as a model. The dream of the electric was never realized but the hybrid car, part gasoline engine, part electric motor and battery, is a reality. Perhaps the dream for full AI will never be realized but I think the hybrid human, part biological, part AI, with selected augmentation, will become a reality and will become a new super race of human beings. What are the social risks and cultural outcomes of an AI augmented human race existing side-by-side with purely biological human beings? I can imagine some dark and frightening scenarios based on nothing more than the most cursory review of human history. Unless the AI augmentation technology is made available to every living human being, and there is no reason to think it will, the future of humanity divided into an augmented super race and a biological under race is very plausible. I would have liked to have seen one of the very capable contributors to this book address this risk potential with more depth and rigor than I can devote to it in this simple review.
See pp. 309 – 314 for the essay by Andy Clark, ‘Do Thrifty Brains Make Better Minds?’ If this Kantian hypothesis is correct, and I think this likely, there are some unsettling implications not discussed in the essay. The idea from Kant is one of the imagination completing sense perceptions to form concepts of understanding. Basically put, the hypothesis is that our perceptions are completed, filled in so to speak, based on our expectations. That is, our expectations, built up from a long history of perceptions automatically complete the otherwise incomplete experience of immediate perception. If indeed our everyday and new perceptions are routinely competed and filled in by expectation built from our own history of perceptions and our imagination, what does this imply for such staples of human experience as eye witness testimony? If our expectations determine what we perceive, or as stated by the author “… to ’trump’ certain aspects of incoming sensory signals…” (p. 312), then “…perceiving, understanding and imagining in a single package. Now there’s a deal!” (p. 314), may not be such a great deal; at least not for one convicted on the strength of eyewitness testimony. Though this very unsettling implication is not discussed in the essay, the author does provide a wonderful quote apposite to the implication “…future perceptions will also be similarly sculpted – a royal recipe for tainted evidence and self-fulfilling negative prophecies.” (p. 313).
See pp. 317 – 321 for the essay by Benjamin Y. Fong, ‘Bursting the Neuro-utopian Bubble’. This is a very troubling essay, but not for the reasons the author presents. The author asks “What happens when health insurance companies get hold of this information?” (This information being neuro-brain mapping information analogues to human genome mapping) Fair enough, but may I also ask, what happens when government gets hold of this information? A government that no less may potentially manage both health insurance and health care? The author speaks about neuro scientists being naïve about the ‘corporate wolves’ with whom they run. The author accuses research scientists of willful ignorance regarding corporate influence. What about the author’s willful ignorance about the influence of government? If ‘neuromarketing’ is a risk (p. 319), what about neuro-governance? Where does the author suppose the massive research funding necessary for such groundbreaking and cutting-edge work will come? Most likely, from private enterprise or government, neither the abode of saints. One place it will not come from is those precious university endowment funds!
More troubling is the author’s causal fallacy in the confusion of correlation with cause or perhaps to even reverse cause and effect or to even confuse an accompanying event for a cause. Yes, there is a connection between schizophrenia and poverty. The author states on p. 320 that “…in the face of the known connection between poverty and schizophrenia” and suggests that research focus should turn toward changing socioeconomic conditions rather than to direct neuro and genetic research. Perhaps the causal chain works in reverse here and it is the unfortunate and tragic disorder of schizophrenia that is the cause of poverty? The author also states “…that low socioeconomic status at birth is associated with greater risk of developing schizophrenia,…” (p. 320). Assuming this is the case, it could instead very well be that people in low socioeconomic status, due to schizophrenia, with untreated or un-treatable schizophrenia, having children to whom the condition is passed, presents the ostensible but misleading finding that schizophrenia results from low socioeconomic status at birth when the arcane problem really is that untreated or even un-treatable schizophrenia is the cause of the low socioeconomic status at birth in the first place. In this case, the research focus and funding should most definitely be directed toward finding treatment options and a cure through neuro and genetic research rather than in attempting to reorder society at some fundamental level. As desirable as some of this reordering might indeed be, t is s very indirect way in which to treat the tragic conditions of mental illness. I agree with the author that the best scientific research is no substitute for the responsibly we bare for working toward a more just society, even if small and incremental progress is all we are capable.
See pp. 330 – 336, the essay by Eddy Nahmias, ‘Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?’ Excellent essay. However, it seems that a possible path to the compatibility of free will and determinism is overlooked. I agree in the main with the author, our efforts are better spent in explaining how free will works rather than in explaining it away (p. 332). The mistake is to cast the discussion of free will versus determinism in terms of a one-size fits all answer so to speak; of addressing the problem as a whole rather than in the parts as I believe it actually exists in the world. I believe the error is in thinking that the world, and the human experience of it, can be characterized as either deterministic or subject to free will. Even standard compatibility comprise solutions are fitted to explain and account for the entire human experience of existence and the world. It seems to me that the most obvious compromise is that each individual human being experiences different levels of free will and determinism and to a different degree and in changing proportions over the course of life. The only two fully, but admittedly most important, points in life that can be said to be fully deterministic (no free will possible) are birth and death. Think of this as a chart with free will plotted on the vertical axis (0% to 100%) and a person’s age plotted on the horizontal axis (0 – 85?). The only two points that can be plotted with certainty, at a level of 0% on the vertical axis, are those corresponding to the birth (first point) and death (last point) on the horizontal axis. Between these two points, one can imagine any number of, actually a great number of, curves that can be fitted to connect the two points that represent the course of any given person’s life. I am not claiming to know that shape of the curve connecting the two points, that is the very point, no two curves are likely to be the same, but I very much doubt that there is only one such curve that can be said to characterize the human experience as a whole. No two charts are likely to be identical. Each individual life is governed by different and changing levels and free will and determinism over the course of life. The capacity for free will is greatly determined by the first, the most important and fully deterministic causal antecedent - the circumstance, place, time and attributes of birth. The irresistible ethical implication here is that one born to privilege, wealth and opportunity will have a greater capacity for free will and thus has greater moral, ethical, social and yes, legal responsibility than one born into deprivation, poverty and limited opportunity. We do not have to give up on free will and with it moral, ethical and legal responsibility, but we must scale it better. In the interest of justice, we must be aware that free will and hard causal determinism do not reside in the same proportions or at equal levels for each individual. The author touches upon this when he explains free will as a matter of capacities with the understanding that these capacities are much more than being conscious of one’s appetites, desires and plans. The next move is to understand that each individual is born with a different set of causally determined capacities and the capacity to develop these capacities. Thus, I agree again with the author that we possess less free will then we like to suppose (p. 336). But if we are fully deterministic beings, then the evolution of consciousness must be taken to be some sort of evolutionary error and this does not seem to be correct. Oh yes, I have of course plotted one such chart for myself and I am not even sure if this one is correct, but it is the only one I can hope to know.
See pp 353 – 357, ‘Can Neuroscience Challenge Roe v. Wade’ by William Egginton. Is the author serious? My objection has nothing to do with the right to abortion. I am not opining on the ethics of abortion in this review. I am not writing from the perspective of someone who wants prohibit abortion or the use of RU-486. I just cannot believe that author is seriously referring to Descartes to refute the findings of neuroscience. I greatly admire the contribution and accomplishments of Descartes a great deal, but not in this case. The issue at stake is whether an unborn fetus can feel pain and if so, can this be established by neuroscience and if so, should this be the basis for curtailing the practice of abortion? That is, does pain sentience equal personhood? The author relies upon Descartes to establish that pain sentience does not equate to full-fledged personhood. So, what of it? Regardless of personhood, to knowingly cause pain to a being with sentience enough to feel that pain, whether human, animal or fetal is prima facia immoral and unethical. I do not pretend to know the answer to the question of fetal pain but any thoughtful being should be appalled at causing pain to another being sentient enough to feel such pain, mouse or man. Using the legal definition of personhood to avoid the ethical responsibility for causing pain is odious and appalling! Using a 17th century understanding of sentience and consciousness to refute the finding of 21st century natural and neuroscience science seems to me anachronistic at best, even bizarre. The author speaks of “…the hubris of scientific claims to knowledge that exceeds the boundaries of what the sciences in fact demonstrate” (p. 353). This is a fair enough point but what of the hubris in using the ideas from the 17th century to refute 21st century scientific research? Let us not forget that this vaunted philosophic tradtion inaugurated by Descaerts and his followers led to the belief that animals did not feel pain because they lacked ‘reflective’ consciousness. This paved the way for the appalling dissection of live animals, the nailing of live animals to planks for dissection and open experimentation and surgical procedures on live animals, the obvious distress and cries of the animals in pain being discounted as merely reactive, not reflective consciousness. This is the standard we are to use in determining the authenticity of fetal pain?
Interestingly, Sam Harris has devolved from neuroscientist (p. 330) to polemicist (p. 356). Does this author need to engage in pejorative ad hominem attacks to bolster his case? This to me is a sign of the weakness of his argument. In another odd statement, the author claims: “Science can no more decide that question [what counts for full-fledged personhood] than it can determine the existence or nonexistence of God.” (p. 356). Really? I thought that our basis for the doubt as to the existence of God and the conclusion in the outright impossibility as to the existence of God was precisely informed by our growing scientific understanding of nature. In any case, the notion of personhood in the context of this argument is a classic red hearing. The issue is the morality and ethics of pain knowingly caused by a being sentient enough to know that is causing pain to another being sentient enough to feel that pain. Even if it is true that pain can only be known by inference from personal experience and observed reactions, this changes nothing from an ethical perspective. This is the issue at stake here. Please, let’s allow science to progress and refine its findings before we dismiss these findings. Science has served humanity so well for so long, why do we now discount it in favor of a philosophic tradition emanating from the early modern period of Europe?
See pp. 497 – 502, ‘The Sacred and the Human’ by Anat Biletzki. On p. 497, the author quotes Ronald Dworkin “we almost all accept…that human life in all its forms is sacred.” At least the essential adverb modifier ‘almost’ was used because I am one of those who does not accept that human life in all its forms is sacred. This belief is as ubiquitous as it is false. It is as well, a very selfish view. Before I shock the readers of this review too much, please allow me explain further, but only in due course. First, part of why I think this to be the case follows on p. 497 where the author quotes R.H. Tawney “…every human being is of infinite importance…” This is unsound on logical grounds. How can a finite being be of infinite value? Further, (not Anat Biletzki’s view) “But to believe this it is necessary to believe in God.” Well, at least this much is correct. If a person can be believe in God, there is likely no limit to what person might believe, even that a finite being can be of infinite value. Both beliefs are equally absurd but do make very nice comfort beliefs with which many otherwise reasonable people indulge. I agree with author that religiously derived ethics are always suspect and even where beneficial, they are at risk.
My view, not likely too far from that of the author (p.489), is that our sacredness is independent of our individualism. This is why I cannot accept that all human life in all its forms is sacred. The sacredness is not contained in, and cannot be confined to, individual human beings, or any one individual person, any more than a finite being can be the container of infinite value. The sacredness of human life is in the relationships we cultivate and have with each other. It is the relationship nexus that is sacred. There is nothing sacred in our just being individual human beings. As discussed in the essay by Lisa Guenther (pp.531 – 534), the very structure of our humanity is relational with the support of others being crucial for a coherent experience of existence. The claim of which by any single person is scared is quite pretentious and selfish. It is not the fact of our individual humanity that makes us sacred, it is our relation to each other as human beings that is and makes us sacred. Human sacredness is the mutually supportive and thus beneficial relationships we form with each other and maintain overtime. This is not achieved through command, secular or sacred. It is achieved through our continued biological, social and cultural evolution. This is what commands us (to answer the author’s question) “to be available to the neediness, the suffering, the vulnerability of the other persons” as posited by Hilary Putnam - p. 500. Here is the true human miracle if one needs miracles. Individual human dignity does not turn the engine of human rights as stated by the author on p. 501. The principles of ethics are empathy and compassion which include the non-human realm of existence, the existential source of which is the authentic self and the phenomenology of empathy, the connections and bonds between sentient beings in our shared experience of existence. Perhaps here is here we finally arrive at the “…the starry night above me and moral law within me” as so pleasantly quoted from Kant by the author in closing on p. 502. Yes, I must admit that my position is also a metaethical one in that I am accepting at the outset of my comments that ethics is possible.
See pp. 503 - 508, ‘Confessions of an Ex-Moralist’ by Joel Marks. As the essay continues, we find the concepts of right and wrong exchanged for desirable and undesirable but the practical consequent is the same, only the language changes. There is no new metaethics here, only a change in syntax. The author posits the interesting hypothesis that in the absence of moral right and wrong, our desires would be the same because it is desire that drives human behavior, not ethics, not morality, not God, and not notions of right or wrong. The author faults himself for bad faith in believing in the absolute possibility of ethics, morals, good and evil, when he knew, but could not admit, the impossibility of each. The author states “Mother Teresa was acting as much from desire as the Marquis de Sade.’ (p. 506). The risk here is in conflating desires and rendering all desires to be of equal value. Also, this statement immediately strikes me as narrow and reductive. If we conflate all desires, how are we to decide upon desirable desires and understanding that not all desires are desirable? The author tells us that all justice becomes a matter of preference. The distinction of ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’ gives way to the distinction of desirable from undesirable. This amounts to nothing more than an alternative way of discussing right and wrong, good and evil
"Ex pumice aquam" (Or, Two Ways of Looking at The Stone)
The Stone Reader collects 133 essays from the early days of The Stone, an online New York Times feature moderated by the famous scholar of 'Continental' philosophy Simon Critchley. Although my literal traffic in New York ended a bit before Giuliani took office, I am going to speculate that the material here is bounded both by place and time; the essays commissioned from notable philosophers are appealing enough, but one is left a bit empty-handed at the end of the book's nearly 800 pages.
1) The material reflects a perennial New York obsession with 'accessibility': though these are some of the most notable names of their era, the authors are generally very concerned with you getting to know them and less concerned with 'laying' the complicated words of historical figures on you. As a philosophical gadfly (for fun if not for profit) I think this approach slightly misguided; If philosophy has a distinctive tenor as a discipline it is by being rightly oriented by what sociology is bedeviled by, the importance of 'classic' authors. The tid-bits offered up out of famous names here are not nothing, and there is 'manful' breadth in cultural diversity, but the reality is the American populace is decidedly under-served in terms of mastering the 'metanarratives' the names of great philosophers epitomize. Those who worry about discussions of Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, or maybe someone else being 'sophomoric' are juvenile; the point is precisely to create spaces of freedom in people's lives, just as the work of John Dewey (the only major historic American philosopher to work out of New York) did. Drilling in texts, as opposed to 'getting cozy', is worthwhile; the material is pitched both too low and too high to serve this function.
2) The dates of publication are printed at the end of the essays, revealing that we are looking at the Weltanschauung of the first Obama term. It is practically painful to read the words in light of the historical distance, and I do not say this as supercilious self-aggrandizement; one almost realizes for the first time what a naive era it was in the sense that people who had sat through what could truly be called some of the darkest days of this country in living memory, the administration of George W. Bush, were tentatively feeling out a way of existing in this century (which was what we would now call 'woke' but not especially militant). I found myself at one point mentally introjecting the word 'emolument' into one of the essays, but it is also true the curiosity of this era—that a democratic socialism which for a long time 'dared not speak its name' is now a virtually-accepted ideological position in the US—is in almost no way foreshadowed by what you see here.
For these reasons I left the book with a sense of sadness rather than 'intellectual optimism', and that's not the best position for intellectual elites to leave you in.
A hefty philosophy reader curated from the New York Times, The Stone editorial series. The book is an anthology of essays divided into 4 thematic sections: general philosophy, science, religion and morals, and society. Each section is equally good and makes for interesting reading. On the upside the essays are pretty approachable, averaging about 10 pages each, well-written, and arouses curiosity in the topic—never boring. On the downside, they do not have the typical academic rigor, rhetoric, and argumentative form you expect from a typical philosophy paper. That may be a relief for some, but for others, they may seem a bit too specious. The tradeoff between rigor and approachability is understandable though.
I read the book from cover-to-cover in sequence. It took me about 2 months to read between other books because there is so much material and could be a heavy read at times. I had to re-read some essays because I sometimes got lost in the argumentation or lost my concentration while reading. Although this book is approachable it is a heavy slough. To get the full value of the book I am going to re-read some essays again randomly, giving myself more space to think.
My favorite essay was The Myth of “Just do it.” and a close second would be The Cycle of Revenge. My favorite subsections were Morality’s God Game and Economics and Politics. I highly recommend reading The Stone Reader, but I would not recommend reading it from cover-to-cover as I did. I would choose a topic arousing my curiosity, take my time reading it, think about what I read, and read it again. This time around I will do some note-taking and follow up references online for deeper analysis. The bibliography for the reader is weak. The best you get is some references embedded within the essays and the list of authors at the end. For further reading, online search engines were my friend.
Disclaimer: I won this book in a GoodReads First Reads Giveaway.
I was SO excited to win this book. I had read the Stone column in NYTimes before receiving this, and a professor I knew was using this book in his beginning college writing class to teach thesis-driven papers/arguments.
And it doesn't disappoint. It covers so many topics. Just when you think you're getting tired of one topic, it switches. It lingers longer on some topics, sometimes because a scandal/event concerning that topic was big in the news (i.e. Dylan Roof, healthcare)). When it lingers longer on a certain issue, the essays take the format of a conversation. The following author usually comments on the previous author and disagrees or pushes back on a single point. It's fantastic because if an essay leaves you convinced, there will be someone smart and well-written to make sure you fight back against feeling too comfortable.
When I first started reading, I was taking a Philosophy of Science class, and the "Science" section of this book matched up beautifully with my course material. I think it even integrated an author from the textbook I was using. If you don't have time to take a class, this book provides a brief but well-written summary by philosophers from the field. Almost all of it rung true to things I was reading at university.
A tip for reading: don't get too picky about certain points. These essays need to be broad, and sometimes they will make leaps in order to make a larger point about something else. Don't focus on the leaps when thinking about it; grab a hold of the salient argument and push back against that. You will notice that this is how the conversation-type essays responding to each other work.
Very happy to add this galley to my collection even though it's a galley and does have some weird little errors. Maybe I'll even use it when I become a teacher/professor.
(Audiobook version) Great compilation work of a printed column of essays that I had never heard of. This work is very large, 26 hours of audio, but the great variety of topics keeps it fresh. As an amateur thinker this book was great exposure to different aspects of modern philosophical thought, however I would not recommend this book as an introduction. It does assume the reader knows at least the Philosophy 101 stuff.
It does have flashes of its time (articles presented are from earlier in the 2010's) so you do hear more than a few essays based on Travon Martin, or the Occupy Wall Street movement, etc. But these are not solved problems and the thinking displayed on the subjects is easily translated to the slightly more modern manifestations thereof.
I have two other Philosophy books I'd recommend over this. Any of the Paul Strathern's 90-minutes series or Baggini's always-fun The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten are (in my opinion) better. Also the The Great Courses has some wonderful introductory lectures. But after those are digested, this compendium holds its own and is also recommended.
I am off to find the second collection of these essays, called Modern Ethics in 77 Arguments.
I took my time with this volume, read it intermittently, piece by piece over a few months or so, trying to do one section a day. I'm no philosopher, probably never will be, so maybe that accounts for the time.
I think my wife enjoyed me reading the book more than I did; I've lauded the contents, shared them with others, thrown the book over my balcony in disgust and, frequently, sat there arguing with it or debating line after line with it to my neighbors'/workmates'/wifes' delight.
Which is why I enjoyed it so much. If the purpose of philosophy is (at least in part) to make you think, and to make you question and/or understand why you think the way you do, this book achieved its purpose. For me, not being an American, it did lose a deal of relevance towards the end; and that's a minor drawback.
I don't think I could go cover to cover on this one in a few settings; well worth the effort, even if a fair few articles are repeats/reprints of the authors' Modern Ethics in 77 Arguments.
This collection of 133 short contemporary philosophical essays from The New York times offers much to think about across a range of topics. These short essays on topics related to classical philosophy, religion, science, and society have been written by different philosophers, and although the collection is rather uneven, I found many of them to be quite insightful and thought-provoking.
These essays do tend to be rather left-leaning, especially those that deal with social topics. In addition, many of the authors make a lot of assumptions, which seemed strange for those trained in rational thought. While some essays were a little dry, those that were most effective seemed to begin with a personal experience of the author, make connections between contemporary dilemmas and philosophical arguments, and explain complex arguments in easy-to-understand language. Overall, I enjoyed this collection’s attempts to make classical philosophy more accessible and to engage in nuanced discussions of complex social issues.
Grayling's excellent historical overview of philosophy left a bad taste in my mouth when it comes to contemporary scholars. The continental vs. analytical fight and obsession with mathematical precision in logic annoyed me and left me feeling discouraged about the ability of philosophy to apply itself appropriately to contemporary debates. So I picked up this reader hoping to refute that perception. Catapano, Critchley, and the authors do an admirable job drawing upon historical wisdom while examining our modern world. Some of the essays are stronger than the others, and there is a certain staleness as the essays first appeared in the New York Times and thus attempt to have news hooks. But in general, the book demonstrated that philosophers still deserve a seat at the table as we examine the world today.
Finally finished this (after three months, while reading other things as well). Pretty much all over the map: some essays were incredibly compelling, others made me want to rip my hair out with the degree to which I thought them academic navel-gazing. For example, can poetry be paraphrased? Really, who gives a rat's ass, even if you love poetry? How would the world change one iota if it can or cannot be?
I originally started this out of my love for the TV series The Good Place, which probably explains why I wish it had gone more heavily into ethics than into various corners of academic philosophy.
This is a collection of short columns from the NYT Stone column - a column about philosophical topics and generally authored by philosophers. The topics are wide ranging and the pieces are disciplined and short - although well written and not excessively technical at all. These are not the same as short philosophy papers but they are thoughtful and entertaining on a wide range of topics. These help to clarify what are current topics of philosophical interest and who is doing significant work on those topics. It is a good prompt for reading further, either in books or articles. There is another collection on ethics that I am looking forward to after finishing this.
It took me nearly a month to finish, but this book contained some interesting essays about a wide range of topics. The ones featured toward the end stand out most, particularly the ones about race, guns, war, and religion. The early elements of the book were clearly meant for people who paid closer attention in philosophy class. Unfortunately, I’m not in that category. It took a bit to get into it. An essay discussing the temptations of Christ and the story’s implication on the true definition of religious faith was probably my favorite, as I immediately shared the key parts with my girlfriend. This triggered an interesting conversation. Glad to be finished!
This is a book about how philosophy may be brought to the people. It consists of 133 pieces written, largely by philosophy academics, for The New York Times around 2012 or so. Some of the pieces are genuinely revelatory, even for an old Philosopher like myself (who studied in the same institution as Critchley). Others are good retreads of old arguments. Still others, especially towards the end or already dated and possibly were jaded even when published.
Variable quality, I liked the first two sections (Philosophy, Science) better than the later sections. Toward the end, some of the essays had little or no philosophical content - just political or social essays. Some interesting, but not in the theme of the book. Some seem quaint, as they are from the 2010-2012 era.
Some of the better ones: Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene When Hope Tramples Truth Nothing to see here: demoting the uncertainty principle
This took me FOREVERRRRR but I will be buying it. Far too many essays I took note of to never look at them again.
The only section that really felt like a drag was Section II: Science. Maybe I was in over my head, or maybe it just wasn’t my jam.
Would encourage anyone wanting to dip in to philosophy to pick this up. Each essay is less than 10 pages and makes for easy reading. I’ll upload a list of my absolute favorites sometime soon.