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Transparency and Reflection: A Study of Self-Knowledge and the Nature of Mind
The topic of self-knowledge has been central to philosophy since antiquity--but if self-knowledge deserves to be not just a goal that each of us should privately pursue, but a topic that philosophers should investigate in general terms, on what basis does it claim our attention? Much contemporary work in philosophy and cognitive science treats human cognition and perception as processes of representation manipulation, unaffected by our capacity for self-awareness. In Transparency and Reflection Matthew Boyle challenges this paradigm by urging a reconsideration of the classical idea that the capacity for reflective self-knowledge is an essential feature of human mindedness.
Boyle argues that our ability for reflective self-knowledge is a byproduct of the "first person perspective" on our own lives that all human beings possess, as rational animals, and he seeks to defend this perspective against influential forms of skepticism about its soundness. Once we appreciate the connection between having a first person perspective on our own minds and having the capacity for self-knowledge, Boyle suggests, we can see a link between debates about how we know our own minds and the dark but intriguing idea that Jean-Paul Sartre expressed in his remark that, for a human being, "to exist is always to assume its being" in a way that implies "an understanding of human reality by itself."
Boyle argues that our ability for reflective self-knowledge is a byproduct of the "first person perspective" on our own lives that all human beings possess, as rational animals, and he seeks to defend this perspective against influential forms of skepticism about its soundness. Once we appreciate the connection between having a first person perspective on our own minds and having the capacity for self-knowledge, Boyle suggests, we can see a link between debates about how we know our own minds and the dark but intriguing idea that Jean-Paul Sartre expressed in his remark that, for a human being, "to exist is always to assume its being" in a way that implies "an understanding of human reality by itself."
- GenresPhilosophy
304 pages, Hardcover
Published February 23, 2024
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April 1, 2026
This book is superficially easy to read. I thought I understood the contours of Boyle's account addressing how we can knowledgeably self-ascribe intentional mental states in the absence of drawing inferences and in a manner that is "non-alienating." I now see I'm still quite confused, and probably need to re-read this work. In particular, I think I need to give more thought to Kant's account of self-consciousness (based in his view of the transcendental unity of apperception) and Sartre's account. Boyle supposedly wanted to vindicate Kant's, but found that it was limited; and he regarded Sartre's as offering resources for overcoming these limitations. I haven't quite put my finger on how that's supposed to work.
Any how, let me spell out basic points that I think I've gotten so far. The key to accounting for self-knowledge, according to Boyle, lies in the structure of consciousness. To understand his solution, we thus need to understand Boyle’s view of this structure, which he takes from Jean-Paul Sartre. On this Sartrean view, there are two basic modes of consciousness: “nonpositional” and “positional” consciousness. I’ll first introduce each mode and the relationship between them. I’ll then explain how they are supposed to enable us to primitively achieve self-knowledge.
According to Boyle, whenever we’re aware of something, we have “positional consciousness.” This is an expansive category that roughly corresponds to what is typically called an intentional mental state. For example, it includes my perception of my hands, my memory of my childhood home, my thought about a philosophical problem, or my imagination of being a mermaid. Insofar as it is useful to stick to everyday language, I’ll often call what Boyle calls positional consciousness a “[intentional] mental state.” (I now see that this is limited... there should be a substantive reason why Boyle and Sartre switched from talk of intentional states to positional consciousness. The two should not be merely synonymous).
Would any moment of consciousness constitute positional consciousness, then? Not exactly. It is integral to Boyle’s account that the content of any instance of positional consciousness be something that we can regard as an object, dissociable from ourselves as subjects. Perhaps there are some aspects of conscious experience that are not dissociable in this way.
Nonpositional consciousness, in contrast, consists in a special form of awareness of our intentional mental states (i.e., positional consciousness). We’re supposed to be nonpositionally conscious of these states whenever we have them. In other words, positional consciousness is supposed to be always accompanied by nonpositional consciousness. Insofar as it is useful to stick to everyday language, I’ll sometimes call that which Boyle calls nonpositional consciousness “primitive awareness [of being in an intentional mental state].” It is “primitive” in the sense that this awareness does not depend on our making any observations or inferences.
Despite being a form of awareness of our mental states, nonpositional consciousness is supposed to be not intentional by Boyle’s lights. That is, this primitive awareness is not about anything in the manner by which our intentional mental states are about things—as my perception is about my hands, or as my thought is about being a mermaid, for example. This claim might sound mysterious: how can we have awareness of something while the state we’re in is not intentional? While Boyle attempts to demystify this claim, it goes beyond my scope to present his ideas on this front.
I’ve introduced Boyle’s account of nonpositional and positional consciousness. How is it supposed to explain how we can primitively know our perceptions, beliefs, and desires? According to Boyle, in primitively achieving self-knowledge, we undergo a mental transition he calls “reflective ascent.”
Over reflective ascent, we start at t1 with being in a certain first-order intentional mental state, and at t2, we conclude this transition by primitively and yet knowledgeably self-ascribing this state. (For brevity, let’s call such a primitive rational mental transition “the relevant transition”). According to Boyle, when we knowledgeably self-ascribe this state at t2, we simply make explicit tacit knowledge we’ve had all along of this state from the genesis of it at t1. For example, when I perceive rain fall, according to Boyle, I’m already knowledgeable of my perceiving it, since part of being in this perceptual state is having nonpositional consciousness of it.
Boyle repeatedly claims that whenever we undertake this relevant transition, we don’t learn, understand, or come to know anything “new” about the mental state under consideration. In Boyle’s words, “the step of reflective ascent does not consist in the acquisition of new information,” or “[reflective ascent] does not constitute a new discovery, but is merely the reflective articulation of an understanding already at work.”
In order not to learn anything new like this, it must be the case that the knowledge one has once one self-ascribes one’s mental state was had by one all along, from the very moment of the genesis of this state. If, instead, one were to achieve this knowledge at some point between t1 and t2 of the relevant transition, this achievement would consist in one’s learning something new relative to the knowledge one already has simply by being in one’s mental state from t1. We may sum up Boyle’s claim as follows:
As part of being in a mental state M, one is primitively aware of M by virtue of one’s nonpositional consciousness of M. This awareness has properties that make it sufficient for one’s knowing one has M in such a way that one is in the position to judge that one has M .
Let me call this “Boyle’s principle.” Of course, there are some changes in my knowledge over the course of the relevant transition. Let’s take an example from Boyle: at t1 I see a bug and am disgusted. After I reflect on this mental state at t2, I self-ascribe the belief the bug is disgusting, and in so doing this, “a repulsion that she formerly felt unreflectively might come to be felt reflectively… she now feels repelled by the bug in a thoughtful and potentially self-critical way.” By Boyle’s lights, the changes in my mental state consists exclusively in changes in the mode of presentation of my knowledge, not my knowledge itself. I don’t learn anything new with respect to my knowledge itself. For example, at t1 of the relevant transition, I already know that I believe the bug is disgusting, and I simply make this knowledge explicit at t2.
I think there are three, significantly different ways to interpret Boyle’s principle. These follow from two distinct senses of what it means to know or learn something new. It seems to me that we can know something in a propositional or a non-propositional manner. I'm still thinking through this idea, however, and I'm not yet in a position to spell it out.
Boyle’s solution to the problem of transparency is coherent—but should we adopt it? Boyle doesn’t explicitly argue why we should prefer his to alternatives that are just as coherent. I’ll show that such an argument in favor of Boyle’s solution can be reconstructed from his general reasoning. In brief, Boyle sets out a criterion of adequacy for any solution to the problem of transparency, and one might think that his solution best satisfies it.
Consider the fact that the self-knowledge at stake in the problem of transparency is primitively achieved. That is, when we “look outwards” at some part of the world and self-ascribe a mental state apparently on this basis, from our point of view, we remain “immersed” in what is presented under our attention from start to finish. For example, when I watch rain falling outside and self-ascribe the belief it’s raining, at no point do I dissociate or become “alienated” from that which I’ve been attending to (to use Boyle’s terms). Thus, a criterion of adequacy for any solution to the problem of transparency is that it does not require that we undertake any means of achieving self-knowledge that alienates us from that which we’re immersed in when we “look outwards.” Let’s call this the “non-alienation criterion.”
There are at least two person-level mental activities of achieving knowledge that are essentially alienating: making observations and drawing inferences. So, these should be ruled out in any solution to the problem of transparency. (Is a form of non- or subpersonal inferential reasoning that is rather non-alienating? This is a complicated issue that would be interesting to address).
Boyle maintains that whenever we draw an inference—and, for that matter, whenever we entertain a proposition—we’re alienated from our previous immersion. For example, when I’m immersed in watching rain fall outside, I think of the fact it’s raining and thereby focus on this proposition of my thought. In doing so, I’m alienated; I no longer attend to the rain itself. Rather, I attend to this proposition—which represents the rain I’m occurrently seeing but also just as much represents other times and places at which it could rain. The proposition “crowds out” the rain from my attention, one might say.
Making an observation of ourselves or our cognitive situation typically “alienates” us from our previous immersion, much as drawing an inference does. While watching the rain fall, I observe that I’m a subject standing in relation to this meteorological event. I thus get “alienated” from my immersion, or I break off from my previous way of attending to things. Instead of noticing the rain, I notice myself as the subject of a perceptual experience. In doing so, my attention becomes preoccupied with facts about subjectivity, which “crowd out” the rain I had previously been attending to. Moreover, anyone could be preoccupied by these very same facts. There is nothing distinctively first-personal or “immersive” about any such observation I make.
Boyle’s solution to the problem of transparency satisfies the non-alienation criterion. When we knowledgeably self-ascribe a mental state, if we’ve known we’re in this state from the moment of its genesis—as Boyle maintains—there can be no point during the relevant transition from being in this state to self-ascribing it at which we need to make an observation or inference. Making observations or inferences is typically required to achieve knowledge; and there is no need for such achievement when knowledge is guaranteed from the outset.
Boyle points out that certain alternative solutions to the problem of transparency fail to meet this criterion. For example, thinkers like Alex Byrne and Christopher Peacocke maintain that we form a judgment or draw an inference during the relevant transition. Boyle maintains such solutions imply “an unacceptably alienated, spectatorial picture of the subject’s relation to her own mental states.” The fact that Boyle’s solution can satisfy the criterion, while these others accounts cannot, might be taken as prima facie justification for his.
Moreover, Boyle might think that his solution is required for satisfying the criterion. He’d be entitled to this stronger claim if it were the case that there are no mental activities that both explain how we achieve knowledge and are non-alienating. That is, making observations or inferences are the only mental activities that are capable of explaining how we achieve knowledge. In that case, Boyle’s solution would be inevitable, given that we’re knowledgeable in our self-ascriptions, and the criterion of non-alienation applies.
I think, however, that there are mental activities other than making observations or inferences that are capable of explaining how we achieve knowledge and are non-alienating. So, even if Boyle wants to make this stronger claim, he’s not entitled to it. It goes beyond my scope to get into this here.
Any how, let me spell out basic points that I think I've gotten so far. The key to accounting for self-knowledge, according to Boyle, lies in the structure of consciousness. To understand his solution, we thus need to understand Boyle’s view of this structure, which he takes from Jean-Paul Sartre. On this Sartrean view, there are two basic modes of consciousness: “nonpositional” and “positional” consciousness. I’ll first introduce each mode and the relationship between them. I’ll then explain how they are supposed to enable us to primitively achieve self-knowledge.
According to Boyle, whenever we’re aware of something, we have “positional consciousness.” This is an expansive category that roughly corresponds to what is typically called an intentional mental state. For example, it includes my perception of my hands, my memory of my childhood home, my thought about a philosophical problem, or my imagination of being a mermaid. Insofar as it is useful to stick to everyday language, I’ll often call what Boyle calls positional consciousness a “[intentional] mental state.” (I now see that this is limited... there should be a substantive reason why Boyle and Sartre switched from talk of intentional states to positional consciousness. The two should not be merely synonymous).
Would any moment of consciousness constitute positional consciousness, then? Not exactly. It is integral to Boyle’s account that the content of any instance of positional consciousness be something that we can regard as an object, dissociable from ourselves as subjects. Perhaps there are some aspects of conscious experience that are not dissociable in this way.
Nonpositional consciousness, in contrast, consists in a special form of awareness of our intentional mental states (i.e., positional consciousness). We’re supposed to be nonpositionally conscious of these states whenever we have them. In other words, positional consciousness is supposed to be always accompanied by nonpositional consciousness. Insofar as it is useful to stick to everyday language, I’ll sometimes call that which Boyle calls nonpositional consciousness “primitive awareness [of being in an intentional mental state].” It is “primitive” in the sense that this awareness does not depend on our making any observations or inferences.
Despite being a form of awareness of our mental states, nonpositional consciousness is supposed to be not intentional by Boyle’s lights. That is, this primitive awareness is not about anything in the manner by which our intentional mental states are about things—as my perception is about my hands, or as my thought is about being a mermaid, for example. This claim might sound mysterious: how can we have awareness of something while the state we’re in is not intentional? While Boyle attempts to demystify this claim, it goes beyond my scope to present his ideas on this front.
I’ve introduced Boyle’s account of nonpositional and positional consciousness. How is it supposed to explain how we can primitively know our perceptions, beliefs, and desires? According to Boyle, in primitively achieving self-knowledge, we undergo a mental transition he calls “reflective ascent.”
Over reflective ascent, we start at t1 with being in a certain first-order intentional mental state, and at t2, we conclude this transition by primitively and yet knowledgeably self-ascribing this state. (For brevity, let’s call such a primitive rational mental transition “the relevant transition”). According to Boyle, when we knowledgeably self-ascribe this state at t2, we simply make explicit tacit knowledge we’ve had all along of this state from the genesis of it at t1. For example, when I perceive rain fall, according to Boyle, I’m already knowledgeable of my perceiving it, since part of being in this perceptual state is having nonpositional consciousness of it.
Boyle repeatedly claims that whenever we undertake this relevant transition, we don’t learn, understand, or come to know anything “new” about the mental state under consideration. In Boyle’s words, “the step of reflective ascent does not consist in the acquisition of new information,” or “[reflective ascent] does not constitute a new discovery, but is merely the reflective articulation of an understanding already at work.”
In order not to learn anything new like this, it must be the case that the knowledge one has once one self-ascribes one’s mental state was had by one all along, from the very moment of the genesis of this state. If, instead, one were to achieve this knowledge at some point between t1 and t2 of the relevant transition, this achievement would consist in one’s learning something new relative to the knowledge one already has simply by being in one’s mental state from t1. We may sum up Boyle’s claim as follows:
As part of being in a mental state M, one is primitively aware of M by virtue of one’s nonpositional consciousness of M. This awareness has properties that make it sufficient for one’s knowing one has M in such a way that one is in the position to judge that one has M .
Let me call this “Boyle’s principle.” Of course, there are some changes in my knowledge over the course of the relevant transition. Let’s take an example from Boyle: at t1 I see a bug and am disgusted. After I reflect on this mental state at t2, I self-ascribe the belief the bug is disgusting, and in so doing this, “a repulsion that she formerly felt unreflectively might come to be felt reflectively… she now feels repelled by the bug in a thoughtful and potentially self-critical way.” By Boyle’s lights, the changes in my mental state consists exclusively in changes in the mode of presentation of my knowledge, not my knowledge itself. I don’t learn anything new with respect to my knowledge itself. For example, at t1 of the relevant transition, I already know that I believe the bug is disgusting, and I simply make this knowledge explicit at t2.
I think there are three, significantly different ways to interpret Boyle’s principle. These follow from two distinct senses of what it means to know or learn something new. It seems to me that we can know something in a propositional or a non-propositional manner. I'm still thinking through this idea, however, and I'm not yet in a position to spell it out.
Boyle’s solution to the problem of transparency is coherent—but should we adopt it? Boyle doesn’t explicitly argue why we should prefer his to alternatives that are just as coherent. I’ll show that such an argument in favor of Boyle’s solution can be reconstructed from his general reasoning. In brief, Boyle sets out a criterion of adequacy for any solution to the problem of transparency, and one might think that his solution best satisfies it.
Consider the fact that the self-knowledge at stake in the problem of transparency is primitively achieved. That is, when we “look outwards” at some part of the world and self-ascribe a mental state apparently on this basis, from our point of view, we remain “immersed” in what is presented under our attention from start to finish. For example, when I watch rain falling outside and self-ascribe the belief it’s raining, at no point do I dissociate or become “alienated” from that which I’ve been attending to (to use Boyle’s terms). Thus, a criterion of adequacy for any solution to the problem of transparency is that it does not require that we undertake any means of achieving self-knowledge that alienates us from that which we’re immersed in when we “look outwards.” Let’s call this the “non-alienation criterion.”
There are at least two person-level mental activities of achieving knowledge that are essentially alienating: making observations and drawing inferences. So, these should be ruled out in any solution to the problem of transparency. (Is a form of non- or subpersonal inferential reasoning that is rather non-alienating? This is a complicated issue that would be interesting to address).
Boyle maintains that whenever we draw an inference—and, for that matter, whenever we entertain a proposition—we’re alienated from our previous immersion. For example, when I’m immersed in watching rain fall outside, I think of the fact it’s raining and thereby focus on this proposition of my thought. In doing so, I’m alienated; I no longer attend to the rain itself. Rather, I attend to this proposition—which represents the rain I’m occurrently seeing but also just as much represents other times and places at which it could rain. The proposition “crowds out” the rain from my attention, one might say.
Making an observation of ourselves or our cognitive situation typically “alienates” us from our previous immersion, much as drawing an inference does. While watching the rain fall, I observe that I’m a subject standing in relation to this meteorological event. I thus get “alienated” from my immersion, or I break off from my previous way of attending to things. Instead of noticing the rain, I notice myself as the subject of a perceptual experience. In doing so, my attention becomes preoccupied with facts about subjectivity, which “crowd out” the rain I had previously been attending to. Moreover, anyone could be preoccupied by these very same facts. There is nothing distinctively first-personal or “immersive” about any such observation I make.
Boyle’s solution to the problem of transparency satisfies the non-alienation criterion. When we knowledgeably self-ascribe a mental state, if we’ve known we’re in this state from the moment of its genesis—as Boyle maintains—there can be no point during the relevant transition from being in this state to self-ascribing it at which we need to make an observation or inference. Making observations or inferences is typically required to achieve knowledge; and there is no need for such achievement when knowledge is guaranteed from the outset.
Boyle points out that certain alternative solutions to the problem of transparency fail to meet this criterion. For example, thinkers like Alex Byrne and Christopher Peacocke maintain that we form a judgment or draw an inference during the relevant transition. Boyle maintains such solutions imply “an unacceptably alienated, spectatorial picture of the subject’s relation to her own mental states.” The fact that Boyle’s solution can satisfy the criterion, while these others accounts cannot, might be taken as prima facie justification for his.
Moreover, Boyle might think that his solution is required for satisfying the criterion. He’d be entitled to this stronger claim if it were the case that there are no mental activities that both explain how we achieve knowledge and are non-alienating. That is, making observations or inferences are the only mental activities that are capable of explaining how we achieve knowledge. In that case, Boyle’s solution would be inevitable, given that we’re knowledgeable in our self-ascriptions, and the criterion of non-alienation applies.
I think, however, that there are mental activities other than making observations or inferences that are capable of explaining how we achieve knowledge and are non-alienating. So, even if Boyle wants to make this stronger claim, he’s not entitled to it. It goes beyond my scope to get into this here.
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