Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism

Politics and Culture in Modern America

by David R. Swartz

In 1973, nearly a decade before the height of the Moral Majority, a group of progressive activists assembled in a Chicago YMCA to strategize about how to move the nation in a more evangelical direction through political action. When they emerged, the Washington Post predicted that the new evangelical left could "shake both political and religious life in America." The following decades proved the Post both right and wrong—evangelical participation in the political sphere was intensifying, but in the end it was the religious right, not the left, that built a viable movement and mobilized electorally. How did the evangelical right gain a moral monopoly and why were evangelical progressives, who had shown such promise, left behind? In Moral Minority , the first comprehensive history of the evangelical left, David R. Swartz sets out to answer these questions, charting the rise, decline, and political legacy of this forgotten movement. Though vibrant in the late nineteenth century, progressive evangelicals were in eclipse following religious controversies of the early twentieth century, only to reemerge in the 1960s and 1970s. They stood for antiwar, civil rights, and anticonsumer principles, even as they stressed doctrinal and sexual fidelity. Politically progressive and theologically conservative, the evangelical left was also remarkably diverse, encompassing groups such as Sojourners, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, Evangelicals for Social Action, and the Association for Public Justice. Swartz chronicles the efforts of evangelical progressives who expanded the concept of morality from the personal to the social and showed the way—organizationally and through political activism—to what would become the much larger and more influential evangelical right. By the 1980s, although they had witnessed the election of Jimmy Carter, the nation's first born-again president, progressive evangelicals found themselves in the political wilderness, riven by identity politics and alienated by a skeptical Democratic Party and a hostile religious right. In the twenty-first century, evangelicals of nearly all political and denominational persuasions view social engagement as a fundamental responsibility of the faithful. This most dramatic of transformations is an important legacy of the evangelical left.

Genres: History, Religion, Politics, Spirituality, Christianity, Christian, Nonfiction

384 pages, Hardcover

First published September 7, 2012

Reviews

[Alex Strohschein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although evangelicals are often perceived as being unquestioning loyal to the Republican Party, in "Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism" historian David R. Swartz effectively demonstrates that such an assumption doesn't line up with trajectories of millions of evangelicals. In fact, a significant number of evangelicals were generally apolitical and inactive until they mustered support for the "born-again" Democrat Jimmy Carter. For instance, Pat Robertson and a young Michael Gerson supported Carter. Those evangelicals who first entered the political arena to support Carter would eventually find themselves on the opposite side of the political spectrum, especially as the Democrats made the pro-choice position orthodoxy within their party and as Republicans responded by solidifying support for pro-life policies (p. 217-18).

Swartz divides his book up into three parts. In the first two sections, he builds chapters around key figures such as Jim Wallis, Mark Hatfield, Samuel Escobar, Richard Mouw, and Ron Sider and uses these leaders to jump into an analysis of various individuals, organizations (Sojourners), communities and theological movements (e.g. liberation theology) that identified themselves as part of the "evangelical left." Importantly, Schwartz doesn't define "evangelical left" based on theology and personal morality - with the exception of Jim Wallis who voiced support of same-sex marriage in 2013, the main leaders Swartz looks at were tilted to the left in terms of their fiscal policies, concern for the poor and suspicion of militarism. The evangelical left generally held to orthodox views on abortion and sexuality and were theologically moderate (i.e. they weren't mainline or hold to bizarre fads like "death of God" theology).

The evangelical left was a diverse group, drawn from ethnic communities (Escobar, Tom Skinner, etc...), evangelical feminists (Sharon Gallagher, Nancy Hardesty), Reformed Christianity (Mouw, the Institute of Christian Studies) and neo-Anabaptists (Wallis, Sider). Their theologies often influenced how they set about engaging in politics, with Reformed activists being more patient and willing to wait to carefully craft policy and intellectual arguments while the neo-Anabaptists mustered grassroots support. Although neo-evangelical leaders such as Carl F.H. Henry (who Swartz begins with thanks to his rallying cry for evangelicals to engage in contemporary culture in his 1947 "The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism) were optimistic that they could entered the halls of power and impact America for the better, the sheer diversity of disparate theologies within evangelicalism presented a reliable, united front from ever being formed. Many within the evangelical left began to quibble that their favourite causes, whether stopping racism, supporting progressive feminist causes or nonviolence and pacifism were being neglected by their fellow believers. Additionally, especially in the 1980s, many groups who were members of the evangelical left allowed ecumenism and liberal activists dissipate the evangelical ethos that had first driven these Christians to action and social justice in the first place; the evangelical left was able to reach out to mainline Protestants, Catholics and Jews, but their evangelical identity was weakened in favour of an ecumenism of progressive politics. As Swartz explains:

"In the 1950s and 1960s evangelical boosters had very effectively created the illusion of a single evangelical identity. The rise of 'Christianity Today' and the National Association of Evangelicals, however, masked the reality that evangelicalism was a coalition of people with some traits in common but also with significant differences. Henry and others so remarkably succeeded in portraying a unified evangelicalism that the secular media in the 1970s fell over themselves to proclaim a 'blossoming evangelical movement.' A vital evangelical center, however, would fail to emerge. Identity politics within the evangelical left exposed the illusion of evangelical unity and suggested that the progressive evangelical front might not thrive" (p. 212).

A pervading theme throughout the book is the evangelical left's alienation from potential allies. Although the evangelical left was able to point to politicians such as Hatfield, Jimmy Carter, and Paul Henry (son of Carl Henry) as leaders whose social conscience led them to the left of their party, in the penultimate chapter, Schwartz argues that Carter's neglect of and inability to pursue policies backed by the evangelical left and centre, coupled with his own accumulation of liberal and secular allies in his inner circle while refusing to appoint evangelicals to key leadership positions allowed the GOP to woo disillusioned and anxious religious conservatives into the Republic fold. In particular, the 1972 Democratic Convention became a coming out party for liberal and secular activists who promoted social liberalism that rattled traditionalist Democrats such as working-class Catholics who held to the Roman Catholic Church's teaching on the sanctity of life (p. 219-220). Although the pro-life side "won the abortion fight in 1972, the year before the Supreme Court issued its Roe v. Wade decision," aggravated pro-choice activists and liberal feminists aggressively fought to make the Democratic Party pro-choice, an objective finally accomplished in 1980. Had Carter been able to pass pro-life policies and encourage pro-life sentiments with the Democratic Party, the ideological trajectory of his party and the GOP may have looked a lot different that it does today. The remnant of the evangelical left who could not back Ronald Reagan (they were laudably active in travelling to Nicaragua and using themselves as buffers between the Contras and locals, p. 237-38) were spurned by Democrats who were suspicious of their religious convictions and fervent pro-life position. As Swartz summarizes:

"Whenever the movement offered a carrot to political allies on the left, conservative evangelicals shouted heresy. Whenever it made a move back toward its theologically conservative evangelical roots, ecumenical activists cried betrayal. Unlike the religious right, it was unable to attract its evangelical constituency deeply. Thorny issues of ecumenicity and identity politics sabotaged the consistent life campaign, the final attempt to revive the evangelical left in the 1980s" (p. 249-50).

I learned some interesting things in this book. Jim Wallis was mentored by Clark Pinnock, who eventually moved to the right politically and Ron Sider studied history at Yale under Jaroslav Pelikan. Also, in the chapter on Sider, Swartz details the astonishingly influence of the Mennonite-tinged "More-With-Less" cookbook, a well-worn copy of which is a favourite of my mother's. There was a rivalry between the Institute of Christian Studies based in southern Ontario and Calvin College, which seems almost laughably considering the ICS is so small. However, according to Swartz, "By the early 1970s, the ICS had evolved into an idiosyncratic fusion of Dutch ethnicity and political counterculture...Tobacco and marijuana (!) were pervasive at the Toronto school" (p. 144). "Moral Minority" is a well-researched, engaging book that dispels the myth of monolithic evangelical conservatism. It generally bypasses the presidencies of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush before concluding in the epilogue with Barack Obama. Readers would do well to read this book alongside "God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right" by Daniel K. Williams.

[Timothy Hoiland · Rating 5 out of 5]

I distrust the Evangelical Left for the same reason I distrust the Religious Right. The main reason for this distrust is that whenever a group of Christians aligns itself so completely with one political party that it becomes unwilling or unable to voice critique, it forfeits its capacity to be prophetic, and instead becomes a pawn. The Christian leaders whose politics I most respect are those who are willing to deviate from the party line when the party line clearly deviates from the dictates of the faith. This goes for politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens alike. A little nuance and humility go a long way.

Earlier this month when I put together a list of my favorite books from 2012, you may recall that I included Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Convervatism (Penn) by David Swartz, a history professor at Asbury University. I wasn’t the only one who liked it...

- See more at: https://www.timhoiland.com/blog/moral...

[Daniel Silliman · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is such a great book. I regret I waited so long to read it. Swartz not only thoroughly documents a deep forgotten strain of evangelicalisms--its progressive left--he also demonstrates the contingency of history. It's clear, in his work, and kind of astounding. In grad school you learn this is a basic insight earned by doing the work of history. History is contingent. But so many studies of movements and especially studies of evangelicalism are consumed with platonism projects, finding the essences, the true forms, and what it is in the mind of God.

Swartz returns evangelical history into the world. Where it is one way. But could have been another. And could be again.

[Kate · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant, insightful, and fascinating history of the rise and fall (and potential rise again) of the American evangelical left. Swartz organizes his book around the 1973 Chicago Declaration of Evangelical Social Concern, using the various members of the meeting as entryways into the complexities, influences, and motivations (including racial, ethnic, and gender identities) that made up the nascent evangelical left and became its legacy.

This was an intensely exciting book to read, eminently readable with clear and fast-moving prose. Swartz does a bang up job of contextualizing and situating his historical analysis and archives within an interpretative framework that actually explains what was really going on in some of the most turbulent evangelical decades. He sheds light on the origins of not only evangelical left, but also how the political and social action of the left informed the ultimate mobilization of the religious right in the 1980s. (The last two chapters and the conclusion were particularly smashing.)

I think this an important book that looks objectively at the issues that formed the American evangelicalism of today, such as the politicization of abortion, the failure of the consistent life ethic, the conflict between simple living and political influence, and the crazy diversity of evangelicalism. A much needed history and analysis of an American religious/political tradition that is too often seen as monolithic, when its roots are less than 40 years old.

[Chris Schutte · Rating 4 out of 5]

An incredibly well-researched book chronicling the (re-)emergence of American evangelicals into public life, and how the "progressive" strain in evangelical engagement eventually lost out, yet, its emphases are now becoming mainstream, especially among younger evangelicals

[George P. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Swartz, David R. 2012. Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

In America, white evangelicals are politically conservative. Seventy-nine percent of white evangelicals who voted in 2012, for example, cast their presidential ballot for Republican Mitt Romney, matching George W. Bush’s share of white evangelical voters in 2004. So connected in the public mind have evangelicalism and conservatism become that it’s hard for many to imagine any other state of affairs. Indeed, many white evangelicals themselves have a hard time imagining how any Christian could vote for a Democrat.[1]

Forty years ago, that state of affairs was easier to imagine. On November 25, 1973, a group of moderate and liberal evangelicals issued “The Chicago Declaration of Social Concern,” which began with these words:

As evangelical Christians committed to the Lord Jesus Christ and the full authority of the Word of God, we affirm that God lays total claim upon the lives of his people. We cannot, therefore, separate our lives from the situation in which God has placed us in the United States and the world.

The declaration went on to acknowledge, “we have not demonstrated the love of God to those suffering social abuses.” It critiqued American evangelicals’ quiescence regarding “the social and economic rights of the poor and oppressed,” “the historic involvement of the church in America with racism” in terms of both “personal attitudes” and “social structures,” “the materialism of our culture and the maldistribution of the nation’s wealth and services,” “the misplaced trust of the nation in economic and military might,” and the “prideful domination” of men and “irresponsible passivity” of women.

It ended on a nonideological, nonpartisan, and eschatological note:

By this declaration, we endorse no political ideology or party, but call our nation’s leaders and people to that righteousness which exalts a nation.

We make this declaration in the biblical hope that Christ is coming to consummate the Kingdom and we accept his claim on our total discipleship until he comes.

The Washington Post described the impulse behind the Chicago Declaration as “a religious movement that could shake both political and religious life in America.” Three years following the declaration, Newsweek declared America’s bicentennial as the “The Year of the Evangelicals,” and Americans—including a plurality of white evangelicals—elected Jimmy Carter, a born-again Baptist and Democrat, as president. But four years after that, white evangelicals formed the Moral Majority and voted for Republican Ronald Reagan, cementing the connection between white evangelicalism and political conservatism that persists to this day. Ironically, it was the religious right, not the evangelical left, which matched Newsweek’s description shook political and religious life in America.

David R. Swartz tells the story of the rise, fall, and recent renaissance of the evangelical left in his book, Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism. He begins in media res with the “Chicago Declaration,” then turns to chapter-length studies of individual signers whose involvement sheds light on the story.

The first of these studies is Carl F. H. Henry, whose 1947 manifesto, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, critiqued the political passivity of white fundamentalists and called for a neo-evangelical engagement of culture and politics, though he himself did not specify what that engagement might look like. Others did, however, including John Alexander of Freedom Now (later, The Other Side), who challenged American racism on biblical ground. Then there was Jim Wallis of The Post-American (later, Sojourners), who condemned America’s war in Vietnam. Mark Hatfield, the moderate Republican senator from Oregon, lent verbal support to, but did not sign, the declaration; he illustrated the possibility of evangelical influence on politics. And Sharon Gallagher of Berkeley’s Christian World Liberation Front and Right On advocated for intentional community and feminist issues.

The opposition of the evangelical left to political quiescence, racism, war, poverty, and patriarchy reflected a number of influences, sometimes contradictory. Samuel Escobar challenged white evangelical indifference to global poverty, igniting a passion for international social concern. Richard Mouw, influenced by Dutch Reformed theology, argued that the church should reform America’s cultural institutions and political structures. Ronald J. Sider, coming from an Anabaptist perspective, argued that the church should model a countercultural community based on peace and simple living.

The diversity of concerns and theological backgrounds underlying the “Chicago Declaration” was both its strength and a cause of the undoing of the evangelical left. The declaration united progressive evangelicals around certain goals, at least in the abstract: anti-racism, anti-poverty, anti-war, anti-patriarchy, etc. In succeeding years, however, when participants tried to craft a united practical strategy to attain those goals, their diversity of concerns hardened into identity politics, and their theological backgrounds exposed deep rifts in assumptions about how the church should exercise its salt-and-light influence in the world.

Additionally, the American body politic tired of the “malaise” of Jimmy Carter and worried about the radicalism—both cultural and political—and violence of the left. The non-evangelical left became increasingly secular and pro-choice, distrusting the religious inspiration and pro-life commitments of their evangelical comrades. Consequently, during the 80s and 90s, much of the evangelical left entered the wilderness, distrusted by both their fellow evangelicals and their fellow leftists. The presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama seemed to have revived the evangelical left, however, giving it occasion both to oppose war and to propose a redistribution of the nation’s wealth and a restructuring of its health and welfare systems. Though the majority of white evangelicals still lean to the right politically, a noticeable subset of younger evangelicals are leaning in the opposite direction. What this shift portends for the future of white evangelical politics is, at the present moment, anyone’s guess.

My own political commitments as an evangelical are conservative. But I appreciate David R. Swartz’s study in the political diversity of American evangelicalism during a formative period of our nation’s recent history. Good history writing such as his challenges faulty memories, shallow ideology, and easy partisanship.

P.S. If you found this review helpful, please vote “Yes” on my Amazon.com review page.

[1] By contrast, ethnic-minority evangelicals routinely vote for Democrats, often by huge margins. Ninety-five percent of black Protestants—which includes black evangelicals—voted for Barack Obama, for example.

[Steve Wegman · Rating 4 out of 5]

History of the Evangelical Left from the 1960s to about 2010, focusing on Mark Hatfield, John Alexander, Jim Wallis, Ron Sider and several others, their organizations, their political efforts and ultimately, their failures. It's a sad but true story that those who dedicate their lives to following Jesus prove to be out of step with the larger American society. They were too liberal for conservatives on social issues like welfare, civil rights, death penalty, women's rights, but too conservative for liberals on abortion and other personal morality issues. While the Moral Majority, with the likes of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson were able to say to people, all you have to do to be Christian is to be a good Republican and support Republican causes, the Minority said you'll have to sacrifice: possibly your good standing as a citizen, possibly your wealth, possibly your freedom. You'll have to take up your cross and die to yourself. Sadly, that message is not as popular as America-First-makes-you-Christian. It's also sad that the evangelical left couldn't overcome their theological and focus issue differences to be a united force.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Set up in the form of a biographical history of a pretty much forgotten movement, this is not a page-turner for the mildly interested. On the other hand, anyone under 50 with an interest (or a stake) in evangelical Christianity will find this history troublingly compelling.
Most of the book is short biographies of the main characters in the movement that arose after the "Jesus Movement," connected to what they started/accomplished. So, basically, what did all those teenage hippie Christians end up doing in their 20's and 30's? Sadly, the answer is that they did some incredible things, and had the world's attention, but were ultimately crushed under the fist of the subsequent movement that created the monster we live with today: The Moral Majority.
I'm in my 40s, so the The Moral Majority is just a given from my 80's childhood. No spoilers, but taking my time through this book made me see a parallel universe and a completely different route that Evangelicals might have taken. Would it have been better? If you think that's a good question, then you will enjoy this book.

[Lukas Kilimann · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting book that details the history of a much lesser known and considered part of evangelical political history in the United States (and the world). According to the author, before the rise of the religious right and the moral majority of the 1980’s, there was a movement of evangelicals (Christians who believe in the authority of scripture and the death and resurrection of Jesus) who were theologically conservative and politically liberal. This book argues that this smaller movement is actually what led to the larger and more powerful marriage of Christians and the Republican Party. His final closing point is that “evangelicals… are more religiously and politically creative than the electoral structures that try to contain them”. It is pretty academic, well thought out and argued, highly thought-provoking, and important for 2022 American Christians to read.

[Jonathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A helpful history that traces the rise and subsequent scattering and lasting influence of the evangelical left (characterized by figures like Jim Wallis, Ron Sider, Richard Mouw and their organizations). Fascinating. Anyone who read Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a Faith and Fractured a Nation and wept ought to read this as a counter-narrative that offers (some) hope as to a better way of being evangelical.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

It may come as a shock to some that evangelicals have not always been associated with the right wing. The rise of right-wing evangelicals came in the late 1970s. It was during this time evangelicals became politicised and we saw the rise of the Moral Majority.

Swartz in this well researched and written book traces the rise and decline of the evangelical left - what he terms the Moral Minority. He looks primarily at the period after 1960 - a time when for most evangelicals politics was taboo and faith was personal and had no place in the public square.

The key players that Swartz examines include Carl Henry, John Alexander, Jim Wallis, Mark Hatfield, Samuel Escobar, Richard Mouw and Ron Sider. The book is in three parts each looking at the emerging, the broadening and finally the fragmentation of the left. The peak of the movement came in 1973 with the Chicago Declaration of Evangelical Social Concern.

The fall of the evangelical left, according to Swartz, however, was its fragmentation and its focus on identity politics. As he puts it:

‘By the late 1970s, it was clear that the politics of identity in all its forms was stunting the promise of the evangelical left. Rifts widened between men and women, black and white, Anabaptist and Calvinist—and in countless other permutations’ (211).

[Troy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Solid book where I learned a lot and it gave me hope that evangelicals are not all part of the GOP. It was interesting to learn about the different evangelical movements. It contains a lot of minutiae that can bog down a reader who might not be all that interested in the details.

[Kathleen Lewis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent analysis of the Evangelical Movement and the key persons involved before the Religious Right aligned itself solely with the Republican Party.

[Josh Adamek · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.5 Stars

Not my favorite formatting, but Swartz's material is substantive for anyone looking into the Evangelical Left in the rise of the Religious Right.

[David Nanninga · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant book that I wish more people knew about/approached as a how-to guide.

[Frank Ogden · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent resource book to learn about the evangelical left political movement during the 50 years. I learned a lot about the individuals who shaped and created this movement. The book also discusses the organizations that were formed and still exist. It should be required reading for advanced U S History course.

Highly Recommended !!

[BookishStitcher · Rating 2 out of 5]

I really wanted to love this book because the topic is something very close to beliefs I share, but the writing wasn't good. More than one cohesive book it's really a collection of essays about different people in the movement.

[Carlyn Cole · Rating 4 out of 5]

An important read for those who are evangelical.

[Philip · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding. If this is any indication, Swartz will sell a lot of books in his career.