Much of the intense current interest in collective memory concerns the politics of memory. In a book that asks, "Is there an ethics of memory?" Avishai Margalit addresses a separate, perhaps more pressing, set of concerns. The idea he pursues is that the past, connecting people to each other, makes possible the kinds of "thick" relations we can call truly ethical. Thick relations, he argues, are those that we have with family and friends, lovers and neighbors, our tribe and our nation--and they are all dependent on shared memories. But we also have "thin" relations with total strangers, people with whom we have nothing in common except our common humanity. A central idea of the ethics of memory is that when radical evil attacks our shared humanity, we ought as human beings to remember the victims. Margalit's work offers a philosophy for our time, when, in the wake of overwhelming atrocities, memory can seem more crippling than liberating, a force more for revenge than for reconciliation. Morally powerful, deeply learned, and elegantly written, The Ethics of Memory draws on the resources of millennia of Western philosophy and religion to provide us with healing ideas that will engage all of us who care about the nature of our relations to others.
Avishai Margalit (Hebrew: אבישי מרגלית, b. 1939 in Afula, British Mandate for Palestine – today Israel) is an Israeli professor emeritus in philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. From 2006 to 2011, he served as the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.
The book's main idea is that human beings have an ethical obligation to remember past persons and events. Margalit maintains that the source of this obligation to remember comes from the effort of radical evil forces to undermine morality by rewriting the past and controlling collective memory. Margalit argues that it is necessary for community to have collective memories in order to achieve a level of repentance and reconciliation. The text suggest that this ethical communal memory can not be universalized because it is contingent on the notion of caring. Caring, as Margalit exemplifies, is too susceptible to “collective egoism” (meaning a group may care about those within their specific group, but not outsiders). In forming a universal moral (as opposed to ethical) community, humanity, at large, becomes capable of remembering moral atrocities (such as the radical evils and crimes committed by the Nazis). The text explicates the important difference between ethics and morality: ethics are concerned with caring and loyalty towards those we are closest to (an optional good); where as morality is concerned with respect toward the whole of humanity (a required good).
Some topics that I found of particular value were: shared memory, collective memory and myth, how democracy relies on memory (for ex. the constitution), forgetting and forgiveness, and the moral witness.
Margalit draws from the writings of Plato, Freud (specifically his theory of memory as a guarded prison), Immanuel Kant, Milton, Ecclesiastes (and his theories on forgetting), and David Hume.
I enjoyed this book very much. If you are looking for a modern book of moral philosophy that is relevant, clear, engaging and well written this book is for you. Margalit differentiates morality from ethics by connecting ethics with "thick relations" and morality with "thin relations." I especially appreciated Margalit's analysis of judeo-christian and biblical memory and their connection to humanism. Ultimately, the book leads to the importance of human forgiveness as covering up rather than blotting out.
Recently I visited Powell's bookstore in Portland, Oregon. Like the Merchant Mart in Chicago, Powell's Bookstore occupies an entire city block. Succinctly put, Powell's is a book lovers paradise. Part of what make it so interesting and wonderful is the endless opportunities for serendipitous discoveries of new books. The Ethics of Memory was one such serendipitous discovery as I trawled through the expansive philosophy section. I am glad I found this little book as it has added clarity to both my thinking about the practice and explication of philosophical insight as well as illumination into the fascinating topic of memory. In particular, as the title alludes, the book is focused on the ethics of memory and centers on the questions: Is there an ethics of memory, and if so what does it consist in? Do we have obligations to remember certain things? Do we have an obligation to forget certain things? There is much to glean from Margalit's treatment of these questions, owing especially to Margalit's direct and precise writing style which yields a delicious collection of helpful distinctions. At times, I found Margalit's choice of sub-topics to be a little scattershot, and might have benefitted from some tighter transitions, but nonetheless I found the book enjoyable and thought provoking. While Margalit is certainly writing from the vantage point of a philosopher, this book is very accessible to a more general audience, and has much to interest all those that are sometimes reflective about the past and its import for the present and future.
I like his writing.... but it is philosophy, which means for me there are all sorts of fascinating points made that I can't remember or apply at the end. He's respectful of religion, and uses many religious (scriptural) examples, but it's an attempt at a purely humanistic ethics. I'm not sure how successful that is.
I didn't love this book. It helped, in part, to learn that it was originally a series of lectures and was not intended drafted as a cohesive monograph. That at least partially explains why the prose is often exploratory rather than tightly argued, and why there is not necessarily a strong thesis one can hang one's hat on. One of Margalit's biggest weaknesses is his habit of posing one question and then answering another without necessarily defining his terms in the meantime. That said, when he does define terms--as he does by oddly separating "ethics" and "morality," he often exposes himself and the reader to more problems than he solves.
Margalit tells us that remembering is not voluntary, so he relieves the individual of the burden to remember. The obligation falls instead on the community as a whole, with each member doing a part as they can or are willing to do so. Radical evil is a question that extends beyond even the thinnest of thick relations to all of humanity, since radical evil is a crime directed against all of humanity, as Hannah Arendt more clearly explains in Origins of Totalitarianism. In his account of forgiveness, we also get some sensible guidance on how to think about the ethics of forgetting. It seems sensible that "covering up" a past wrong (disregarding it while it remains on the record) should be preferable to "blotting it out." In my own research on historical memory in China, for example, it was easier to accept that older relatives who experienced troubling events did not want to share than the notion that the state would simply erase from the historical record facts that were politically inconvenient.
The part of the book I keep returning as a more valuable philosophical resource is the moral witness. As Margalit describes it, this is someone who testifies to suffering at personal risk, in the sober hope that a moral community will someday be there to listen. This reminded me of Ian Johnson's description of the Great Leap famine, where an underground journal named Spark《星火》was confiscated almost as soon as it began to circulate. Decades later it turned up in an archive, was scanned, and now passes from reader to reader as PDF attachments to email. Its authors wrote without knowing who, if anyone, would read it.
Margalit says quite a bit about the witness but much less about the listener. When I interviewed young people who had engaged topics like the Great Leap famine, they were often drawn to the topic because it was viewed as off limits, and that made them curious. That curiosity led them to the testimony, but not with the mindset that the creators of the testimony probably intended (they weren't there to engage in reliving or emotional resonance with past sufferers, but, as it were, to scratch an intellectual itch).
Yet, by and large, I find the book problematic, perhaps chiefly because of the central distinction he draws between "thick" and "thin" relations. This loops back into the idea that "ethics" (the domain of the "thick") is fundamentally different from that of "morality" (the realm of the "thin"). I'm not comfortable with this easy divide because it oversimplifies our ties to complex identity and social formations. It's not hard to imagine an alternative, indeed most theorists of cosmopolitanism (Martha Nussbaum, for example) and most applied theory runs contrary to this clumsy and too-easy dichotomy. For example, in China's Good War, historian Rana Mitter offers an alternative frame of "circuits of memory." Unpacking China's memory of the Second World War, Mitter traces memories of the same event as they travel through different communities, overlapping in some places and diverging in others. Each of us sits on several of these circuits at once. Some run through a family, and many cross national borders. What Margalit calls a thick relation looks to me like two people who share many circuits, and a thin relation like two people who share few. That would make the difference one of degree. It would also explain his exception for radical evil without a separate category called morality: memories of the Holocaust travel on circuits that reach far beyond any one nation. Mitter is a historian describing how memory moves, so he can't tell us what we owe one another (he's not arguing ethics or making normative claims). Still, I suspect Margalit's picture of memory is too tidy for the ethics he builds on it.
Хоча я і позначаю це теґом scholarly (бо читала з інтересу до теоретичних концептуалізацій), варто розуміти, що це не так дослідницька розвідка, як приклад чистого філософування.
Ключовий концепт - наскільки можна говорити про якийсь один ключовий концепт, коли йдеться про збірку так-сяк тематично споріднених текстів, що постали з окремих лекцій, а не писалися як структурно частини однієї ідеї - чи принаймні найцікавіший для мене тут - це протиставлення моралі й етики як понять, які керують принципово різними сферами стосунків. Етика - це, мовляв, про стосунки з тими, хто нам "хтось", а моральність - з тими, з ким ми взаємодіємо чисто як представники роду людського. Стосунками, які належать до сфери етики, керує поняття турботи - насамперед такої, якою об'єднані члени однієї сім'ї, але й також різних інших угруповань, які метафорично випливають з ідеї сім'ї - наприклад, нації чи професійного "братерства". Про такі спільноти можна сказати, що це "спільноти пам'яті", бо вони всередині себе розподіляють працю збереження пам'яті в тому вигляді, в якому вони про неї "домовилися".
І тут хочу зробити такий коментар на маргінесах: в дисертації я свого часу так і сяк крутила фразу з одного пригодницького роману - "Сподіваюсь, що ви зробили, як українець і людина, чесно й гідно, належні висновки...." (цитата приблизна, але досить близька до оригіналу) "Що це означає? - запитувала мене одна професорка. - Що українець в цьому контексті - не людина?" І ось нарешті належний методологічний handle для того, щоб її як слід розкрутити. Спостерігання чогось горя чи отримання інформація про скоєні злочини проти певної спільноти просто вимагають різного рівня висновків: одного рівня, якщо йдеться про абстрактних людей, на чиї страждання ми реагуємо як абстрактні люди (рівень моралі), та іншого, якщо йдеться про членів нашої спільноти (рівень етики).
У наступних частинах, правда, центральність цього концептуального розрізнення спадає, ба більше, очевидно, що вони писалися взагалі без цього розрізнення на увазі. Наприклад, поняття moral witness розкручується уже без зважання на це протиставлення. Цей розділ мені видався теж досить цікавим, але, можливо, занадто перейнятим уже дріб'язковими концептуальними розрізненнями (а це вже "моральний свідок"? а такий випадок? а такий випадок? чисто для з'ясування значення слів, а не для коментаря про якийсь культурний момент - бо ж, кажу, це чисте філософування, а не дослідницька розвідка). А далі мене вибісило, що правильний "моральний свідок" - це той, хто ризикує, аби залишити свідчення про страждання його групи, з надією лише на те, що колись у майбутньому з'явиться така ціннісна спільнота, яка оцінить це свідчення, навіть коли в моменті здається, що світ котиться в пітьму. А людина, яка те саме робить, бо вона має надію, що ось прямо за нинішніх механізмів (хоча б міжнародного права) ці свідчення допоможуть притягти злочинців до відповідальності - ні, недотягує до чистого і незатьмареного поняття "морального свідка". Вибісило - мабуть, можна сказати, що це вже мої висновки, які я роблю "як українець і людина", читаючи в той момент, коли наша "спільнота пам'яті" прямо зараз оплакує Вікторію Рощину, але ще не перестала оплакувати таких людей як Вікторія Амеліна чи Макс Левін.
I sought out this book based on research I'm doing for a talk on collective memory. It had some relevant points for me. Reading reviews justified for me the problems I had with it.
Overall, I think there are some super interesting points in this book. Responsibilities, both thick and thin, to remembering aspects of life - for example, your mother's name, versus the Holocaust (whether you are a Jew or not) - really make you think about the nature of us humans and how we interact with one another.
There were some tie-ins to the idea of imagined communities (borders are made up, but nations are a really important type of group!). However, I did think the last few chapters were less relevant to me, and therefore harder to get through. I read that these are a group of lectures all published together, and that makes me feel better about picking and choosing which ones make sense for me to linger over.
I don't think I'd recommend this for a casual reader, it is definitely something that would get assigned in a college class.
As stated in the preface, this small book is a collection of lectures (a format I always have problem with) with an approach stressed on examples and light on principles (a bit like Zizek, not really my favorite). A reader more in tune with this style may give it a higher rating.
I would recommend chapter 1 (on remembering a name and the role of memory in caring), chapter 2 (on collective memory and the social obligation to remember) and chapter 6 (on the relationship between forgetting and forgiveness). The remaining three chapters may seem either niche for a special audience or less structured. Sometimes ideas are underdeveloped but this right mix of intellectual rigour and cultural references can be enough to keep a curious reader going.
Please be noted that Mr Margalit often makes use of biblical references.
Through the medium of both religious and philosophical concepts, Margalit takes us through the ethics (and the morality) of memory. In all modesty I am sure there are parts of the relatively short book that I missed and misunderstood, but I found it thoroughly thought provoking, especially his final chapter on what it means to forgive and forget and how the two are and are not related. There were parts of his writing that I felt overcomplicated the book, for example he introduces almost a new vocabulary - the idea of both thick and thin relationships (somewhat analogous to the depth of the relationship) plus has very opinionated definitions of morality vs ethics. Quite frankly I felt his thesis would have flowed better without these (to me) distractions. I still both enjoyed and would recommend.
I have NO clue why this book has only NINE reviews on Amazon. That alone tells me there's no justice at all to this business of book popularity. Lucidly written, accessible, yet erudite, fascinating, and so convincingly argued deserves a much, much wider audience than the Amazon reviews indicate. It's a rich philosophical work that's actually relevant to all of us—in the way John Gray's books are—and I've learned so much about forgiveness, ethics vs. morality, remembering vs. forgetting, testimony, and much more. Very, very happy I came across this book—and right on the tail of my discovery of John Gray at that! Will be reading the rest of Margalit's works for sure. Highly, highly recommended for anyone who's interested in contemporary philosophy at its best.
Very good - honestly rather brilliant and thoroughly thought out. My only concerns are the human centric perspective and some minor details that I am quite sure are slightly antiquated psychological interpretations.
Not gonna lie, The Ethics of Memory is the reason I called my dad last weekend. Avishai Margalit writes about fathers and sons with a kind of clumsy tenderness, the awkward silences, the half-jokes, the "you doing okay?" that really means "I love you," and the scene in the garage, where neither of them can say what they mean, wrecked me. It does get a little sentimental near the end. For anybody with a complicated parent. Skip it if you'd rather not feel anything on your commute.