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European History in Perspective
Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871
The Prussian Army invented the systems of modern war, and Helmuth von Moltke was the first modern war planner. His accomplishment was to develop, bring to fruition and validate--in the three wars of German unification against Denmark (1864), Austria (1865), and France (1870-71)--the war processes invented during his lifetime. These processes have been used in all modern 20th-century wars because they respond to the size, space, time, and technology mandates of industrial mass warfare. This book describes and analyzes these developments as an aspect of Moltke's life as a professional soldier.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
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About the author
Arden Bucholz
6 books1 followerArden Bucholz is Professor of History at SUNY, Brockport.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 28, 2022
I picked this up thanks to an acquaintance’s recommendation. My goal had been to gain some knowledge regarding the late 19th century Wars of German Unification and to gain an understanding of the military career of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the man considered by many to have been Germany’s foremost military genius. It’s a short book but it proved to be what I was looking for.
Bucholz’s point of departure from previous studies of these wars was that he was relying on new methods, sources and insights to inform his work. The methods are organisational, knowledge and learning theory, the sources are Theodor Fontane’s writings and the insights are regarding Helmuth von Moltke.
The methodology being applied of organisational, knowledge and learning theory are indeed novel. The author analyses armies and wars withing this methodology. He discusses a lot of concepts pertaining to the Prussian army such as future orientation, single-loop and double-loop learning, development towards sources of knowledge etc; at one point he describes armies as the ‘systematic use of organized knowledge applied to the practical skill of war making.’
After describing his approach in the introduction, Bucholz begins with a chapter on the legacy of Napoelonic Warfare and its impact on Prussian armies. He identifies what makes Napoleonic Warfare the earliest form of modern warfare (its innovations in organisation and technology, time consciousness and reliance on future expectations) and then discusses how Prussia invented modern war processes in the wake of its 1806-7 defeat to Napoleon. A key element of the book is introduced here: the General Staff system and its organisational, representational, educational and analytical functions. Although initially only a type of military think tank, the General Staff would become a formidable tool for the purpose of waging and winning wars.
The life of Helmuth von Moltke is the subject of the next few chapters; in fact, his life is the unifying theme of this book. One can’t help but be impressed by Moltke for despite coming from an impoverished family, his was a refined and cultured personality. Moltke was a precocious child: at age eight he was tackling Homer and in his teens he was reading Goethe and Shakespeare. He was fluent in seven languages: German, Danish, English, French, Italian, Spanish and Turkish. In the cartographic section of the Danish army and then the Prussian army he discovered a talent for sketching and drawing. Later on, he developed a taste for classical music and became an admirer of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert and Mendelssohn.
Bucholz humanises Moltke’s life by detailing his personal affairs, such as his marriage. Though he was 42 and Marie was 17 at the time of their marriage, they were a happy couple with Marie supporting Moltke in his career as long as she lived, from acting as his secretary during mobilization and hosting balls and dinners for the Prussian officers to reading the Militär-Wochenblatt, the army’s military journal, and putting up with her husband’s lengthy travels.
Moltke also developed good relations with Prussia’s royal family, foreign dignitaries and his colleagues in the Prussian army. He was a respected officer and behaved with dignity and integrity with all his colleagues. To give an example, in the week after the Battle of Koniggratz Moltke repeatedly urged Albrecht von Blumenthal, Chief of Staff of the First Army, to move south in pursuit of the fleeing Austrians. Blumenthal declined, saying that his formation was not in fit condition to undertake the task. The exchange got heated and once the war was over, Blumenthal wrote to his wife laying out the whole scenario. The letter was intercepted by Austrian intelligence who published it widely in south German newspapers. Even the king of Prussia received a copy and laughed at his unfortunate officer. Moltke, however, declined to read it stating that it was a private letter for Blumenthal’s wife and not intended for anyone else.
It's to Bucholz’s credit that he managed to effectively showcase Moltke’s early life and dealings, from his first taste of battle as adviser to the Ottomans to his position as one of Prussia’s most respected officers.
At the same time, there is a lot of theoretical exposition relating to developments in the Prussian army. As before, the focus is on the Prussian General Staff with Bucholz illustrating how this organization spearheaded the growth of the world’s first modern army, the Prussian army. The development of modern weapons such as the Dreyse rifle, the increasing use of railways for military transportation, the mapping of terrain, the formulation of plans, the practice of conducting war games. Moltke’s role in this is undeniable and he is portrayed as the first modern war-planner, a commander who understood the changing dimensions of warfare and planned accordingly, building a ‘system of expedients’ that could resist the worst shocks.
The second half of the book is dedicated to the German Wars, namely the Danish War, Austro-Prussian War (1866) and Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). Each war gets a chapter and is analysed in light of the theoretical concepts and technological changes discussed earlier. Although the description of the wars isn’t bad, there are a couple of problems. First, there is the lack of maps. There is only one map per war showing the theatre of activity. There is nothing to illustrate troop movements, tactical details or the course of the various battles. This is a big flaw as it makes it difficult for the reader to visualise the war. Second, the wars are not described in smooth chronological fashion, instead, Bucholz breaks up a given war into a number of battles that are then described separately. This makes for a jarring narrative and doesn’t fully show the sequence of events. As in the rest of the book, Moltke’s thoughts and actions are intertwined with the narrative and Bucholz effectively shows how he planned and won the Wars of German Unification.
Overall, it was a good book. I achieved my purpose of gaining insight regarding the career of Helmuth von Moltke and the events of the German Wars and also learned of Prussia’s development of the world’s first army. I believe the following passage, concerning Moltke’s attitude before the Austro-Prussian War (1866), best illustrates how Bucholz has written the book:
Bucholz’s point of departure from previous studies of these wars was that he was relying on new methods, sources and insights to inform his work. The methods are organisational, knowledge and learning theory, the sources are Theodor Fontane’s writings and the insights are regarding Helmuth von Moltke.
The methodology being applied of organisational, knowledge and learning theory are indeed novel. The author analyses armies and wars withing this methodology. He discusses a lot of concepts pertaining to the Prussian army such as future orientation, single-loop and double-loop learning, development towards sources of knowledge etc; at one point he describes armies as the ‘systematic use of organized knowledge applied to the practical skill of war making.’
After describing his approach in the introduction, Bucholz begins with a chapter on the legacy of Napoelonic Warfare and its impact on Prussian armies. He identifies what makes Napoleonic Warfare the earliest form of modern warfare (its innovations in organisation and technology, time consciousness and reliance on future expectations) and then discusses how Prussia invented modern war processes in the wake of its 1806-7 defeat to Napoleon. A key element of the book is introduced here: the General Staff system and its organisational, representational, educational and analytical functions. Although initially only a type of military think tank, the General Staff would become a formidable tool for the purpose of waging and winning wars.
The life of Helmuth von Moltke is the subject of the next few chapters; in fact, his life is the unifying theme of this book. One can’t help but be impressed by Moltke for despite coming from an impoverished family, his was a refined and cultured personality. Moltke was a precocious child: at age eight he was tackling Homer and in his teens he was reading Goethe and Shakespeare. He was fluent in seven languages: German, Danish, English, French, Italian, Spanish and Turkish. In the cartographic section of the Danish army and then the Prussian army he discovered a talent for sketching and drawing. Later on, he developed a taste for classical music and became an admirer of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert and Mendelssohn.
Bucholz humanises Moltke’s life by detailing his personal affairs, such as his marriage. Though he was 42 and Marie was 17 at the time of their marriage, they were a happy couple with Marie supporting Moltke in his career as long as she lived, from acting as his secretary during mobilization and hosting balls and dinners for the Prussian officers to reading the Militär-Wochenblatt, the army’s military journal, and putting up with her husband’s lengthy travels.
Moltke also developed good relations with Prussia’s royal family, foreign dignitaries and his colleagues in the Prussian army. He was a respected officer and behaved with dignity and integrity with all his colleagues. To give an example, in the week after the Battle of Koniggratz Moltke repeatedly urged Albrecht von Blumenthal, Chief of Staff of the First Army, to move south in pursuit of the fleeing Austrians. Blumenthal declined, saying that his formation was not in fit condition to undertake the task. The exchange got heated and once the war was over, Blumenthal wrote to his wife laying out the whole scenario. The letter was intercepted by Austrian intelligence who published it widely in south German newspapers. Even the king of Prussia received a copy and laughed at his unfortunate officer. Moltke, however, declined to read it stating that it was a private letter for Blumenthal’s wife and not intended for anyone else.
It's to Bucholz’s credit that he managed to effectively showcase Moltke’s early life and dealings, from his first taste of battle as adviser to the Ottomans to his position as one of Prussia’s most respected officers.
At the same time, there is a lot of theoretical exposition relating to developments in the Prussian army. As before, the focus is on the Prussian General Staff with Bucholz illustrating how this organization spearheaded the growth of the world’s first modern army, the Prussian army. The development of modern weapons such as the Dreyse rifle, the increasing use of railways for military transportation, the mapping of terrain, the formulation of plans, the practice of conducting war games. Moltke’s role in this is undeniable and he is portrayed as the first modern war-planner, a commander who understood the changing dimensions of warfare and planned accordingly, building a ‘system of expedients’ that could resist the worst shocks.
The second half of the book is dedicated to the German Wars, namely the Danish War, Austro-Prussian War (1866) and Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). Each war gets a chapter and is analysed in light of the theoretical concepts and technological changes discussed earlier. Although the description of the wars isn’t bad, there are a couple of problems. First, there is the lack of maps. There is only one map per war showing the theatre of activity. There is nothing to illustrate troop movements, tactical details or the course of the various battles. This is a big flaw as it makes it difficult for the reader to visualise the war. Second, the wars are not described in smooth chronological fashion, instead, Bucholz breaks up a given war into a number of battles that are then described separately. This makes for a jarring narrative and doesn’t fully show the sequence of events. As in the rest of the book, Moltke’s thoughts and actions are intertwined with the narrative and Bucholz effectively shows how he planned and won the Wars of German Unification.
Overall, it was a good book. I achieved my purpose of gaining insight regarding the career of Helmuth von Moltke and the events of the German Wars and also learned of Prussia’s development of the world’s first army. I believe the following passage, concerning Moltke’s attitude before the Austro-Prussian War (1866), best illustrates how Bucholz has written the book:
Moltke had the whole Austrian War in his head several years before it happened. As an artist he was constantly imaging the world. As a soldier he was constantly thinking about future war possibilities. As chief of the General Staff, Moltke had almost ten years of war gaming, staff rides and manoeuvres worth of looking at possibilities. Possibilities on paper, at the sand table, possibilities riding through the countryside with two dozen officers or with the king and two divisions or corps. Moltke thought in terms of constantly changing scenarios. His mind imaged war possibilities as a director images shots in a film: with the whole film in mind. Possibilities came and went. Each one inevitably suggested others. Each door closed opened others not apparent before. The trick was to balance and relate the separate individual moments to the projected image as a whole. No one else in Europe or the world looked at war in this way in 1865.
March 24, 2024
Short, and I'm not sure what Bucholz's argument is as the book continues. The chapter on the Austrian War diverts into discussions of casualty tables which sought to provide precise analysis of how many casualties a unit could take before routing. I have doubts as to how accurate these tables were and Bucholz makes no effort prove or disprove their validity.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews