Greenfield is Professor of Synaptic Pharmacology at Lincoln College, Oxford. On 1 February 2006, she was installed as Chancellor of Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh. Until 8 January 2010, she was director of the Royal Institution of Great Britain
AN ARGUMENT THAT THE "MIND" AND THE "SELF" ARE SYNONYMOUS
Susan Adele Greenfield (born 1950) is a British scientist, Professor of Synaptic Pharmacology at Lincoln College, Oxford, and member of the House of Lords. She has also written other books such as 'Journey to the Centers of the Mind.'
She wrote in the Preface to this 2000 book, "This book initially started life as a neuroscientist's exploration of pleasure... The human condition seems to entail an uneasy vying between times of abandonment when we 'let ourselves go' and other times... when we are 'developing' or 'broadening' our minds... The more I tried to translate into brain terms this dichotomy... the more I realized that it did not apply to pleasure alone, but to a far wider range of basic emotions. Hence the quest... widened into a consideration of all emotions, both how the brain can accommodate their diversity, as well as whether there might be a common basic factor that distinguishes an emotion, in general, as such. My 'solution,' as you will see, is that emotions and the mind are not polar opposites, but rather the ends of a continuum." (Pg. ix)
She suggests, "I have tried to show that consciousness should be viewed as a means for coordination and communication between brain and body, more specifically as a way of unifying the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems." (Pg. 183)
She concludes, "Finally, we come to the basic idea that emotions are an abrogation of the Self. The more I wrote of this book, the more I found it impossible to distinguish MIND from the concept of SELF. After all, if MIND is the personalization of the brain, then what more, or what less, could SELF actually be? I'll stick my neck out and say that as far as I'm concerned, the two terms might as well be synonymous. For virtually all animals save humans, and for infant humans, the underdeveloped mind would entail a lack of self-consciousness. Consciousness will blossom into self-consciousness only when enough associations are in place to be able to provide a common referent to myriad experiences, like a hub on a wheel." (Pg. 185-186)
This book will be of more interest to those interested in cognitive neuroscience, than to those only interested in the philosophy of mind.