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Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right
This book argues that the American conservative movement, as it now exists, does not have deep roots. It began in the 1950s as the invention of journalists and men of letters reacting to the early Cold War and trying to construct a rallying point for likeminded opponents of international Communism. The resulting movement has exaggerated the permanence of its values; while its militant anti-Communism, instilled in its followers, and periodic suppression of dissent have weakened its capacity for internal debate. Their movement came to power at least partly by burying an older anti-welfare state Right, one that in fact had enjoyed a social following that was concentrated in a small-town America. The newcomers played down the merits of those they had replaced; and in the 1980's the neoconservatives, who took over the postwar conservative movement from an earlier generation, belittled their predecessors in a similar way. Among the movement's major accomplishments has been to recreate its own past. The success of this revised history lies in the fact that even the movement's critics are now inclined to accept it.
207 pages, Hardcover
First published July 15, 2007
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276 people want to read
About the author
Paul Edward Gottfried
36 books141 followersPaul Edward Gottfried is an American paleoconservative political philosopher, historian, and writer. He is a former Professor of Humanities at Swarthmore College and Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania. He is editor-in-chief of the paleoconservative magazine Chronicles. He is an associated scholar at the Mises Institute, a libertarian think tank, and the US correspondent of Nouvelle École, a Nouvelle Droite journal.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
July 6, 2024
Gottfried gave us the term “paleoconservative” to describe his position and affinities. Here he offers a stinging critique of neoconservatives, just as their power was waning. As with his previous work, his predictions are spot on. In 2007 Gottfried was 100% confidant that gay marriage would be legal in short order, even at a time when Obama was wary of embracing it.
The book is best in describing why the neoconservatives succeeded in capturing the Republican Party, which was due to funding, being more palatable to progressives, and their strident anti-communism. The parallel story is the creation of a new right after 1945, one that Gottfried thinks unfairly cast shade on the paleoconservative position, while also creating a working coalition to fight the USSR. That coalition policed itself vigorously, and by 2000 it was intellectually monotone. Gottfried does not go as far as say it, but this stagnation might be why Bush was unable to adapt to a changing situation, while the administrations of Bush Sr., Reagan, and to a lesser degree Nixon were more flexible and successful.
Of course, the ultimate critique is that the neoconservtives were hardly conservative. They instead took up a light progressiveness that Gottfried finds disgusting and futile. The former point limits the book; Gottfried is a man with personal axes to grind. The latter is a point well taken. He saw that the neoconservatives had no social base and precious few "values" outside an aggressive foreign policy. They were only an elite movement. Hence, when their project failed, they would join the Democrats. Low behold, in 2021 George W. Bush has a higher approval rating with Democrats than Republicans.
This is the weakest of Gottfried's books so far, but still worth a read. It is limited by his personal grudges and by at times arcane asides. Yet, as with his best work, he is good at describing the times and predicting, with eerie accuracy, where we are headed. Even if one disagrees with him, Gottfried is a man worthy of being read and debated. It helps that he is a good writer and unfailingly honest. He has held his views for decades and is not a mere opportunist as so many, right and left, have been over the decades.
The book is best in describing why the neoconservatives succeeded in capturing the Republican Party, which was due to funding, being more palatable to progressives, and their strident anti-communism. The parallel story is the creation of a new right after 1945, one that Gottfried thinks unfairly cast shade on the paleoconservative position, while also creating a working coalition to fight the USSR. That coalition policed itself vigorously, and by 2000 it was intellectually monotone. Gottfried does not go as far as say it, but this stagnation might be why Bush was unable to adapt to a changing situation, while the administrations of Bush Sr., Reagan, and to a lesser degree Nixon were more flexible and successful.
Of course, the ultimate critique is that the neoconservtives were hardly conservative. They instead took up a light progressiveness that Gottfried finds disgusting and futile. The former point limits the book; Gottfried is a man with personal axes to grind. The latter is a point well taken. He saw that the neoconservatives had no social base and precious few "values" outside an aggressive foreign policy. They were only an elite movement. Hence, when their project failed, they would join the Democrats. Low behold, in 2021 George W. Bush has a higher approval rating with Democrats than Republicans.
This is the weakest of Gottfried's books so far, but still worth a read. It is limited by his personal grudges and by at times arcane asides. Yet, as with his best work, he is good at describing the times and predicting, with eerie accuracy, where we are headed. Even if one disagrees with him, Gottfried is a man worthy of being read and debated. It helps that he is a good writer and unfailingly honest. He has held his views for decades and is not a mere opportunist as so many, right and left, have been over the decades.
November 20, 2020
8/10.
Better than 'The Vanishing Tradition', not truly great like 'Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt'. A recommended look in to the multifarious history, purges, and policing of the American 'conservative' movement, the three signal ideas in this book are firstly that the author actually draws a distinction between the conservatives and the true Right, the co-optation by or symbiosis with the conservatives of the Republican party and their tied fates, and most importantly, the uncanny similarities between anticommunist postwar conservative political organization and the CPUSA itself, a parallel that is highlighted indirectly by Whittaker Chambers. It is this party-oriented and cadre-guided party discipline that gives the movement its distinct form and allowed the neocons easy takeover.
The author doesn't explore how the money that gave the neocons control of the movement came to be and how it was directed to that end, which would have taken the author in to the depths of the Jewish question. Another missed opportunity is in not exploring further the failure of America's lack of aristocracy or landed gentry and the failure of conservatism to take root here.
Gottfried is always good, and here makes the case for the distinction without a difference: that American conservatism and American liberalism are both offshoots of New Deal leftism, and that a classical liberal is to the right of either.
This isn't as true since the rise of SJWism on the left and a populist bent to conservatism in Trump's era, but the book is surprisingly timely still.
Better than 'The Vanishing Tradition', not truly great like 'Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt'. A recommended look in to the multifarious history, purges, and policing of the American 'conservative' movement, the three signal ideas in this book are firstly that the author actually draws a distinction between the conservatives and the true Right, the co-optation by or symbiosis with the conservatives of the Republican party and their tied fates, and most importantly, the uncanny similarities between anticommunist postwar conservative political organization and the CPUSA itself, a parallel that is highlighted indirectly by Whittaker Chambers. It is this party-oriented and cadre-guided party discipline that gives the movement its distinct form and allowed the neocons easy takeover.
The author doesn't explore how the money that gave the neocons control of the movement came to be and how it was directed to that end, which would have taken the author in to the depths of the Jewish question. Another missed opportunity is in not exploring further the failure of America's lack of aristocracy or landed gentry and the failure of conservatism to take root here.
Gottfried is always good, and here makes the case for the distinction without a difference: that American conservatism and American liberalism are both offshoots of New Deal leftism, and that a classical liberal is to the right of either.
This isn't as true since the rise of SJWism on the left and a populist bent to conservatism in Trump's era, but the book is surprisingly timely still.
November 18, 2016
It is often said that the neoconservatives have derailed a basically healthy conservative movement. As I understand it, that used to be Paul Gottfried’s point of view. In Conservatism In America (2007), however, Gottfried argues that the post WWII conservative movement was intrinsically flawed. Gottfried still prefers the 1950’s style Buckley conservatism to the contemporary neocon version, but he sees similar problems with both, and thinks that the easy neoconservative “takeover” of the conservative movement can be explained in part by those similarities. Through this critique, the reader sees why Gottfried-still very much a man of the Right-has given up on the "official" conservative movement. This movement has obviously lost much of its persuasive power in 2016; Gottfried's book is a great resource for those who would understand the limitations and pernicious functioning of a conservative movement that is losing its hegemony over the Right in America.
Gottfried thinks that post WWII American conservatism has never had a strong social base. This distinguishes it from both Burkean “classical conservatism,” and various 20th century “Rights,” such as the American anti-New Deal, libertarian/Jeffersonian Right of the 1930’s. Gottfried defines “the Right” as “a predominantly bourgeois reaction, explicitly against social and political radicalization, that has taken many forms. But these forms arose in societies in which the ancient regime, to which classical conservatism had rallied, was already tottering or had never existed.” (xiii) The post WWII conservative movement was not so much a genuine social movement as a constructed movement built above all to battle communism. This “artificiality” was a glaring weakness. Because the movement did not have a strong, natural base, the promulgation of “values” was necessary to promote unity and gain support. Gottfried also brings out the importance of discipline to the Buckleyite, National Review circle. Non-conformists to the “party-line” were expelled from the movement. Later on, the neoconservatives shared important structural similarities with their Buckleyite predecessors. They too lacked a real social base, and likewise compensated by relying on values for unity and support. And, of course, they expelled those deemed heterodox.
Gottfried’s biggest gripe in this book is with the “value conservatism” utilized by the conservative movement. Gottfried’s attack on value conservatism should not be misunderstood. He does not claim to be attacking objective moral values. What he is attacking is the notion that there are transcendent political truths/values. The belief that there are political truths beyond history is more leftist than it is authentically conservative or rightist. Value conservatism has also proved so open to alteration over the years that it can hardly be said to have any stable meaning.
In terms of value conservatism, Russell Kirk’s work represents for Gottfried the relatively innocuous beginnings of a process that would later become very pernicious under the neoconservatives and various Straussians. Though Gottfried admires classical conservatism, he thinks Kirk erroneously stressed the importance of a Burkean heritage in America. However, his interpretation was useful both in that it gave the Buckleyites an impressive old world geneology, and because Burke’s understanding of the state as a community of souls tied in well with the acceptance of state power the conservative movement thought necessary to fight communism. The popular and well-respected Kirk also offered 6 canons that defined conservatism. This, says Gottfried, was where the value conservatism trouble started. Given that late 18th century England was obviously different in many respects from 20th century America, Kirk’s attempt to find a strong bond between Burke and America necessitated a linkage that transcended historical circumstance. Being a conservative for Kirk entailed accepting the appropriate canons/”values.”
Over time, the neocons have replaced earlier conservative “values” with a celebration of equality. This has resulted in a messianic political religion that defends the welfare/administrative state necessary to ensure the neocon version of equality, and seeks to spread liberal democracy around the globe. Gottfried dislikes these (often aggressive) leftist affirmations ostensibly made in the name of conservatism. He also dislikes the neocon failure to rigorously support many socially conservative positions. Because the neocons have turned the conservative movement into an adjunct to the Republican Party, amorphous value conservatism slides leftward over time as the attempt is made to speak of conservative values in such a way as to inoffensively appeal to the broadest possible electorate. Thus, even when the neocons disagree with the liberal democrats on certain topics, their opposition is watered down and not very vigorous. And more authentically right wing voices continue to be marginalized by the neocons, who are happy to police acceptable parameters to contemporary political debate. Also, by habitually (and erroneously) claiming their progressive political opponents are mere “value relativists,” the neocons miss the opportunity to explicate and critique their opponent’s true values. (These values are ably explained in Gottfried’s Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt.) In general, progressives have found in the neocons a very useful and accommodating opposition.
Since the neocons have so profoundly altered what passes for conservatism in America, one might wonder how the neocons gained such complete ascendancy with very little struggle. Gottfried makes the argument that the neocons (who had impressive financial and institutional advantages to begin with) took over the conservative movement with relatively little controversy because conservatism since the 50’s has prized internal discipline, and because the especially traumatic possibility of becoming an excommunicated movement conservative tended to enforce compliance with new, neocon “truths” once the neocons assumed positions of power. Given that the intellectual world is much more liberal than conservative, a movement conservative who is blackballed, says Gottfried, suffers much greater isolation than a straying liberal. (I think Gottfried speaks with credibility on this issue.) Gottfried also argues that the appeal to “value conservatism” often masks to movement conservatives just how much the movement has changed.
This book is a thought provoking read. It might prove especially valuable for traditionalist/Kirkian conservatives who still see themselves as movement conservatives. Even though Gottfried criticizes Kirk, he is appreciative of Kirk’s accomplishments as a man of letters. Gottfried also has some sympathy with Kirk’s personal political preferences, which were similar to Robert Taft’s. Kirk may have erred in stressing America’s Burkean connection and in helping to inaugurate the “value conservatism” game, but Gottfried saves his real scorn for those who came later, and to be fair, it was impossible for Kirk to see what was to become of the conservative movement. Gottfried also makes an interesting distinction between Kirk and the “cultural traditionalists” like T.S. Eliot whom Kirk so admired. Though there are many important similarities between the learned and intensely moral Kirk and such figures, these men did not really care about politics, while Kirk wanted to be a movement player. Perhaps, Gottfried seems to imply, Kirkians would do better to stand aloof from the conservative movement and focus more on preserving and transmitting the Western cultural heritage. To the extent that Kirkians do wish to involve themselves in politics, Kirk’s personal right-wing sensibilities, which were formed in the isolationist, small-government, pre-National Review era, provide a sounder (though more radical) approach than participation in the mainstream and leftward trending conservative movement that Kirk helped to found.
Finally, I would mention that the results of the 2016 Presidential election may have provided a genuine opportunity to forge a real alternative to progressivism; Gottfried's destruction of the notion that post WWII conservatism is some sort of Platonic ideal might prove useful to this task because it opens up theoretical space for creative action.
Gottfried thinks that post WWII American conservatism has never had a strong social base. This distinguishes it from both Burkean “classical conservatism,” and various 20th century “Rights,” such as the American anti-New Deal, libertarian/Jeffersonian Right of the 1930’s. Gottfried defines “the Right” as “a predominantly bourgeois reaction, explicitly against social and political radicalization, that has taken many forms. But these forms arose in societies in which the ancient regime, to which classical conservatism had rallied, was already tottering or had never existed.” (xiii) The post WWII conservative movement was not so much a genuine social movement as a constructed movement built above all to battle communism. This “artificiality” was a glaring weakness. Because the movement did not have a strong, natural base, the promulgation of “values” was necessary to promote unity and gain support. Gottfried also brings out the importance of discipline to the Buckleyite, National Review circle. Non-conformists to the “party-line” were expelled from the movement. Later on, the neoconservatives shared important structural similarities with their Buckleyite predecessors. They too lacked a real social base, and likewise compensated by relying on values for unity and support. And, of course, they expelled those deemed heterodox.
Gottfried’s biggest gripe in this book is with the “value conservatism” utilized by the conservative movement. Gottfried’s attack on value conservatism should not be misunderstood. He does not claim to be attacking objective moral values. What he is attacking is the notion that there are transcendent political truths/values. The belief that there are political truths beyond history is more leftist than it is authentically conservative or rightist. Value conservatism has also proved so open to alteration over the years that it can hardly be said to have any stable meaning.
In terms of value conservatism, Russell Kirk’s work represents for Gottfried the relatively innocuous beginnings of a process that would later become very pernicious under the neoconservatives and various Straussians. Though Gottfried admires classical conservatism, he thinks Kirk erroneously stressed the importance of a Burkean heritage in America. However, his interpretation was useful both in that it gave the Buckleyites an impressive old world geneology, and because Burke’s understanding of the state as a community of souls tied in well with the acceptance of state power the conservative movement thought necessary to fight communism. The popular and well-respected Kirk also offered 6 canons that defined conservatism. This, says Gottfried, was where the value conservatism trouble started. Given that late 18th century England was obviously different in many respects from 20th century America, Kirk’s attempt to find a strong bond between Burke and America necessitated a linkage that transcended historical circumstance. Being a conservative for Kirk entailed accepting the appropriate canons/”values.”
Over time, the neocons have replaced earlier conservative “values” with a celebration of equality. This has resulted in a messianic political religion that defends the welfare/administrative state necessary to ensure the neocon version of equality, and seeks to spread liberal democracy around the globe. Gottfried dislikes these (often aggressive) leftist affirmations ostensibly made in the name of conservatism. He also dislikes the neocon failure to rigorously support many socially conservative positions. Because the neocons have turned the conservative movement into an adjunct to the Republican Party, amorphous value conservatism slides leftward over time as the attempt is made to speak of conservative values in such a way as to inoffensively appeal to the broadest possible electorate. Thus, even when the neocons disagree with the liberal democrats on certain topics, their opposition is watered down and not very vigorous. And more authentically right wing voices continue to be marginalized by the neocons, who are happy to police acceptable parameters to contemporary political debate. Also, by habitually (and erroneously) claiming their progressive political opponents are mere “value relativists,” the neocons miss the opportunity to explicate and critique their opponent’s true values. (These values are ably explained in Gottfried’s Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt.) In general, progressives have found in the neocons a very useful and accommodating opposition.
Since the neocons have so profoundly altered what passes for conservatism in America, one might wonder how the neocons gained such complete ascendancy with very little struggle. Gottfried makes the argument that the neocons (who had impressive financial and institutional advantages to begin with) took over the conservative movement with relatively little controversy because conservatism since the 50’s has prized internal discipline, and because the especially traumatic possibility of becoming an excommunicated movement conservative tended to enforce compliance with new, neocon “truths” once the neocons assumed positions of power. Given that the intellectual world is much more liberal than conservative, a movement conservative who is blackballed, says Gottfried, suffers much greater isolation than a straying liberal. (I think Gottfried speaks with credibility on this issue.) Gottfried also argues that the appeal to “value conservatism” often masks to movement conservatives just how much the movement has changed.
This book is a thought provoking read. It might prove especially valuable for traditionalist/Kirkian conservatives who still see themselves as movement conservatives. Even though Gottfried criticizes Kirk, he is appreciative of Kirk’s accomplishments as a man of letters. Gottfried also has some sympathy with Kirk’s personal political preferences, which were similar to Robert Taft’s. Kirk may have erred in stressing America’s Burkean connection and in helping to inaugurate the “value conservatism” game, but Gottfried saves his real scorn for those who came later, and to be fair, it was impossible for Kirk to see what was to become of the conservative movement. Gottfried also makes an interesting distinction between Kirk and the “cultural traditionalists” like T.S. Eliot whom Kirk so admired. Though there are many important similarities between the learned and intensely moral Kirk and such figures, these men did not really care about politics, while Kirk wanted to be a movement player. Perhaps, Gottfried seems to imply, Kirkians would do better to stand aloof from the conservative movement and focus more on preserving and transmitting the Western cultural heritage. To the extent that Kirkians do wish to involve themselves in politics, Kirk’s personal right-wing sensibilities, which were formed in the isolationist, small-government, pre-National Review era, provide a sounder (though more radical) approach than participation in the mainstream and leftward trending conservative movement that Kirk helped to found.
Finally, I would mention that the results of the 2016 Presidential election may have provided a genuine opportunity to forge a real alternative to progressivism; Gottfried's destruction of the notion that post WWII conservatism is some sort of Platonic ideal might prove useful to this task because it opens up theoretical space for creative action.
December 17, 2021
Published in 2007, Gottfried's Conservatism in America is more relevant than ever after four years of the Trump presidency, a vigorous and heavily mystified bi-partisan effort to destroy that administration, and the still-bleeding wounds marking D.C. politics which this intra-elite civil war has left behind. More importantly, such in-fighting visits a far more destructive trickle-down effect upon tens of millions of vulnerable Americans regardless of our variable political allegiances.
Conservatives in the US, Gottfried reminds us, once were staunchly and uniformly opposed to adventurism abroad, empire-building, "endless wars." As Gottfried influence Robert Nisbet puts it in his "The Present Age: Progress and Anarchy in Modern America":
"Clearly, the American Constitution was designed for a people more interested in governing itself than in helping to govern the rest of the world. The new nation had the priceless advantage of two great oceans dividing it from the turbulences of Europe and Asia. Permanent or even frequent war was the last thing any thoughtful American of the time would think of as a serious threat."
These were the roots to which self-declared conservatives once widely held firm. After World War II however, as most observant Americans can note, the reverse has become the norm, both Bushes' blunders in Iraq and Reagan's Latin America tinkering being just three among many examples.
Gottfried, a self-avowed right-winger himself, wants the old conservatism back, but is not optimistic it can be resurrected. "Conservatism in America" is more post-mortem than manifesto. Of course, as mentioned previously, this book came to press nearly a decade prior to Trump defeating Hillary Clinton (the latter whom as Gottfried notes won the admiration of many "neo-conservatives" in the lead up to what would become her fierce primary battle against Barack Obama) by running against what his campaign framed as her own "endless war" policies, empire-building, and specifically her votes in favor of the occupation of Iraq. Again see Nisbet, here imagining what the "Founding Fathers" of America would think if they could time travel to see our military today:
"The returned Framers would not be surprised to learn that so vast a military has inexorable effects
upon the economy, the structure of government, and even the culture of Americans; they had witnessed such effects in Europe from afar, and had not liked what they saw."
As happens so frequently whenever the USA faces crises like it currently does now, rumors, whisperings, and sometimes out-and-out cheering abound throughout the globe declaring the "Coming Collapse of the American Empire." Based on the past decisions of our elites, are we currently heading in a similar direction as Rome and Great Britain? Or is America's unique staying power attributable to its unprecedented ability to absorb crises, and use that chaotic energy to make the empire stronger? As these debates rage fiercer than perhaps ever before, it is a worthwhile use of time to trace the history of one of this country's most controversial thought traditions, conservatism, and ask where this tradition heading next, how it may be redefined differently in the future, and how that may help or harm the cause of those multitudes noted above, who suffer most while our would-be leaders continue to tear themselves (and us) apart.
Conservatives in the US, Gottfried reminds us, once were staunchly and uniformly opposed to adventurism abroad, empire-building, "endless wars." As Gottfried influence Robert Nisbet puts it in his "The Present Age: Progress and Anarchy in Modern America":
"Clearly, the American Constitution was designed for a people more interested in governing itself than in helping to govern the rest of the world. The new nation had the priceless advantage of two great oceans dividing it from the turbulences of Europe and Asia. Permanent or even frequent war was the last thing any thoughtful American of the time would think of as a serious threat."
These were the roots to which self-declared conservatives once widely held firm. After World War II however, as most observant Americans can note, the reverse has become the norm, both Bushes' blunders in Iraq and Reagan's Latin America tinkering being just three among many examples.
Gottfried, a self-avowed right-winger himself, wants the old conservatism back, but is not optimistic it can be resurrected. "Conservatism in America" is more post-mortem than manifesto. Of course, as mentioned previously, this book came to press nearly a decade prior to Trump defeating Hillary Clinton (the latter whom as Gottfried notes won the admiration of many "neo-conservatives" in the lead up to what would become her fierce primary battle against Barack Obama) by running against what his campaign framed as her own "endless war" policies, empire-building, and specifically her votes in favor of the occupation of Iraq. Again see Nisbet, here imagining what the "Founding Fathers" of America would think if they could time travel to see our military today:
"The returned Framers would not be surprised to learn that so vast a military has inexorable effects
upon the economy, the structure of government, and even the culture of Americans; they had witnessed such effects in Europe from afar, and had not liked what they saw."
As happens so frequently whenever the USA faces crises like it currently does now, rumors, whisperings, and sometimes out-and-out cheering abound throughout the globe declaring the "Coming Collapse of the American Empire." Based on the past decisions of our elites, are we currently heading in a similar direction as Rome and Great Britain? Or is America's unique staying power attributable to its unprecedented ability to absorb crises, and use that chaotic energy to make the empire stronger? As these debates rage fiercer than perhaps ever before, it is a worthwhile use of time to trace the history of one of this country's most controversial thought traditions, conservatism, and ask where this tradition heading next, how it may be redefined differently in the future, and how that may help or harm the cause of those multitudes noted above, who suffer most while our would-be leaders continue to tear themselves (and us) apart.
November 25, 2022
Absolute destruction of conservatism. Tracing the history of it from the 50s to 2007, it shows how the culture conservatives are trying to conserve is poorly defined and the values they profess to stand for are inconsistent. At least the newer National Review crowd.
August 10, 2015
This book clarified a lot that confused me about the American political scene, especially regarding the inane conservatives. The author's main points are well documented, often at first hand, which serves to place on in a history of persons and goals. Too often history dissolves into tales of classes, masses and abstract concepts, without reference to the people who embody these world-spirits.
Gottfried's religious views are never expressed in the book, he seems sympathetic to Christianity but wary of its ability to be counterfeited. Much of the association he makes between American political culture and religion is the specifically Protestant, utopian leanings of American politics as against Europe's ancient ties of religion and blood.
Gottfried's religious views are never expressed in the book, he seems sympathetic to Christianity but wary of its ability to be counterfeited. Much of the association he makes between American political culture and religion is the specifically Protestant, utopian leanings of American politics as against Europe's ancient ties of religion and blood.
February 3, 2015
This is an informative book that presents an alternative to the FOX News version of conservatism. It compares early, continental European conservatism with the American version that developed throughout our founding period and was detailed by Russell Kirk in his book, The Conservative Mind. Dr. Gottfried is as his best when describing how the conservative movement changed in the 1980's and 1990's from the traditional American conservatism of Kirk into the shallow, Neoconservative version that is presented by most today. It will not be appreciated by talk-show hosts, but if you are looking for something other than what you get from Republican talking heads, this book is for you.
January 22, 2016
Need to glance back through it, but I found his argument more vitriolic than helpful. If I ever am involved in the early stages of a political movement that later rejects me I hope that I can avoid writing a book like this. Ha.
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