THE ROMAN ORATOR DISCUSSES A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT TOPICS
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) was a Roman statesman, orator, lawyer and philosopher, who served as consul in the year 63 BC.
He explains, “The [philosophical] school I myself have particularly followed is the one which in my view comes closest to Socrates in its methods: it allows me to refrain from expressing a personal opinion of my own, while I am at liberty to correct other people’s mistakes and make my own search for the most probable solution, whatever subject may happen to be involved.” (Pg. 57-58)
He cites Epicurus, noting, “we have to listen to him declaring… that the wise man… even when he is being burnt and racked and cut to pieces, will never cease to assure us: ‘It means nothing to me at all.’ … what inconsistency his works reveal. For here is a man who actually identifies evil with pain and good with pleasure, thus making a mockery of all our attempts to establish moral standards… since nothing is really of the slightest significance except pleasant or unpleasant physical sensations.” (Pg. 91)
He observes, “What a lot of trouble one avoids if one refuses to have anything to do with the common herd! To have no job, to devote one’s time to literature, is the most wonderful thing in the world. And by literature, I mean the works which give us an opportunity to understand the universe and nature in all its infinity, and the world in which we ourselves live, its sky, land and sea.” (Pg. 107-108)
He comments, “we must make absolutely certain that private debts do not ever reach proportions which will constitute a national peril. There are various ways of ensuring this. But just to take the money away from the rich creditors and give the debtors something that does not belong to them is no solution at all. For the firmest possible guarantee of a country’s security is sound credit, and, once you cease to regard the repayment of debts as mandatory soundness of credit is no more.” (Pg. 168)
He acknowledges, “Somehow expositions of this kind seem to carry special conviction when they are placed in the mouths of personages of an earlier generation, especially when these were eminent men. For example, when I read my own treatise ‘On Old Age,’ it sometimes affects me so profoundly that I actually feel it is Cato who is doing the talking and not myself! In that book I was writing on the subject as one old man to another.” (Pg. 177)
He states, “For although some authorities have lately begun to argue that the soul perishes alone with the body, so that everything is obliterated by death, I disagree with them. I prefer the more ancient view, which was held, among others, by our own ancestors. They used to pay meticulous reverence to the dead, which they would never have done had they believed that once a person is dead nothing affects him any more.” (Pg. 182)
He points out, “Take away the bond of kindly feeling from the world, and no house or city can stand. Even the fields will no longer be cultivated. If that sounds an exaggeration, consider the converse situation: note the disasters that come from dissension and enmity. When there is internal hatred and division, no home or country in the world is strong enough to avoid destruction. That shows the value of the opposite situation---friendship.” (Pg. 189)
He says of the instruction of orators, “One was told that an orator’s theoretical and practical task is divided into five parts… I also listened to instructions about making one’s oration attractive… This is the sort of thing to which the theoreticians devote their learning, almost every bit they possess. If I rejected all these efforts as a waste of time, I should not be telling the truth. For the rules certainly supply a speaker with useful reminders… But, in my view, the principal significance of these regulations is somewhat different. The reputation this or that speaker may have gained by following them is not really the point. What the compilers of the maxims have really done is to note carefully, and collect together, a set of procedures which good speakers had hitherto employed anyway, following their instinct. That is to say, eloquence is not derived from the rules: it is the other way round.” (Pg. 285-286)
He recounts a trial of one Rutilius: “what, in fact, happened was that Rutilius lost his case---and so we, for our part, lost a very fine man. And the reason why this happened was because his defense was conducted just as if the whole affair was taking place in Plato’s ideal Republic. None of Rutilius’s counsel produced any moans or shouts, none displayed the slightest sign of grief, there was not a sign of any protests, or calls upon the name of Rome, or pleas for mercy. In short, nobody so much as stamped a foot during the entire course of the trial. They behaved as if they were afraid they were going to be reported to the Stoics!” (Pg. 319)
This book will be of keen interest to students studying the “classics” and history of ancient Rome.