Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War by Max Hastings

by Max Hastings

A magisterial chronicle of the calamity that crippled Europe in 1914.

1914: a year of unparalleled change. The year that diplomacy failed, Imperial Europe was thrown into its first modernised warfare and white-gloved soldiers rode in their masses across pastoral landscapes into the blaze of machine–guns. What followed were the costliest days of the entire War. But how had it happened?

In Catastrophe: 1914 Max Hastings, best-selling author of the acclaimed All Hell Let Loose, answers at last how World War I could ever have begun. Ranging across Europe, from Paris to St. Petersberg, from Kings to corporals, Catastrophe 1914 traces how tensions across the continent kindled into a blaze of battles; not the stalemates of later trench-warfare but battles of movement and dash where Napoleonic tactics met with weapons from a newly industrialised age. A searing analysis of the power-brokering, vanity and bluff in the diplomatic maelstrom reveals who was responsible for the birth of this catastrophic world in arms. Mingling the experiences of humbler folk with the statesmen on whom their lives depended, Hastings asks: whose actions were justified?

From the out-break of war through to its terrible making, and the bloody gambles in Sarajevo and Mons, Le Cateau, Marne and Tannenberg, this is the international story of World War I in its most severe and influential period. Published to coincide with its 100th Anniversary, Catastrophe: 1914 explains how and why this war, which shattered and changed the Western world for ever, was fought.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War I, War, Military History, Military Fiction, European History

Audio CD

First published September 12, 2013

About the author

Sir Max Hugh Macdonald Hastings, FRSL, FRHistS is a British journalist, editor, historian and author. His parents were Macdonald Hastings, a journalist and war correspondent, and Anne Scott-James, sometime editor of Harper's Bazaar.

Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.

Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.

After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.

He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.

He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.

Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Just as at Mons, wherever enemy masses appeared within rifle range, they were mauled. ‘It is impossible to miss German infantry,’ wrote forty-three-year-old Maj. Bertie Trevor, a company commander in the Yorkshires. ‘They come on in heaps.’ But the defenders in their turn suffered from artillery fire, which caused especially severe losses in British batteries, deployed as conspicuously as were their forebears on the ridge of Mont Saint-Jean, at Waterloo in 1815. Indeed, the first Duke of Wellington would have seen much at Le Cateau that was familiar to him: enemy troops advancing in close-packed columns; drivers lashing lathered artillery teams forward to unlimber; gallopers bearing orders hastening hither and dither…A German officer wrote wonderingly: ‘I did not think it possible that flesh and blood could survive so great an onslaught…’”
- Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War

Max Hastings is one of the better World War II writer-historians working today. In books like Armageddon, Retribution, and Inferno, he manages to be both accessible and sophisticated. A general reader can enjoy his work, while even longtime students can learn something new. If you want a finely chiseled, conventional-wisdom-defying nugget to toss in your friend’s face while getting drunk with him at a bar, Hastings is the man to read.

Hastings was once a war-correspondent, and it shows in his writing as he delivers sharp judgments, finds telling details, and eschews predictable retellings. His presentation is terse, stripped-down, and shorn of bluster and encomiums. He is unimpressed with wartime mythmaking, and unafraid to deliver an opinion. I haven’t always agreed with his conclusions, but at the very least he always got me thinking. When I read a book by Max Hastings, I know I’m reading a book by Max Hastings.

In Catastrophe 1914, Hastings gets into his DeLorean and takes his talents back to an earlier war. Though he is working in a different time period, with entirely different archives to consult, the results are still excellent.

Published in 2013, Catastrophe 1914 was clearly designed to arrive – along with many other titles – just before the centenary of the Great War. That is not to say that Hastings phoned this in. Quite to the contrary, this is a rather ambitious volume, covering events from Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination to the Christmas Truce on the Western Front, all in 563 pages of text. In between there is mass mobilization, Germany’s invasion of Belgium and France, Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia, the Russian invasion of east Germany, the Battle of the Frontiers, the Battle of the Marne, and finally a stalemate that would ultimately linger until 1918.

All serious books about 1914 must face comparisons to Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August. While that is an all-time classic – with certain unbeatable literary flourishes – Hasting’s effort is comparable, and covers far more ground (and unlike Tuchman, he does not neglect the Eastern Front). To get through all the topics he tries to cover, Hastings employs a telescoping approach to military maneuvers. He starts with a broad overview, generally at the corps level, and then zooms in to smaller detachments to capture the viewpoints of junior officers and common soldiers. Mostly, this is effective.

The first of Kluck’s infantry began to push downhill towards the water, shielded along most of its unlovely length by drab houses, mine pitheads and industrial installations…Pte. Sid Godley was enjoying coffee and rolls brought to him by two Belgian children, with whom he made clumsy efforts at conversation, when their little party was interrupted by an incoming German shell… Godley settled down behind his rifle. As the first Germans showed themselves, thousands of British soldiers opened fire, the rippling crackle of their musketry soon overborne by the crump of artillery. The Germans began crowding around the dangerous salient north-east of Mons, at Nimy, where the bridges were defended by the Royal Fusiliers, who had the 4th Middlesex to their right…Col. Hull, commanding the Middlesex, was a small-arms enthusiast who had taken pains to ensure that his men could shoot straight, and that day they did him proud. Successive German rushes were checked by murderous rifle-fire. Huddled grey-green corpses, surmounted by Pickelhaube helmets, soon littered the north bank. But Kluck’s men, in their turn, took up firing positions and were soon inflicting casualties on the ill-concealed British.

To be sure, things get complicated. Even though Hastings makes an effort to avoid minutiae, there are times when his descriptions come to resemble an alpha-numeric soup of army groups, corps, divisions, etc. I think that’s just a reality of World War I writing. The battles were complicated. They were huge and messy and they took place over days and weeks. This isn’t like Gettysburg, where you can take a look at a couple of maps and figure things out. The titanic clashes of August 1914 are simply difficult to conceive. There are maps in this book, but they try to do so many things that it’s hard to decipher them.

Far easier to follow are Hastings’s brief, oft-acerbic mini-biographies of the war’s chief players, which seldom failed to entertain. For instance, Hastings’s take on Edward Grey:

Grey is usually depicted as a gentle, civilized figure who lamented the coming of war in 1914 with unaccustomed eloquence, and wrote fine books on birdwatching and fly-fishing. A widower of fifty-two, his personal affairs were less arid than most of his contemporaries assumed. He conducted a lively love life, albeit much more discreetly than his colleague Lloyd George; Grey’s most recent biographer identifies two illegitimate children. Some of his contemporaries disdained him. Sir Eyre Crowe, a Foreign Office official who was admittedly prone to intemperance, called Grey ‘a futile, useless, weak fool.’ The foreign secretary’s accustomed taciturnity caused Lloyd George, for one, to conclude that there was less to him than met the eye; that his economy with words reflected not strength of character, but debility. Grey spoke no foreign languages, and disliked Abroad. Although a highly intelligent man, he was also a narrow one, subject to violent mood swings. Yet from 1905 to 1916 he ran Britain’s foreign policy as a private bailiwick.

One of the things that struck me about this book was its confidence. Having switched subjects, one might expect Hastings to display a less-sure grip. To the contrary, Catastrophe 1914 is written with the certainty of a man who has been studying the Marne and Tannenberg his whole life.

As previously noted, Hastings is not shy about airing his historical judgments. The chief verdict he delivers in Catastrophe 1914 is that the onus for the war rests on the Germans. In forming this view, Hastings rejects Tuchman’s mechanistic retelling, and takes a swipe at Christopher Clark’s recent (and well-received) The Sleepwalkers.

I found Hastings’s German axe-grinding to be one of this book’s main shortcomings (though it is also the price you pay for choosing one of his books). In his opinion, Germany wanted war in 1914 and encouraged Austria-Hungary to give Serbia an impossible ultimatum, with the foreknowledge that Austria-Hungary would invade Serbia and precipitate general war at a time favorable to Germany (that is, at a time before Russia reached full strength).

Certainly, this is a supportable argument. But Hastings doesn’t really support it. He just says it (as he tends to do). By starting his narrative in 1914, he ignores the fraught decade leading up to World War I, where half a dozen crises (e.g., Morocco I and II, the Balkan Wars) came and went without sparking a conflict.

Hastings is also a bit disingenuous in framing his case. He downplays the culpability of Russia and France (two great powers) in tying their destinies to that of Serbia, a loose-cannon of a country filled with pan-nationalists who’d already fought two recent wars of territorial conquest. On a couple occasions, Hastings justifies Russia’s mobilization as an action necessary to protect Serbia from destruction. This interpretation naively makes Serbia into some kind of martyr, when in reality, Serbia’s military had an undisputed role in Franz Ferdinand’s assassination. They weren’t victims, they were instigators with their own designs.

Of course, disagreeing with Hastings is part of the fun of reading him. His thinly-veiled arrogance is part of his charm. He is always entertaining, and this volume is no exception. Besides, World War I is an extremely dense subject, and in that sense, Hastings’s clarity and bottom-line pronouncements makes the subject more manageable, especially if you have not read a lot beforehand.

Being a relative latecomer to the study of the First World War, I have discovered that the least interesting part of the conflict is the battles. My favorites books have been about the years leading up to 1914, or the period between Ferdinand’s assassination and Germany’s invasion of Belgium. The actual clashes between opposing armies are so hard to imagine that I often tune them out. Catastrophe 1914 does a really good job of at least trying to bring coherence to the fields of death at Mons, La Cateau, and Tannenberg, while simultaneously connecting those impersonal bloodlettings to the individuals who lived through them and died during them.

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

With this latest book, Mr. Hastings confirms my opinion that he is one of the two or three best military historians writing today. This is an excellent look the last half of 1914 as Europe spiraled into abattoir that became known as the Great War. He blends both high and low level views of the war to make a very readable volume.

Mr. Hastings looks at the causes of the war- the strategic position of Germany and her desire to dominate Continental Europe, the weakness of Austria, Russia’s desire to be the savior to all the Slavs. France’s fear of Germany and her desires for empire. In telling the story of the beginnings of the war, Mr. Hastings emphasizes that most of Europe between the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand and the actual outbreak of war 6 weeks later, did not feel war was likely. There had been several other crisis’s in the recent past that seemed more likely to spark a war. In some ways war came as a surprise to most of the population of Europe.

When the author starts telling the tale of the actual opening campaigns of World War I he is absolutely scathing in his assessment of the generalship of the various armies. He is especially critical of the Austrian High Command. In the Austrian Military, there seemed to have been a complete lack of professionalism throughout the officer corps. This showed up in there disastrous invasions of Serbia and Poland. The German commanders come off as professional at the tactical level, but without a strategic vision. Although Moltke is shown to be someone in over his head. He is portrayed as a commander that after the start orders are given, fails to keep a grasp of the situation. He allowed his armies to drift apart and with a more aggressive enemy, they could have come to disaster.

On the British/French side, the British Commander, John French, is portrayed as almost as bad as the Austrians. Several times the author states that French should have been relieved. About the only British General that comes off well is the 2nd Corps Commander, General Smith-Dorian. The French Commander, Joseph Joffre, comes off pretty well. Even then, Sir Max finds major faults with his insistence on offensives into the Alsace and Ardennes and his failure to call them off when it became obvious they were not working. His major accomplishment seems to have been keeping his head, when all around him were losing theirs. One thing I hadn’t realized before reading this book is the age of the various senior commanders in 1914 – all were over 60 with some approaching 70!

He also takes on the reports of German atrocities. He does admit the German Army shot civilians in Belgium and France. However he blames it on the German fears of irregular warfare such as had occured in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. He says this colored the German command's view and almost everyone was viewed as a guerillia.

It telling this story, Mr. Hastings makes good use of first person accounts from generals, private soldiers and the occasional civilian caught up in the maelstorm. His telling of the exhaustion of the invading Germans as they neared the Marne puts their defeat in context. He also praises the French effort and their determination not to quit. The author also debunks the legend of the Taxi cabs to a certain extent. Yes troops were conveyed to the front in taxi cabs, but there weren’t very many of them, about a brigades worth - 4000 or so.

About the only fault I have with the book is the author’s tendency to leave quotes in French untranslated. This is a fairly common occurrence that I found distracting. I give this a very hearty recommendation and would rate 4.5 stars if Good Reads allowed partials.

[Max · Rating 4 out of 5]

In 1910 British General Henry Wilson told military students that a European war was likely. One student responded that such a war would take “inconceivable stupidity on the part of statesmen.” The general replied “inconceivable stupidity is just what you are going to get.” The responsibility for WWI is endlessly argued. Catching almost everyone by surprise, the war began precipitously as events quickly spun out of control. On June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo in Bosnia, recently annexed by Austria-Hungary, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary was assassinated by dissidents. Austria-Hungary blamed Serbia and declared war exactly one month later. A bloodbath ensued that engulfed Europe resulting in 9 million combatants and 7 million civilians dead. Hastings spends over 500 detailed pages telling us how it started and tracing the first few months of the war.

Austria-Hungary, long annoyed by Serbia and afraid of its pan-Slav vision, wanted more than retribution for the assassination. Austria-Hungary was widely seen as weak and fractured. It wanted to colonize Serbia to demonstrate strength and expand its empire. Its military leaders were overconfident and chafing at the bit to start a war with Serbia. They banked on alliance partner Germany to bail them out if Russia went to Serbia’s aid. Once Germany committed its support, Austria Hungary quickly planned its invasion of Serbia.

The German army, unlike Austria-Hungary’s, was disciplined, organized and prepared. The Germans were ready for war, plans in hand. Army Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke considered a European war inevitable and that time was not on Germany’s side, believing Russia would get stronger in years to come. He believed France had to be taken out first in any general war, then Russia. While his erratic boss, Kaiser Wilhelm, bounced back and forth about war, Moltke did everything in his power to encourage Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia and precipitate a wider war.

On the other side were Russia, France and Britain. Russia did not want war but could not stand aside and let Austria-Hungary take over Serbia, subjugating its Slavic brethren. The Russian army, while large, was not prepared for war and there was fear of revolution. French leaders were always suspicious of the Germans. France was in alliance with Russia knowing that in any war Germany would attack them first. The French pinned their hopes on Germany having to fight on two fronts. British leaders were clueless and completely preoccupied with the Ulster crisis which was approaching civil war in a deeply divided Britain. Britain had a huge navy and vast colonial territory but a tiny army. The French and Russians felt with Britain on their side they could win. The Germans discounted Britain as unlikely to enter and not having much to contribute if they did.

On July 23, 1914 the Austrians issued an ultimatum to Serbia that Serbia could not possibly accept. Regardless, Austria Hungary had already made the decision to go to war and on July 28 declared war on Serbia. Russia responded by mobilizing its troops. On August 1 Germany declared war on Russia and on August 3 declared war on France. On August 4 Germany invaded Belgium and Britain declared war on Germany. WWI was underway little over a month following the archduke’s assassination before which a major European war was far from almost everyone’s mind.

Moltke adopted the existing German war plan, the Schlieffen Plan named after his predecessor. It called for an envelopment of the French army proceeding quickly through Belgium and Northern France. It would not lead to success. The rapid advance could not be supported with adequate logistics. Horses and carts were the main transport when railroads were not available. Railroad infrastructure favored the French. Moltke was indecisive and moody and had to please the difficult Kaiser. Moltke stayed in Luxembourg far removed from the action. His commanders often acted on their own waiting for communication. Early victories against French outdated tactics and abysmal strategy made the Germans more overconfident than they were when they started.

The French Chief of Staff Joffre had his own plan; Plan XVII. It was totally misguided and resulted in heavy losses from senseless French attacks against well defended German positions in central and southern France. Joffre ignored German troop movements in the north. Despite initial defeats, however, he kept his composure and wits, finally recognized the German plan, redeployed his forces north, and engineered the battle of the Marne which forced a German retreat. In September the Kaiser replaced Moltke with his personal favorite, Falkenhayn. He massed German forces to try a breakthrough at the Belgian town of Ypres. The German attacks went on relentlessly for weeks and both sides endured heavy losses. The allied lines barely moved as the British Expeditionary Force, French and Belgian troops held on. This bloody battle would characterize the rest of the war. All participants were quickly learning what worked and what didn’t. Early twentieth century arms favored defenses and trench warfare became the norm for the next four years.

On the Eastern front, Austria-Hungary’s ill equipped, ill led and fractious army stalled with heavy casualties against tiny Serbia. Eventually Serbia would fall to overwhelming numbers. Austria-Hungarian forces were also humiliated by the Russians in Galicia (SW Poland). The Russian army was devastated by the Germans at Tannenberg in East Prussia. Russia’s disorganized and poorly led forces were no match for the Germans, but with a much larger population Russia would stay in the fight until revolution in 1917.

Hastings’ coverage ends in 1914. His battle narratives are filled with accounts of individual soldiers. We read in their own words the gruesome details of the war. We see how patriotic can do attitudes quickly shifted to dismay then grim acceptance. Hastings’ portraits include the countless hapless civilians rooted out of their homes and left with nothing. Across Europe women and children were deprived of their breadwinners, their livestock, fuel and other resources to supply the armies. Hastings even gives us accounts of the vast numbers of unfortunate animals used or caught up in the fighting.

I’ve read several books on WWI, enough to know the causes of the war are open to many different interpretations. I find Hastings’ views as credible as any I’ve come across. How Europe could proceed in five weeks from a widely shared perception of an ongoing sustainable peace to all-out war is intriguing and frightening. It’s never lost on me when I consider the current state of international relations. The other thing that stands out is the brutal nature of the war, the immense loss of life and the acceptance of both; although for this there are parallels.

Hastings does a thorough job. As in another of his books that I liked, Inferno, about WWII, the accounts of the participants distinguish his work. Through these he imparts the feel of being on the front and also how it felt for loved ones waiting at home. For those who have read many WWI books, Catastrophe 1914 may get lost among the many offerings. For the uninitiated it may seem too detailed. For myself, somewhere in between, I found it very worthwhile.

[Brett C · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was my second Max Hastings book and he gives detailed history lessons. This particular book was centered around one year; but he opened with the political scene leading to war running through the year's end. Hastings wrote not only about the military aspect but European-wide impacts. He explained social, political, cross-border diplomacy, economic impacts, and other details about European society during the war. He covered many other topics like military aviation, the navy, and the hellish life in trench warfare mention a few.

Something new I learned was the Austrian vengeance that led to an aggressive offensive into Serbia. When Archduke Franz Ferdinand (next in line of power) was assassinated, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in July 1914. But the offensive was a failure to the Austrian war machine. "The Hapsburg Empire, served by incompetent officers and unwilling soldiers, had inflicted humiliation upon itself. A tiny Balkan country proved able to maul the invading Austrians to such effort that only a rabble fell back across the Drina.(pg 153). I was engaged during this entire 21-page chapter Disaster on the Drina.

This book was loaded with information leading up to the events of 1914, the catastrophic collapse of Europe, and tailed off with a brief overview of events to come throughout the remainder of the war. At this point I would recommend anything by Max Hastings. Thanks!

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Blunderers.

You may ask, is there a need for another account of the causes and outbreak of the First World War? The answer is a ‘yes, always’. There is something fascinating about humanity’s turning point, how Europe threw it all away, tore itself apart and drove it’s people down a new and dark path. How this came about, is one of the pivotal moments in history. This needs to be understood by everyone, if not only to learn from these mistakes and how humans could do the most appalling things to each other, in WWI and then even worse in WWII. Nazism, communism, the Holocaust, Stalinism, total war, bombing raids and the utter destruction architecture and heritage all hark back to that day on 28/06/1914, when Gavrilo Princip fired those two fateful shots on the Appel Quay, Sarajevo. What is so great about this book, is that Sir Max Hastings does not only describe the count down to war in July 1914, but also the first five months of fighting that followed. A transition from the old world, 19th century armies and outlook into the mass murder and continuous slaughter of the First World War.

Hastings has written this book rejecting the masterful argument of Christopher Clark, that Europe ‘sleepwalked’ into the abyss in 1914, that Serbia was a rogue state which was implicated in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and knew this would drag the world into war. Within this all sides share guilt in starting the conflict. Hastings returns to the older view, that Germany is mostly to blame for the cause of the war. He states that HH Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and the British government had no choice but to fight in 1914, thus removing accountability from the United Kingdom for the causes of the war. The problem is that Hastings glosses over the the causes very quickly, whilst Clark painstakingly pieces them together over the course of his whole book. Furthermore, Hastings admits that there is a huge amount of ‘conflicting’ information in the archives and documentation. For me Clark’s argument is stronger, with perhaps Germany having ‘more’ of the blame than others, but with each state being implicated to some extent. To be sure, no one wanted the conflict that did follow.

So if there is doubt over Hastings arguments for the causes; where this book really excels is the description of the fighting in the opening months. Hastings has proved himself to be a master of military history and has done a great job here, in this element of the book. It’s a shame he hasn’t written more on WWI, as they would be successful. Hastings certainly shows he has more of an understanding of and is more comfortable writing about fighting on the Western Front. This is to be expected as Hastings is British. But he does attempt to discuss the engagements across all sectors. He delivers the suffering of man and horse, the battles, the problems with logistics, technology and the civilian caught in between. I really got a sense of the war when it was on the move before the mud, scared landscape and stalemate. The ‘Miracle of the Marne’ is especially well told.

Overall I really enjoyed this read, but as I mentioned above there are a couple of problems. If Hastings backed up his arguments for the casting of blame on the outbreak and this held water and he understood the Eastern Front better this would be a fantastic book. But he hasn’t been able to resolve this and therefore for me, the book falls short because of these shortcomings. In spite of this I would recommend this book on the descriptions of the fighting on the Western Front in the opening months of the war.

[WarpDrive · Rating 5 out of 5]

A masterpiece of impeccable scholarship. Exhaustive, very detailed and informative, beautifully researched, well written, riveting, an absolute pleasure to read and highly recommended to anybody interested in a serious, comprehensive treatment of the events leading to the start of WWI, and also of the major events of the first 5 months of the war, up to Christmas 1914.

It is simply one of the best books that I ever read about WWI; pity that it stops at the end of the year 1914. I really wish the brilliant author had written other books, one for each year of WWI.

The author has certainly strong opinions and personal perspectives about some events and characters of the story, and I found his perspectives about the causes of the war a little simplistic (and a bit too focused on the proximate causes rather then the more structural deep reasons behind this conflagration). However, his points are always well argued and supported, and his scholarship is generally beyond reproach.

All aspects of the war are treated with masterful clarity and often with an impressive level of detail; in particular I was pleasantly surprised by how the author brilliantly explained the following aspects of the war:
- the political structures of the main belligerents, with particular focus on the complex and ambiguous relationship between civilian and military authorities
- the associated social, cultural and even psychological aspects; the role of war propaganda at home and at the front, and the increasing sense of disillusionment, futility and dismay developing among troops of all belligerents after the initial weeks of the war
- the unexpectedly critical role played by logistics issues in the war, and the initial unpreparedness of all belligerents to cope with the huge demands of modern warfare
- the lack of coordination between the allied powers of both coalitions and the serious bungling of the commanders in chief and of many generals of both opposing factions. In particular, the amateurish botch-ups of Churchill in WWI, driven by an overly inflated sense of ego and of adventure, were quite appalling. The performance of the British Expeditionary Force's commander was also an absolute disgrace. The rivalries and lack of coordination between the individual generals in the Russian army were not negligible in contributing to the Tsar's army defeats. And Moltke's absences and total personal inadequacy to run the German offensive in France were significant. All was topped by the dismal performance of the Austrian generals, which was possibly the worst
- the rapidly changing nature of the war, from a "gentlemen war" reminiscent of 19th century warfare, and characterized by relatively rapid movements of troops, to a war of attrition/exhaustion reliant on defensive entrenchments, field artillery and ruthless discipline (especially in the Western front)
- the deep structural weaknesses (economic, politic, social and military) of the Hapsburg empire
- the individual moral and human aspects of the war, vividly brought to life by several first-hand accounts rendered by officers as well as common soldiers from all parties involved
- the persistence of deep and hideous class differences within the armies of all countries involved, not just of the Central Powers but also of the Entente Alliance
- the initial reluctance of the British to impose a blockade, in order to prevent a potential collapse of international trade and a clash with the economic interests of the USA
- the idiosyncrasies and peculiar nature of naval warfare during the initial stages of the war
- the precarious and inefficient nature of reconnaissance, communication and intelligence technology and strategies, which caused what Carl von Clausewitz called "Nebel des Krieges" (also known as "Fog of War" in English) to be an important factor in warfare during the first phases of WWI

The more technical military aspects are treated at a perfectly balanced level of detail (generally at "Corps" level), and are usually well supported by clear accompanying maps (especially in relation to Mons, Le Cateau, the Marne, and 1st Ypres), which will please many military history buffs.
The only minor complaint I have is that the the Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes battles in the East are not covered in much detail (comparatively speaking), while the overall narrative is a bit over-weighted towards the role played by the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) in the Western Front.

Generally speaking, there are so many interesting and surprising details and facts brought to life by the author, that it is simply impossible to list them all in a review - I could only list a small subset, so I can only invite the interested reader to savor the author's knowledge and compelling writing, so clearly transpiring in this book.

In summary, it is an absolutely rewarding and beautiful read. A well-deserved 5-star rating - 600 pages of utter pleasure for the lover of serious history. I am happy that I bought this masterpiece, and I will definitely read more books by this author.

[StefanP · Rating 5 out of 5]

,,Pripremamo se za ulazak u dugačak tunel pun krvi i mraka.”
Andre Žid, 28. juli 1914.

Mnogi putevi su vodili Katastrofi. Da li se moglo izbjeći? Teško. Ako se pogleda cijelokupna istorija onda se vidi da je ona unazad bila puna ratova, nemaštine, zaraza, bolesti, prevrata, pljačkanja, razaranja i čega još sve ne. Ali Evropa s početka dvadesetog vijeka je bila najnaprednija kako u vojnom tako i u tehnološkom domenu. Telefon, gramofon, motorna vozila, bioskopske predstave i električna struja u domovima postajali su uobičajeni među dobrostojećim svijetom. Društveni i politički napredak u Evropi i Americi poprimao je zamah koji nije zabilježen u ranijim sličnim razdobljima. Polako se krčkao krah monarhije, socijalizam je sve više rastao, a liberalizam je polako počeo da otpada. Bilo je očigledno da će o budućnosti odlučivati volja masa ili pojedinaca viještih da tim masama manipulišu. Međutim sa takvim napretkom počele su da se rađaju ogromne nejednakosti. Desetine miliona stanovnika bilo je zgroženi zbog takvih nejednakosti. Industrije Rusije, Francuske, Njemačke, i Velike Britanije tresle su se od štrajkova.

Međutim to su bila neka od unutrašnjih problema nekih od zaraćenih zemalja. Na spoljnom planu bila je na dijelu očigledna diplomatska kriza. Ta kriza se uglavnom ogledala u kolonijalnoj konkurenciji. Primjerice, Marokanska kriza 1905. i 1906. Potom aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine od strane Austro-Ugarske uz čvrstu podršku Njemačke 1908. i 1909. godine. Zatim slijedi druga Marokanska kriza 1911. pri čemu Francuska uz podršku Britanije čuva protektorat nad Marokom ali uz neke ustupke Njemačkoj u Kongu. Druga Marokanska kriza pokrenuće i Italiju koja vrši invaziju na Libiju 1911. i 1912. Takav napad na Libiju oslabiće nešto Osmansko carstvo, koje će svoj konačan fijasko doživjeti 1912. godine u Prvom Balkanskom ratu.

Neke države Balkana na čelu sa Srbijom izlaze kao zemlje pobjednice u prvom i u drugom Balkanskom ratu. Međutim vidno oslabljene. Osoblje iznureno, municije i vojne opreme kao i hrane bilo je sve manje. Kada se priđe pitanju da li je rat odgovarao nekim zemljama, svakako da da, ali postojale su zemlje koje su imale svoje unutrašnje probleme. Rusija je oslabljena izašla iz rata sa Japanom 1904. i 1905. godine, Velika Britanija je imala velike probleme oko Irske, Francuska je bila oslabljena iz ranijih ratova sa pruskom, mada se ipak brzo oporavljala. Njemačka se ipak nekako činila najsvježija za taj sukob. 1913. ona je imala vojni budžet kao nikada ranije u istoriji. Austro-Ugarska kao konglomerat mnogih etničkih pripadnosti posebno naroda sa Balkana, vidno je napredovala u vojnoj sferi. I na neki način kad se sve uzme u obzir, nekako se dobija osjećaj kao da je svim zemljama istovremeno odgovarao rat, možda nekim zemljama jako puno, ali nekim ipak jako malo. Sve zaraćene zemlje imale su svoj interes. Neke da učvrste svoju kolonijalnu moć, neke oko teritorijalnih interesa kao npr. Rusija oko zauzimanja Dardanela i izlazak na toplo more, ali što će se kasnije pokazati i sa Italijom, pa i sa Japanom. Većina istoričara izgleda ima ustaljeno mišljenje okrivljujući njemačku za rat. I na neki način to rade s punim pravom. Misleći da je na kraju krajeva ona mogla sve to da zaustavi. Ali koherentnost mnogih kriza kako vojnih, tako i diplomatskih svakako je vodilo ka neizbježnom ratu.

Evropa je tih godina dvadesetog stoljeća posjedovala plemićke krune, balske haljine, bijele leptir mašne i frakove, balkanske seljake u širokim čakširama i fesovima. Mladići s brkovima, lulama i slamnim šeširima, djevojke s punđama i visokim okovratnicima. Novinari su počeli da uvećavaju tiraže svojih novina te su tada dobijali nezapamćeni uticaj. Njena društvena i politička moć sve je više rasla. Veliki rat postaće idila pred oluju.

Ova knjiga se uglavnom iscrpno bavi samo godinom 1914. Ser Maks Hejstings je knjigu uglavnom bazirao na Zapadnom frontu. Sve bitke na tom frontu pokrivene su mapama. Ona sadrži mnogo citata što oficira, generala, careva, običnih seljaka, što citata iz dnevnika vođenih tokom rata; tako da čitalac preko toga ulazi u glave glavnih aktera rata i stvara jednu širu sliku duha vremena tog početka dvadesetog vijeka. Bavi se planovima zemalja, naročito Njemačke i Francuske, naširoko opisuje Britanske unutrašnje probleme kako sa Irskom tako i neslaganja donjeg i gornjeg doma. Prodire u ekonomska stanja zaraćenih zemalja, osjećanja stanovništva, mladeži koja tek treba da stupi u rat itd. I ako je veliko žarište rata na Zapadnom frontu, Hejstings nije zapostavljao Rusiju u Istočnoj pruskoj i Poljskoj. Naširoko je pisao i o Austro-Ugarskoj invaziji na Srbiju. Te naveo citat da se Austro-Ugarska povukla pred Srbijom kao Napoelon pred Moskvom. Nešto pred kraj knjige je šturo opisao Cersku bitku, ali svakako u njoj unjeo dozu veličanstvenosti, što ona i jeste bila. Buđenje iz mrtvih ili novorođenje. Kako god, Maks Hejsting završava knjigu sa nekim malim opservacijama o narednim godinama rata i taki stiže do Versaja. Na kraju postavlja litanje o uzaludnosti rata, kao i uzaludnoj pogibiji svih ljudi u tom ratu. I to sa slijedećim riječima: ,,Saveznici su svijetu nametnuli nezgrapni Versajski mirovni ugovor 1919, ali da je Njemačka kao pobjednica diktirala uslove mira, postavlja se pitanje kakva bi bila evropska sloboda, pravda i demokratija, da li bi one teško stradale."

[Manray9 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War is an outstanding achievement by noted historian Max Hastings. Hastings revisits the course of events from the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand through Christmas 1914 and in doing so revises the conventional wisdom on German and Austrian war guilt for the Great War. As Hew Strachan wrote in the NY Times: “(Hastings’) fans will recognize the trademarks: trenchant and Olympian judgments that eschew quirkiness in their pursuit of common sense and that are supplemented by extensive quotations from lower-grade participants: the victims and workhorses of others’ decisions.” All true, and much to his credit and unlike other writers, Hastings does not focus on the Western Front. He gives due emphasis to the war in the east, as well as the fighting in the Balkans. This is not only good history, but an entertaining reading experience too. Catastrophe 1914 is one of my top books of 2013

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

I hate to do it but I can only give Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War 4 Stars, definitely a step down from my normal man-crush on everything Max Hastings scribbles down. I had to take away a star for the buildup to August 1914. It may be unfair but I read Tuchman’s The Guns of August a short time ago and was riveted at her account of the road to war. Sir Max’s account was simply not as good. At times, I practically had to prop my eyelids open with toothpicks. Tuchman had me on the edge of my seat while I just had to plough through Hastings’ account. Sir Max shines after the war begins as he brings his sharp focus on the men and women in the midst of the battles and movements, from the lowest grenadier up to the generals, bureaucrats, politicians and monarchs. This account takes you to the end of 1914 and covers all the fronts and some of the naval engagements. I particularly liked his accounting of the battles in Serbia and on the eastern front, primarily Poland and Galicia. Surprisingly, the Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes campaigns are not covered in much detail.
If I have one major complaint on the book, it is the limited focus on the French and overexposure on the BEF. The page count does not measure up to the scale of what each country brought to the fight.

Sir Max always focuses his skeptical eye on all the players and most do not measure up. He covers all the major players and many I had not heard of before. In particular, the Hapsburgs and Serbians are covered in greater detail…which is nice because they started the whole damn thing. The course of the war is often related from the soldiers’ accounts and letters. The home front is also covered by the spouses and children of the fighters. Maps of the front positions and specific battles are sprinkled throughout and are pretty good.

Why were the Germans so ready to go to war? And did anyone recognize what the ultimate impact of modern, industrial war would be? Here is Hastings’ explanation:

There seem several explanations. First, Germany’s rulers, like many men of their generation, accepted the role of war as a natural means of fulfilling national ambitions and exercising power: Prussia had exploited this cost-effectively three times in the later nineteenth century. Georg Muller, head of Wilhelm’s naval cabinet, told his master in 1911, ‘war is not the worst of all evils’ and this belief pervaded Berlin’s thinking. The Kaiser and his key advisers underestimated the magnitude of the dominance their country was achieving through its economic and industrial prowess, without fighting anybody. They were profoundly mistaken to suppose that European hegemony could be secured only by the deployment of armies on battlefields.

But paranoia was a prominent feature of the German psyche at this period — a belief that the country’s strategic position, far from progressively strengthening, was being weakened by the rise of socialism at home and the Entente’s military capabilities abroad. Many German bankers and industrialists were morbidly convinced that the Western democracies were bent upon strangling German trade. Berlin’s ambassador in Vienna made initial attempts to cool the Austrian government’s bellicosity, but the Kaiser scribbled on his reports: ‘Who has authorised him to do that? It is extremely stupid!’ The Germans knew it was overwhelmingly likely that the Tsar would throw his protective mantle over Serbia — Nicholas had earlier committed himself to doing so. But Moltke and Bethmann Hollweg viewed Russia, to the point of obsession, as an existential threat; and if they had to fight Nicholas’s army, they preferred to do so sooner rather than later. On 20 May 1914, sharing a railway compartment between Potsdam and Berlin, the chief of staff told Foreign Minister Jagow that within a few years Russia would be winning the arms race. If the price of anticipating such superiority was also to be a clash with France, Russia’s ally — which Moltke assumed — the General Staff had planned meticulously for such a prospect, and professed to be confident of victory.

Bethmann was a natural government official rather than a leader. Lloyd George later recalled conversations with him during a 1908 visit to Germany to study its health-insurance law: ‘an attractive but not an arresting personality ... an intelligent, industrious and eminently sensible bureaucrat, but he did not leave on my mind an impression of having met a man of power who might one day shake destiny’. Bethmann was also a vacillator, especially about the rival merits of peace and war. In 1912 he returned from a visit to Russia alarmed by the evidence of its rising might; and during the following year was heard to advocate a pre-emptive conflict. In April 1913 he lectured the Reichstag on the looming ‘inevitable struggle’ between Slavs and Teutons, and warned Vienna that Russia was bound to join any conflict between Austria and Serbia. In his better moments, however, the chancellor recognised the perils posed by a clash of arms. On 4 June 1914 he told the Bavarian ambassador that conservatives who imagined that a conflict would enable them to reassert their own domestic power, crushing the hated socialists, were mistaken: ‘a world war with its incalculable ramifications will strengthen social democracy; which sermonizes the virtues of peace’. War, he added, could easily cost some rulers their thrones.

In tangled harness Bethmann, the Kaiser and Moltke made the critical decisions. Germany actively encouraged the Austrians to attack Serbia, and Berlin’s three principal actors made no attempt to manage events in such a way as to avert a wider calamity; therein lies the case for their culpability for what followed. It seems mistaken to argue that they entered the July crisis bent upon precipitating a general European conflict; but a pervasive German fatalism about such an outcome contributed largely to bringing it about. The Social Democrat leader August Bebel, a hero to millions of workers, delivered an impassioned warning following the 1911 Agadir crisis. “Every nation will continue to arm for war until a day comes at which one or the other says “Better a terrible end than a terror without end” [A nation may also say] “If we delay any longer, we shall be the weaker instead of the stronger. Then the catastrophe will happen. Then in Europe the great mobilization plans will be unleashed, by which sixteen to eighteen million men, the finest of many nations, armed with the best instruments of murder, will take the field against each other. The Gotterdammerung of the bourgeois world is approaching.”

Some modern historians blame the Russians as the instigator of this world war. Here is Hastings’ argument against the blaming of Russia for starting the war:

The Russians made little attempt to conceal their extended preparations. The Tsar told the Kaiser without embarrassment on the night of 29 July, in one of their personal ‘Nicky—Willy’ communications: ‘the military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations.” Those who today attribute to Russia principal responsibility for war are obliged to rely on the same argument as did the Kaiser in July 1914: that the Tsar should have preserved wider European peace by allowing Austria to conduct a limited war to crush Serbia. Such a case can be made; but it seems essential to acknowledge its terms, rather than attempt to construct a spurious indictment that the Russians were guilty of duplicity. The most important dates in the July crisis were the 23rd, when Austria made explicit its commitment to destroy Serbia, and the 24th, when Russia began to take active measures to respond. Unless or until evidence is forthcoming that the Serbian government was complicit in the plot to kill Franz Ferdinand, or that Russia had prior knowledge of the outrage, the Tsar’s commitment to resist the attempt to extinguish Serbia seems justified. The best reason for Nicholas to have held back was not doubt about the legitimacy of Russia’s action, but caution about the menace posed by belligerence to his own polity.

Atrocities were mainly committed by the Central Powers on both western and eastern fronts. The shooting of civilians and destruction of towns and villages in Belgium and France by the Germans is well covered but Hastings brings to light the actions by the Austro-Hungarians as well:

He described how, on 17 August, his column was fired upon from a cornfield behind the front. Austrian patrols sent to investigate returned with sixty-three prisoners; they claimed that some women and children among them were caught carrying rifles, and that they had found a priest in possession of grenades.

‘An hour later: Pallavicini wrote, ‘only a mass grave was visible. In order not to upset [our] soldiers by [the sound of] shooting, these people were bayoneted to death. The priest’s beard had supposedly been ripped off —our men were that angry after the atrocities committed [against them]. In the afternoon I motored to Losnitza, where fourteen [Serbs] swung from a gallows. Oberstleutnant Kokotovié had given orders to hang them. From rooftops our troops were still being fired upon. The hatred for us is boundless, and everyone is our enemy. The population is so deceitful that I must always anticipate being shot down by a child or an old woman, though to our faces they appear servile ... We are not fighting against an army of 300,000 but against a whole nation. This seems a war driven by religious fervour. The priests are the worst agitators and monasteries the main centres of agitation.

A striking feature of the many executions of civilians carried out on the Eastern Front, especially by the Austro-Hungarians in Serbia, is that they were photographed, and the images published. This was because, far from being a source of embarrassment to Vienna, the punitive killing of alleged francs-tireurs or spies was an important aspect of its policy; Conrad wanted as many people as possible to know about them. Hangmen presented bodies for the camera like sportsmen displaying animal trophies. An Austrian officer in Serbia recorded on 24 August: “I met a column of thirty [alleged francs-tireurs] assembled for execution. They were accompanied by a crowd of people including Prince Odescalchi and Lieutenant Weiss who could not refrain from boxing the ears of the poor wretches, bound as they were. We tried to restrain them but it was absolutely impossible. The execution place was at the edge of the woods behind the monastery. The [condemned Serbs] had to dig their own graves. Then they were sat down in front of the pit and bayoneted five at a time, three infantrymen stabbed each. A gruesome spectacle. Odescalchi behaved like a wild animal and would have liked to take part. It was terrible to see earth being heaped on the victims while some still lived — and indeed tried to climb out of the grave — and to see some of those rising from the grave.

The far-flung French and British possessions are called upon to provide manpower for the meat grinder, despite the fact none of the colonies or member governments had a say in whether to go to war in the first place. Using the empires to add men to the fight:

The French:

Further north on that same dreadful 22nd, the French Fourth Army advanced up a forest road through the Ardennes which led through the village of Bellefontaine One regiment, led by Charles Mangin, headed onwards until, as they approached Tertigny, the Germans opened fire from neighbouring woodlands. Bitter fighting followed, Mangin led a bayonet charge, while street fighting developed in Bellefontaine, which came under heavy shellfire That evening, French survivors retired to the edge of the forest, having lost eight company commanders and more than a third of the regiment France had always planned to exploit its colonial mercenaries to make good its shortfall of white manpower Mangin wrote in a deplorable book he published in 1910, La Force Noir ‘In future battles these primitives, for whom life counts so little and whose young blood flows so ardently, as if eager to be shed, will certainly display the old “French fury” and will reinvigorate it if necessary.’ Now that war had come, Moroccans, Senegalese and Algerians were indeed hurled foremost into its flames By 1918, France’s black soldiers had suffered a death rate three times higher than that of their white comrades, because they were so often selected for suicidal tasks.

The British:

Two Indian divisions joined the right of the BEF’s line on 22 October. The reinforcement was desperately needed, and the first Indian soldier to win a VC was a Baluchi, Sepoy Khudadad Khan, who gained his medal manning a machine-gun in Hollebeke.

It was widely suggested, however, that the Indian corps was ill-suited to continental campaigning. Frank Richards, who had served for years in the subcontinent, wrote later with a ranker’s contempt: ‘native infantry were no good in France. Some writers in the papers wrote at the time that they couldn’t stand the cold weather; but the truth was that they suffered from cold feet, and a few enemy shells exploding around their trenches were enough to demoralize the majority’. Indian Cavalry Corps commander Lt. Gen. Mike Rimington declared scornfully that his men were ‘only fit to feed pigs’. This was grossly unjust; Indian troops taught the rest of the BEF the art of patrolling. But there was a core of truth in the view that it was brutal, even in the British Empire’s hour of need, to expose mercenaries from the far side of the world to the appalling cultural shock of the struggle in Flanders.

Overall, the casual slaughter and waste of men and material in huge amounts is well covered by Sir Max. The French and the Germans on the Western Front fight each other to a standstill at fearful losses:

The Germans lost 283 killed and 1,187 wounded in the action at Virton, but French casualties were many times heavier. On two occasions, entire formations broke and ran; the dead lay stacked like folding chairs, overlapping each other where they fell. As always, the mounted men were slaughtered: two brigade commanders fell, along with every officer of one regiment; another lost a third of its strength. That evening, Third Army’s commanders at first harboured delusions about renewing the attack next day; their men were ordered to entrench, employing their only tools to hand — mess tins. But it was soon recognised that regiments almost bereft of leaders were unfit to fight again. A survivor, stunned by his experiences, stood muttering again and again, ‘Mown down! Ah ... Mown down!’ The broken, units evacuated Virton, whose inhabitants afterwards suffered severely at the hands of the Germans, who accused them of signaling to French artillery. The Kaiser gave both his son and Prince Rupprecht the Iron Cross First and Second Class.

The fighting on this one day, the 22nd, cost the French army 27,000 men killed, in addition to wounded and missing in proportion This was a much larger loss than the British suffered on 1 July 1916, the first day of the Battle of the Somme, which is often wrongly cited as the First World War’s high-blood-mark Other advances upon Longwy and Neufchateau were shattered in similar fashion to those further south The casualties in August 1914 were not merely statistically more terrible, but dealt the French army a blow from which it never fully recovered — it is remarkable that it recovered at all Fourth Army commander Langle de Cary observed laconically to Joffre: ‘On the whole, results hardly satisfactory’. More than a few senior officers lost offspring both Foch’s only son and his son-in-law perished. The C-in-C urged a renewal of the assault, but Langle ignored him and withdrew.

I strongly recommend this excellent book as a companion to Tuchman’s book. The combination will give you a very strong understanding of the war from the start until the end of 1914.

[Tony · Rating 3 out of 5]

My love / hate relationship with Max Hastings continues…

[Helga · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The very emphasis of the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill', makes it certain that we are descended from an endlessly long chain of generations of murderers, whose love of murder was in their blood as it is perhaps also in ours.”
― Freud

Alas, how many thousands have lain there bleeding.

I recommend this book to readers who love to read about the Great War, how it all began and what really happened to Europe in 1914.

[Ian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Like many British people, I have a family link to the Great War. My paternal grandfather, born in 1898, served on the Western Front with 2nd Battalion The Seaforth Highlanders. He would have joined the conflict during the period of static trench warfare that prevailed from Oct/Nov 1914 to the spring of 1918, very much the image of WWI that most West Europeans possess. Max Hastings' book covers the very start of that period, focusing on the lead-up to the War and the War itself from August to Christmas 1914. The author readily concedes that Christmas 1914 is an arbitrary cut-off date, but choosing to cover a limited time period allows issues to be explored to a level of detail that would not have been possible in a one volume history of the entire conflict. Hastings develops some interesting themes in this book, in particular the extent of social division in Britain at the time of the War's outbreak. Today in Britain there is a high level of awareness about the campaigns of the suffragettes, and deservedly so, but how many people know that in Britain in 1914 only around 50% of males were allowed the vote, that during the War millions of working days were lost each year due to strikes, and that in 1914 Britain itself was on the brink of civil war over the issue of Irish Home rule? The latter issue even resulted in some senior army officers openly supporting anti-Home Rule rebels in Ulster against the UK's lawful government.

Hastings is firmly in the camp of those historians who hold Austria-Hungary and Germany as primarily to blame for starting the War, firmly rejecting the notion that Russian mobilisation caused Germany to follow suit. Detailed and persuasive arguments are provided in the book and other reviewers have commented on them.

Until reading this book I hadn't known about the horrendous level of casualties that occurred during the "war of movement" that took place in the early months of WWI. Images of this period create an impression of armies still partly in the 19th century; cavalry units; British infantry in flat caps; Germans in Pickelhaube; and the French famously still in bright blue coats and red trousers (Hastings quotes a bemused German soldier writing home and commenting how French soldiers "really look like something out of a picture book"). But in 1914 there was nothing outdated about the technology of killing. As the author highlights, many British people believe that that first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, when the British Army lost around 10,000 dead, was "the bloodiest day of the War." Hastings points out that the French Army had no less than 27,000 men killed in a single day in August 1914. All the armies of 1914 were largely made up of officers and men unprepared for the murderous nature of 20th century warfare.

As is usual with Max Hastings, analysis is mixed in with personal testimony from participants, generally letters and diary excerpts from ordinary soldiers and junior officers. As is also his style, Hastings is forthright with his opinions. To varying degrees he is critical of all the main army commanders. He is scathing about Sir John French, commander of the BEF, only slightly less critical of the German commander, Helmuth von Molkte, although perhaps his greatest contempt is reserved for Austria's Conrad von Hötzendorf, whom he describes as "the supreme bungler".

Although the book gives due coverage to the Western Front, Hastings devotes quite a few chapters to the Serbian, Galician and East Prussian Fronts, as well as the War at sea, the beginnings of War in the air, and the Home fronts in each country. As he argues in the introduction, the conflict in Eastern Europe has tended to be overlooked in Western authored war histories.

Hastings is also clear that WWI was not the "pointless family quarrel" that so often has been portrayed. Whatever the shortcomings of the British and French societies of the time, the 3 Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire) were repressive, imperialistic and anti-democratic, and each demonstrated appalling brutality during the conflict, far in excess of anything the Entente were guilty of. Hastings argues that a victory for the Central Powers would have been a very undesirable outcome for Europe, and that the modern view of the conflict was not held by the majority of people at the time. He argues that the views of the "soldier poets" whose poems were taught to so many British schoolchildren (including myself) and who did so much to shape modern British opinion of the War, were not representative.

Both an entertaining and informative read.

[Jean · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have spent the past three years reading everything I can get my hands on about world war one. Now that we are on the brink of the one hundredth anniversary of the Great War many new books are coming to market. “Catastrophe 1914” is one of them. In 1930 Sir Winston Churchill wrote “No part of the Great War compares in interest with its opening”. Max Hastings’s book addresses only the last six months of 1914. The book is well researched and Hastings draws on a wide range of documents and firsthand account to chronicle the events. The major strength of the book is how Hastings portrays the principal characters, not as stereotype but as real human beings with as many flaws as virtues. The author uses excellent narrative skill as he provides the wide-lens approach to the broad political and economical environment, but he also pays close attention to the details of his characters and their lives that makes for a human story. As you read the book you can see how the author rejects the long held academic theories about the war. He goes step by step and destroys the myths about the war’s beginning, and briefly destroys the theories about the consequence of the wars ending and also about what if German had won. Hasting sketches the steps by which Europe descended into war, he does not break new historiographical ground but rather skillfully outlines evidence by several generations of scholars into a readable narrative that is highly understandable to the lay reader. The author covers both the Western and Eastern fronts of the war as they were entirely different wars being fought at the same time. Hastings held me spellbound throughout the book. If you are interested in WWI history this is an excellent book to provide you with understanding and insight as well as wet your appetite for more. I read this as an audio book. Simon Vance did an excellent job narrating the long book.

[Steve · Rating 3 out of 5]

Catastrophe deserves more than 3 stars. Probably 4 or even 5, but I have to say this is one of longest reads I've had in some time. I think I've been reading this, on and off, for two months. It isn't the writing, since if anything Hastings has grown as a writer. His critical voice, his eye for the suffering soldiers and civilians, the calling out of stupid generals and politicians, is as good as it gets. And on top of that, "Catastrophe" brings some much needed attention to events in the East (Tannenburg, Galacia). In addition Hastings, in a classy gesture, tips his hat to the great Barbara Tuchman, whose The Guns of August has stood for so long as the go-to popular history of WW 1. But it's a history, Hastings reasonably asserts, badly in need of an update. A lot has been uncovered since Tuchman wrote her book. One revelation is that all the participants destroyed or tailored records in order to show themselves in a better light. The re-assembling of this history has, I imagine, been painstaking, though to be honest I didn't read anything in Hastings' effort that changed my impressions of the war. In short, the Germans and Austrians wanted war. And they got it.

And Hastings delivers it. At least the first five months, though it felt at times like five years. Hastings is very deliberate in letting the participants speak. This approach does create a real on-the-ground feel for these battles and events. What gets lost however is momentum in the narrative. Maybe this is by design, since the end pages are devoted to the endless trenches, and endless death. No one was going anywhere far for the next few bloody years.

[Biljana · Rating 4 out of 5]

11. novembra ove godine obilježeno je stotinu godina od završetka Prvog svjetskog rata, što je i bio povod da baš tokom ovog mjeseca pročitam nešto više o ovom sukobu koji je počeo u Evropi, da bi se poput plamena proširio na cijeli svijet.

A upravo knjiga poznatog britanskog novinara i ratnog istoričara Maksa Hejstingsa nudi odgovore na pitanja kako i zašto je došlo do skoro potpunog uništenja Evrope.
I, ne, to nije zato što je Gavrilo Princip u Sarajevu izvršio atentat na austrougarskog prestolonasljednika Franca Ferdinanda i njegovu suprugu, kao što su nas učili i još nas uče udžbenici istorije - razlozi su veoma složeniji i sežu mnogo godina prije samog početka rata.

Prvi dio ove knjige obuhvata period od završetka osmanske vladavine na Balkanskom poluostrvu, uspon Austrougarske, industrijski napredak Zapada i borbu za kolonijalnu prevlast, pa sve do septembra 1914. i povlačenja ruske vojske iz Istočne Pruske.

Objektivno, razumljivim i pitkim jezikom, praćeno dnevničkim zapisima običnih ljudi toga doba, Hejstings donosi veoma zanimljivu priču, ne samo o vojnim taktikama i političkim previranjama, već i o ljudskoj prirodi, egu, željom za moći i tlačenjem, koji kad se jednom pokrenu niko ne može zaustaviti, bez obzira na ljudske živote.

[Tim Mercer · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5 stars. Well worth a read by one of the more readable authors on the topic.

The book starts in the traditional place for WWI books, the Balkans. It outlines the overall recent history of the area and links that history into the current network of alliances between the Balkan countries with the major European powers.

From here he narrates the following 6 months and stops his book at the end of 1914. In this he describes the participants activities from the senior leadership down to the lowest levels of society's experience. He describes the war experience from all perspectives with numerous quotes from participants describing what the saw, did and felt. Hastings covers both officers and private soldiers experiences in different armies and on different fronts. He also counterpoints this with what it was like to be a civilian both in the city and in the country both at home and when war rolled in. You are walked through what happened to the civilians that stayed behind in occupied territory as well as those took to the road and became refugees.

He doesn't have much complementary to say about any of the countries leadership's war preparations or their subsequent actions. A few learn from their mistakes others are removed. Unfortunately by the time they start to understand what this war will require it is too late for a quick end. As he quotes from George Orwell, "the only way swiftly to end a war is to lose it." Too many lives, too much land and too much money been lost to make this an acceptable solution for any of the participants. The only way out was to win.

In here the author basically blames the Germans for the war. He demonstrates well that they preferred to go to war then and reinforced existing alliances accordingly so there was no sleepwalking in that respect. Where I think they all were sleepwalking is that most of the military and next to none of the mostly ruling aristocracy understood the type of war that technology was bringing them. The stupidity of the ageing monarchist system enabled these far than elite thinkers to make decisions the consequences of which they completely did not understand. It took the tragedy of this conflict to make the remaining populace realise that this could not continue and at the end the monarchies fell.



Off topic comments on reading historical works as hardcopies vs ebooks vs audiobooks follow.

This was the first audiobook that I have read that describes history over a large geographical area. I that I think I prefer these style of books as hardcopy for 2 reasons. First is I find that it is easier to flick between text and maps. Often in ebooks the maps are quite small on your screen and as much as you can adjust the font in the text maps you are usually stuck with the map the size of your screen. You can work around that in ebooks by screen shotting them to an app that lets you enlarge but not in audiobooks.

Secondly and to more importantly I like flicking back and forth and checking the references (usually at the back of hardcopies). Very easy to do with hardcopies, I normally use to bookmarks to facilitate this. In ebooks it can be done by fiddling with bookmarks assuming that the ebook doesn't have the references hyperlinked. Not quite as quick using bookmarks but not far off and hyperlinked reference sections are the gold standard I feel. Audiobooks I have yet to see any solution that is as sleek. Although the caveat that this is the first historical audiobook I have done.

Time to jump into Beevor's Berlin for comparison.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

An exhaustive but readable account of the events of 1914. Hastings begins with the assassination of Ferdinand to the diplomatic machinations of the July crisis, to the outbreak of war in August. Hastings covers all the military actions of 1914 with the right amount of detail, including those events that have been largely forgotten, such as the Austrian invasion of Serbia that actually marked the beginning of the war’s military actions. His treatment of the British Expeditionary Force is very good and he shows how they repeatedly escaped disaster due to luck, sheer French manpower, and German fumbling.

Hastings’ writing is clear and moves along at a crisp pace. He provides fair and insightful portraits of all the statesmen and generals that shaped the beginning of the conflict. He also gives good coverage to the experience of civilians. The book’s most memorable and vivid parts deal with the immense suffering that the war brought to ordinary people. Contrary to what Christopher Clark has argued in his recent work, Hastings casts doubt that Europe “slept-walked” into war or that the beginning of the war was just a series of blunders and accidents. Hastings argues that all belligerents went to war for what they saw as genuine threats, and viewed such a course of action as inevitable. Also contrary to what Clark has argued (and more in line what Sean McMeekin has argued), Hastings places blame on Germany for the outbreak of war. He’s not always convincing, but his case for it is clear and readable. Hastings shows how Europe’s statesmen preferred to persist with dangerous policies rather than accept the consequences of admitting their implausibility and failure. This makes the “sleepwalking” thesis more questionable.

One of the most striking parts of the narrative is Hastings’s treatment of the war’s morality and the justifications used to prosecute it. In our popular imagination, the alleged merits of the Entente cause became meaningless amid the horrors of the war and the incompetence of those who prosecuted it.

Hastings disputes the notion that the First World War was more morally ambiguous than the Second, and that nothing could have justified its massive bloodletting.. He details several episodes of German atrocities during the invasion of Belgium. Excesses are committed by all armies that have ever engaged in war. But far from denying them, as Hastings points out, many German government and press organs sought to justify them. Notably, retaliatory executions of hostages was made into official German policy, and was unmatched in scale in Western Europe during that era. Hastings also finds Germany primarily responsible for the outbreak of war due to its failure to restrain Austria’s belligerent activities.

Hasting frequently records French phrases and expects the reader to know what they mean. My schoolboy French was usually enough to puzzle out the meaning, but it was irritating nevertheless.

[Biljana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Drugi dio knjige Katastrofa: 1914. - Početak kraja, nastavlja priču o ratnim dešavanjima od septembra do kraja decembra 1914. godine, i to skoro isključivo na Zapadnom frontu.

Za razliku od prvog dijela, poglavlja drugog sastoje se od detaljnih opisa frontova i bitaka, što laicima na određenim mjestima može biti teško za pratiti, pa je zato praktičnije čitati po jedno poglavlje, kako bi tekst bio jasniji.

Poslednja trećina obiluje svjedočenjima vojnika i običnih ljudi, koja se posebno odnose na decembar prve ratne godine, i u kojoj su opisane strahote života u poplavljenim rovovima, ranjavanjima, opštoj oskudici njege i lijekova, zaraznim bolestima, stradanju životinja i sveopštem besmislu koje će velikom dijelu evropskog stanovništva donijeti smrt.

Koliko običnom čovjeku nije bilo do rata govore opisi o malim primirjima za Božić 1914, godine, kićenje jelke na ničijoj zemlji, razmjena cigareta i hrane, a koji su vojnici obe strane morali kriti od svojih nadređenih.

Na samom kraju, autor se ukratko osvrće i na okolnosti završetka rata, odgovornosti za njegov nastanak i žrtvama koje su podnijete zarad nekog boljeg svijeta.

''Mi više nismo svoji. Jedva da smo i dalje ljudi, uglavnom smo dobro uvežbane mašine koje izvode sve radnje bez mnogo razmišljanja. O, Gospode, kad bismo samo mogli ponovo postati ljudi.''

[Walter Mendoza · Rating 5 out of 5]

Catastrophe 1914, is an cronicle about the WWI. The author examining the beginnings of the WWI, the Sarajevo assassinations, and follows the battlefield fighting; the hellish conditions of the trenches during the 1914.

The book covers whom and what started the conflict, the describes in vivid detail, the terrible tragedy of war. Well researched, with internal doccuments of the Triple Entente nations and the Triple Alliance. The major events from politics and military strategy, to the experiences of the infantery soldiers. Well written, an brilliant study and analisys; one of the best. I recommend this book.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Is there anything really new under the sun to say about the outbreak of the First World War and the campaigns of its first 5 months? Well, no, not really, but that doesn't stop one of my favorite military historians from giving it a good go, and your reading this book will not go unrewarded. Taking into account the best of the last 20 years or so's historical research, Hastings has concluded that Germany and Austria bear the primary responsibility for the disaster that was WWI, and that preventing a German-dominated Europe was a worthwhile war aim, in spite of the heavy sacrifices. As he always does, Hastings peppers his narrative with peppery verdicts and conclusions on the decision-taking and war-making abilities of the various politicians and military leaders but, hey, what would a Max Hastings history book be without those judgements? It's part of the fun! Best of all, of course, is Hastings' mastery of the sources combined with his rich and creamy prose that makes reading his work so pleasurable. If you haven't read a good book about the causes of the war and how it played out in its first year since "The Guns Of August" then curl up with this one. You won't regret it.

[L Fleisig · Rating 5 out of 5]

"O piteous spectacle! O bloody times!
Whiles lions war and battle for their dens,
Poor harmless lambs abide their enmity."
Wm. Shakespeare. King Henry VI, Part 3.

Max Hasting's "Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War" is a masterfully crafted account of Europe's descent into the apocalypse known as the Great War. It is a study that focuses on Europe's sabre-rattling lions who led millions headlong into the valley of the shadow of death. It also provides a compelling parallel narrative of the lambs, civilian and soldier alike, who in abiding their enmity provided fodder for the carnage that inexorably followed.

Hasting has two stories to tell and he tells them well. The first third or so of the book covers the events leading up to the commencement of the war. The book starts, as many histories of WWI do, with a Prologue on the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. However, Hasting makes a compelling case for the notion that the events in Sarajevo were but the last link in a chain of events that led to the war. Hastings looks at Sarajevo as a pretext for a war that many European leaders, most notably those in Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire, were hungry for; while other leaders (France, Russian and to a lesser extent Britain) felt was inevitable and who did little to stop the march to war.

The remainder of the book is devoted to an account of the first five months of the war, from August through December, 1914. Those marked were marked by the great opening offensives, the Germans march through Belgium toward Paris, the Russian offensive in the East and the Austrian offensives in Poland and Serbia. The outcome of these battles, particularly in the west, drew the battle-lines over which the next three years of trench warfare were fought. The carnage was, of course, enormous and Hastings tells the stories of these great battles, the Marne, first Ypres, Mons, Tannenburg, and Poland, in a way that is thorough and elucidating. This is not a classic military history filled with the minutiae of these battles. However, Hastings provides sufficient details in clear prose to give the non military historian (such as this reviewer) a comprehensive picture of the scope of each great battle, and the geography and strategy of the warring sides.

Two aspects of the book stood out for me and warrant some attention. First, Joseph Stalin is reputed to have said that "[a] single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic." It is quite easy, when looking at the canvas of a war that took millions, for an author or reader to focus on these huge losses and become desensitized to the great human tragedy at hand. Hasting, by focusing not just on the lions fighting over their dens but on the lambs who had to avoid their enmity avoids this problems. Hastings has interwoven into his big picture narrative vignettes of the stories of soldiers (on all sides) at the front and their loved ones at home. Hastings accomplishes this in a seamless fashion that does not distract from the big picture but which successfully manages to keep the readers eye also on the ongoing tragedy and folly of the war.

Second, while accounts of the action on the `eastern front' are legion for popular WWII histories, many WWI histories I have read pay scant attention to the great battles that raged in Prussia, Serbia and Poland. In fact the only complete narrative of Russia's disastrous offensive at the Battle of Tannenburg I have read came in a work of fiction, Alexander Solzhenitsyn's August 1914, which battle forms the centerpiece of Solzhenitsyn's (historically accurate) fictional narrative. Hastings examines the Battle of Tannenburg and the large offensives that took place in Galicia and Serbia.

Hastings writes with authority and erudition. He also writes with a clean, engaging prose that made wading into the trenches of a complicated subject both an educational and enjoyable experience. Hastings has written a compelling and authoritative account of the first year of the `war to end all wars' and I recommend Catastrophe to anyone with even a remote interest in the subject matter.

[Cold War Conversations Podcast · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good wide ranging solid account of the first year of World War 1 covering both the strategic view and the view of the men and women in the front lines. Also some myth busting of the early performance of the BEF.

It was good to see attention to the often over looked eastern front.

I found some of the language Hastings uses a bit too smart for my liking. For example he keeps mentioning the German host when talking about the German armies. Maybe it's just me, but I found this quite irritating.

Nonetheless it's made me want to read more about the WW1 eastern front, for example I hadn't heard about the Siege of Przemyśl, the longest siege of WW1.

Can anyone recommend any books as I'm surprised to see no obvious books in english on Tannenberg?

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 2 out of 5]

American readers: Take this British book with a grain of salt.

Why? Because while Max Hastings is very good on military tactical issues, and solid on strategic ones in the first shifting of his pen from World War II to World War I, he's close to being all wet on geopolitical issues related to the start of the war.

First, the good.

Hastings gives more detailed coverage to the Eastern Front at the start of the war than do many WWI intros, which often talk about the battles of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes, and nothing else.

Hastings also covers how the Russians rolled back the Austrians in Galicia.

And, even more exposing the dry rot of the Hapsburg Empire, how Serbia, the cause of the war, also rolled back the Hapsburgs' two different early fall and late fall 1914 invasions.

On the Western Front, he rightly faults Joffre's Plan 17 and has little good to say about Sir John French as the BEF commander. And, he notes how Moltke had weakened the original Schlieffen Plan even before the start of the war, how he weakened it further with Tannenberg worries, and how he had a nervous collapse before the two sides made their race to the Channel. He also notes that the French army, outside of things such as the rouge pantaloons, was not that much worse than the German, and how some German commanders, like Kluck and Bulow, as well as the royal commanders, were either too old (them) or not fully competent for general reasons (some of the royals).

On larger strategic issues, he raises the issue of whether the Schlieffen Plan could even succeed with a pre-mechanized army. I say, just possible. The Germans would have needed to have more fodder ready for horses, and definitely more replacement boots for troops. If this AND an unaltered Schlieffen plan had been in place, the Germans might just have pulled it off.

The one thing Hastings gets right on geopolitics is wondering why Germany didn't do a better PR job on the international law violations of Britain's blockade by extension later in the war.

===

Now the bad, and why this book gets just three stars.

Hastings subscribes to the traditional German war guilt idea on the cause of the war, and from that, seeks to build a legal-type case for British intervention.

First, on a "balance of powers" issue, you don't have to have German war guilt as a primary cause, or even No. 2 after simple balance of powers issues. Britain's early 1700s intervention in the War of the Spanish Succession, for example, didn't go looking for "war guilt."

Second, related to that, is that his attempt to "pin the collar" on Germany is just wrong.

Hastings engages with Christopher Clark's excellent new book, "The Sleepwalkers," but only to reject it, and Clark's labeling of Serbia as a "rogue state."

I'll go one better than Clark, myself. I rarely use the term "cultural DNA," but with Serbia, having read books about the original battle of Kosovo and its aftermath, and seen the 1990s ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, I make an exception. "Rogue state" might be a bit mild; "semi-failed state" might be even better.

Third, and related to that, Hastings talks about the would-be violations of international law that were in Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. True, but it had less such violations than NATO's 1990s ultimatum to Serbia. This issue got mention online at about the time Hastings' book was headed to press. Surely, he could have addressed it in the prologue, within modern book publishing time frames. And, he chose not to.

Fourth, near the end, Hastings adds in what I can only call a "British imperialism whopper." In the last chapter, an epilogue though not officially titled as such, he claims the US contributed "little militarily" to World War I.

True in 1917; not true in 1918, where the US had 1 million troops on the Western Front by early July and 2 million by the end of the war. Yes, the US was using Allied artillery and some other munitions and weapons; it was cheaper than shipping them, since an unoccupied France could make them onsite. At the same time, the US had been supplying warhorses for Britain and France from the start of the war.

The increasing American flood of men spurred the desperation behind Ludendorff's Kaiserschlact, and the expected continuation of that into 1919 led to Ludendorff's collapse in October 1918.

Beyond that, at St. Michel and elsewhere, American troops contributed significantly to the Hundred Days Offense that rolled back German gains from spring 1918.

Without American intervention, Germany still couldn't have won the war. It might have been able to keep Austria propped up, and keep from losing, though.

In addition to justifying British entry, despite his dismissal of American military contributions, I have the feeling that Hastings is trying to sell American readers on the worthiness of American intervention.

Well, there, he's plain wrong.

It's true that a German Mitteleuropa, while certainly nowhere near as bad as Nazism, wouldn't have been ideal. But, it would have been much less a problem for the US than for Britain. And, if achieved only at the price of Austro-Hungarian collapse, might not have been worth that much anyway.

In any case, I've always said that we should have protested the British blockade by extension, on international law grounds, just as much as German submarine zones, then followed George Washington's warning against entangling alliances and let the Entente and Central Powers beat each other senseless.

Hastings' "war guilt" and seeming British imperialism get this book knocked down from 4-plus stars to 3. His whopper about American intervention costs it another star to fall to 2.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a reread of a book I had nothing but fond memories of for the six years since I first read it. As such, I won't discuss it as much as in my first review (found on my old profile under the name: Derek Weese, in case you're interested).
However, for this review, I have to come to the conclusion that I simply did not enjoy this book as much, though it was still enjoyable, the second time around as it was reading it for the first time.
Briefly, allow me to highlight why this book wasn't as awe inspiring this time around.
First off, and this will be controversial, while Hastings' use of first person accounts humanizes the struggle, and is very endearing at times, it is also misleading. Hastings' style of writing tends to focus far too much on the trees, and as such misses the bigger forest more often than not.
This is not the book to read for a detailed overview of the first year of the war. But if you want what is an excellent, emotional, heartfelt, gut wrenching tale of the first year of the war, then this is a beautifully written book.
It's important to note, however, that this book glosses over much in the way of the broader picture, to focus on individual stories, who sometimes only have a peripheral acquaintance as to what is really happening. Then again, Hastings' is a journalist, and this book is written with a journalist's flair.
It is good, very good, but it is not a history, per se.
Secondly, while Hastings must be applauded for shedding light on the French struggle in 1914 for an English audience, he still has the habit of spending an inordinate amount of time on the British side of the story. While this is understandable, he is British himself, after all, the disparity is highly noticeable the second time through.
The Eastern Front, the struggle of the Serbians, the titanic clashes in Galicia between the Austro-Hungarians and the Russians, the fighting in East Prussia and Poland between the Germans and Russians, all of it gets very much short shrift in comparison to the Western Front. Hastings is also almost dismissive in his attitude towards the Russian Army, which as the books of Prit Buttar have pointed out, were no slouches. The great Battle of Tannenberg is told in slightly more than a page, while the First Battle of Ypres, in Belgium later that year, received nearly a fifty page chapter (admittedly, the best piece of writing in the book).
Despite those two gripes, this was an enjoyable book, but one that is not as inclusive of the totality of the story of 1914 as one may expect.

[Charles Inglin · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent account of how Europe went to war in 1914 and the first months of the war. Max Hastings presents, I think, a fairly balanced accounting of the arrogance, pig-headedness, chauvinism and just plain stupidity that propelled Europe into a total war which would destroy three monarchies. I would perhaps quibble with his laying a greater amount of blame on Germany and somewhat less on France. While Kaiser Wilhelm could, had he been a more sagacious and stronger man, have stopped the march to war, the machinations of now largely forgotten French diplomats to insure that war started, and with it the chance to revenge the defeat of 1871, was somewhat glossed over.

Well illustrated is the overall poor quality of the higher commanders on all sides, including the Germans. Despite the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War which demonstrated the vast technological advances in the killing power of rifles, machineguns and artillery, tactical thinking was still heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Wars, with disastrous results. With most of the combatant armies having spent almost a hundred years largely involved in fighting colonial wars, the sheer butchery resulting from two forces with armed with the latest in weaponry shocked everyone, and the senior commanders had no answers except to do the same thing over and over with ever greater numbers of troops. But as Hastings points out, they had few options. Even when one side managed a local breakthrough, the communications, transportation and logistics technology to exploit it didn't exist and wouldn't until World War II. And the heavy losses incurred early in the war insured that politically neither side could negotiate an end without gaining enough to justify the losses. So they were condemned to fight to exhaustion or political collapse.

So, the moral of the story is, wars are easy to start, but incredibly difficult to end.

[Olethros · Rating 3 out of 5]

-De lo interesantísimo a lo común pero notable.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. El libro 1914. El año de la catástrofe (publicación original: Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes To War, 2013) es un repaso al año 1914 en relación a la Gran Guerra, a las circunstancias nacionales entre los países implicados, a las reacciones tras el magnicidio en Sarajevo, a las actitudes que mantuvieron mientras escalaba la tensión y sus reacciones en el momento álgido para, después, sumergirse en la contienda a nivel táctico y operativo durante los primeros meses de la Primera Guerra Mundial.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is classic Max Hastings - history writing at its finest. Best known for his books on World War II, the author turns his sights to the outbreak of World War I and the initial campaigns in both the West and the East between August and December 1914. The result is an extremely well-written narrative that brings not only the political and military personalities to life but also conveys the horrors of the war as experienced by front-line officers, soldiers, and non-combatants. One of the strengths of Mr. Hastings' books is how he examines and assesses the decisions and performance of senior leadership, as well as conventional thinking (both at the time and since) about his chosen subject matter, but in a fair and balanced manner. Catastrophe 1914 is no exception - for example, his examination of whether the war "was worth it" is both refreshing and timely.

[Sean · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hastings continues to impress -- at this point, I'd read anything he writes. A nice, in-depth history of the run-up to the war, and then a very detailed analysis of the first few months of the conflict. Both fronts are covered in great detail, as are the home fronts. For the armchair student of military history, this is the most interesting period of the war, with maneuver on a massive scale and competing militaries struggling, often unsuccessfully, to develop doctrine to cope with changes in technology and command & control.

* He lays blame for the conflict at the feet of Germany, for agreeing to back the Hapsburgs carte blanche in their punitive expedition against the Serbs. Others, the Russians and Austrians included, share in this blame but to a lesser degree.

* Hastings makes a strong moral argument for the necessity of the war against the Central Powers. Germany, despite lacking a premeditated plan to do so, demonstrated a commitment to expansionism at the expense of her neighbors. She also displayed brutal indifference to the peoples she conquered, bested only by German behavior in the conflict to follow.

* Much of our conception of the war is influenced by the pacifist writings of the Remarques and the Owenses-- a pointless slaugther executed by hapless buffoons and despised by the ordinary man in the trenches. Not so, says Hastings. Granted, the war needn't have come, but once it did, most supported carrying on to the bitter end. The alternative was German hegemony over Europe. Given German behavior in occupied territories, fighting against this hegemony wasn't pointless or stupid, even if the cost was awful to bear.

* Hastings is catty and doesn't reserve judgment. Look out, Moltke the Younger, you just got bitch-slapped.

* If all you know about the war is muddy trenches, this book will be particularly enlightening.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books about the outbreak of WWI that has been brought out to coincide withe it's centenary. Max Hastings is very good writer on military and as historian of 20th century wars. I must tell you that if I could run down his book I would because having seen him performing in TV numerous times since he accompanied the task force that reconquered the Falklands I can assure you he is one of the most pompous and bogus sounding people I have ever had the misfortune to hear. He positively cultivates the manner and views of the reactionary club bore. But it doesn't affect writing style or his historical professionalism. A really first rate book and one will out last most of the instant history tie ins and assorted anniversary twaddle that will be coming on to the market by 2014.

[Manolo González · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very detailed work about all the actions that took place in 1914 during the road to war and the first campaigns (just as the title says), I loved all the first hand testimonies, but somehow I think in some parts is entirely focused on the BEF and the British side (understandable because the autor is an Englishman), but it doesn’t become the book as boring, it’s a must for those seeking to comprehend this critical year.