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Another Bloody Century by Colin S. Gray
Colin S. Gray has advised governments on both sides of the Atlantic about military affairs, and he looks into the future to provide some intriguing answers about the ways Western armed forces—which have traditionally been trained to fight conventional, not guerrilla, warfare—may have to evolve.
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First published April 1, 2007
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About the author
Colin S. Gray
96 books73 followersColin S. Gray was a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. In addition, he was a Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
March 4, 2024
This is a theoretical/philosophical/logical/historical/pragmatic look at war and warfare to come, and is one of the most engaging books I have read in quite some time. The author has a superb, and often wickedly delightful sense of humor that emerges unexpectedly throughout his text - he is particularly unkind to the multi-national, soft and fuzzy make peace not war can't we all be friends crowd. The book is worth buying just for the final two chapters - The Control of War and A Warlike Future - but I strongly recommend you read all the preceding chapters, nevertheless. Gray lays out, and eviscerates, the various grand theories of war - also those for controlling and eliminating war - and covers factors that do in fact limit war, if unevenly and unreliably. Throughout I found myself thinking how much I wish I had written THAT, or how intellectually satisfying it is to learn THAT.
There is much to be learned here. Very satisfying, very stimulating, very provocative of serious thought...
There is much to be learned here. Very satisfying, very stimulating, very provocative of serious thought...
December 13, 2015
Excellent aside from the points cited below.
Gray does a masterful job of presenting a picture of the state of warfare at the end of the 20th century, then looking at all its likely permutations in the 21st. The title expresses his general feelings - he doesn't like war, he's tired of it, and he's equally tired of pronouncements that either the whole nature of war or the aspects of human nature that cause war will somehow change because we're in a new millennium.
He outlines the military history of the last three centuries and looks at all the factors that play into warfare, most of which aren't new, some of which are. He talks about conventional (uniformed-military on uniformed-military) war, guerrilla war, terrorism, cyberwarfare, and war in space, among other things, as well as doing a solid job of looking at the interplay of politics, economics, industries, ideologies, and warfare. He does this while making the book a lively and entertaining read, not always easy given these topics.
I have, however, a couple of quibbles. First, Gray is a true fanboy of Clausewitz and cites him over and over, sometimes when the applicability of Clausewitz's thought is dubious, and overlooks the fact that some of what Clausewitz wrote was just plain mistaken. For example, Clausewitz wrote that the goal of war has to be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, and that hasn't been true for a long time if it ever was - which leads to my second objection.
Gray is fairly derisive about the term and concept '4th generation warfare', but his argument is a straw man - what he first sets up as the definition of 4th generation warfare, and then debunks, isn't the general meaning of the term at all. He uses the term to mean warfare between governments and non-state groups, i.e. most of guerrilla warfare. That's one means of 4th generation warfare, but not its end. To quickly sum up:
1st generation war was mass-oriented - whoever had the bigger army (or could bring the most to bear at the decisive spot on a battlefield) usually won. It was, as Clausewitz wrote, about destroying the enemy army.
2nd generation war was firepower-driven. Think World War I. Also true to Clausewitzian doctrine.
3rd generation war was maneuver-oriented - we can look back to Napoleon and to the U.S. civil war - think Nathan Bedford Forrest and his 'git there fustest with the mostest' - and really came into its own with mechanized warfare in World War II. It diverged from Clausewitz in that its goal was not necessarily to destroy the enemy armed forces, but to maneuver to a position where they couldn't win, so they'd usually give up.
4th generation warfare aims at the minds and will of the decision-makers who decide to begin and continue wars rather than aiming at the armed forces - in a dictatorship, the mind of the head of state; in a representative government, the executive, the legislature, and the voting public. 4th generation war came into its own with the development of electronic mass media.
So while, as Gray says, guerrilla war and terrorism aren't new, 4th generation warfare is a fairly recent phenomenon. For that reason only, I'm giving this 4 rather than 5 stars.
Still, a very well researched, organized, and thought-out book, and well worth reading.
Gray does a masterful job of presenting a picture of the state of warfare at the end of the 20th century, then looking at all its likely permutations in the 21st. The title expresses his general feelings - he doesn't like war, he's tired of it, and he's equally tired of pronouncements that either the whole nature of war or the aspects of human nature that cause war will somehow change because we're in a new millennium.
He outlines the military history of the last three centuries and looks at all the factors that play into warfare, most of which aren't new, some of which are. He talks about conventional (uniformed-military on uniformed-military) war, guerrilla war, terrorism, cyberwarfare, and war in space, among other things, as well as doing a solid job of looking at the interplay of politics, economics, industries, ideologies, and warfare. He does this while making the book a lively and entertaining read, not always easy given these topics.
I have, however, a couple of quibbles. First, Gray is a true fanboy of Clausewitz and cites him over and over, sometimes when the applicability of Clausewitz's thought is dubious, and overlooks the fact that some of what Clausewitz wrote was just plain mistaken. For example, Clausewitz wrote that the goal of war has to be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, and that hasn't been true for a long time if it ever was - which leads to my second objection.
Gray is fairly derisive about the term and concept '4th generation warfare', but his argument is a straw man - what he first sets up as the definition of 4th generation warfare, and then debunks, isn't the general meaning of the term at all. He uses the term to mean warfare between governments and non-state groups, i.e. most of guerrilla warfare. That's one means of 4th generation warfare, but not its end. To quickly sum up:
1st generation war was mass-oriented - whoever had the bigger army (or could bring the most to bear at the decisive spot on a battlefield) usually won. It was, as Clausewitz wrote, about destroying the enemy army.
2nd generation war was firepower-driven. Think World War I. Also true to Clausewitzian doctrine.
3rd generation war was maneuver-oriented - we can look back to Napoleon and to the U.S. civil war - think Nathan Bedford Forrest and his 'git there fustest with the mostest' - and really came into its own with mechanized warfare in World War II. It diverged from Clausewitz in that its goal was not necessarily to destroy the enemy armed forces, but to maneuver to a position where they couldn't win, so they'd usually give up.
4th generation warfare aims at the minds and will of the decision-makers who decide to begin and continue wars rather than aiming at the armed forces - in a dictatorship, the mind of the head of state; in a representative government, the executive, the legislature, and the voting public. 4th generation war came into its own with the development of electronic mass media.
So while, as Gray says, guerrilla war and terrorism aren't new, 4th generation warfare is a fairly recent phenomenon. For that reason only, I'm giving this 4 rather than 5 stars.
Still, a very well researched, organized, and thought-out book, and well worth reading.
June 22, 2021
What will the future of war be? Professor Gray takes a swing at his predictions.
Why I started this book: I'm always on the look out for new audio editions of my many professional reading titles. And I was thrilled to find that Audible had at least 5 new ones.
Why I finished it: Professor Gray argues that predicting the future is a chancy business. 1. War is not going to disappear. Human nature means that we will continue to fight. 2. War is politics, and that by stopping wars prematurely instead of solving things, we just put them on hold and give both side time to rearm and continue later. 3. We will be surprised by the nature of future war, because the very act of planning for war, means that the other side will plan for our plans. 4. Someone has predicted the future, but we have no idea of who they are and if they are right, until after the fact. Too much noise. But my favorite part of this book was his many asides, and opinions of other military historians and policy planners, especially since many of these authors are also on my Professional Reading list.
Why I started this book: I'm always on the look out for new audio editions of my many professional reading titles. And I was thrilled to find that Audible had at least 5 new ones.
Why I finished it: Professor Gray argues that predicting the future is a chancy business. 1. War is not going to disappear. Human nature means that we will continue to fight. 2. War is politics, and that by stopping wars prematurely instead of solving things, we just put them on hold and give both side time to rearm and continue later. 3. We will be surprised by the nature of future war, because the very act of planning for war, means that the other side will plan for our plans. 4. Someone has predicted the future, but we have no idea of who they are and if they are right, until after the fact. Too much noise. But my favorite part of this book was his many asides, and opinions of other military historians and policy planners, especially since many of these authors are also on my Professional Reading list.
June 26, 2016
Gray focuses on his book's subtitle, "Future Warfare." He repeatedly stresses that our best view of future wars comes from the mirror of past wars, in that technology, causes, and techniques may change but the nature of conflict will remain the use of force to impose one's will on the enemy. This definition by military theorist Clausewitz following the Napoleonic wars is frequently invoked by Gray. There are good things in this lengthy book: his treatment of geopolitics and the possible uses of NATO in the future are examples. However, the book is heavily redundant and lacks the incisiveness of his earlier work. Cutting a hundred pages would have given it at least one more star.
As it is, the book is probably best suited for scholars, more so than general readers.
July 20, 2018
Inordinate amount of waffling, book doesn't start until many chapters in. When it gets going it's quite interesting but annoyingly sprinkled with repeated caveats and disclaimers. When you get to the point when the author correctly predicts Russia invading Ukraine it no longer even seems like a prediction.
March 22, 2020
Interesting analysis on the future of warfare in modern society pulled from the lessons of history. The ending discussion on the benefits of academic study to guide our decisions and attitudes toward conflict and war was most compelling.
May 31, 2018
it begins with truisms, declares the good of colonialism and imperialism in the distinction without a difference called hegemony, and never recovers from that insane filter.
January 4, 2020
The author presents irrefutable facts as his argument and delivers each point in the most round-about fashion. He quotes Clausewitz like a fan girl and sets Clausewitz' words up on a pedestal by which all other quoted sources are measured against and ultimately labeled as varying degrees of "Clausewitzian/un-Clausewitzian". Essentially much of his book follows the following train of thought: "this one person said this about irregular warfare but that's un-CLausewitzian and I don't agree with it and here's why". All in all, I do not recommend this book.
October 22, 2023
I enjoy reading Gray. Gray's views on future war are based on Clauswitz's central premise that war is an extension of politics. This book goes into great depth and breath on the grand future narratives, peace, cyber and space warfare—just a great read. The only problem is that he views the same views I do, which is probably why I like it.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews