Consciousness

by William G. Lycan

In this book, William Lycan defends an original theory of mind that he calls "homuncular functionalism." What is consciousness? The answer to this question has been pondered upon, grappled with, and argued about since time immemorial. There has never been an answer that achieved consensus; certainly philosophers have never agreed.In this book, William Lycan defends an original theory of mind that he calls "homuncular functionalism." He argues that human beings are "functionally organized information-processing systems" who have no non-physical parts or properties. However, Lycan also recognizes the subjective phenomenal qualities of mental states and events, and an important sense in which mind is "over and above" mere chemical matter. Along the way, Lycan reviews some diverse philosophical accounts of consciousness-including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Castañeda, among others-and demonstrates how what is valuable in each opposing view can be accommodated within his own theory. Consciousness is Lycan's most ambitious book, one that has engaged his attention for years. He handles a fascinating subject in a unique and undoubtedly controversial manner that will make this book a mainstay in the field of philosophy of mind. Consciousness, with these earlier works, is a Bradford Book.

Genres: Philosophy

Paperback

First published October 1, 1987

About the author

William G. Lycan is an American philosopher and professor emeritus at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he was formerly the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor. Since 2011, Lycan is also distinguished visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, where he continues to research, teach, and advise graduate students.

Reviews

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

A PHILOSOPHER PROPOSES A THEORY OF "HOMUNCULAR FUNCTIONALISM"

William G. Lycan (born 1945) is a professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; he has a co-appointment at the University of Connecticut. He has written other books such as 'Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction,' 'Consciousness and Experience,' 'Real Conditionals,' etc.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1987 book, "Some mental states have 'feels' or qualitative phenomenal characters... some philosophers have doubted the ability of any physicalist account of the mental to accommodate this fact. There is something it is like, or feels like, to be in pain or to hear middle C... how could the introspectible qualitative features of such states as these possibly be explained, explicated, afforded, or even allowed by a theory that reduces persons and their states [to] to motions of dull little atoms in the void? That is the main question that concerns me in this book. In answer to it I shall develop and defend the theory of mind that I call Homuncular Functionalism, arguing that the view is entirely adequate to the subjective phenomenal character of the mental and to all the facts of consciousness." (Pg. xi)

He states, "I do not believe that any version of Machine Funcationalism can succeed. Rather, I shall defend an ontology of the mental that is functionalist in a more robust sense of the term 'function' than that employed by the Machine theorist." (Pg. 8) He later explains, "'Machine Functionalism' is the view that a correct metaphysical explication of a particular mental state ... would take the form 'To be in mental state M is to realize or instantiate machine program P and to be in functional state S relative to P.'" (Pg. 30)

He admits, "Functionalism is the only positive doctrine in all of philosophy that I am prepared (if not licensed) to kill for. And I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction (some say obsessively) as fundamental to metaphysics. But I maintain that the IMPLEMENTATION of that distinction in recent philosophy of mind is both wrong and pernicious." (Pg. 37)

He argues, "if we also accept my claim that Homunctional characterizations and physiological characterizations of states of persons reflect merely different levels of abstraction within a surrounding functional hierarchy or continuum, then we can no longer distinguish the Functionalist from the Identity Theorist in any absolute way. 'Neuron,' for example, may be understood either as a physiological term... or as a (teleo-)functional term... on EITHER construal it stands for an instantiable---if you like, for a role being played by a group of more fundamental objects. Thus, even the Identity Theorist is a Functionalist---one who locates mental entities at a very low level of abstraction." (Pg. 58-59)

He states in the final chapter of the book, "Materialism, and Functionalism in particular, suggest a causal determinism regarding human thought and action, and such determinism occasions worries about both freedom of the will and the evident spontaneity of consciousness. In this chapter I shall try to allay those worries; for they are entirely groundless." (Pg. 113)

This book will be of interest---particularly to Functionalists---to anyone studying the Philosophy of Mind.