Musical Meaning and Expression by Davies, Stephen (1994) Paperback

by Stephen Davies

We talk not only of enjoying music, but of understanding it. Music is often taken to have expressive import―and in that sense to have meaning. But what does music mean, and how does it mean? Stephen Davies addresses these questions in this sophisticated and knowledgeable overview of current theories in the philosophy of music. Reviewing and criticizing the aesthetic positions of recent years, he offers a spirited explanation of his own position. Davies considers and rejects in turn the positions that music describes (like language), or depicts (like pictures), or symbolizes (in a distinctive fashion) emotions. Similarly, he resists the idea that music's expressiveness is to be explained solely as the composer's self-expression, or in terms of its power to evoke a response from the audience. Music's ability to describe emotions, he believes, is located within the music itself; it presents the aural appearance of what he calls emotion characteristics. The expressive power of music awakens emotions in the listener, and music is valued for this power although the responses are sometimes ones of sadness. Davies shows that appreciation and understanding may require more than recognition of and reaction to music's expressive character, but need not depend on formal musicological training.

Genres: Music, Research

Paperback

First published June 1, 1994

About the author

Stephen Davies is a Distinguished Professor of philosophy at the University of Auckland, New Zealand.

Reviews

[Brandt · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, philosopher Stephen Davies attempts to explain why music has meaning. When we talk about music we do not say that we only enjoy it. We also talk about music's ability to be understood or misunderstood. Sometimes music appears to speak towards deep feelings and experiences. Consequently, some music is viewed as having a content that makes these expressions available. Therefore, the driving question of this book is: what does music mean?

There is disclaimer to be warned about before attempting to read this book. If you are looking for a book that is easy to read, then this is probably not it. Davies' is a trained philosopher, and a stalwart analytic one at that. This book attempts to explain every microscopic detail about expression and meaning in music in depth. Hence, you will have to read about 238 pages about what music is not, before you finally get to what Davies' claims music is. This can be frustrating, but if you are up to the challenge, then this book can be very rewarding in the quest to understand what is wrong with all the previous theories about musical meaning.

It is important to explain that I have used the word “meaning” three times already. Like Davies, I am using this word to express the fact that I think music can and should be understood and appreciated and that it is created to be so.

Along with the preliminary question, what does music mean? Davies then branches out to ancillary questions about music viz., how could emotions be expressed in music, and are musical phrases understood as utterances about emotions? The ultimate reason for these questions is that music's expressive power has proved to be philosophically intriguing. For the remainder of this review, I will showcase two particular chapters of the book. First, I will explain chapter four to elucidate some of the arguments against meaning and expression in music. Second, I will scrutinize chapter five, where Davies' finally elicits his theory. I will first explain Davies' theory and then briefly discuss some of my further questions about it.

In chapter four, Davies clarifies a common thread in the previous chapters that there is a system that connects music and meaning through some variety of symbolization (p. 167). The theories, of the associations discussed earlier, often quarreled on whether or not symbolism can be placed within a distinctive schema for music. Davies concluded that although the previously discussed theories fell unpleasantly short of an answer, it is still implicit to presume that music has at least certain modes of meaning. It is from this preliminary argument that Davies posits the question: “How does music secure its meaning if not as a symbol?” (p. 167).

To answer the question, Davies considers two views, “the expression theory,” and “the arousal theory” respectively (pp. 174 & 187). Davies clarifies that because these theories implicate causal processing, a perspectival shift needs to take place moving away from the earlier explanation of music being “types of meaning” (p. 29). Davies reasons the intention of these theories must be investigated. This is because, “Music is inanimate, yet it expresses emotions with a power and directness indicating that it cannot be regarded merely as a symbol of emotions...” (p. 167). Ultimately, Davies aspires to demonstrate that the expression and arousal theories look at the expressiveness in the work, as opposed to its character that the symbolism theories held (p. 168).

Opening with the expression theory, Davies explains that, “expressiveness is an expression of the emotions experienced by the composer (or performer)” (pp. 168-169). The emotions elicited from the music are recognizable as those of the composer (or performer). These emotions are expressed in composing the music, and can be interpreted by the listener. Considerably, much like one can recognize someone as being sad when they are seen crying (p. 170). Davies distinguishes that there may be either a difference, or concurrence between, the composer of the music and the performer. Whereas the composer may express emotion, the performer can emphasize or structure those expressive nuances (pp. 170-171).

This account of the expressive theory has some convincing objections. Notably Davies highlights examples, such as, Stravinsky's Symphony in C, and Beethoven's Piano Concerto No. 1. In the former example, Stravinsky composed his Symphony in C during a time when both his mother and first wife had died. Stravinsky then wrote that he was, “...able to go on only by composing...” and that, “...no more than before do the parts of the Symphony written in those dark days represent an expression of my feeling or loss” (p. 172). In the latter example, the assumed “joyous” expression of Beethoven's Piano Concerto No.1 was written at a time when the composer was experiencing severe gastroenteritis (p. 172). In both of these authoritative examples, it seems that the expression theory of musical meaning, as a comprehensive explanation, may be erroneous.

Davies attends to these issues by improving what he deems the “crude” theory of expression and augmenting it with his “Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Expressions of Emotion” (p. 173). With this amended theory, Davies articulates that primary emotions have characteristics that are representative of the emotion expressed. As an example, “Sobbing...is a primary expression of sadness and like emotional states” (p. 173). Davies then associates the primary emotions as possibly involving the earlier expressed types of symbolic meaning viz., “B or C as meaning A” (p. 174).

Davies then depicts secondary emotions as, “...behavior that issues from the emotions felt, yet that could not be seen as expressive by someone who was not already aware of the agent's [performer/composer] intentions or circumstances” (p. 175). The typical modus operandi of the secondary emotions is intentional; nevertheless, this is not always the situation (p. 175). As an example, a person can throw himself or herself into drawing a picture at a time when they are experiencing intense grief. The act of drawing the picture would be seen as an expression of either circumventing or dealing with that grief. The undertaking of drawing could also be understood as creating a picture that represents his or her moment of grief or, using the act of drawing to provide the grief time to diminish. All of these would be ways of expressing the grief the person experienced; nonetheless, we would not generally consider the picture created to be, in itself, expressive of the person's grief. The “grief would be expressed through, rather than in,” the picture. Accordingly, the persons drawing of a picture would not be grief itself (p. 176).

The tertiary expressions diverge from secondary expressions in that they are contingent on the use of “conventions and rituals” (p. 176). Using the preceding example of someone drawing a picture, if a person was to dedicate the picture to the reason for their grief, then, it would be a tertiary conventional expression. Hence, the expressiveness of the picture is forwarded in a way that precludes a secondary expression (p. 176). Davies deduces that, in the expression theory, music can be used to express feelings. However, as seen through the examples of Stravinsky, Beethoven, and the grief stricken artist, there is nothing to indicate that this is the circumstance (p. 184).

Davies then moves on to explain the view known as the arousal theory. This theory indicates that the expressiveness of music, “...consists on the work's evoking that [the emotion aimed at by the performer (or conductor)] emotion in the listener” (p. 184). Thus, music would be sad if it also makes the listener of the music sad. The formulation that Davies works out for this theory is “M [music] is E [an emotion] = M evokes E in L [the listener]” (p. 185).

The enigma inherent in the arousal theory of music, and one that Davies also points out, is that it is grounded on subjective experience. There can be a general concurrence of the experience between various listeners that reveal the music as sad. Thus, the listener's subjectivity is only a dispositional property contingent on concurrence to be accurate (p. 185). Davies then endeavors to solve this problem by amending the formula of the arousal theory to declaim:

M [music] is E [an emotion] = M evokes E in L [the listener] in virtue of its possessing properties a, b, c (properties that might be specified in musically technical terms without reference to E) (p. 187).

Still, this amended formulation does not conquer the conundrum of either distracted listeners, or listeners that fail to be aroused by the music. Subsequently, Davies must alter the arousal theory further. Now the amended arousal theory is,

M is E = M tends to evoke E in L, given that L attends to the music in the absence of factors that inhibit or interfere with L's emotional response to M.

This leads to a modal definition:

M is E = M would evoke E in an L attending to the music in the appropriate manner unless the tendency for M to evoke E in L were thwarted or prevented by [a list of inhibiting or interfering factors] (p. 189).

Davies conclusion, and one that I agree with, is that the arousal theory, even with his own modified definition, still does not encompass a way to account for the expressiveness of music (p. 189).

Consequently, both the arousal and expression theories of music surmise that all emotions are expressed by the music and must be expressions of emotions are mistaken. The arousal theory attempts to locate the expression in the listener, whereas the expression theory attempts the same in the composer. Therefore, if the music embodies the emotion purportedly expressed, then the emotion cannot be experienced. This is the precise opposite of what both of the theories are striving to prove (p. 199).

It is difficult to add too much more to this conclusion. The only thing I can add, with certainty, is that I think Davies has over-elaborated his defense. Through just the few examples mentioned in this essay, it is apparent that neither the expression nor the arousal theory can independently, or jointly, incorporate an all-inclusive understanding of the feelings present in the composer and the listener.

In chapter five, Davies rationalizes that all of the suppositions in the previous chapters were “negative ones” (p. 201). Circumspectly pointing out the previous arguments made, Davies justifies that music,

1. “Is not usefully compared to a natural language with respect to its meaning.
2. Does not “...comprise a special, nondiscursive symbol system aiming at denotation.”
3. Does not have depictive content like there is in representational paintings.
4. Does not explain the content heard, felt, and vented by composers. Even if, when composing, the composers might express emotion.
5. Its expressiveness does not “...consist[s] in its power to move the listener, even if listeners are sometimes moved by... [it]” (p. 201).

Thus, in all the previous theories, the locations of significance in the music falls outside of, “the boundaries of the musical work,” and are “something referred to, or denoted, or symbolized, or depicted, or vented, or aroused” (p. 201).

Davies now focuses on theories in which the location of significance in the music is internalized as an intrinsic property (p. 201). Davies first undertakes the conception that, “emotions expressed in music are sui generis” (p. 201). The hindrance with approaching music this way is that it denies a need, and presupposes the failure, of music to be evaluated. The music just is. Davies then opposes the theory of emotions being expressed in music itself with the theory that, “emotions are not expressed in music” (p. 203). This theory relies on the perception that music is incapable of representing its own thoughts, and that feelings in re contain thoughts. Davies expresses some interest in this theory, and thinks it can be reinforced, if music only expresses “a purely musical beauty” (p. 212).

Nevertheless, unswerving with his ceaseless requirement to analyze everything, Davies declares that the “emotions are not expressed in music” theory rests on an evaluation of possible counterclaims to the operative clause of the argument that feelings in re contain thoughts. Davies then submits many of the counterclaims. Specifically,

1. Emotions, and like states, are not always “directed at emotional objects.”
2. “Some emotions might be individuable in terms of the feeling tone, or pattern of feeling tone, that is partly constitutive of their nature.
3. The behaviors that give expression to emotions might, themselves, be individuable (pp. 213-219).

The assumption is that, moods, emotions “or feelings do not take objects, and do not involve beliefs or make-beliefs about such objects” (pp. 213-219). Hence, everything that has just been discussed are circumstances where emotion can only be expressed if felt (pp. 213-219). No matter how much of an argument is concocted, sentient beings – and not music – experience moods and emotions.

Throughout the remainder of the chapter, Davies explores some other prominent attributes of the expression of emotion in music viz., “emotion characteristics in appearances,” and music being experienced as movement (pp. 221-229). For succinctness, I will point out that Davies will finally present his overall theory after considering all the others.

Davies theory – his actual theory – finally, is this:

In the first and basic case, music is expressive by presenting not instances of emotions but emotion characteristics in appearances. Our experience of musical works and, in particular, of motion in music is like our experience of the kinds of behavior which, in human beings, gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearance (p. 239).

In this theory, it can be ascertained, that Davies has appropriated some of the hitherto mentioned portions of other theories. Primarily, Davies drew from the earlier theory that, “emotions are not expressed in music,” to explain that to be sustained, music only needs to express “a purely musical beauty” (pp. 203 & 212). Furthermore, Davies focused on the concepts of “motion in music” by supporting his earlier claim that, “If many familiar kinds of movement do not involve change in location...musical motions will be neither unusual nor mysterious” (p. 235). Lastly, Davies connects this to his presentation of secondary emotions in chapter four that states, “...behavior that issues from the emotions felt, yet that could not be seen as expressive by someone who was not already aware of the agent's [performer/composer] intentions or circumstances,” still allow for an experience of emotions (p. 175).

Now that Davies theory is explained and understood, I can express my estimation on whether or not I agree with it. It is difficult to disagree with Davies. The systematic explanation of previous theories of music, and the conclusions that Davies derives, lead me to concur with many of his grounds. However, some thought-provoking details do need supplementary explanation.

Davies expounds the similarities between His and Peter Kivy's versions of the theory. One significant segment of this that connects with Davies theory that, “music is expressive by presenting not instances of emotions but emotion characteristics in appearances,” is the rationalization that we incline to “animate the things we perceive” (pp. 239 & 241). I think that Davies under-represents this imperative factor described in Kivy's theory. Given the appropriate analysis, this would help explain why music is occasionally talked about as something that has feelings, thoughts, and emotions. This abnormality of human psychology absolutely reinforces Davies' theory.

Also, there is an aversion to Davies' approach that I think is best explained within the context of Claire Detels' essay, “Autonomist/Formalist Aesthetics, Music Theory, and Soft Boundaries,” in Musical Worlds. In the Essay, Detels' explains that some musical theories present “underlying autonomist/formalist assumptions” (p. 150). When analyzing theories of music, there is a tendency to consider the music as separate works. This leads to a isolation of the musical works from their socio-historical context. Moreover, the autonomist's/formalist's tend to consider “universal, or at least normative, standards of value with which musical works can be judged and compared” (p. 150).

In essence, this is the same aversion that I have to Davies' theory. Davies presents his theory as being reasonable, yet I think it would fail to stand up to a test of the trans-cultural and trans-historical evidence. In many respects, this is the same line of argumentation that Lydia Goehr presented in Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music. As different or apparently reasonable as Davies theory is presented, he has in fact, propagated a centrifugal culmination of data and over-analytic procedures that force the exclusion of alternative factors. In many respects, Davies argument in support of his theory works in a fashion of circularity. There are claims made, augmented, dismissed, and then re-instantiated as if they are something new, and fresh. Thus, the theory points to the only possibility is that Davies theory is universally correct.

In conclusion, I concur with much of what Davies has submitted. I do consider the idea of expressiveness as a considerable aspect of a work of music. However, I also assume that if a listener is incapable of comprehending or recognizing what is being expressed in a particular piece of music, then the listener should focus on understanding the musical expression. Therefore, music can be appreciated, and the expression felt (by the listener), and the meaning understood. All this requires is for the listener to pay attention.

[Zachary · Rating 5 out of 5]

Stephen Davies has written an extraordinary work exploring the nature of meaning (and apprehension of that meaning) in music. In some aspects, I’m sure there are many who might ask what the point of such a book as this might be. For some of the issues he delves into might seem trivial, at least at places. In other spots some of the philosophical (as well as musically philosophical) points seem to almost split hairs. But this is strategic because Davies is striving to be as comprehensive as he can be within the specific areas he is attempting to interact.

I found his approach to be fascinating, in that he tends to outline an argument and then work through his problems with that argument. Then he will raise the perspective of another person, possibly against the previous perspective, but sometimes this second individual’s approach could be similar, but nuanced differently. Then Davies proceeds to pick this perspective or claim/argument apart as well. Then he might present another perspective or two utilizing the same technique. Finally he will present his perspective that he has been alluding to all along. As an aspiring philosopher and theologian, his engagement with the claims of other scholars is thorough and an example how to argue well. But I suspect many will become frustrated because it can get rather tedious in places.

Why do I note this? Because this book is not for everyone. I think Chapters 5 and 6 contain the core of his argument, but he does build off the foundation he lays in the first four chapters. This book seems aimed directly at music scholars as well as philosophers who deal with art and artistry. Often the reading is laborious. I would argue that this book is aimed squarely at academics and scholars and would suggest most others to stay away from it—or just read the fifth and sixth chapter.

Did I enjoy it? Yep, sure did. But it has some key concepts I’ll be utilizing in a dissertation before long, so it was an important and necessary read for me. So, if you’re one who wants to dive into some deeper reading and thinking in regards to music and what it means and how it means, then this is the book for you.

[Lance Grabmiller · Rating 2 out of 5]

Some of the driest of philosophy is thorough to the point of being repetitive and this is as dry as a bone.

[Rory Armstrong · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Goodreads review by Brandt covers it well.
A difficult but worthwhile read.