Tecumseh's War: The Epic Conflict for the Heart of America

by Donald R. Hickey

The Shawnee chief and warrior Tecumseh came to prominence leading an Indigenous alliance against the United States in a war waged from 1811 to 1815. In 1805, Tecumseh’s younger brother Lalawethika (soon to take the name Tenskwatawa) had had a vision for an Indian revitalization movement that would restore native culture and resist American expansion. The movement was timely because President Thomas Jefferson’s “Hammer” in the West, William Henry Harrison, was in the midst of imposing treaties on the Indians that by 1809 would compel them to surrender more than 70,000 square miles of territory in the Old Northwest and beyond the Mississippi River. Tenskwatawa’s revitalization movement drew support from Indigenous peoples across the Old Northwest and into the Great Plains, and having become the most powerful spiritual leader in the region, he was now referred to as “The Prophet.” 
           
 To counter American expansion, Tecumseh organized the movement’s followers into a powerful political and military alliance. While Tecumseh was away recruiting Southeast tribes to his confederacy, war with the United States erupted. On November 6, 1811, Harrison, determined to smash the confederacy, camped an army near the center of Native resistance at Prophetstown in present-day northwestern Indiana. In what came to be known as the Battle of Tippecanoe, Harrison’s men fought off an Indian attack the next day and then razed Prophetstown. Seven months later, when the United States declared war on Britain, thus initiating the War of 1812, the British and Tecumseh forged an alliance against the United States. Initially, the alliance enjoyed considerable success, forcing the surrender of US forces at Mackinac, Chicago, Detroit, and present-day Monroe, Michigan. These losses, coupled with the slaughter of Americans on the River Raisin and elsewhere in the West, inflamed settlers throughout the region. 
            
The tide in the war began to turn in mid-1813, and in the wake of Commodore Oliver H. Perry’s spectacular victory on Lake Erie in September, Harrison invaded Canada. With “Remember the Raisin!” as their battle cry, Harrison’s men defeated an Anglo-Indian force in the climactic Battle of the Thames. Tecumseh was killed in that battle, and although his confederacy disintegrated, British support ensured that the Indian war would continue. Tecumseh’s War ended only in 1815 after the British made peace with the United States and abandoned their native allies. This left the Indians with little choice but to make their own peace, and thereafter they were at the mercy of the United States. 
            
Tecumseh’s War: The Epic Conflict for the Heart  of America  by distinguished historian Donald R. Hickey is the sweeping and engrossing story of this last great Indian war—the last time that Native Americans had a powerful European ally to oppose United States expansion and thus the last chance they had of shaping the future of the continent. 

Genres: History

544 pages, Hardcover

First published October 16, 2023

About the author

Don Hickey is a professor of history emeritus at Wayne State College. He earned his B.A. in 1966, his M.A. in 1968, and his Ph.D. in 1972 from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

During the first decade of the 19th century, land-hungry Americans flooded over the Appalachian Mountains to settle in the Great Lakes region of North America. As they spread out to farm the territory that would become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois, increasingly they came into conflict with the tens of thousands of Native Americans who inhabited the region, many of whom had already been displaced by previous waves of American settlement. In response, Tecumseh, one of the chiefs of the Shawnee people, sought to organize a confederation capable of resisting the colonization efforts of the United States. Alarmed by the growth of his movement, American forces under the command of William Henry Harrison launched a preemptive strike against the confederacy, sparking a war that would end in Tecumseh’s death and the end of his hopes for a coordinated effort capable of halting American expansion.

Despite the fact that the opening battles took place seven months before the United States’s declaration of war against Great Britain, Tecumseh’s War is often treated as just a part of the War of 1812 into which it was subsumed. One of the many merits of Donald Hickey’s fine book is his presentation of it as a distinct conflict in which the war between the United States and Britain was a backdrop. While not neglecting its relationship between the two, his focus allows him to give the causes, events, and legacy of Tecumseh’s War the attention they deserve. In doing so, he not only provides a careful account of the local factors that led to the outbreak of fighting in the Old Northwest, but their impact on the history of both the region and the nation overall – one that is arguably greater than the larger war with which it is associated.

Doing so requires Hickey to delve both into federal Indian policy and the response of the tribes in the region. As he notes, Thomas Jefferson strongly supported efforts to expropriate land from the Native Americans, claiming that such lands were an obstacle towards their assimilation into American civilization. To carry out these policies, he turned to William Henry Harrison, a career army officer who, as governor of Indiana Territory, signed a dozen treaties between 1803 and 1809 expropriating from the tribes in the region thousands of square miles of territory. The growing discontent among the Natives with the loss of territory ensured their receptivity towards the message spread by Lalawethika, Tecumseh’s brother. Previously a drunken loudmouth, a vision he experienced in 1805 led Lalawethika to renounce alcohol and refashion himself as the “Prophet” of a new religion that called for the purging of American settlers. His message found a receptive audience, and spread rapidly throughout the region.

Among the Prophet’s supporters was Tecumseh, a warrior respected by friends and enemies alike for his leadership abilities and organizational skills. Though Hickey is doubtful that Tecumseh ever joined the movement, the partnership between him and his brother proved a mutually beneficial one. Such was the growth of their movement that by 1808 Harrison was increasingly convinced that an armed confrontation was inevitable. Alarmed by the growing concentration of the movement’s followers at Prophetstown in northwestern Indiana, in the fall of 1811 Harrison took advantage of Tecumseh’s absence on a recruitment trip to the south to lead an expedition to destroy the settlement. It was while Harrison’s forces were camped near the Tippecanoe River that the Prophet’s forces launched an attack, one that took Harrison’s men by surprise but was ultimately driven off. Hickey is critical of the decision to attack, noting that its failure discredited the Prophet’s leadership and set back Tecumseh’s efforts to build an inter-Native confederacy among the tribes in the trans-Appalachian West.

Though a lull followed the battle of Tippecanoe, Native opposition to American expansion remained undiminished. Tecumseh’s efforts received an unexpected boost the following year when the increasing tensions with the United States led British officials to extend support for his confederacy. Here Hickey connects the war between the United States and Tecumseh’s forces with the broader conflict with the British, showing how the two merged together with the American declaration of hostilities. His formidable knowledge of the War of 1812 is on full display in these pages, providing a perspective that encompasses the national and even global implications of the events unfolding in the wilderness of the Old Northwest. Even with this, however, his focus throughout remains squarely on the region, covering in detail how the conflict played out once the British intervened.

Buoyed by British support, the confederacy scored some notable successes, particularly at the battle of Frenchtown and with the capture of Fort Dearborn. Yet broader factors told against them. As Hickey notes, while Americans often suffered greater losses in their battles, they were far better able to absorb them than their opponents. The Indians’ aversion to casualties meant that such setbacks took a greater toll on their morale, which was vital for sustaining the confederacy’s war effort. Though the British appreciated the contribution by the Native forces and provided important logistical assistance, their continuing support for the confederacy was always dependent on whether supplying it served British goals – and with the foremost British goal of the war being to end it as speedily as possible, sacrificing the confederacy ultimately proved to be a matter of if rather than when.

Thus, while the British discussed the idea of creating an Indian barrier state that would serve as a buffer between the United States and British Canada, it was never made a condition for ending the war. Even if it had been, Hickey judges it unlikely that either the United States would have ever agreed to the evacuation of American settlers required under some of the proposals, or that such a state could have survived subsequent encroachment. These factors all suggest that any victory by Tecumseh's confederacy in what Hickey labels “the last great Indian war in North America” was doomed to be a fleeting one at best. It lends a particularly tragic tone to his book, making it an account not just of one of America’s most famous “Indian wars,” but the end of an era in which resisting the tide of westward expansion still seemed possible for Native Americans. In recounting that effort, Hickey has made a valuable contribution to understanding this underappreciated turning point in American history, one that should be read by everyone interested in the subject.

[Christopher Lutz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential reading on the subject. Brings a new perspective that feels even more complete as the entire war the United States fought with the native tribes in the 1810’s is covered, where most other works only briefly mention the years after Tecumseh’s death if at all.

[zidayin · Rating 3 out of 5]

read for history 404.

i think this is a great entry point for anyone who wants to learn a little bit about the development of native americans and american relationships. it’s a nice, easy, and fairly quick read with short chapters. these digestible chapters help establish great context and provides good insight into the leaders on both sides if the war. it’s an easy, fairly light read. don’t let the page count scare you, it goes by quicker than you think.

however…

i do think hickey applies somewhat of a racial binary on the native americans. he lacks giving greater native and american relations context (little turtle’s war, for example). he doesn’t spend the time to differentiate between native cultures and tribes.

similarly, i think his claim that this was the last chance for natives to fight against the americans thanks to the aid of the british isn’t very strong. at the beginning of tecumseh’s war and the war of 1812, the british need the natives to advance. british aid isn’t really impactful until the tide turns, and the americans start to dominate the war. aid and support that the british aren’t afraid to recall in place of an easier negotiation for peace. to say that this was the natives’ last chance seems more like a counterfactual argument.

[Aiden M. G. Grimes · Rating 3 out of 5]

Donald Hickey’s Tecumseh’s War: The Epic Conflict for the Heart of America raises the argument that the last important war between the American Indians and the colonial Americans was the war campaign led by Tecumseh, a well-recognized Shawnee military leader from the Ohio territory. Throughout the course of the book, Hickey attempts to remove Tecumseh’s War from the War of 1812, and connects the war to the end of an era in which the American Indians could properly defend their grounds from American colonists in a post-Revolution age. Furthermore, Hickey claims that Tecumseh was the last cohesive element of a Pan-American Indian coalition against the United States, oftentimes implying or explicitly stating that other American Indian leaders of the time had abandoned or lost hopes in their attempts to defend a separated American Indian society. Despite his well-rounded argument, Hickey fails to uphold his thesis throughout the book, focusing more on the perspective of William Henry Harrison than the American Indians, struggling to separate Tecumseh’s War from the War of 1812 despite one of the major pillars of his argument claiming otherwise, and failing to properly refute counterarguments that the American Indians were already losing an uphill battle against colonialism in general.
Going off the title alone, Hickey already misleads the audience into believing that his book will focus solely on Tecumseh and the American Indian approach to the war, but reading any further than the first couple of chapters will have most historians disappointed. Apart from the exposition of the war, the Battle of the Thames, and the few instances scattered between dozens of pages about the Americans, Canadians, and the English, Hickey provides miniscule accounts of Tecumseh at all throughout the war. This is not to say that Tecumseh was irrelevant to these battles and conflicts, but Hickey should have clarified that his argument was mostly going to focus on the perception of Tecumseh rather than the exact words and feelings of Tecumseh himself. Despite this, Hickey avoids telling the audience that much of the information that he presents about Tecumseh is hearsay, which is extremely misleading, especially for a book written with the intended audience being other historians and historians-to-be.
Hickey acknowledges that much of the history of Tecumseh is contested, but fails to notify the reader in a direct manner. For instance, Hickey mentions that Tecumseh could have traces of European heritage in his family due to his lighter-than-average complexion, but does not go into any explanation as to where this claim originates. While he does further discuss this matter in a note in the back, claiming that a prior relative to Tecumseh claimed a possible European heritage, Hickey does not mention this any further in the actual reading of the book. Such an omission is understandable if the point was moot to Hickey’s claim, but Hickey explains that this mixed complexion was acknowledged and sometimes interpreted by American colonists as a point of relation when speaking to or of Tecumseh. If Hickey elaborated where the idea of Tecumseh’s mixed heritage originated, then it would make much more sense in the context of the book. Hickey also does this with Tecumseh’s portrait; except he fails to mention that Tecumseh’s portrait was painted posthumously. This similar approach is carried out throughout the book, with many of the accounts of Tecumseh originating from third-parties with oftentimes little connections to Tecumseh himself, but Hickey typically attributes future accounts to their respective source.
Instead of focusing on Tecumseh, Hickey relies on retelling much of Tecumseh's War through the account of William Henry Harrison, the governor of the Indiana territory. Overall, Harrison provides a fairly well-detailed account of the warfare between the Americans, English, and American Indians, but the extensive usage of Harrison and other Americans like William Hull and Lewis Cass to describe a war supposedly formulated and executed by Tecumseh appears as misleading. Hickey does provide some quotes from Tecumseh in response to British generals throughout the war, but such are far and few between compared to the quotes Hickey relies on from British generals themselves, raising the concern of whether the war was truly as oriented around Tecumseh as Hickey claims.
Beyond Tecumseh as an individual, Hickey fails to provide enough rebuttals to claim that Tecumseh’s War was separate from the War of 1812. One point that Hickey makes at the beginning of the book is that Tecumseh’s War was inherently different from the War of 1812 because it was the last set of battles in which the English could partially rely on the American Indians for support against the Americans colonists, thus making the two wars different as the combatants in-question had changed and the British policy had transformed to eliminate American Indians from the question of an American containment. However, there are two points that Hickey acknowledges and fails to properly refute that devastates his argument. The first point is that Hickey recognizes in his own argument that the threat of the English needed to exist throughout all conflicts in order for such to be a war against the United States. While there are some distinctions between the American Indians and the English as peoples and threats to the United States, the conflicts that occurred throughout both wars were, for the most part, English-led and Indian-assisted. Hickey acknowledges this issue, but does not entertain the counter, weakening his argument.
The other point of Hickey’s argument that falls flat is Hickey’s inability to differentiate the American Indians as English-allied combatants of the War of 1812 rather than their own force against the Americans in Tecumseh’s War. While there are certainly differences in motives, with the American-Indians supporting any way to hold back American westward conquests while the English sought to control the American states from international influence through economic embargos and impressment, Hickey spends too much time overlapping the American Indians with the English that these motives are ironically lost throughout his book, watering down the potency of Hickey’s claims.
These two subpoints roll into the next issue of Hickey’s argument, which is his inability to prove that Tecumseh was some form of swan song for the American Indians, as many high-ranking indigenous leaders were already bracing for the full effects of a forced co-existence between a superior American colonial power and a coerced indigenous group. Throughout his argument, Hickey recognizes that other prolific American Indians, such as Little Turtle and Black Hoof, turned towards the American cause after failures to heed the colonial expansion westward from the east coast, but never allows their stances to be held to the same weight as Tecumseh. Diluting the importance of such secession by former leaders from the American Indian cause without a rebuttal is counterintuitive to Hickey’s claim, and further reduces Tecumseh’s importance to standing up against the United States.
Tecumseh’s War: The Epic Conflict for the Heart of America is a well-written book that gives an excellent account of what happened throughout the earlier years of the War of 1812, but Hickey’s arguments about Tecumseh, the differentiation between Tecumseh’s War and the War of 1812, and the general American Indian decline prior to Tecumseh’s uprising are not supported enough to sustain over 400 pages of reading.

[Fred Baerkircher · Rating 3 out of 5]

I know it's about the war, but there's barely anything in this book about Tecumseh. It's very much the war from William Henry Harrison's perspective. Also, it's mostly a rote recounting of battles, with little about any social context or analysis.