AN ACCOUNT OF THE KIDNAPPINGS, BOKO HARAM, AND NIGERIA
Novelist Helon Habila wrote in this 2016 book, “Checkpoints, or roadblocks … are a regular feature of road travel in Nigeria. Nigerians have become resigned to them the way they are resigned to the lack or reliable electricity or running water… in reality they are nothing but extortion points. They have become a place where you paid your taxes at gunpoint, fully knowing the taxes would not get to the state coffers but into private pockets… In Borno and Yobe states, the epicenter of Boko Haram insurgency, there were roadblocks about every two-mile interval.” (Pg. 18-19)
He explains, “At the height of its power, Boko Haram controlled over 70 percent of Borno State and many other areas in neighboring states. With the annexing of towns and villages, the group’s ambition had expanded: It was now intent on establishing a Caliphate, ISIS style… the group made rapid advances, routing the military in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. By 2015, it controlled twenty out of the twenty-seven local government areas in Borno state. The emir of Gwoza, one of the major emirates in Borno State, was killed by the sect.” (Pg. 27)
Of the Chibok kidnappings, he recounts, “the girls were simply taken. As the government troops pushed Boko Haram further into the forest, ransom payments became an easier way to raise money, and kidnappings had already become more frequent. Boko Haram fighters also needed children and older women to cook and clean for them, and the younger women became ‘wives’---sex slaves and mothers to the next generation of fighters. Men too old to be conscripted were simply lined up against the wall and shot. Chibok became the most symbolic of all the kidnappings, especially because the girls were under the care of the government when they were taken. The was against Boko Haram would never be won until the victims were at least accounted for.” (Pg. 28-29)
An Imam points out, “The only thing is it okay to kill are animals, and only for food… How then can you kill a man, who is just like you… who had done nothing to you… how can you question his existence, or even kill him? In Islam, any man who kills another man, with no just cause, he should also be killed. They now even kill other Muslims, they throw bombs in mosques while people are praying. Islam doesn’t sanction that. This is just a sect with its own doctrine and its own way of thinking, but it is not Islam.” (Pg. 56)
The author recalls, “But this wasn’t only happening in Islam. Christianity too was changing, even if not as violently. A frenzy of charismatic Christianity had taken hold in the southern cities… Coincidentally… this was a time when our sales were dropping drastically, As the economy declined, and corruption became more rampant, people sought answers in religion. But an irrational reliance on religion, instead of giving the people peace and comfort, only mad them less tolerant and more desperate.” (Pg. 60)
He notes, “the 1970s was a period which most Nigerians old enough to remember would perhaps regard and the country’s golden era. The civil war had ended and the country entered its oil boom years… Kleptomancy hadn’t yet taken root as a principle of governance. The specter of unemployment and youth restlessness had not yet reared its head. Education from primary school to university level was free for all Nigerians… Every graduate was assured of a job. This was also the time when Nigeria missed the chance to establish a solid foundation for its economic future through industrialization. The government wasted money on mismanaged expenditures…. The ‘cornering’ of state money and privilege for personal use became the norm. Ethnic and religious divisions, used so successfully by the British during the colonial era to divide and rule, resurfaced… A once vibrant middle class of civil servants, entrepreneurs, and university professors, trained by the British, would be gradually decimated and sent into exile … by successive military dictatorships.” (Pg. 68-69)
He explains, “Apart from disgust with corruption and disaffection with the political system, the Kannama group was also disenchanted with Muslim leaders’ tolerance of the status quo. They wanted change, not only in politics, but in religion as well… To the Kannama group, there was not coexistence between state and religion. The state and its institutions were Western… inventions, and whatever came from the West must have Judeo-Christian provenance, and so must be rejected in favor of sharia. True Islamic reform would require an overturning and overhauling of all institutions of British-inspired government.” (Pg. 82-83)
He concludes, “many Boko Haram members, who were ordinary boys in dirty shirts… shooting at whatever they were told to shoot by their handlers... Like most things in life, it all came down to chance, opportunity, and desperation.” (Pg. 110)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the Chibok kidnappings, Boko Haram, and Nigeria.